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ABSTRACT: 
This is a study of American attitudes towards Hungary during the First World War. 
The focus is on the American images of Hungary and of key Hungarian politicians, such as 
Tisza, Apponyi, Andrassy and Karolyi. The opinions of President Wilson are given special 
attention both before and during the war. Other prominent Americans discussed include 
Theodore Roosevelt, various members of Wilson's cabinet (Lansing, Baker, Daniels) as well 
as his private advisors (Colonel House, Creel, the Inquiry), his Ambassadors (Penfield, Gerard, 
Stovall) and American intelligence agents. A second set of opinions has been obtained from 
dismemberment propaganda in America and from the survey of various American daily and 
weekly newspapers and the Hungarian·American press. 
Another major theme is the re·evaluation of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy, which was 
prompted by new developments in Wilson research on the one hand and by many observa· 
tions during my studies on the other. It is argued that claims that lansing, dismemberment 
propaganda and separatist politicians from the Habsburg Monarchy decided Wilson's actions 
do not hold water: the President made his decisions alone in the Habsburg case in response. 
to a series of events between April and June 1918. It is also pointed out that despite the 
growing American involvement in the war the prewar lack of interest in· Hungary was 
maintained, although the romanticized concept based upon the Kossuth· myth was replaced 
by another extreme interpretation based upon dismemberment propaganda. The fact that no, 
American authority decided to obtain a genuine picture of early twentieth century Hungary 
meant that American policies were based upon cliches and misconceptions, which were also 
carried into the Peace Conference period. Another thing to remember is the fact that 
Hungary was part of the Austro·Hungarian Empire during the First World War, which ruled 
out a separate Hungarian policy on the part of the Wilson administration. To get around this 
awkward situation the focus of the thesis is constantly shifted between Hungary and the 
Monarchy, with concentrating on Hungary when and where possible .. 
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In 1989, Professor Zsuzsa l. Nagy of the Institute of History of the Hungarian 
Academy called my attention to the fact that American policies towards Hungary during the 
Paris Peace Conference have practically been neglected. On her suggestion, I wrote my first 
serious piece on the United States and the Treaty of Trianon. While doing so I discovered 
that nothing has ever been written about wartime American attitudes and policies towards 
Hungary: I found no assessment of the American press dealing with Hungary, nor a single 
account of dismemberment propaganda in the New World; there is no evaluation of the work 
of the American embassy in Vienna and of its reports on Hungary, nor of the attitudes of 
Wilson and his official and unofficial advisors. Clearly, there is a gap here, and the examina· 
tion of these issues forms the backbone of my dissertation. 
The dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy at the end of the Great War has been 
discussed from a variety of viewpoints. Valiani (1973) has done it with a focus on Italy, 
Calder (1976) and Goldstein (1991) with concentration on the British Empire. Ferenc Fejto, , 
in his award winning book (1990), presented the French attitude. Kann (1964) chose the ~ 
point of view of the nationalities and the inner frailties of the Monarchy as his starting 
point, while Sikl6s (1987) is a fairly recent study in Hungarian. A number of other general 
studies include Zeman (1961) and Crankshaw (1963). May (1966) is the first major general 
study that devotes considerable attention to the policies of the Wilson administration. 
However, these works carry only occasional references to the American contribution 
to the Allied war effort against Austria-Hungary; discussions of Wilson's East-Central 
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European policies are few and far between. The classic and still standard study was written 
back in 1957 by Victor S. Mamatey, son of Albert P. Mamatey, who served as the president 
of the Slovak league in America during the First World War. A similarly valuable account of 
lansing's policies was written by George Barany in 1966. An unpublished dissertation (1958) 
by Gerald H. Davis is the only comprehensive account of American·Austro-Hungarian relations 
until the end of 1917, while May (1957) covers the same period, albeit with a much wider 
focus. 
American attitudes and policies towards the various East-Central European nationali· 
ties have been discussed in more detail. These writings include Gerson's classic study of the 
making of an independent Poland (1953), the works of Josef Kalvoda (1986), D. Perman 
(1962) and Betty M. Unterberger (1989) on the Czechs and Slovaks, Prpi~'s (1967), lede· 
rer's (1963) and Zivojinovi6's (1972) writings about the South Slavs, and Devasia's unpub-
lished thesis (1970) on the Rumanians. These accounts carry some superficial references to ' 
Hungary, as well as to policies and attitudes towards Hungary, but the definitive study is 
yet to be written. The aim of the present work is to fill in this intriguing gap both in East-
Central European and in American historical writing, as well as to offer a different and 
updated version of Wilson's policies towards the Danubian basin. 
And although further historiographical details and considerations will be offered in . 
each chapter, it is perhaps not entirely inappropriate here to introduce the two main ' 
interpretations of how the Allies came to support the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. 
According to Calder (1976), as the war dragged on, the Allies had to rely more and more 
heavily upon the military services of the Poles, Czechs; South Slavs, etc. In return, they 
made seemingly minor concessions which in the end added up to supporting dismemberment· 
• without openly stating it before the spring and summer of 1918. This he calls 'commitment 
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by implication.' An alternative view is presented by Zeman (1961), who argues that the 
eventual Allied decision to break up Austria-Hungary was made in response to the ever· 
changing social, political, military and diplomatic realities of the war. While Calder's doctrine 
of 'commitment by implication' describes the policies of the Allies most accurately, it does 
not fit the Americans. As we will see, it is Zeman's interpretation that suits best the policies 
of Wilson, with the restriction that it does not apply to the Allies. Mamatey (1957) takes 
a position somewhere in between, while Unterberger (1989) attaches too much significance 
to the contributions of the Czechs and Slovaks. 
* * * 
Before presenting my arguments and findings, it is necessary to clarify certain 
aspects of the problem at hand. This is a study of American attitudes and policies towards 
Austria-Hungary and Hungary during the First World War. But it is not a dismemberment 
study, inasmuch as the focus of attention is continuously narrowed to Hungary. Furthermore, 
issues which are part of the process of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy but 
are not directly related to American policies towards Hungary (Le. the future of Poland and 
the Italians of Austria-Hungary) receive only limited attention. It is not a study of World War 
One diplomacy and war aims, either: international relations, (including war aims and secret 
peace talks) are discussed only within the framework of American policies and attitudes 
towards Hungary. The above restrictions have been included and emphasized because I do 
not feel fully qualified to write a complete dismemberment study after only some six years 
of research. 
The problem that is most likely to have kept historians from dealing with US-Hungari· 
an relations is the seemingly difficult task of separating the Austro-Hungarian and Hungarian 
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aspects of the whole issue. This problem is best summed up as follows: although there was 
no independent Hungary, there was an American policy towards her during the Great War, 
albeit only through the prism of the Habsburg Monarchy. Therefore, if one wants to analyze 
American attitudes and policies towards Hungary, one also has to look at the Monarchy. 
What makes the case of Hungary still different from those of the Czechs, Slovaks, South 
Slavs, etc., is Hungary's special position within the Habsburg Monarchy between 1867 and 
1918. 
The Compromise of 1867 (the Ausgleich) between Austria and Hungary created a 
special constitutional system called 'dualism' and laid out the actual nature and details of . 
the relationship between the two countries. Austria and Hungary became (supposedly) equal . 
partners with a common sovereign (the Emperor Francis Joseph, until his death in 1916) and, 
with common foreign and military affairs. This actually meant that Hungary enjoyed full 
autonomy within the Habsburg Monarchy but had no right to a national army or to an 
independent foreign policy. Consequently, Hungarian political life was divided between those 
who supported the dualist system and those who called for fuller independence by embracing 
the tradition of 1848. Those who opposed the dualist system (including. Count Albert 
Apponyi) came to power between 1906-09 .- but failed to break away from Vienna. Appar-
ently, by the coming of the World War, 'Kossuth's Hungary' had settled for a most favoured 
position within the realm of the Habsburgs. 
Because of Hungary's special position in the Monarchy, the US had an image of 
, • ..,.$ 
Hungar~ in a way she did not have of any other nationality living within Austria-Hungary. 
However, as we will see later, this image was not based upon current political and interna-
tional realities; instead, these more often than not were simply overlooked. That notwith-
standing, American attitudes and policies towards Austria-Hungary necessarily applied to 
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Hungary as well, except in cases that involved the Austrian half of the Monarchy exclusively. 
!The two most obvious such examples were the future of the Poles and Italians of Austria· 
Hungary.) From a Hungarian point of view, the most important question was whether the US 
, 
would accept Hungary as an independent player on the international scene, and if so, in 
appreciation of prewar attempts to achieve that (Apponyi's and Karolyi's visits to the US) 
or in response to the ever-changing political, diplomatic, and military realities of the World 
War. 
During the Great War, any American decision regarding the integrity of the Habsburg 
Monarchy was necessarily a decision about the future of Hungary as well. As long as 
America's policy was to strike a separate peace deal with Austria-Hungary, dismemberment· 
was out of the question. When in April 1918 this American policy ran into a cuI de sac, 
the only alternative left was dismemberment. But by then, dismemberment meant the 
realization of the claims of practically all the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy to 
independence in the hope that common sense would lead these new countries into some sort 
of regional integration. Fiorello La Guardia's (later Mayor of New York City, where one of 
the airports is named after him) December 1917 proposal to provide undercover support for . 
Count Michael Karolyi (an 1848-er who was looked upon as pro-Entente both at home and 
in the Allied countries, and who after the war became Hungarian Premier) was nothing less. 
than a logical alternative to removing the Monarchy from the war through secret peace 
negotiations. In fact, it was also an alternative dismemberment proposal, insofar as it was 
meant to bring about a Habsburg . Hungarian break. This plan may have enjoyed some press 
support in the US, but Wilson rejected it •. and not because he knew that such a move in 
Hungary was practically out of the question. He did so because it did not fit his policy of 
secret peace talks and because he considered it immoral to use subversive means to interfere 
with the domestic affairs of the Monarchy. 
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The other field where the study of Austria-Hungary and Hungary can best be separat· 
ed is that of dismemberment propaganda. It will be demonstrated that dismemberment 
propaganda against the Habsburg Monarchy targeted Hungary primarily. In the various calls 
for the reorganization of the Danubian basin, many propagandists accused the Hungarians 
of the worst abuses, of instigating the war, and of serving Germany unconditionally. (Both 
the La Guardia proposal and dismemberment propaganda are discussed in detail below.) 
There is yet another aspect to be considered, and that is the nature of America's 
domestic and foreign affairs. By the turn of the century, the US was beginning to give up 
her diplomatic tradition of isolation in favour of economic expansion into Latin America and 
the Far East. At the same time, Americans distanced themselves from the conflicts of 
Europe, and it was obvious that they would not intervene in an all-European showdown. Still, 
the US could not afford to disregard the problems of Europe completely, especially those of 
the Southern and Eastern parts. This was because around the turn of the century over 20 ' 
million immigrants arrived in the US .. and most of them came from those parts of Europe., 
Immigrants from Austria-Hungary settled down in the same region and carried over old world , 
conflicts to the new one. Initially, the Americans showed no interest in these conflicts; it ' 
was up to the representatives of the various nationalities to try to achieve a political status 
in America that would give them a say in decision making. (Immigration is dealt with in the 
first chapter below.) 
Another distinction that must be made is between attitudes and policy, i.e. between 
public opinion and decision making. I chose to discuss both American attitudes and policies 
towards Hungary because I believe that a comprehensive study cannot be written if either 
of these two aspects is disregarded. The US, with its tradition of freedom of the press and 
with more than 2,000 dailies and 15,000 weeklies published, was a fertile field not only for 
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the presentation of conflicting views but also for all-out propaganda. However, the connec· 
tion between public opinion and diplomatic decision making in the Habsburg case during the 
Great War was not as one might expect it to be in the US. America's democratic historical 
tradition might lead the reader to expect that policy decisions were made under pressure 
from the public and according to its wishes. Wilson's management of American public opinion 
was actually quite different: although there were dissident voices, in general it may be said 
that he controlled domestic public opinion and sometimes even spoon-fed it with information 
he wanted the people to read and believe. Therefore, it must be born in mind that public 
( 
opinion was not part of policy making; instead, it occasionally promoted alternatives to 
Wilson's policies, while, more often, it supported the President. 
Therefore, all through the present study, the discussion of both neutral and belliger· 
ent America begins with a detailed analysis of propaganda and public opinion, continues with 
(the more important department of) decision making involving official and unofficial advisors, 
and the whole piece concludes with an exposition on the views and conduct of President 
Wilson, the sole conductor of US foreign policy during the World War. 
After some hesitation I decided to abandon the narrative form in favour of an 
analytical approach. What this really means is that in some cases (especially chapters 2, 3, 
6, and 11) the chronological order is sacrificed for the sake of fully unfolding various argu-
ments. Other than that, the thesis follows a chronological order with American entry into the 
war being its internal dividing line. 
* * * 
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Unlike the Poles, the Czechs, the Slovaks, the Rumanians and the South Slavs, the 
Austro-Germans and especially the Hungarians have looked upon the First World War and the 
subsequent peace treaties as a national tragedy. No contrast can be more striking than the 
image of the Czechs erecting statues of and naming streets after Woodrow Wilson with the 
Hungarians, barely more than a couple of hundred miles to the south, mourning the loss of 
two thirds of the territory and of the population of the Kingdom of Hungary -- and with it 
the aspiration of becoming the leading regional power along the River Danube. The one 
aspect of the war that historians are quick to point out is the road the US travelled from 
the position of being an uninterested neutral country through actual participation in the war 
on the side of the Allies to bargaining for small villages in Europe at the peace conference. 
This dissertation was written with the aim of shedding some light upon the real nature and 
dimensions of this dramatic change. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PRELUDE: PREWAR CONTACTS 
An initial look at Hungarian·American contacts before 1914, when serious diplomatic 
relations were out of the question due to Hungary's position in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
suggests in general the lack of mutual interests and, consequently, superficial attitudes on 
both sides. Yet, however irrelevant these connections may seem, especially if compared to 
America's relations with the major players in world politics of the age, prewar contacts 
between the two countries provided the basis for the American approach to Hungary during 
the First World War, which, in turn, influenced heavily American attitudes and polices at the 
Paris Peace Conference. 
American·Hungarian relations before the World War fall into two periods with the 
American Civil War and the Austro·Hungarian Compromise of 1867 providing an ostensible 
dividing line. The outstanding moments of the pre· Civil War period were the diplomatic 
interlude in 1848·49 and Kossuth's American visit during 1851·52, while other, mostly 
personal and cultural, contacts are of limited importance for the purpose of the present 
study. The five decades between the Civil War and the outbreak of the World War gave new 
dimensions to Hungarian·American relations. Hungary became a nominally equal partner in the 
Dual Monarchy, and large·scale migration, the so·called new immigration, provided a new 
basis for closer contacts. Other main features of the post·Civil War period were the develop· 
ment of several important personal connections and the evolution of a positive, yet super· 
ficial, image of freedom loving and democratic Hungary in the United States. This image was 
maintained despite the fact that it had been challenged seriously in Britain (Robert William 
\ 
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Seton-Watson, Henry Wickham-Steed) and in France (Ernest Denis, Andre Cheradame) while 
the Americans themselves confronted a different yet more real Hungary, which hardly lived 
up to American ideals. The following discussion first introduces American-Hungarian cultural 
and political connections before the Civil War, then outlines the period of new immigration 
with a broader view to include the various Habsburg nationalities living in the United States, 
and concludes with a summation of the images Hungary and the US had developed about 
each other. Woodrow Wilson's approach to (Austria-) Hungary, which has its roots in prewar 
times, together with the overlapping period between his inauguration as President of the 
United States (March 1913) and the outbreak of the World War, are discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
Together with the Irish, the Germans and the Poles, the Hungarians have always 
been among the better known immigrants in America and, like every immigrant group, they 
too tried to present an early 'colonizer' of their own. This task was performed by Eugene 
Pivany, a prominent banker and historian, who later turned to politics and propaganda in 
support of his native country. Basing his argument on a medieval Norwegian chronicle, Pivany 
claimed that the first Hungarian ever to set foot on American soil was called Tyrker, who 
sailed across the Atlantic from Iceland with leif, son of Eric the Red, around A.D. 1000.1 
While this story was based upon one single source and extensive speCUlation, which Pivany 
himself freely admitted, the journey of Stephanus Parmenius Budaeus was better authenticat· 
ed. Parmenius sailed from Newfoundland on a British ship and died on the way back in a 
storm in 1583. Captain John Smith, a famous early 'American', travelled extensively in 
Hungary (1600-02) and even fought the Turks there. By the coming of the American 
1. Pivany (1926) pp. 5-6. Note that this essay is the summation of Pivany's writings from the 
two decades before the World War. Pivany's Tyrker theory was published by Szazadok, the leading 
historical journal in Hungary, as early as 1909.-
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Revolution there were, at best, a few hundred Hungarians living in America, yet a handful 
of Hungarian officers, the most famous of whom was Colonel Commandant Kowatch of the 
Pulaski legion, fought successfully for American independence, and received due apprecia· 
tion.2 
Although diplomatic relations between Washington and Vienna were established during 
the early 1800s,3 Hungarian·American relations remained limited almost exclusively to 
cultural and personal encounters as Hungary was only a province of Austria. Nevertheless, 
many prominent Hungarians were influenced and impressed by developments in the New 
I 
World. Sandor BiilOni Farkas travelled in the United States in 1831 and his travelogue, with 
an entire chapter on American democracy (which, in a sense, makes him the Hungarian 
T ocqueville), captured the imagination of Count Istvan Szechenyi, the leading figure of the 
Hungarian Reform Movement in the 1820s and '30s. A year later, the mathematician and 
astronomer Karoly Nagy also paid a visit to the New World where he made friends with . 
President Andrew Jackson and established official connections between the Hungarian Aca· 
demy (founded on Szechenyi's initiative in 1825) and Benjamin Franklin's American Philosophi· 
cal Society. Another famous Hungarian scholar, Janos Xantus, spent more than a decade in 
America (1851·64) and, besides extensive scientific research, he entered government service 
and met President Fillmore. Xantus left a large collection of rare animals and plants for the 
Smithsonian Institute and became a member of the American Philosophical Society. After reo 
turning to his native Hungary he was appointed Director of the Ethnographical Division of 
the Hungarian National Museum and was also among the founders of the Budapest ZOO.4 
2. Pivany (1926) pp. 6·14; 18·20. 
3. Barany (1967) p. 140. 
4. Pivany (1926) pp. 27·28; 43·44; Kende (1927) 1: 207·26. 
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The 1848 revolutions in Europe brought about the only direct Hungarian·American 
diplomatic interlude before the World War. In December 1848, during the Hungarian War of 
Independence, Louis Kossuth asked William H. Stiles, the American Minister in Vienna, to 
mediate between him and the new Emperor Francis Joseph. Stiles' appeal to the BaUhaus· 
platz was turned down and in June 1849 Kossuth sent ~n official delegation to Washington. 
At exactly the same time Secretary of State Clayton instructed Dudley A. Mann, an 
American secret agent in Europe, to go to Hungary and recognize her independence if 
possible. In his instructions to Mann 118 June 1849) Clayton condemned the Russian 
intervention which eventually forced the Hungarian surrender. When Mann's reports were pub· 
lished in 1850 Hiilsemann, the Austrian Minister in Washington, -sent a fiery note to the _ 
State Department claiming that had Mann been discovered he would have been treated as 
d 
a spy. In his reply, the so·called 'Hiilsemann Letter', Secretary of State Webster stated that -
any such move would have led to war.5 Webster's action was clearly theatrical given 
America's rather limited role in world politics at the time. Another forgotten by·product of 
the Hungarian interlude was a minor diplomatic crisis between the United States and Austria 
in 1853 when Marton Koszta, one of the high ranking officers of the former independent 
Hungarian army, was captured by the crew of an Austrian warship in Smyrna, Turkey. 
Captain Ingram of the American warship U.S.S. St. Louis, moored in the same harbour, was 
informed and, as Koszta's naturalization as an American citizen was in progress, he felt it 
to be his duty to intervene. By threatening to open fire, he forced the Austrian warship to 
release the kidnapped Hungarian.s 
5. Pivany (1926) pp. 34·35; Kende (1927) 1: 56·64; Wriston (1967) 460; 462·64. Note that in 
1910 Pivany published all the relevant documents and an analysis in Szazadok. 
s. Pivany (1926) pp. 46·47; Kende (1927) 1: 252·56. 
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Kossuth's eight-month visit in America, which began in December 1851, led to a 
'Kossuth craze'. Several contemporary accounts maintained that he was given a reception 
second only to that of Lafayette. Kossuth toured the United States, was invited to deliver 
a speech in Congress and met President Fillmore as well as Secretary of State Webster. He 
tried to secure American diplomatic support for Hungarian independence and his principle of 
'intervention for non-intervention,,7 but he was rejected on both accounts. Nevertheless, 
during his stay in America Kossuth stressed his republicanism and protestantism, knowing 
that those were key American ideals.8 Hence, the real importance of Kossuth's American 
visit was that he helped create an image of a democratic Hungary, which continued to be 
identified with Hungary and Kossuth until well into the First World War by which time it had 
become largely false. Meanwhile, Laszl6 Ujhazy, of Kossuth's entourage, stayed in America 
and founded a Hungarian settlement, New Buda, in Iowa. Later he became American Consul 
to Ancona, Italy and died in America after his retirement from active diplomatic service.9 
At the beginning of the 1860s Hungarians in America numbered around 4,000. Some· 
800 of them fought for the Union with 53 ranking as captain or higher. Their contribution· 
often heroic, like Colonel Zagonyi's death ride at Springfield, Missouri, on 25 October 1861 
• helped maintain the positive image of Hungary and the Hungarians and came to provide a 
7. Prompted by the Russian intervention in the Hungarian War of Independence in 1849, this 
meant that if a third party intervened in a conflict between two countries other powers should force 
her to withdraw. See: Headley (1854) 276-84. 
8 Headley (1854) is an enthusiastic contemporary account; the definitive work on Kossuth's 
visits to England and the States is Janossy 11940; 1944; 1948), including a volume of narrative and 
two volumes of related documents. On Kossuth pressing his protestantism and republicanism see 
Headley (1854) pp. 251 and 254, respectively. 
9. Pivany (1926) p. 41; Kende (1927) 1: 138·76. 
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rather spectacular point of reference for the wartime propagandists of the Hungarian 
case.10 
* * * 
The end of the Civil War in America and the Habsburg·Hungarian Compromise of 
1867 marked the beginning of a new era in the history of both countries. The link between 
the two was provided by large·scale migration from Austria-Hungary to America. In the 
history of American immigration, the period between the Civil War and the First World War 
is generally referred to as the 'new immigration,' and it saw an estimated 26 million people 
going to America. The term was applied to distinguish this period from the earlier ones: 
between the War of 1812 and the Civil War mostly Western and Northern Europeans, now 
predominantly Eastern and Central European peoples moved to the New World. Naturally, this. 
transatlantic migration provided new dimensions for Hungarian-American contacts and must 
be looked at in some detail to introduce the various domestic American players coming from 
the Habsburg Monarchy and to assess their goals and political weight in American politics._ 
New immigration11 provided cheap labour for the rapid development of American 
industrial capitalism during the 'Gilded Age.' While the overall figure of 26 million immigrants 
is generally accepted, the actual number of the people of the various nationalities migrating 
to the New World from the Habsburg Monarchy is still hotly debated. What we certainly 
10. Pivany (1926) pp. 48·55; Kende (1927) 1: 328·68. 
11 The following account is based upon the classic studies of new immigration, which include 
Handlin (1973), Jones (1957), Taylor (1971) and Wilcox (1929-31). Kraut (1982) and Fuchs (1990) 
were also found useful. Blumenthal (1981) is a unique little volume piecing together the story of new 
immigrants from quotes. 
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know is that most new immigrants from East-Central Europe went to America for a relatively 
short time in order to earn some money and return home.12 In fact, return migration in most 
cases was around 30-40%. Economic distress at home and the desire to escape military 
service, combined with the possibility of easier success in America, served as the main 
driving forces behind overseas migration. Most of the immigrants were of peasant stock, 
single males under 30, who found work in the New World as unskilled industrial labourers 
in mines and factories along the East Coast, in the Mid-Atlantic region and in the cities of 
the Great Lakes area. Letters and returning migrants served as the main sources of informa· 
tion about life and work in America. Some, like the Slovaks, engaged in chain migration, 
which means that people from the same village, members of the same family, lived together 
in the US, too. Others, including the Magyars and the Rumanians, moved two or three times 
in America before finally settling down. Being used to mixing with other nationalities back 
home, immigrants in the New World settled down in the same regions, often in the very 
same neighbourhood in cities like Cleveland, Chicago, Pittsburgh and New York.13 
Since most immigrants intended to return home after a few years' work in the US, 
they accepted the meanest and most dangerous jobs, and maintained an extremely low stan· 
dard of living. This was in part due to the fact that immigrant workers were paid much less 
than native-born American workers (but still much more than back home), and also because 
these immigrants wanted to save as much and as quickly as possible. One typical way of 
saving money was living in a boarding house, which provided both cheap accommodation and 
12 A typical Rumanian saying went like: 'a thousand dollars and home again'. HEAEG p. 880. 
13 Blumenthal (1981) p. 120 offers an ethnic map of Chicago in the 1910s: 'To the north of 
the Loop was Germany. To the northwest Poland. To the west were Italy and Israel. To the 
southwest were Bohemia and Lithuania. And to the south was Ireland.' She, however, forgot to 
mention the rather large Rumanian colony of the Windy City. 
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food. At the same time the tavern served as the cultural center of the immigrant community. 
There people could get together for a chat and a drink, could sing folk songs and recapture 
the atmosphere of their homeland. The church and the press helped maintain ethnic identity 
but in some cases religious and political affiliations served as disruptive factors within the 
community. 
Immigrants arrived in the US with $10·30.00 cash and began to save money as soon 
as they started working. They spent as little as possible and sent the rest of it home via 
banks. It was natural that they trusted their own ,bankers more than native Americans, and 
a banking elite, concentrated in New York and Chicago, soon emerged. Some of them, for 
example the Croatian Frank Zotti and the Hungarian Alexander Konta, came to play an all· 
important part in the life of their communities before and during the war. 
Besides religion and the press, ethnic organizations also played an active part in 
holding the communities together. The vast majority of these organizations were sick benefit 
societies, providing the necessary insurance for the dangerous work of the immigrants. Those 
who never started the naturalization process and spoke no English at all were treated with 
contempt and condescension by the native Americans. New immigrants took the meanest 
jobs, the ones rejected by the Americans,14 and were either denied representation by or . 
refused to take out membership in labour unions. They also had to face religious discrimina· 
tion: in a country which based its underlying principles upon Protestantism, Catholic and 
Jewish immigrants were not very welcome. 
14 Blumenthal (1981) p. 96 cites the breakdown of a working week of a Russian steel worker 
in Pittsburgh in 1919: 'Time on the job, 91 hours; eating about 9; street car (45 minutes each way), 
10.5; sleep (7 1/2 hours a day), 52.5; dressing, undressing, washing, and so forth, 5; that totals 168 
or every single hour in the week, an it's how I slave.' 
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Naturally, these immigrants were the targets of Americanization, sometimes patient 
but most of the time impatient and even violent. Verbal and physical abuse, even direct 
attacks, were not uncommon. Their religious preferences, their reluctance to Americanize and 
refusal to stand up collectively for their rights encouraged the nativists,15 who began to 
to treat them as less-than-humans. One striking yet typical example is the story of the 
Slovak Josef leksa. He immigrated to the US at the age of 19 and started working in a coal 
mine. He was crippled in an accident (this was by no means uncommon, since work security 
was given little attention where new immigrants worked) and cheated out of compensation 
while still in bed in hospital.16 Verbal abuse was not uncommon, either. Native-born Ameri· 
cans called Ruthenians and Hungarians 'hunkies' in reference to the country of their origin 
and not to their physical appearance. Similar degrading terms used to describe new immi· 
grants were 'polak' for the Poles and 'bohunk,' which was used for both Bohemians and 
'hunkies.' 
Nativism and anti-immigrant sentiments characterized the political-academic elite of 
the country, too. One such statement by Woodrow Wilson is cited and analyzed in chapter 
2. Another good example is an 1896 speech in Congress by the Republican Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge, a close friend of TR's, and Wilson's chief opponent in 1918-19: 
There is an appalling danger to the American wage earner from the flood of 
low, unskilled, ignorant foreign labor which has poured into the country for 
some years past, and which not only takes lower wages but accepts a 
15 Nativism is a term applied to the conduct of native-born Americans who abused and insulted 
new immigrants in various ways for various reasons. The best brief account of nativism is Kraut 
(1982) pp. 150-57. Fuchs (1990) pp. 66-67 points to the Ku Klux Klan's role in mistreating the new 
immigrants. Ross (1914), quoted later in this chapter, is a typical nativist account. 
16 Cited in Blumenthal (1981) pp. 109-10. 
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standard of life and living so low that the American workingman cannot 
compete with itY 
Clearly, being a new immigrant in the United States of America around the turn of the 
century was no easy task and required a lot of commitment, courage and endurance. 
As a result of the general desire to go home after a relatively short stay in the New 
World, most East·Central European immigrants prior to World War I tended to stay out of 
domestic American politics. Instead, they remained preoccupied with the internal affairs of ' 
their community and with the problems of their homeland. With immigrant groups from the, 
Habsburg Monarchy numbering between 100 . 600,000 each (except for the Poles) and with, 
the immigrants living scattered all over the country, American politicians showed little 
interest in winning their vote. Thus, interest in East·Central European affairs remained 
confined mostly to academic circles (Herbert A. Miller, Emily G. Balch, Archibald Cary . 
Coolidge, etc.) and to individuals with direct connections to the region (TR and Apponyi, the . 
Cranes and Masaryk).18 
A look at social composition and political ties to the homeland at the same time 
offers most interesting conclusions about the various groups of the new immigrants. Non· 
Hungarian 19 immigration from Austria·Hungary more or less reflected the social composition ( 
of the compatriots left behind .. which was clearly not true of the Hungarians. Since the 
17 Quoted in Blumenthal (1981) p. 162. 
18 Miller, Coolidge, TR, Apponyi, Masaryk and the Cranes are all discussed later in this and 
subsequent chapters. Balch wrote a classic study of Slavic immigration: Our Slavic Fellow Citizens 
(New York, 1910. Reprint: New York, 1969). 
19 Then, 'Magyars' was used to describe ethnic Hungarians, and 'Hungarians' was used to 
denote all inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary. The same distinction is avoided in this dissertaion, 
the word 'ethnic' is added to Hungarians when needed. 
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Hungarian·Americans represented only the lower classes of Hungarian society (as we will see 
later, they were mostly of peasant stock), makers of Hungarian policy had little faith in 
them. While their financial contributions were welcome, they had no say in making the 
decisions about the future of their own country. This was due to Hungary's special position 
within the Monarchy: Hungarians could and did promote their case in a legally recognized 
way through their official government. Thus, during the war there was practically no political 
cooperation between the Hungarian·Americans and Budapest. (A similar attitude characterized 
the actions of the Rumanians and Serbs in America, who also had an offcial government to 
look after their future.) 
In contrast, all other nationalities tended to be more active politically in America than 
at home. The various nationalities within Austria·Hungary represented the subordinate classes 
and their political liberties were often severely curtailed by both Vienna and Budapest; but 
no such restrictions were at play in America. Quite naturally, they conducted anti·Habsburg 
propaganda and joined without much hesitation the various independence movements started 
by their leading politicians in exile.20 To counter the overall lack of interest in East·Central 
European matters, these immigrants had to become active in domestic American affairs and 
make themselves useful one way or another. To realize their dreams of independence, they 
needed Allied support during the war and favourable developments on the military, political 
and diplomatic scene. They also needed to introduce themselves and their demands to the 
American public. For better understanding of the wartime efforts of the various immigrant 
groups from the Habsburg Monarchy they must be introduced one by one. 
20 Hungarian. non·Hungarian relations were also quite different: in America, unlike in Hungary, 
the Hungarians had to behave with no government to protect them. But since the Hungarian· 
Americans were unable and unwilling to stand up for Hungary, these conflicts remained local ones; 
this was not an issue during the war. 
20 
The largest Slavic group in the US on the eve of the Great War was the Poles. By 
1914 some 2 million Polish new immigrants from three different countries (Germany, Russia 
and Austria·Hungary) had entered the US. Poles have been among the earliest heroes of the 
US with Kosciuszko and Pulaski, and their voting power has long been considered significant. 
Chicago, having some 400,000 Poles, was called the American Warsaw, and other large 
colonies existed in Buffalo, Cleveland, New York City, and Pittsburgh. Language and religion 
served as the unifying forces within the Polish·American community, as well as a general 
desire for the restoration of Polish independence. Yet, apparently very few of the Polish· 
Americans joined the Polish legions in Canada and France. American Poles chose instead to 
support the Polish National Alliance (founded in 1880) with money and rallied behind Pade· 
rewski only when he had achieved most of what he wanted. There is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the issue of Polish independence was treated by both the British and the Ameri· 
cans separately from the future of the Habsburg Monarchy, which is why the Polish 
contribution to the dismemberment of Austria·Hungary is given little consideration below.21 
The second largest Slavic community on the eve of the war in the US was the 
Slovak one. They emigrated from the Northeastern part of Hungary and carried anti·Hungari· 
an sentiments to the New World. The some 600,000 Slovak·Americans maintained close ties 
with their homeland, where they even circulated Slovak newspapers printed in America. The 
Hungarian government encouraged Slovak emigration and discouraged remigration in order to 
improve popUlation statistics in favour of the Magyars. The Slovaks settled down in New 
York, the Great Lakes area and the Mid·West. Their leading wartime organization was the 
Slovak League of America (founded in 1907). The Slovaks entered into an alliance with 
21 See the relevant sections in Taylor (1971) and the entry on Poh!s in the HEAEG pp. 787·803. 
Wilcox (1929·31) discusses all the immigrant group listed here and provides very reliable statistics 
about them. 
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Czechs as early as October 1915 in order to create an independent federal republic out of 
the Slovak and Czech territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. This agreement was later 
confirmed by the Pittsburgh Convention of 30 May 1918, under the guidance of Masaryk. 
Thomas Bell's Out of This Furnace (1941) is a wonderful tribute to Slovak life in America.22 
The Czechs turned out to be the most active group during the war. Czech immigra· 
tion started after the revolution of 1848. Unlike the new immigrants, these early Czechs 
were skilled farm labourers who moved to the New World with their families and settled in 
the agricultural regions of the Mid· West and Texas. By 1914 some 350,000 Czechs had 
entered the US and settled with their fellow Slavs in the Mid·West and the Great lakes 
area. Chicago, Cleveland and New York held 45% of all Czechs in America. Chicago became 
the third largest concentration of Czechs after Prague and Vienna, with 41,000 Bohemian· 
Americans. Standing out from among the other new immigrants, 40% of the Czechs were 
skilled labourers. The Bohemian National Alliance was created on 18 August 1914 and within 
a year it came to represent most of the Czechs in the New World. Its expressed aim was 
the creation of an independent Czecho·Slovak state out of the territories of Austria·Hungary. 
Its leaders, ludvik J. Fisher and Emmanuel Voska, promptly established contacts with 
Masaryk and Bene§ and provided most of the funding for the Czechoslovak National Council 
in Paris (some $675,000) during the war. They also campaigned for the independence of 
their homeland in the US.23 
22 Mamatey (1967); HEAEG pp. 926·34; Alexander (1991); Roucek and Brown (1937) pp. 230· 
45. On the Hungarian government's policies towards the Slovaks see Glettler (1990) and Szarka 
(1995) chapters 4 and 5. 
23 Odlozilik (1967); HEAEG pp. 261·72; ~apek (1920); Roucek and Brown (1937) pp. 230·45. 
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Carpatho-Ruthenians in the US numbered around 6 to 8,000 during the war and 
remained politically inactive until the summer of 1918, by which time it became clear that 
President Wilson would support the reorganization of the Danubian basin. Victor S. 
Mamatey's rather weak claim that they decided the future of their homeland is analyzed in 
a subsequent chapter.24 
The South Slav population in the United States was composed of Croats (400,000), 
Slovenes (300,000), Serbs (200,000) and Montenegrins (20,000). Religious and political 
conflicts were carried over to the New World, which ruled out a unified stand for an 
independent South Slav state in the Balkans. Typical was the case of the Croats, some of 
whom supported the creation of a Jugoslav federation within the Habsburg Monarchy to 
minimize Serbian control, while others created the Croatian National Alliance (1912) with the 
expressed aim of destroying Austria-Hungary. Eventually, the Jugoslav National Alliance was 
established in Chicago and its headquarters were later moved to Washington, D.C. The 
Alliance established contacts with Ante Trumbic's Jugoslav National Council in london and 
South Slavs in America came to support the Jugoslav idea against the Serbian Premier Nicola 
Pa~it's Greater Serbia project. like the Czechs, the South Slavs contributed the funds for 
the work of their leaders in Europe.25 . 
According to the census of 1920, Rumanian-Americans and their descendants 
numbered around 85,000. They displayed little activity in support of the Greater Rumania 
program of the Bratianu government until the arrival in the US of a Transylvanian-Rumanian 
24 HEAEG pp. 200-10; Mamatey (1967) and Magocsi (1975). 
25 Prpic (1967); HEAEG pp. 247-55 (Croats); 916-26 (Serbs); 934-42 (Slovenes); Roucek and 
Brown (1937) pp. 245-53_ 
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mission during the autumn of 1917. This, however, is hardly surprising since Bratianu bet 
his money on the French and eventually got most of what he wanted at the Paris Peace 
Conference.26 When considering the work of the various immigrant groups in the United 
States, it must always be remembered that the Rumanians and the Hungarians had a country 
and a government of their own which was looking after the affairs of their respective 
countries. Thus, unlike the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and South Slavs, they did not necessarily 
have to court the American public and the Wilson administration. 
This was also true of the German speaking Austrian·Americans, who numbered ( 
around 275,000 in 1914, with, most interestingly, two thirds of them coming from the 
Hungarian half of the Empire. Austrian·Americans did not maintain a separate national 
identity in the New World but joined German societies and read German·American newspa· 
pers. They remained politically inactive during the war.27 
In 1910 the vast majority (some 80%) of ethnic Hungarians in America lived concen· 
trated in Ohio (97,962),· New York (93,606), ,Pennsylvania (79,630) and New Jersey 
(59,962). The rest settled down in Illinois (29,401 ),Connecticut (21,093), Indiana (15,357), 
Wisconsin (7,338) and California (5,559).28 Interestingly, no major urban concentrations 
developed; according to American statistical data, 35·50% of the Hungarian·Americans lived 
in 'rural non farming areas,' that is, in small mining towns just outside the big cities. In the 
1910s Hungarians made up an estimated 10% of the population of Cleveland, Ohio, the 
'American Debrecen,' which is still seen as one of the main centres of Hungarian immigration. 
26 Devasia (1970), introduction; HEAEG pp. 879·85; Roucek and Brown (1937) pp. 319·30. 
27 HEAEG pp. 164.71. 
28 Puskas (1982M) p. 198. 
, 
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The almost 30,000 Hungarians of New York lived scattered all over the city,29 and Chicago, 
one of the major target areas of East-Central European migration, had only 13,253 Hungari-
ans, as opposed to 400,000 Poles and 41 ,000 Czechs_3D 
The overwhelming majority of Hungarian immigrants were of peasant stock and went 
to America in order to raise some money and return home rich enough to start a new life_ 
Hungarians in America led the lives of typical East-Central European new immigrants, settling 
down in industrial and mining areas and working as unskilled labourers in mines, steel and 
iron mills. They lived in boarding houses, which they called 'burdoshaz'. They had to take 
up jobs other Americans turned down, and earned very little money, usually not more than 
40% of what a native-born American received for the same job.31 Indicative of the mistreat· 
ment of the Hungarian-Americans is the following story: when a foreman was asked about 
the number of fatal accidents during the previous month, he reportedly said: 'Five men and 
twelve hunkies.' The historian Herbert Feldman, who cited this incident, maintained that this 
was an extreme case.32 There is strong evidence to suggest that Feldman was mistaken. 
According to another contemporary account: 
Fourteen Hungarians died because their platform collapsed beneath them. The 
workers had questioned the safety of the platform, but their foreman ordered 
them to use it anyway, adding the following comment: 'Never mind! There 
are many more Hungarians that will replace yoU!,33 
29 Puskas (1982M) pp. 189-99; Puskas (1982E) p. 129. 
30 Fejos (1993) chapter 2. 
31 Tezla (1987) 2: chapters 5 and 8. 
32 Feldman (1931) p. 148. 
33 Body and Boros-Kazai (1981) pp. 8-9. 
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Albert T ezla, who edited a two-volume documentary account of Hungarian life in America 
between 1895 and 1920, also emphasizes the shockingly high number of industrial accidents 
and negligence on the part of native-born Americans.34 
Although the Hungarian-Americans remained politically inactive in the New World . 
after all, they did not plan to stay long and most of them did not even start the natural-
ization process . nativist abuse, dismal working conditions and low wages convinced many 
of them of the necessity of joining the American working class movement. Of the various 
American labour organizations the one to welcome new immigrants was the Industrial 
Workers of the World, a radical, semi-revolutionary organization with a rather poor reputation 
among native-born Americans. By 1917, the I.W.W. had several Hungarian divisions a" over 
the Great lakes area and in New York.35 Thus, people of peasant stock went to America 
to work in industry and mining, they had to abandon their earlier political apathy and seek 
representation by a labour union that, with its bad reputation, alienated them from both 
native-born Americans and their fellow Hungarians on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Meanwhile, skilled labourers, artisans, intellectuals, etc., who formed only a small 
fraction of Hungarian immigrants, moved straight to the large urban centres of Cleveland, 
Chicago and New York City. They, together with the churches, established control over the, 
Hungarian-American press and organizations. Thus, this intellectual elite, together with the 
earlier mentioned New York bankers, came to represent Hungarian ideas and immigrants by 
1914. They also maintained connections with the home country and kept the concept of 
American-Hungarian cooperation alive. One such highly symbolic act was the erection of the 
34 Tezla (1987) 2: 7·11. 
35 Puskas (1982M) pp. 214-17, 294-97. 
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first ever Kossuth statue in Cleveland, and a Washington memorial in Budapest in 1902 and 
1906, respectively.36 Their physical separation from the rest of the Hungarian·Americans 
meant that rapidly developing personal relations with the American political and economic 
leaders, especially after the turn of the century, remained the privilege of a handful of jour· 
nalists, bankers and clergymen together with prominent visitors from Hungary. To understand 
the wartime performance of the Hungarian·Americans it is necessary to point out some 
characteristic features of their (1) societies, (2) press and (3) churches, and (4) to outline 
the position on and the policies towards immigration of the Hungarian government. 
Firstly, in the light of the earlier presented facts about dangerous working conditions 
and ridiculously low wages, it is hardly surprising that the first Hungarian·American organiza· 
tions were sick benefit (fraternal) societies. The first of these was the Hungarian Sick 
Benefit Society of New York, founded in 1852, which was followed by numerous others (the . 
most famous one was undoubtedly the Verhovay ~id Association). Insurance and sick benefit . 
societies remained the most important and most numerous ones during the period under 
examination: a 1917 survey of New York immigrants, for example, listed 22 Hungarian 
organizations, half of which were fraternal. 37 Other societies were also created in response 
to the specific needs of Hungarian immigrants. These included self·educating (onkepzo) and 
singing societies as well as literary and religious ones. Two important Hungarian·American 
political organizations, the Republican and the Democratic Clubs, were formed in New York 
City, under the presidency of Marcus Braun and Mar Czukor, respectively. The only attempt 
to create an organization representing all Hungarian·Americans came in response to the 
36. Kende (1927) 2: 208·50. Note that at that time there was no Kossuth statue in Hungary 
and that 1902 was the centenary of his birth. 
37 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 110. See the chapter on the Inquiry below. For similarly 
revealing general statistics from 1911 see Puskas (1982M) p. 231. 
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Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905-06.38 Then, the American-Hungarian Federation was 
established and it organized a rally in support of the Independence Coalition in Cleveland on 
27 February 1906. But with the end of the crisis in Hungary this patriotic upheaval soon 
died away and the Federation, unable to realize its aim to unite all Hungarian-American 
societies, lost its importance.39 Thus, at the outbreak of the World War no central Hungari-
an-American organization existed, due to the fact that no political issue was big enough to 
bring about a unified stand. As will be seen later, the only attempt to create one central 
Hungarian-American organization was promoted by a federal government agency after the 
American declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Secondly, the first Hungarian newspaper in America was the short lived Magyar 
Szamuzottek Lapja (Bulletin of Hungarian Exiles), which was published during October and. 
November of 1853. Similar attempts to maintain a Hungarian paper in the New World, such 
as the Magyar Amerika (Hungarian America) in 1873, also remained fruitless in the absence 
of a wide readership.40 Thus, it was only during the 1890s, when large scale immigration 
peaked for the first time, that a viable Hungarian-American press began to emerge and by 
the end of the World War 28 newspapers were being published.41 These newspapers repre· 
sented a wide variety of interests,42 but by the early 1910s two dailies, the Szabadsag 
(Liberty) of Cleveland and the Amerikai Magyar Nepszava (Hungarian-American People's Voice, 
38 See Sugar (1981) and Stone (1967) for details. 
39 Puskas (1982M) pp. 223-49; Puskas (1982E) pp. 154-81; Vardy (1985) pp. 38-49. 
40 Vardy (1985) pp. 71-72; Puskas (1982M) pp. 285-86. 
41 Puskas (1982M) pp. 290-91; Creel Report (1920) p. 91. In 1922 Park listed 27; see Park 
(1970) p. 300. Note that this is a reprint of the 1922 edition. 
42 For details see Vardy (1985) pp. 76-85; Puskas (1982M) pp. 291-99. The socialist paper was 
called Elore (Forward) and was published in New York. 
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hereafter cited as AMNSZ) of New York City, rose to prominence. The Szabadsag was 
founded in 1891 by Tihamer Kohilnyi, a first generation Hungarian gentry immigrant. Kohanyi 
edited his paper, which became a daily in 1906, until his death in 1913 and was so outspo· 
kenly anti·Habsburg that the Szabadsag was actually banned in Hungary. Edited by Martin 
Dienes between 1913 and 1915, the Szabadsag received Hungarian government subsidies and 
became involved in Ambassador Dumba's sabotage campaign, which is discussed in chapter 
3. In 1917 Endre Cserna married Kohanyi's widow and gained control over the paper, which 
performed yet another political about face and began to promote the cause of the Allies and 
Americanization.43 The other leading daily of the period, the AMNSZ, took a stand simila~ 
to that of the Szabadsag, although its anti-Habsburg tone was considerably more moderate .. 
It was founded in 1899 by Geza D. Berko, who edited it until his death in 1927. The 
AMNSZ was launched as a weekly paper, became a semi-weekly in 1902, and was published 
daily after October 1904.44 While the Szabadsag remained a Cleveland paper the AMNSZ. 
was published simultaneously in New York City, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Chicago by the 
early 1910s. 
According to the radical Hungarian-American journalist, Eugene S. Bagger (Bagger· 
Szekeres Jeno), 'the Szabadsag, up to America's entrance into the war, was a Hungarian . 
newspaper which happened to be published in the United States.~45 This description, which 
fits the AMNSZ as well, indicates that the majority of political reports, as one may expect 
among immigrants who intended to return to Hungary, discussed events in Hungary. The 
style of the advertisements and the serialized novels by the likes of Mikszath and J6kai in 
43 Park (1970) pp. 347.49. 
44 Vardy (1985) pp. 74.75. 
45 Bagger-Szekeres quoted in Park (1970) p. 348. 
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the Sunday supplements46 also made the leading papers look more Hungarian than Ameri· 
can. Nonetheless, being the only strong link between most immigrants, these two dailies 
came to control Hungarian·American public opinion: 
To be ignored or 'teased' by these papers means, for the Hungarian business 
or professional man making his fortune among his people, almost certain ruin. 
And the worst of it is that the injured party • unless it be a matter of 
criminal libel· has no way at his disposal to seek redress.47 
The quality of early twentieth century Hungarian·American journalism left a lot to be desired. 
Most papers had neither a consistent policy nor a well·trained staff; in fact almost all Hun· 
garian·American journalists of the period had learnt the trade in the New World and moved 
freely from one paper to another.48 One such example was Geza Kende, the assistant editor 
of the Szabadsag until 1911, who took the same position with the AMNSZ in 1912 only to 
write the history of Hungarians in America for his former paper between 1925 and his death 
in 1927. With the outbreak of the World War news from home became more and more 
scarce and the diplomatic break between the Monarchy and the United States in April 1917 
cut them off completely. Thus, the attention of the Hungarian·American press shifted 
gradually towards domestic American issues and Hungarian·American affairs. 
Thirdly, the vast majority of Hungarians in the New World, just like in the old one, 
belonged to the Roman Catholic and Calvinist churches. In the absence of authenticated 
statistics one may only say that there were proportionately more Calvinists among the 
immigrants than among their compatriots at home, which was due to the fact that the 
46 Puskas (1982M) p. 300. 
47 Bagger.Szekeres quoted in Park (1970) p. 76. George Creel, the head of the CPI, also realized 
how important the control of the immigrant press was. See chapter 8 for details. 
48 Puskas (1982M) pp. 299.300. 
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centre of Hungarian emigration was the North Eastern part of the country, which was pre· 
dominantly Calvinist.49 The churches in America played an all important part in the life of 
the immigrants: they maintained ties with the homeland, kept nationalist sentiments alive, 
and provided service and teaching in Hungarian.50 
The first Hungarian service in America was organized by Kossuth's former padre, the 
Rev. Gedeon Acs, in 1852.51 Yet, the actual beginnings of Hungarian·American church life, 
like the press, date back only to the 1890s, when the first Catholic and Calvinist churches 
were established.52 Since the organization of the Catholic Church automatically excluded . 
the possibility of direct Hungarian control over the congregations in America (the first of 
which were founded by Charles Bohm in Cleveland in 1893), the mother church was limited 
to supplying politically correct priests with salaries and subsidies for church.building. ~3 
Unlike the Roman Catholic, the Calvinist Church offered considerable leeway for . 
interference from Hungary, which both the mother church and the government willingly 
accepted. In fact, the first ever Hungarian·American congregation was a Calvinist one 
founded by the Rev. Gusztav Juranyi in Cleveland in 1891. Within a short time the Rev. 
49 Puskas (1982E) pp. 181·82; Vardy (1985) pp. 50·54; Puskas (1982M) pp. 250·60. 
50 Puskas (1982E) pp. 201·15; Puskas (1982M) pp. 270·83. 
51 Vardy (1985) p. 52. 
52 Puskas (1982E) pp. 183·92. Note that other denominations attracted only a small fraction 
of Hungarian immigrants and played no significant part during the war. The second largest protestant 
denomination, the Lutheran one, is worth a brief glance. Hungarian Lutherans in the United States 
went to Slovak churches until as late as 1907 when Istvan Ruzsa was sent to the New World to 
lay the foundations of Hungarian·American Lutheranism. On Hungarian government policies towards 
Slovak churches in America see Glettler (1990). 
53 Puskas (1982E) pp. 187·88; Vardy (1985) pp. 54·58. 
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Sandor Kalassay emerged as the leading figure of Hungarian Calvinism in America but seven 
years around the turn of the century (1898·1904) saw the break·up of the movement over 
the administrative issue of which church organization to join. Some decided to emphasize 
their connections to the homeland (after all Calvinists had long been the advocates of 
Hungarian nationalism) and the first American Diocese of the Hungarian Reformed Church 
was formed in 1904. Those who thus joined the mother church came to be called the 'join· 
ers'. Others, giving in to American government and church pressures, joined the Reformed 
Church of America to emphasize their loyalty to their new home, and came to be known as 
the 'non·joiners'. Still others decided in favour of the Presbyterian Church of America, and 
became known as the 'presbyters'.54 These disagreements sometimes led to shocking 
confrontations and prevented the reunification of the Hungarian·American Reformed move· 
ment.55 Furthermore, these hostile exchanges continued during the war and ruled out a 
unified Hungarian·American stand in support of the home country while giving rise to the 
dubious myth of Wilson's dislike of Hungarians, which is explained later. 
Fourthly, with emigration figures reaching the one million mark around the turn of 
the century, Hungarian government intervention was a natural and logical development for ' 
several reasons.56 Firstly, since most Hungarian·Americans intended to return home their 
national affiliation needed to be preserved and attempts to Americanize them had to be coun· 
teredo Secondly, the emigration of the non· Magyar peoples, especially the Slovaks, from 
54 Vardy (1985) pp. 58·61; Puskas (1982E) pp. 197·201; Puskas 11982M) pp. 264·69. 
55 Komjathy (1984) p. 171 recites that on one occasion the wives of New Brunswick ministers, 
at the heat of an argument, displayed their bare bottoms in public to one another to show their 
mutual dislike. Note that the reunification of the Hungarian·American Reformed movement is yet to 
be achieved. 
56 The following discussion is based upon Puskas 11982M) pp. 260·69; and Vardy (1985) pp. 
86·88. Additional information is footnoted. 
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Hungary offered an easy means of improving Hungarian population statistics by simply dis-
couraging their re-migration.57 Thirdly, from the 1890s onwards, Ambassadorial reports from 
Washington emphasized the anti-Hungarian propaganda of Slovak, Ruthenian and Rumanian 
immigrants and the anti-Habsburg tone of the Hungarian-American press. Finally, emigration 
offered numerous business opportunities. Hungarian-Americans sent their money home through 
New York banks, which resulted in the rise to political prominence of some Hungarian-
American bankers, such as Alexander Konta, whose services could be (and actually were) 
secured by the Hungarian government. Meanwhile, the right of shipping emigrants to the New 
World was sold to the Cunard Line, and the money thus earned was channeled back into the 
development of Fiume, Hungary's main seaport at the time.58 Hence, government action 
seemed not only necessary but held out promises of considerable yet easy political and 
financial profit. 
Thus, in 1903 the' Amerikai Akcio' (American Action), a three pronged program was 
launched. The Slovak and Ruthenian branches intended to discourage the re-migration of non· . 
Magyar peoples to Hungary and set out to prevent anti-Hungarian propaganda both in the 
United States and in Hungary, without much success.59 The third and naturally most 
important branch was the Hungarian one. The obvious preference was securing the loyalty 
of Hungarian emigrants to the home country, which took the form of preventing their Ameri· 
canization and encouraging them to return home. The American Action also made attempts 
57 Glettler (1990) pp. 109-10. 
58 Csocsan de Varallja (1974) p. 141; and letter to the author dated 11 March 1994; Revai 
Nagy lexikona (1914) 11: 719. 
59 For example, R. W. Seton-Watson recorded that the Slovaks had more newspapers in America 
than in Hungary: Seton-Watson (1908) pp. 202-03. Nonetheless, these were widely circulated in 
Hungary despite the fact that the Hungarian postal service was ordered to refuse their delivery: 
Glettler (1990) p. 115. 
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to suppress the anti-Habsburg tone of the press of the Hungarian-Americans, and to monopo-
lize their financial transactions and transatlantic journeys. In 1911 all such efforts were 
centralized and the Transatlantic Trust Company was established in New York City. It 
subsidized both the press and the clergy, and tried to monopolize financial transactions 
between Hungary and the United States.60 The Austro-Hungarian Consulates in America 
were instructed the protect immigrants as much as possible even by lobbying for industrial 
, 
) 
safety legislation in some of the states.61 The American Action may have enjoyed the full 
backing of Budapest but it achieved little. Its activities were continued until 1918 and were 
partially revealed to the American public in various Congressional hearings after the war. 
* * * 
Meanwhile, prominent Hungarian-Americans and important visitors from Hungary 
developed several personal connections in America. Instrumental in the development of such 
personal relations on the American side was Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United 
States between 1901 and 1908. The Hungarian Republican Club of New York City was , 
involved in Roosevelt's 1900 election campaign and Marcus Braun, the president of the Club, 
was appointed as special immigration inspector for the Department of Commerce and Labor. 
In 1904 Braun reported on immigration abuses by the Hungarian government. He charged the 
Hungarian Premier Count Istvan Tisza with misconduct claiming that he forced non-Magyar 
immigration to the United States while cashing in on a deal with the Cunard Line, whom he 
60 Park (1970) pp. 417-21. Park quotes the relevant Congressional hearing with some comment. 
61. HEAEG p_ 469. 
34 
granted practical monopoly of transporting these immigrants. 62 During his next visit to 
Hungary in the following year Braun was arrested by the police for supposedly insulting a 
detective and was released only after the Roosevelt administration had ,intervened on his 
behalf. On his return to America he resigned from his job but was reappointed later the same 
year on Roosevelt's recommendation. In his recollection of the affair,63 Braun charged the 
American Ambassador in Vienna with not giving him the support he was entitled to as an 
agent of the American government. Roosevelt initially maintained that Braun was looking for 
trouble when going to Hungary after his report but when the issue was cleared up he 
extended his condemnation to Ambassador Storer as well.64 
Roosevelt demonstrated his appreciation of the Hungarians with a symbolic gesture 
by signing the Charter of the Hungarian Reformed Federation of America (the largest Hun· 
garian·American Calvinist organization) on 2 March 1907. Passed by the second session of 
the Fifty Ninth Congress this document remains a unique one: no other immigrant organiza· 
tion has ever been granted the same privilege by President or Congress.65 
However, of all his Hungarian connections, Roosevelt's friendship with the prominent 
Hungarian politician, Count Albert Apponyi, was by far the most significant. Not only was 
62 This was true only in part. The deal with the Cunard line did not work out as expected and 
the Continental Pool (of five other agencies) was drawn into the business in 1911. These companies 
agreed to pay 10 crowns for every emigrant into the Emigration Fund and to return to Hungary 
1,000 poor immigrants at a reduced fee. Revai Nagy lexikona 11: 718·19: Kivandorlas. Further 
information is provided in the 1909 volume of Corpus luris Hungarici, in the footnotes of law No .. 
2 of that year (which was the second emigration act). 
63. Marcus Braun, Immigration Abuses. New York, 1906. 
64. Roosevelt (1952) 5: 43·45; 314. 
65. Beky (1970) 20.23. 
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it the strongest unofficial political connection between the two countries but it was also 
carried well into the war period, securing the sympathies of the leader of President Wilson's 
domestic opposition.66 Apponyi led the Hungarian delegation to the conference of the Inter· 
parliamentary Union, held in St. louis, Missouri in 1904. He scored a major success with his 
mastery of English and his addresses and was invited again by the New York Peace Society 
and the Civic Forum in 1911. During his first visit to America Apponyi was invited by 
Roosevelt to a private dinner where they made friends and the President promised to visit 
Hungary. They remained in touch through correspondence,. sometimes in secret,67 a precau· 
tion taken because of Apponyi's position in Hungary as a prominent opposition politician and , 
his leading role in the 1905·06 constitutional crisis, which threatened the very existence of . 
the Habsburg Monarchy. During his 1910 tour of Europe Roosevelt visited Hungary and reo . 
turned Apponyi's earlier visit. The ex·President met several other prominent Hungarians, in· 
eluding the dying Ferenc Kossuth, and delivered a short speech in the Hungarian Parliament ' 
praising Hungary and her history, while in another address at the Washington memorial he 
expressed his appreciation of Hungarian·Americans. His visit was a sweeping success and 
the Szabadsag reported on it extensively for Hungarians in the New World.68 Apponyi's 
second American visit in 1911 was similarly successful. Besides meeting some prominent 
Americans (including Andrew Carnegie, Henry Cabot lodge and William Jennings Bryan69) 
66. For an account of their contacts see: Kerekeshazy (1943) 121·32; Apponyi (1933) 130·70; 
Kende (1927) 2: 477·88; Barany (1967) 141; Roosevelt (1954) 7: 374·79. Their correspondence was 
consulted in the Roosevelt papers at the library of Congress. 
67. Roosevelt (1952) 5: 314. 
68. Szabadsag, 18 and 19 April 1910. 
69 Carnegie was a famous millionaire who founded the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, which later analyzed the war and sent an official mission to Hungary in 1930: Shotwell 
(1961) Chapter 15. Bryan was a leading Democratic politician who became Wilson's first Secretary 
of State. lodge has already been introduced. 
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and his Civic Forum speech, he was invited to address the Congress of the United States, 
becoming the third non-American (after Lafayette and Kossuth) to be granted that honour. 
Learning belatedly of the Cleveland rally in support of his Independence Coalition during the 
Hungarian constitutional crisis of 1905-06, Apponyi decided to win the support of Hungarian-
Americans for the opposition. This plan, however, never materialized as Apponyi rejected the 
1914 invitation of the Hungarian-Americans, thus opening the way for Count Michael Karolyi. 
It was during Apponyi's second visit that he last met Roosevelt. 
Theodore Roosevelt's involvement with Hungarian affairs was by no means limited 
to symbolic acts and personal relations. With Hungary becoming an official partner of Austria 
in the Dual Monarchy the first American Consulate was set up in Budapest in 1878; and it 
was Roosevelt who promoted it to Consulate General in 1904.70 In June 1906, at the. 
height of the Hungarian constitutional crisis, he instructed Ambassador Francis to contact, 
Apponyi secretly and obtain the Hungarian position.71 However characteristic this move was 
of American attitudes it passed practically unnoticed: the crisis died down and no further 
action was taken. The presidency of William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's successor, brought· 
about the first twentieth century agreement between the United States and Hungary. 'Made 
necessary by the requirements of Hungarian procedure and law' a copyright agreement 
between the two countries was signed in Budapest on 30 January 1912 and was ratified 
by Congress on 23 July of the same year.72 By 1914 several Hungarians were serving in 
the Habsburg diplomatic corps in America. Prominent among them were Alexander von Nuber, 
who later joined the Hungarian diplomatic service, and Consul General Ernst Ludwig in Cleve· 
70. Barany (1967) p. 141. 
71. Roosevelt (1952) 5: 314-15; Roosevelt to Francis, 25 June 1906. 
72. OL K 106, File 2. Further details of the negotiations are not available. 
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land, who published an important propaganda piece during the World War both in English and 
in Hungarian and later represented Hungary unofficially in Berne, Switzerland during 1919. 
* * * 
Before turning our attention to wartime American attitudes and policies towards 
Hungary it is necessary to examine the mutual images the two countries had developed of 
each other by 1914. Interestingly enough, the most recent overall analysis of America's 
image in Hungary was written by the litterateur Ivan Boldizsar while a comprehensive 
assessment of American views regarding Hungary, the Hungarians, and the Hungarian· 
Americans is yet to be written. 
According to Boldizsar,73 the pre-Civil War period saw the emergence of a highly 
idealized image of the New World in Hungary, which he attributes almost exclusively to the 
work of Sandor Biiliini Farkas. The Hungarian traveller depicted America as the New Eden, 
the land of unlimited opportunities and voiced hardly any criticism. This idealistic image of 
America was enhanced further when the young republic • symbolically at least • sided with 
Hungary in 1848-49 and during Kossuth's American visit. Boldizsar goes on to describe Hun· 
garian attitudes towards the United States during the Reconstruction period (1865·77) as 
'admiration mixed with disillusionment.' Hungarian travellers in America, still the chief source 
of information and opinion in this period, were primarily interested in industrial America, 
especially technological details. Nonetheless, the earlier idealized image of America was 
73 The following account is based upon Boldizsar (1986). Boldizsar based his essay on the works 
of the prominent Hungarian scholars Anna Katona and Laszlo Orszagh. 
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modified with the addition of a touch of reality: the first descriptions of slums and poverty 
were also included. 
Surprisingly, Boldizsar then states that the period between the 1 BBOs and the 
outbreak of the World War brought no significant changes in the image of America in 
Hungary. He bases his argument on the fact that in this period immigrants from Hungary 
became the chief source of information for the home country, and that these immigrants 
failed to produce lengthy and realistic accounts of life in America. In fact, ~nly accounts of . 
extreme cases of disaster or success reached the Hungarian public. While this is a good 
point, it is still only part of the picture; Boldizsar overlooked at least two important aspects 
of the question. Firstly, Hungarians came to view America as a financial springboard rather 
than a model democracy; according to the Hungarian version of the American dream a few _ 
years of hard work held out the promise of a decent living once back home. Thus the earlier 
fascination with the American political system was replaced by economic calculation, which I 
did transform, or at least coloured, America's image in Hungary. This attitude was accepted 
by the Hungarian government, which, as has been discussed above, did not refrain from 
interfering with domestic American affairs. Secondly, it is true that Hungarian·American 
immigrants did not write travelogues or other lengthy accounts of their experience in America 
but their information was not lost. What actually happened was that individuals, who went 
to America with the sole intention to give an account of life in the New World, were 
replaced by immigrants with other, primarily economic, interests. Most of them returned 
home and told their relatives and acquaintances about their life in America and their accounts 
of early twentieth century industrial America were certainly more realistic than those of the 
earlier travellers. However, these returning immigrants tended to emphasize the bright side 
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of living in America and often consciously overlooked the hardships awaiting newcomers 
there.74 
Thus, the Hungarians had no detailed and realistic concept of the New World, only 
, 
fragmentary images and dreams of a fairyland. Nor did the Americans have a realistic image 
of Hungary. In the absence of any such earlier attempt it is difficult to assess the various 
images of Hungary, the Hungarians and the Hungarian·Americans in the New World and the 
following account is necessarily based upon speculation and deduction. Hungary apparently 
had at least three different images in America. The still controversial image of the real 
Hungary, together with open and concealed challenges to America, such as the arrest of an 
, 
American government agent or the campaign to prevent Americanization, played a very limited 
role in American policy making towards the Habsburg Monarchy. The real Hungary had no 
universal suffrage, nor did she appear to be willing to introduce it, but the Jews of Hungary 
were treated 'more liberally than anywhere else in Europe.'75, This represented a peculiar 
balance in the eyes of many Americans: Hungary was more acceptable than, for example, 
Rumania, where the Jews were mistreated, but less acceptable than Britain or France, which' 
were viewed as more democratic. It was largely due to immigration that the Americans 
became aware of the multinational nature of the Hungarian Kingdom (in TR's words: 'It was 
interesting to an American to pass successively through various villages each consisting only 
of Slavs, Magyars or Germans:76) but the way these minorities were treated was clearly 
not an issue. 
74 On this latest point see Puskas (1990). 
75 Ross (1914) p. 173. 
76 Roosevelt (1954) 7: 372. from his account of the visit to the Apponyi estate. 
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Another, and similarly marginal, image was that of the Hungarian·Americans or 
hunkies. A most comprehensive account was written by the sociologist Edward Alsworth 
Ross, one of the leading nativists of the time.77 Ross cleverly identified the Hungarians' 
'race pride,' which he also called a high sense of honour. He went on to describe their 
problems and intention to return home together with their love of wine,78 and made a very 
important point about their crime statistics, which is the only condemnatory element of his 
discussion: 
Their crime record is bad. No alien is more dreaded by the police than a 
vengeful or drink·maddened Magyar. The proportion of alien Magyar prisoners 
who have been committed for murder is 35.6 per cent., higher than of any 
other nationality save the Russians. Their hot·headed and quarrelsome 
disposition causes personal violence to bulk very large in their crime. In 
offenses against chastity their showing is bad, but their bent for gainful 
crime is slight. 79 
Similar statements in the works of Hungarian sociologists, such as Gyula lIIyes in A pusztak 
nepe (The People of the PusztaI, suggest that Ross had a point. Interestingly, in a different 
context Ross' account matches the stereotypical image of the Magyar nobleman, which was 
part of the third, and most widespread, concept of Hungary in America. 
Americans who visited Hungary contacted almost exclusively aristocrats and members 
of the gentry, collectively known as 'nobles', who even at the outbreak of the World War 
considered themselves the true political representatives of Hungary (hence the rejection of 
universal suffrage). These nobles were generally pictured as being chivalric, proud, good and 
77. Kraut (1982) pp. 152·53 identifies Ross as one of the worst nativists and cites some 
shocking passages from the very same work that is used in this chapter. 
78 Ross (1914) pp. 173.75. 
79 Ross (1914) p. 175. 
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willing fighters (the Hussars, Kossuth's army, etc.), and fond of food, music and women. This 
stereotypical and in scope rather limited concept was enhanced by several factors such as 
Hungary's stand in 1848·49, Kossuth's American tour in 1851·52, the contributions of Hun· 
garian officers in America's wars and personal connections. That this image was the 
dominant one may easily be demonstrated with the case of Theodore Roosevelt. A quick 
glance at his record outlined earlier clearly shows that he was living with the image of 
Kossuth's Hungary of some 60 years before and was more interested in the opinion of 
Apponyi, an opposition politician, than that of the entire Hungarian government in time of 
crisis, during 1905·06. 
The years between 1906 and 1908 saw a minor Kossuth revival in America. William . 
Lingelbach's Austria-Hungary (1906) was apparentlv the first book written by an American 
about the Monarchy, although it was a rewritten version of a French text. In the same year 
Marcus Braun also released a short piece on Hungarian history with a special emphasis on 
Kossuth.BO Kossuth featured as 'Hungary's Washington' (together with Bern, Klapka and. 
Dembinski) in Congressman Abraham Lincoln Brick's address in support of the Charter of the 
Reformed Federation in February 1907. B1 In 1908 the short -lived Bulletin of the Hungarian· 
American Federation was launched with articles from prominent American politicians and 
Hungarian·Americans alike. Eugene Pivany contributed an essay on Webster and Kossuth and 
another one on Kossuth's American visit.B2 C. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen's two volume study 
of The Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation, published in the same year in Britain, nat· 
BO. Marcus Braun, Glimpses of Hungary and Hungarians. New York, 1906. Note that Braun's two 
books cited in this chapter were reprinted in San Francisco in 1972. 
B1. Beky (1970) 21.22. 
B2. Puskas (1982E) 181. 
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urally attracted wider attention in the Anglo-Saxon world, and became apparently the only 
pro-Hungarian reference for wartime American government agencies_ Curiously, British, 
French, and Slovak-American writers' attempts to challenge the liberal image of Hungary 
clearly failed to influence American politicians and public opinion of the time. 
Prewar Hungarian-American contacts thus helped create a rather peculiar and clearly 
. not to say consciously· misplaced perception of Hungary in America by 1914. Based upon 
the protestant republican myth of Kossuth and his liberal Hungary of more than half a 
century before, it was complemented by the more general image of the merry Hungarian 
nobleman, the lover of liberty and the pleasures of life. Despite the fact that Americans con- , 
fronted a different yet more real Hungary in the form of naturalization problems, immigration 
abuses and the arrest of an American government agent, they failed to modify their view. 
Early twentieth century Americans simply ignored the existing government of Hungary and 
went back to the Kossuth image which, at the same time, was cleverly kept alive by such 
symbolic moves as erecting his first statue on American soil on the centenary of his birth. ' 
Furthermore, the Hungarian-Americans were not identified with Hungary in this context while ' 
prominent Americans chose to establish contacts with opposition politicians such as Apponyi 
and came to view him and the 1905-06 Independence Coalition as the real Hungary and the 
rightful heir to the Kossuth tradition, irrespective of reality and without even trying to 
understand Hungary and the Hungarian mind. 
Consequently in the United States, unlike in Great Britain and France, this superficial 
and misplaced image of Hungary and the Hungarians remained unchallenged and was carried 
well into the World War by the Wilson administration. Personal contacts, sympathies and 
myths were swept aside only after the American intervention against the Central Powers in 
1917, only to be replaced by a different set of connections and myths. But before continuing 
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the evaluation of the image of (Austria-) Hungary in American public opinion and political 
circles a bypass will be taken to analyze Woodrow Wilson's view of and attitude towards 
Hungary, the Hungarian-Americans and some prominent Hungarian personalities_ 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
WOODROW WILSON, HUNGARY AND THE HUNGARIANS 
It is necessary to outline Thomas Woodrow Wilson's views on (Austria-) Hungary and 
the Hungarians .. in part because he became the wartime President of the US and conducted 
the foreign affairs of his country single-handedly, and also because he offers an interesting 
case-study of what might be expected of a leading American political scientist in terms of 
understanding the problems of the Danubian basin. The aim of this chapter is to refute two 
fallacious assumptions about Wilson, namely that he was an expert of East-Central European 
affairs and that he had ill feelings about the Hungarians, and to cast some light upon the 
real nature of his attitude towards Hungary and the Hungarians. As these two issues are 
clearly interwoven, the following discussion is centered around the three main periods of 
Wilson's career: (1) the academic years; (2) the early political years; and (3) his presidency. 
The difficulty of such an enquiry lies not only in the fact that practically nothing has 
been written about the question but also in the shortage of information. Besides Wilson's 
own writings, secondary sources, correspondence and contemporary newspapers were of 
considerable assistance in filling in this gap in Wilson research. 
Since Wilson is the all-important figure of our investigation, it might be useful to 
provide some basic biographical information about him first. Thomas Woodrow Wilson was 
born in Staunton, Virginia, in 1856. His father was a Presbyterian minister, which accounts " 
for Wilson's strong religious inclinations. He graduated from Princeton at the age of 23 and 
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had a short and unsuccessful spell as a lawyer. He then completed his doctorate at Johns 
Hopkins University in 1885. He taught political science at Princeton between 1890·1902, 
then served as President of the same university until 1910. Between 1910·12 he was 
governor of New Jersey and then went on to win the Democratic nomination for the 
Presidency in 1912. Being elected twice, he served as Chief Executive of his country until 
1921. For his grand design of the league of Nations he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
and after his second term he retired to his private home in Washington, D.C. He died in 
February 1924. 
Of the three main periods of his active life, Wilson's academic career is the most , 
revealing since he expressed his genuine opinion and attitude towards Hungary and the Hun· 
garians without the outside constraints he had to consider later as a politician. Furthermore, 
his academic works have been cited as evidence for his good understanding of the problems 
of the Habsburg Monarchy; 1 and one of them got him into a lot of trouble during the 1912 
election campaign. With all this in mind, it appears necessary to quote Wilson's academic 
works extensively in order to disprove the claims of his expertise on the Habsburg Empire 
and to point out some aspects of his character and views which later influenced his political 
conduct. 
Wilson's earliest, and at the same time most detailed, academic reference to the 
Habsburg Monarchy, which naturally carried a discussion of Hungary and the Hungarians, 
was included in The 8tate.2 This work is generally seen as one of the highlights of the 
future president's academic career as a political scientist and is a lengthy discussion of the 
1 May (1957) p. 214; Kisch (1947) p. 235; Unterberger (1989) p. 16. 
2 It was first published in 1889, hereafter the 1904 revised edition is quoted. 
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theory and practice of the state. Wilson devoted a fifteenpage chapter to the Habsburg 
Monarchy and wrote an impressive account of its constitutional structure. Unfortunately, 
some other aspects of his presentation are less convincing and give away his superficiality 
and prejudices. 
He begins his discussion with a reference to the ethnic triangle of German, Slav and 
Magyar in the Monarchy. Of all the peoples of the Habsburg Empire he picked out the 
Czechs and the Magyars as the most ardent devotees of freedom and 'home rule'. He 
maintained about the Magyars that: 
Dominant in a larger country than Bohemia, perhaps politically more capable 
than any Slavonic people, and certainly more enduring and definite in their 
purposes, the Magyars, though crushed by superior force in the field of 
battle, have been able to win a specially recognized and highly favored place 
in the dual monarchy. Although for a long time a land in which the noble 
was the only citizen, Hungary has been a land of political liberties almost as . 
long as England herself has been.3 
While this section may be interpreted in various ways another brief quotation proves that 
. 
Wilson was somewhat off·target in his assessment of Hungary. He interpreted the 'rule of 
the Magyar gentry', one of the future wartime anti·Hungarian cliches, as a natural develop· 
ment in democracy: 
As must always happen where there is real ministerial responsibility, the 
lower House [of the Hungarian Parliament] is the governing House. The. 
Magnates yield, in the long run, every point upon which the purpose of the 
Representatives is definitely fixed.4 
3 Wilson (1904) pp. 335.36. 
4 Wilson (1904) p. 347. This quote speaks for itself. 
47 
The fact that this fifteen page section in The State is Wilson's longest and most comprehen· 
sive reference to the Habsburg Monarchy and Hungary in itself disproves the claims that he 
was an expert on the matter. His appreciation of the Hungarians must be attributed to the 
Kossuth myth, which first reached him apparently through his father, the Rev. Joseph 
Ruggles Wilson, and in broader terms to his we"·known sympathy for peoples living under 
foreign domination. The interesting reference to the para"el between the British and Hungari· 
an constitutional traditions remained unclarified in The State and it was not until 1908 that 
the future president raised the issue again. In Constitutional Government in the United States 
he detected two 'remarkable differences' between the Magna Carta and the Hungarian 
Golden Bull, but again in a way which proves anything but his correct understanding of the 
problem: 
For all she made a similar beginning, Hungary did not obtain constitutional. 
government, and England did. Undoubtedly the chief reason was that the no· . 
bles of Hungary contended for the privileges of a class, while the barons of 
England contended for the privileges of a nation, and that the Englishmen 
were not seeking to set up any new law or privilege, but to recover and 
reestablish what they already had and feared they should lose. Another and 
hardly less significant reason was that the Englishmen provided machinery 
for the maintenance of the agreement, and the Magyars did not.5 
This rather unscientific passage again shows Wilson focusing on broader issues at the 
expense of details and accuracy. At the same time, this is the first unconcealed manifes· 
tation of his WASP superiority complex,6 which would reappear in one of his 1912 election 
speeches. 
5 WWPs 18: 72.73. 
6 So far he has been only described as 'Anglophile' and his admiration for Gladstone is common 
knowledge. The above passage suggests that it is an understatement. 
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Wilson's only other academic work related to the Monarchy and Hungary casts no 
favourable light on his judgement, either. In the fifth volume of his A History of the American 
People (1902) he revealed his views about Hungarian, Polish and Italian immigrants with a 
then typical arrogance towards new immigrants, which earned him a lot of trouble in 1912. 
According to Wilson, after 1890: 
there came multitudes of men of the lowest class from the south of Italy 
and men of the meaner sort out of Hungary and Poland, men out of the. 
ranks where there was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick . 
intelligence; and they came in numbers which increased from year to year, 
as if the countries of the south of Europe were disburdening themselves of 
the more sordid and hapless elements of their population, the men whose 
standards of life and work were such as American workmen had never 
dreamed of hitherto.7 
Wilson then referred to the problems and limitation of Chinese immigration in the same period 
and claimed that: 
the Chinese were more to be desired, as workmen if not as citizens, than 
most of the coarse crew that came crowding in every year at the eastern 
ports. They had, no doubt, many an unsavory habit, bred unwholesome -
squalor in the crowded quarters where they most abounded in the western -
seaports, and seemed separated by their very nature from the people among 
whom they had come to live; but it was their skill, their intelligence, their 
hardy power of labor, their knack at succeeding and driving duller rivals out, . 
rather than their alien habits, that made them feared and hated and led to 
their exclusion at the prayer of the men they were likely to displace should 
they multiply. The unlikely fellows who came in at the eastern ports were 
tolerated because they usurped no place but the very lowest in the scale of 
labor.8 
7 Wilson (1902) pp. 212.13. 
8 Wilson (1902) pp. 213.14. 
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It is clear from the above that Wilson, like most of his contemporaries, separated the image 
of the 'hunky' from that of Hungary: he felt justified in condemning the former without 
extending the same condemnation to the latter. He actually carried this tendency a step 
further during the war in the German case when he drew an arbitrary dividing line between 
the people and their government, very much the way he distinguished the unacceptable 
Hungarian-Americans from the 'real' Kossuth type Hungarians. 
It was this incoherent, yet by no means unusual, attitude of praising 'Kossuth's _ 
Hungary' while denouncing the Hungarian-Americans that Wilson carried into his early political 
career, which extended over the eleven years between 1902 and 1912, his election as 
president of Princeton University and of the United States respectively. His Princeton years, 
which provided the first serious test of his political skills,9 also brought about Wilson's first 
real Hungarian contact. Apparently, a Hungarian by the name of Rezsa Kunfalvy was one of -
his students in New Jersey; yet even this episode would have escaped the attention of later 
historians had Kunfalvy not tried in vain to contact Wilson during the spring of 1919 in order 
to secure more favourable peace terms for Hungary.1D During Wilson's tenure, although inde· 
pendently of him, Princeton was becoming one of the main targets for the 'Peregrins' (i.e. 
Hungarian Reformed theology students educated abroad) together with Utrecht, Basel, and. 
Edinburgh in Europe; and it was also during his presidency that the first such student was 
admitted to the famous Ivy League university.ll Unfortunately, the details of Wilson's 
possible Hungarian connections in the New Jersey governorship period (1910·12), the later 
9 For details and evaluation see Link (1947) pp. 37·92; Mulder (1978) pp. 158-228. 
10 Romsics (1991) p. 75; LC TWWps: Series 5B: Peace Conference Correspondence: Stovall to 
Wilson, 11 March 1919. 
11 Komjathy (1984) pp. 154 and 115. 
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part of his early political career, are not available. This is quite surprising because, as 
indicated in the previous chapter, New Jersey was one of the main target areas of Hungari-
an immigration, and the Hungarian-American churches were accused of anti-Americanization 
practices, which certainly fell under the jurisdiction of the Governor. It would seem natural 
that Wilson had to deal with some of these issues but no definitive evidence has been found. 
In sharp contrast with the lack of incidents and references from the period between 
1902 and 1911, a study of the 1912 election campaign provides both in abundance. Wilson 
was repeatedly called on to account for his statements in A Historv of the American People, 
which have fully been quoted above, but instead of withdrawing them he got into lengthy 
and unnecessary public and private arguments about them. 
Interestingly, his uncontrolled remarks were picked out not by immigrants but by the 
press magnate William R. Hearst, who decided to back Champ Clark for the Democratic 
nomination. Hearst and his associates launched their uncompromising attack on the would·be 
president as early as 29 January 1912.12 Arthur S. Link, the leading expert on Wilson, 
noted that Wilson would not have written those remarks if he had been preparing for a 
political career.13 Wilson's initial intentions, however, mattered little in 1912, especially,,-
when George F. Williams claimed in an open letter published in the New York Times that 
Wilson had not a single good word for any minority, ethnic or political, in the entire coun-
try.14 Wilson rightly claimed that the Hearst papers 'misrepresented' him since he had 
condemned not the Hungarian, Polish or Italian peoples but some of their representatives in 
12 Link (1947) pp. 380-90. 
13 Link (1947) p. 381. 
14 Link (1947) p. 381. 
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the New World; and in the light of the reference, as quoted above, to the unusually high 
crime rate among Hungarian·Americans, his remarks, if properly worded, would not have been 
completely unjustified. Yet, his unwillingness to withdraw his statements, an early manifesta· 
tion of the importance he attached to principles, made his apologies look weak and easy to 
reject. 
Hungarian·Americans were quick to join the anti·Wilson campaign. ~n 3 February. 
1912 Marcus Braun wrote an open letter to Wilson demanding the withdrawal of his 
statement regarding Hungarians and invited him to a public discussion of his views. In his 
polite reply four days later Wilson stated that he had nothing against the Hungarians and ex· 
cused himself from the public meeting, claiming to have made prior arrangements for a 
campaign in the west. The Hungarian·American public meeting did go ahead without Wilson 
on 11 February in the Webster Hall, New York City, which in itself was a symbolic choice, 
Daniel Webster being the American Secretary of State who granted Kossuth a royal reception 
in 1851·52. The meeting condemned Wilson's statements and demanded their public with· 
drawal; and a copy of the resolution was forwarded to his office. 15 
This incident marked the beginning of an all· out campaign by Americans, Poles, 
Italians and Hungarians alike, who all expressed their reservations about Wilson's unfortunate 
remarks and requested clarification and withdrawal.16 Meanwhile, Wilson was campaigning 
with the program of the New Freedom, a package of progressive domestic reforms, and 
refused to take decisive steps in the other matter until as late as 22 July. Then, brushing 
aside private apologies on the eve of the Democratic National Convention, he granted a long 
15 BH GKps: Newspaper File: unidentified clipping; WWPs 24: 135·36. 
16 For further details see WWPs 24: 226; 241·43; 269·70; 404·07; 548·49. 
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interview to Geza Kende, a prominent Hungarian·American journalist and assistant editor of 
the AMNSZ. According to Kende, they chatted for hours about Wilson, his plans for the 
future and about his views on immigration. As expected, the Hungarian journalist brought up 
the quite delicate issue of the day and Wilson gave him the following written statement: 
I believe in the reasonable restriction of immigration but not in any restric· 
tion which will exclude from the country honest and industrious men who 
are seeking what America has always offered, an asylum for those who 
seek a free field. The whole question is a very difficult one but, I think can 
be solved with justice and generosity. 
Anyone who has the least knowledge of Hungarian history must feel that 
stock to have proved itself fit for liberty and opportunity.17 
Thus, Kende had a first class scoop which he immediately leaked to an American journalist 
and on the next day, 23 July 1912, the AMNSZ and the New York Times covered the . 
interview simultaneously. It appears that Kende and his editor·in·chief, Geza Berko, together 
with some prominent New Yorkers, such as Mar Czukor, Alexander Konta and Edmund 
Gallauner, were instrumental in calming the storm raised against Wilson by the Hearst 
papers. Nevertheless, criticism did not cease after the Kende interview so Wilson decided to 
open the Connecticut state campaign on 25 September 1912 discussing Italian, Polish and 
Hungarian history. Quite unfortunately for him, he did so in typical Wilsonian fashion, which 
is clearly reflected in the passage on Hungary: . 
Why, in that ancient Kingdom of Hungary, for example, contemporary with 
the great Magna Charta, to which we look back as the source of our con· 
stitutional liberties, there was proclaimed upon a notable day the terms of 
the Great Golden Bull which ran almost in the identical terms of the Magna 
Charta. But Hungary never could get a foothold for the execution of those 
17 AMNSZ 23 July 1912 pp. 1·2; WWPs 24: 562·64. 
53 
principles until she began to send eager multitudes across the ocean to find 
in America what they had vainly hoped for in Hungary.18 
This passage is obviously a summation of Wilson's complacent and at times even anachronis· 
tic approach. It then is hardly surprising that he was again criticized and had to. make more 
amends in a subsequent campaign speech,19 which apparently settled the issue once and 
for all. 
Of Wilson's several 1912 Hungarian supporters Gallauner and Konta deserve further 
attention. Surprisingly little is known about Gallauner who was called on in 1916 by Colonel 
Edward Mandell House2o on Wilson's request, probably to provide similar services in 
Wilson's second presidential campaign.21 The fact that Wilson had a special case file on the 
Hungarian suggests that he was found worthy of attention. Gallauner's services, however, 
had long been forgotten by 1919 when he tried in vain to secure official American interven· 
tion on behalf of a Hungarian aristocrat who had tried to recover his private yacht, the 
Tolna, seized by the French authorities as enemy property back in 1914.22 
However, of all Wilson's 1912 Hungarian connections his association with the New 
York banker Alexander Konta, arguably the most controversial Hungarian·American figure of 
the war period, proved to be the most fruitful. Konta made himself acceptable to Wilson by 
18 WWPs 25: 256. 
19 WWPs 25: 275.76. 
20. House was Wilson's closest friend, private advisor and 'super Secretary of State' during the 
war. Their friendship broke up during the Paris Peace Conference over the league of Nations issue. 
21 WWPs 35: 276. 
22 lC TWWps: Series 4: Case Files: No. 5080: Edmund Gallauner. 
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providing several important services without asking for anything in return. Their relationship 
may hardly be described as friendship; one may say instead that in Konta Wilson had a 
prominent Hungarian-American whom he could, and willingly did, use if needed. The details 
of their three post 1912 contacts cast more light upon some broader issues and, therefore, 
require further discussion. 
Their first post-election contact was initiated by Konta, who asked Frank McCombs, 
Wilson's former campaign manager, to secure an interview for Karolyi with the President in 
April 1914. The request was flatly turned down and Konta took no further action.23 If 
anything, this incident clearly showed the President's lack of interest in Hungarian politics 
and marked the beginning of a tendency on his part to refuse to meet separatist politicians 
from the Habsburg Monarchy until the summer of 1918. 
The next encounter was prompted by broader issues in early 1916, and the 
President's reaction was more favourable this time. Because some Hungarian-Americans were 
involved in sabotage and the Dumba affair,24 they were charged with disloyalty and had 
to face discrimination and physical abuse. Under the auspices of Konta, Berk6, Czukor and 
Braun, a convention was held in the Garden Theater in New York City on 30 January 1916 
to protest against violent discrimination and to reiterate loyalty to the United States. The 
President's appointment of Kentucky senator Ollie M. James as his special representative to 
the meeting proves that the Wilson White House welcomed the initiative. Obviously speaking 
for the President, James reportedly stated that 'As for the hyphen, I do not care what is 
23 WWPs 29: 404; 409. 
24 These issues are covered in the next chapter. 
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before it as long as there is true American spirit behind it.'25 When Konta secured a brief 
audience with Wilson and presented him with a copy of the declaration of the meeting the 
President made his complimentary reply public by authorizing its publication in the New York 
Times.26 Some Hungarian-Americans, especially the press, were much less enthusiastic 
about the issue; the Szabadsag went as far as telling Konta that he had made the mistake 
of his life by unnecessarily pressing loyalty to the United States. It appears that the Garden 
Theater meeting was a New York venture rather than an all-out Hungarian-American 
demonstration, and many thought that Konta was offering the Hungarian-American vote to. 
Wilson. Konta's quite sensible reply, stating that he was acting with the best of intentions 
both towards the Hungarian-Americans and their new home country, was fully printed in the, 
Szabadsag but the issue remained unresolved.27 While the events of February 1916 called 
the President's attention to Konta again, the attacks in the press, which played an all impor-
tant role in the forming of Hungarian-American public opinion, clearly undermined Konta's 
position in immigrant circles. 
The domestic and international situation had changed drastically by the end of 1917, 
when the third and longest Wilson-Konta episode began to take shape. At the end of 
November 1917 Konta, during a friendly conversation with the radical journalist Frank I. 
Cobb, suggested that the United States should declare war on Austria-Hungary and claimed 
that the Hungarian-American clergy was involved in sabotaging Americanization. When 
requested to provide further details, in a letter which was then sent on to Wilson, Konta 
25 BH GKps: Newspaper File: cutting from either the AMNSZ or the Szabadsag, dated 31 
January 1916. The hyphen here refers to hyphenated Americans. 
26 WWPs 36: 205 and n. 1; lC TWWps: Series 4: Case Files: No. 2898: Alexander Konta: Konta 
to James Patrick Tumulty (Wilson's secretary), 11 and 18 February 1916. 
27 Szabadsag, 29 February 1916. 
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(very much like Marcus Braun in 1904) accused the Hungarian government and Reformed 
Churches of anti-assimilation agitation and espionage. Furthermore, Konta claimed that the 
Szabadsag. which was directly involved in the Dumba affair and conducted a campaign 
against Konta personally, was the only truly loyal Hungarian-American organ.28 This seem-
ingly confusing statement must be seen as a tribute to Endre Cserna, the new editor of the 
paper, who, as has been indicated in the first chapter, had introduced a strong loyalist tone 
into the paper after his takeover in the spring of 1917. 
Konta's revelations were not only deemed useful but also came at the right time: the 
Committee on Public Information (hereafter CPI), Wilson's own propaganda agency under the 
journalist George Creel, was just about to begin its 'work among the foreign born' to 'delete 
the hyphen', which above all meant the establishment of government control over 'enemy 
aliens', such as the Hungarian-Americans. During the early days of 1918, the American· 
Hungarian loyalty league was organized under the supervision of Creel and the CPI, and on 
Cobb's suggestion Konta was named chairman.29 The loyalty league had no real chance 
of realizing its ultimate goal of unifying all Hungarian-Americans (its membership reached only 
20,000) simply because Konta, with his rapidly declining prestige in immigrant circles, a 
hangover from 1916, was unacceptable as a leader. This did not seem to bother Creel who 
cleverly focused on controlling the press and selling liberty Bonds. The league itself 
organized loyalty demonstrations, supported the liberty loans and Konta continued his 
attacks on the clergy. 
28 WWPs 45: 135-40. 
29 Mock and larson (1939) pp. 220-25; the CPI is discussed below together with other wartime 
Hungarian-American activities which were not linked directly to Wilson. 
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On 15 March 1918, the 70th anniversary of the 'Kossuth revolution,' Konta publicly 
accused the Hungarian·American churches of disloyalty and espionage.3D While th~ accusa· 
tion regarding espionage was unfounded, the fact that the Hungarian·American clergy, 
Catholic and Reformed alike, continued to receive subsidies from Budapest even after Decem· 
ber 191731 may be interpreted as disloyalty. The subsequent house searches, however, 
provided no evidence and a delegation of Reformed Ministers, led by M6r Czukor of the. 
Democratic Club of New York, was invited to a White House audience on 8 July 1918, 
\ 
which was the last occasion on which Wilson met Hungarians before the end of the war.32 
The Hungarian·American historian Aladiir Komjiithy, himself an insider, argues that if Konta's 
accusations had the slightest foundation this visit would not have happened.33 
An alternative explanation would be that Wilson decided to stay out of the internal 
struggles of the Hungarian·Americans and the audience was but a theatrical move to boost 
their loyalty; and there is a strong case for this interpretation. Wilson's chief concern at the 
time was the securing of the loyalty of enemy aliens, who formed a considerable proportion 
of the population of the United States. He understood the almost schizophrenic situation of 
these peoples: many of them intended to return home after the conflict to countries which 
were at war with the United States. The logic of the situation dictated that strong steps 
would have led to resistance and sabotage, which he was not willing to risk. Germans and 
Hungarians, for example, were exempted from conscription, and the property of the Hungari· 
30 Komjathy (1984) pp. 141.42. 
31 Note that the evidence for this is cited in the fourth chapter below. 
32 Szabadsag, 9 July 1918. 
33 Komjathy (1984) p. 144. 
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an Reformed Church in America was not seized by the Alien Property Custodian.34 As for 
Hungarian-Americans, Marcus Braun was allowed to maintain his (rather unimportant) govern-
ment job despite the fact that Wilson and Lansing were aware of the fact that his newspa· 
per was financed by the Germans.35 In the light of these facts Wilson's decision should be 
seen as evidence of his good political judgement of the situation and not necessarily of his 
ignorance of what was going on in immigrant circles. 
Konta retired soon after this incident and the official explanation maintained that it 
was due to disagreements over funding the propaganda campaign among the Hungarian· 
Americans.36 It follows from the above that Konta's unproven accusations and his limited 
popularity among the people he was representing may well have played their part in his. 
decision. Yet, whatever reasons prompted his resignation, his replacement at the helm of the 
Loyalty League by Alexander Markus, on whom no information has been found, marked the 
end of Konta's association with the President. The December 1918 Senate hearings on 
enemy propaganda, the findings of which must be treated with caution, proved his prewar _ 
connections with Tisza and suggested that such links were maintained during the war.3? 
* * * 
34 Szabadsag, 11 and 12 December 1917. 
35 WWPs 34: 528-29, Lansing to Wilson 27 September 1915. 
36 Mock and Larson (1939) p. 220. 
37 These are quoted in Komjathy (1984) pp. 144; 148 n. 1; his connection with Apponyi is cited 
in chapter four below. 
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Here, we must pause briefly and address the myth of Wilson's 'seemingly unfounded 
anti-Hungarianism,' which emerged from the disillusionment with his policies in post-war 
Hungary. The Rev. Laszlo Harsanyi surprised many Hungarians during his 1920 visit to the 
home country by claiming that Wilson's attitude had dated back to the turn of the century. 
According to Harsanyi, Wilson was the notary of the New Brunswick diocese when the 
debate between the Reformed Churches was going on and became disillusioned with the 
Hungarians after seeing incidents such as the one quoted in the previous chapter. Harsanyi 
went on to argue that Wilson subsequently developed an overt dislike for the Hungarians, 
which accounts for his refusal to deal with Karolyi on several occasions as well as with 
Hungarian pleas during the Peace Conference. Komjathy refutes this argument by simply 
pointing out that Wilson attended no conventions as a notary after 1904, and that the de· 
bates peaked after he had been elected President.38 Yet, however unfounded the Harsanyi 
interpretation may seem, it remained the only one for a long time since no attempt has been 
made to analyze Wilson's attitudes towards the Hungarians. Interestingly, the same miscon-
ception resurfaced after the recent political changes in Hungary in 1989. In his rather 
unhistoric but widely publicized account, J6zsef Vecsekloy describes the Treaty of Trianon 
as an attempt to commit genocide and accuses Wilson of a conspiracy with the French to 
destroy Hungary. 39 
In fact, the evidence presented here suggests that despite what he had written in 
1902, Wilson nursed no hostility towards Hungary or the Hungarians,40 not even after the 
38 Komjathy (1984) pp. 171·72. According to Komjathy, Harsanyi kept the myth alive by telling 
it even to 1956 immigrants. 
39. VecseklO'y (1993), esp. pp. 277·78. 
40. If anything, the following episode testifies to that. In September 1917 Istvan Kender from 
lorain, Ohio, asked Wilson to become the godfather of his new-born twin sons. Kender promised to 
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events of 1912. This makes the single most important Hungarian related question of the 
war, namely why Wilson ignored Karolyi in 1914, 1917 and in 1918·19, even more intrigu· 
ing. A most thorough enquiry into the matter provided no definitive explanation but a few 
interesting conclusions did arise and to understand them it is necessary to look at some of 
the details. 
Karolyi's two visits to the United States during April and July 1914 provided the 
first possibility of a contact with the American President. Karolyi, then a little· known figure 
in the Hungarian opposition, went to America to raise support for an independent Hungarian 
foreign policy favouring not Germany but France. Wilson's refusal to see him suggests that 
the Karolyi visits passed practically unnoticed and were looked upon with limited interest in . 
Washington. This was true, since the entire controversy over Karolyi's visits developed after 
Wilson's refusal to meet him. The President's action was dictated by the logic of the 
situation, insofar as he had no reason to get involved in the internal affairs of Austria· 
Hungary. This attitude continued to be the basis of his approach to separatist politicians 
from the Monarchy seeking American support, at least until the summer of 1918, by which 
time he had also joined the dismemberment camp. 
Nonetheless, the controversy which developed over the Karolyi visits did not escape 
the attention of the Wilson administration; in fact, it created the first, and rather un· 
favourable, impression of the Hungarian politician. Karolyi undoubtedly enjoyed the support 
of the Hungarian·American press and especially the services of Kende. Alexander Konta wrote 
raise the 'two Hungarian yankees' to be loyal citizens and ready to fight for 'world democracy' 
should the Germans or anyone else threaten it again. Wilson agreed and the two boys were named 
Roy and Robert Woodrow Wilson Kender. BH GKps: Newspaper File: unidentified clipping dated 14 
September 1917. 
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a special article about him for the Sunday magazine section of the New York Times on 5 
July 1914, in which the New York banker presented the Hungarian aristocrat as the heir 
apparent of Kossuth. On the other hand, Slovak·Americans gave the Hungarian aristocrat a 
hard time and, on top of that, Alexander Gondos (alias S. E. Glenn), acting upon orders from 
Budapest and financed by the Tisza government, started an all-out campaign to discredit 
Karolyi.41 When the details were revealed by a report from the Budapest Consul-General 
Coffin, Wilson must have been shocked by the way in which domestic Hungarian issues were 
transferred to America. Marcus Braun's supposed involvement, also reported by Coffin (but 
merely as hearsay), hardly cast any more favourable light upon the politicians involved.42 
By the end of 1917 Karolyi had become the fourth Hungarian politician, besides 
Apponyi, Andrassy and Tisza, to be repeatedly mentioned in the American press and the only 
one generally considered pro-Entente. This was because in July 1916 he established his own 
party with a platform of peace without annexations and sought Allied support for his 
program. Nonetheless, Wilson and Lansing refused to deal with him again in October 1917 
when Karolyi tried to establish connections with the White House through Hugh R. Wilson 
of the Berne Embassy.43 This American stand was due to several factors, most importantly 
to Wilson's reluctance to take further definitive steps in the Habsburg case just before the 
declaration of war. Two reports, which independently described Karolyi as pro-Entente but 
politically unimportant, also played their part. The first of these was a Seton·Watson 
41 Mamatey (1967) pp. 230-32; NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708 reel 3: Glenn to Bryan, 20 May 
1914. 
42 NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708 reel 3: Coffin to Bryan, 30 June 1914. 
43 The details of the Hugh Wilson·Karolyi and the Anderson-Apponyi negotiations, mentioned 
below, are given in the next chapter. 
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interview with Coffin, the second Anderson's report about his negotiations with Apponyi.44 
Moreover, Karolyi went to Switzerland to participate in a pacifist conference, which was 
watched with considerable distrust from Washington. And as if all that was not enough, 
Karolyi worked there with Rosika Bedy·Schwimmer, who was practically persona non grata 
in the White House due to an earlier incident. Before explaining the curious connection 
between the President, Bedy·Schwimmer and Karolyi, another December 1917 incident must 
also be described. 
In the dying days of 1917, Fiorello La Guardia, then a Congressman serving as 
captain of the US Signal Corps in Italy, approached the American Ambassador, Thomas 
Nelson Page, with an ingenious plan. La Guardia suggested that the Americans should 
contact Karolyi and urge him to start a revolution which would lead to the separation of 
Hungary from Austria. While Page believed that the proposal was worthy of 'serious 
consideration, ,45 Wilson did not. His brief letter to Lansing in the matter on the very first 
day of the last year of the war explains his views better than any secondary analysis: 
It seems to me that this would be very unwise and dangerous, and quite 
contrary to the attitude of honour which it has been our pride to maintain 
in international affairs; does it not seem to you? Too many irresponsible 
"agents" are at large, and they are apt to do a great deal of harm. This is 
worse than the Anderson case, about which there was at least nothing 
underhand and of the nature of intrigue.46 
44 Hajdu (1978) pp. 229; 234.35. 
45 NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708 reel 3: Page to Lansing, 29 December 1917. In May 1917, a 
similar proposal by Marcus Braun was also turned down. See Barany (1967) pp. 151·55. 
46 Ibid, next document. 
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This letter indicates that Wilson's broader moral and political principles also played 
their part in not dealing with Karolyi during the war. Yet, it would be a serious mistake to 
underestimate the importance of personal dislikes in the matter, which take us back to BMy· 
Schwimmer. Rosika BMy·Schwimmer was a Hungarian born suffragette and pacifist of 
international fame. She first met the President in September 1914 and they discussed the 
war situation. After the interview, Bedy·Schwimmer, rather unfortunately, informed the press 
about the details of the interview. The President angrily denounced her and refused to see 
pacifists for several months.47 On the insistence of Jane Addams, the American pacifist and 
suffragette, Wilson granted BMy·Schwimmer another brief audience in November 1915, but 
the ice cold reception in the White House made it clear- that she was not welcome in 
Presidential circles.48 She then was instrumental in the organization of the Ford peace 
expedition, which was seen as a direct pacifist attack on Wilsonian policies. The young 
American journalist William C. Bullitt, also on board and reporting for the Philadelphia Public 
ledger and the New York Times, made sure that everyone had a good laugh at the members 
of the mission.49 It was after all this that Bedy·Schwimmer contacted Karolyi in Berne in 
late 1917, which was apparently reported to Washington.5D 
And the worst was still to come. Although the events of November·December 1918 
extend beyond the scope of the present study, they are too closely related to Wilson's 
47 Kraft (1978) pp. 10-11. That such incidents were unacceptable in American government 
circles was again made clear when Kende, for a similar offence, was banned from the Harding White 
House. BH GKps: Correspondence File: George B. Christian, Jr. (Harding's secretary) to Kende, 28 
September 1921: 'In reply to your letter of September 26th, I beg to say that the President will not 
discuss the statements of one who ventures to quote the President's private conversations.' 
48 Kraft (1978) pp. 72.73. 
49 Kraft (1978); Brownell and Billings (1987) pp. 41·49. 
5D Hajdu (1978) pp. 229, 234. 
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attitudes to be disregarded. Karolyi, ignorant of the real nature of the connection between 
the President and Bedy·Schwimmer, appointed her as Ambassador to Berne, which was by 
far the most important Hungarian diplomatic post in post·war Europe. When challenged in the 
Council of Ministers, Karolyi argued that this was meant to be a gesture for the Presi· 
dent. 51 The American Ambassador in Berne, Pleasant Alexander Stovall, whose distaste for 
women has been well documented by the CPI agent Mrs. Vira B. Whitehouse, forced Bedy 
Schwimmer's recall within a month. Most certainly acting upon orders from the White House, 
he thus cut off Hungary's only diplomatic Iifeline.52 
The one clear conclusion that emerges from the discussion above is that Wilson 
displayed little interest in Hungary before and during the First World War. As an academic, 
despite his own and later historians' claims, he was not familiar with the major problems of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. While he understood the dualist constitutional system better than 
any of his experts in the Inquiry, his other references are unfounded, superficial, and are 
based more upon myths and stereotypes than upon reality. 
Another obvious conclusion, which follows logically from the previous one, is that 
Wilson's anti·Hungarianism is only a myth. If he was to develop any dislike for the Hungari· 
ans, then it was not around the turn of the century but in 1912; yet he never took revenge 
for the campaign against him and never said anything degrading about Hungary in general. 
That notwithstanding, personal dislikes, especially in the case of Bedy·Schwimmer, did indeed 
51 OL K 27: Minutes of the Council of Ministers: Box 118: 18 November 1918. 
52 This incident alone is worthy of a lengthy discussion. The only such attempt was performed 
by the Hungarian·American historian Peter Pastor, who starts his presentation in 1918: Pastor 
(1975). Mrs. Whitehouse is discussed with the CPI in a subsequent chapter. Further information was 
obtained from the George D. Herron papers at Stanford University; see also Briggs (1932). 
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influence his decisions. Wilson's attitude towards Karolyi has been reconstructed with some 
speculation, but the reports questioning the Hungarian aristocrat's political weight and reo 
vealing his connections with Bedy-Schwimmer seem to provide a reasonable explanation for 
the President's conduct, which, on all three occasions, was naturally determined by broader 
Issues. 
Wilson apparently followed the then general American tendency, as pointed out in 
the first chapter, to view 'Kossuth's Hungary' as the real one and to disregard the conduct 
of the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian-Americans. The study of American public 
opinion during the neutrality period regarding Austria-Hungary, and of the various attempts 
to influence it, will provide further insight into the forces shaping American policies. But be· 
fore that it is necessary to review American . Austro-Hungarian diplomatic relations during 
the World War, as the next step of our general enquiry. 
o 
CHAPTER THREE: 
AMERICAN· AUSTRO·HUNGARIAN DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS. 1913·18 
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Prewar American . Austro-Hungarian diplomatic relations revolved around economic 
debates and immigration issues which continued into the war period. A debate over tariff 
rates had actually begun back in 1878 with the Monarchy adopting a protectionist economic 
stand. The British blockade during the war rendered the issue purely academic and an 
agreement was finalized in January 1915.1 Not surprisingly, the issue of overseas migration 
was also raised on the highest level of Habsburg-American diplomacy as well as in the 
American Congress. The Naturalization Treaty of 1870 exempted re-migrating American citi· 
zens from service in the K und K Army. Considerable loss of manpower provided the incen· 
tive for an Austro-Hungarian diplomatic move to amend the treaty in 1890 which the 
Americans rejected as interference with their domestic affairs. The issue was raised again 
after the Braun affair in 1905, and the Monarchy scored minor successes in 1906 and 1907 
when two acts of Congress made the withdrawal of American citizenship possible if a natu· 
ralized citizen took up permanent residence outside the United States. The issue became 
really hot after the outbreak of the First World War; it even gained a new dimension with 
thousands of Habsburg subjects intending to return home to fight, but unable to do so be-
cause of the British blockade. Nonetheless, the Wilson administration refused to go beyond 
the concessions granted in 1907 and the issue was dropped unresolved.2 
1 Davis (1958) pp. 1.7. 
2 Davis (1958) pp. 9-22; ludwig (1921) p. 141. 
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At the same time, Vienna remained a rather unpopular diplomatic post in the eyes 
of many Americans; in fact, it took Wilson more than six months to find a suitable Ambas· 
sador to Vienna in Frederick Courtland Penfield. Unlike the President's other appointments, 
Penfield had some previous diplomatic experience (he had served in london and Cairo under 
the Cleveland administrations); still, his main qualifications were his large financial contribu· 
tion to Wilson's 1912 election campaign and the fact that he was a Roman Catholic.3 At 
the same time, the Habsburg Monarchy was represented in the United States by Constantin 
Theodore Dumba, a wealthy and popular aristocrat with professional diplomatic training. 
The sixteen months between Wilson's inauguration and the outbreak of the war 
passed without either country taking serious steps to develop closer connections. Wilson 
showed no interest in Count Michael Karolyi's two visits in 1914 and it was the Sarajevo 
assassination that eventually forced the two countries to deal with one another. Penfield 
dutifully reported the incident and President Wilson immediately sent a telegram of condo· 
lence to the Emperor Francis Joseph.4 However, the significance of the assassination of the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand was underestimated by all American Ambassadors in Europe, with 
the only serious warning coming from the Budapest vice· Consul Frank E. Mallett, on 13 July 
1914.5 Consequently, instructions for Ambassadors were not despatched until as late as 17 
August 1914,6 by which time the Austro·Serbian conflict had escalated to an all·out 
European war. 
3. WWPs 27: 110·11; 127. 
4. FRUS 1914 pp. 24.26. 
5. Bell (1983) p. 29; FRUS 1914 Suppl. p. 16. 
6. FRUS 1914 Suppl. p. 740; Bell (1983) pp. 32·33. 
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Wilson's call for neutrality 'in thought as well as in action' not only met general 
agreement in America but it also set the stage for American . Austro·Hungarian relations. 
In August 1914 Dumba secured American consular protection for Austro·Hungarian subjects 
and property in Russia, France and Great Britain.7 An American offer of 'good offices' and 
mediation was presented to Vienna on 4 August 1914, only to be rejected politely by the 
Ballhausplatz, which welcomed American mediation but only after the restoration of the 
'honour of the Flag'. 8 On 8 December 1914 the United States and the Monarchy agreed to 
grant the inviolability of all diplomatic and consular correspondence.9 
The events of 1914 hardly suggested what was to follow in the next year: 
diplomatic relations proved to be a lot more complex in 1915. Routine tasks like the 
representation of Austro·Hungarian interests and the inspection of POW camps with K und 
K soldiers in Allied countries were carried out by American representatives while Penfield 
supplied similar services for Allied governments in the Monarchy.lo Nevertheless, the period 
between May and December 1915 brought on no less than three serious crises in American· 
Austro·Hungarian relations. The first of these was but a side· effect of the German·American 
controversy over the sinking of the lusitania, which resulted in the death of 105 American 
citizens. After an interview with Bryan about the incident, Dumba reported home that the 
, American notes, however strongly worded, meant no harm, but had to be written in order 
to pacify the excited public opinion of America.' Vienna passed the message on to Berlin 
7. FRUS 1914 Suppl. pp. 732.33. 
8. FRUS 1914 Suppl. pp. 42; 50. 
9. FRUS 1914 Suppl. p. 543. As will be shown in chapter 5 below, the Americans did not 
always honour this agreement. 
10. Davis (1958) pp. 73.84. 
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where the Foreign Minister Zimmermann showed it to the American Ambassador James Wat· 
son Gerard, whose consequent report to the State Department discredited both Bryan and 
Dumba, and contributed to the former's resignation. 11 
The other two crises developed over the broader issues of neutral trade and access 
to American contraband. The British blockade of the Central Powers, introduced in late 
1914, cut them off from American contraband. Germany and the Monarchy repeatedly 
demanded equal treatment and the Americans were caught between two fires as the British 
refused to make concessions. A long debate over international law and neutral rights and 
duties developed but without the slightest hope of an acceptable solution. Realizing this, both 
/ 
Dumba and the German Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff embarked upon sabotage 
by calling for strikes and issuing warnings that working in American munition factories would 
be treated as treason once the offenders returned home. While the new Secretary of State, 
Robert lansing, expressed his frustration over the fact that he could not find evidence 
against von Bernstorff,12 Dumba was caught in the act. His report to the Austrian Foreign 
Minister Count Stephen Burian was intercepted and published by the British authorities acting, 
upon information from a Bohemian-American secret agent, Emmanuel Voska. Dumba and the 
New York Consul-General Alexander von Nuber were declared persona non grata and recalled 
on 8 November 1915.13 
11. Chambers (1939) p. 206; May (1957) p. 217. Bryan resigned because of the provocative 
tone of the second American note to Germany. The only other twentieth century American Secretary 
of State to resign over a matter of principle was Cyrus Vance of the Carter administration, who thus 
protested against sending helicopters to rescue American hostages in Iran. 
12 LC RLps: Private memoranda: Character Sketches p. 21. This is a small volume of handwrit· 
ten comments by lansing on important wartime politicians. 
13. This so-called 'Dumba affair' became a standard feature of wartime anti-Habsburg propagan· 
da. May (1957) pp. 220-21; Davis (1958) pp. 114-55. 
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The third crisis, over the sinking of the Ancona, almost resulted in a diplomatic break 
between the two countries. On 7 November 1915 a submarine flying the Imperial and Royal 
flag torpedoed the Italian liner en route from Naples to New York and nine Americans died. 
Both Colonel Edward Mandell House, Wilson's private advisor, and Secretary of State Robert 
lansing suggested a diplomatic break but the President refused to act partly because there 
were doubts about the nationality of the submarine. later the American historian Gerald H. 
Davis discovered that the Ancona had actually been sunk by a German U-boat and that the 
Ballhausplatz had been denied access to the facts. Nevertheless, Burian accepted respon· 
sibility for the attack and issued a pledge to refrain from similar offenses. Thus, by giving 
in to the American demand presented in the form of an ultimatum he managed to postpone 
the German-American showdown, which then seemed likely.14 Dumba's recall, diplomatic 
humiliation in the Ancona affair, and early military setbacks on the Serbian front 15 combined 
to degrade the Monarchy to the level of a secondary belligerent in the eyes of the Americans 
while, according to Penfield, anti-American sentiment in Vienna peaked in February 1916.18, 
Within a month of the sinking of the Ancona a second submarine offence increased 
tensions further. On 5 December 1915 another German U-boat flying the Austro-Hungarian 
flag held up the Petro lite, an American tanker. The two captains met and parted 'in the best 
of friendship' although some supplies were taken by the submarine. This time Burian refused 
to take responsibility, and further German atrocities, including the sinking of the Sussex, 
diverted attention. The issue was reopened in July 1916 in the form of another American 
14. Davis (1966) provides all the details. 
15 Armstrong (1971) p. 34 records the American attitude towards the debacles of the K und 
K army. 
18. Penfield to House, 3 February 1916. WWPs 36: 124. 
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note, which Baron Zwiedinek (the Austrian Charge d'Affaires, who in the absence of an 
ambassador was the highest ranking Austrian official in the United States) suggested had 
more to do with the coming presidential elections than with actual grievances. Accordingly, 
Burian promised a second investigation in his reply of 20 July 1916. The Ballhausplatz 
claimed that no new evidence was found (15 September 1916) and the debate died down.17 
Apart from the Petrolite affair, 1916 proved to be a quiet year in American· Austro· 
Hungarian relations; Presidents, after all, do not take risks during the year when they are 
running for reelection. To balance the uneven diplomatic representation the State Department 
requested Vienna on several occasions to send an Ambassador to Washington. Eventually, 
Count Adam Tarnowski, a Polish aristocrat of considerable diplomatic skill and experience, 
was chosen 18 although many Americans had expected the appointment of Count Apponyi. 
The fact that the selection of Tarnowski was an open gesture to the pro· Polish lansing was 
ignored by Washington. On 24 November 1916 the two countries mutually granted free radio 
communication between the Embassies and their respective governments, which seems to 
have been Vienna's condition for sending an Ambassador.19 
1916 also brought about a semi· official Hungarian·American interlude. William 
Christian Bullitt, the same journalist who had reported on the Ford Peace expedition in late 
1915, decided to spend his honeymoon in the Central Powers by interviewing key politicians 
including the German Foreign Minister von Jagow, Tisza, Apponyi and Count Julius Andrassy, 
17. Davis (1958) pp. 204.09. 
18. FRUS 1916 Suppl. p. 800. 
19 FRUS 1916 Suppl. pp. 807·08. Penfield's relevant report is quoted extensively in the fifth 
chapter below. 
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another prominent Hungarian politician who later became the last Foreign Minister of the 
Monarchy. On his return to Washington Bullitt submitted a transcript of the von Jagow and 
Tisza interviews (which he was not allowed to publish) to the State Department and caused 
a minor sensation with his articles about the Central Powers in the Philadelphia Public 
ledger.20 
It was not until the end of 1916, after Wilson was reelected, that broader issues 
were introduced to the Habsburg·American agenda in the form of open peace drives. The 
initiative for a peace move on the part of the Central Powers came from Burian, who , 
presented his plan to the Emperor Francis Joseph on 28 September 1916. With the 
Emperor's consent he met von Jagow at Pless (17 October) and the actual text of the 
communication was drawn up. However, Francis Joseph's death on 21 November 1916, 
followed by Wilson's telegram of condolence,21 delayed action. The young Emperor Charles 
in his coronation speech declared peace to be his most immediate aim and reorganized his 
cabinet by appointing Count Ottokar Czernin as Foreign Minister and General Artz von 
Straussenburg as chief·of·staff. 22 The first open peace overture of the entire war, then, 
came from Germany on 12 December 1916, calling for an international conference to settle 
conflicting interests. Six days after the German note the President, also openly, requested 
all belligerents to state their war aims. Lansing flatly, and unfortunately for him openly, reo ' 
jected Wilson's peace move, arguing that it might seem to have been worked out in 
cooperation with Germany. As a result of his open attack in the press he lost the President's 
20. Brownell and Billings (1987) pp. 49·65; SML weBps: Bullitt to Frank Lyon Polk (then 
counselor of the State Department), 20 September 1916. Note that BulliU's contribution is discussed 
in subsequent chapters. 
21. FRUS 1916 pp. 30.31. 
22. Chambers (1939) pp. 75.76. 
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confidence completely and was forced to recall his statement in the matter.23 Meanwhile, 
even in Berlin there was little optimism about the German peace move24 and, according to 
expectations, the Allies rejected it. The German reply to Wilson's peace note again called for 
an international conference prior to which Berlin was not willing to reveal her war aims. On 
, 
the other hand, the Allies did enumerate their war aims, including the 'liberation of the Ita· 
lians and also of the Slavs, Rumanes and Czecho·Slovaks from foreign domination: Czemin's 
public speech two days later focused on this sentence and for the first time Wilson was 
expected openly to take sides in the dismemberment question.25 Instead, he delivered the 
'Peace without Victory' speech (22 January 1917) probably as the last attempt to maintain 
American neutrality and secure the role of ultimate mediator for himself. 
As a result of the failure of the peace moves the Central Powers switched from 
intensified to unlimited submarine warfare on 31 January 1917. The subsequent German· . 
American diplomatic break was followed by a warning from Vienna that an American , 
declaration of war on Germany would result in the severing of Austro·Hungarian . American 
diplomatic relations.26 Simultaneously, Penfield inquired whether the declaration of unlimited 
submarine warfare meant the modification or withdrawal of the Ancona pledge, about which 
Tarnowski reported that the Americans were looking for a 'loophole' to maintain relations.· 
Accordingly, a compromising reply from Vienna stated that the submarines of the Imperial 
23. lansing (1935) pp. 174·90; Smith (1958) 149·50; Smith (1971) pp. 109·10. 
24. Grew (1953) 1: 296. 
25. Scott (1921) pp. 35·38; 42·44. 
26. FRUS 1917 Suppl. 1 p. 193. Note that during the Ancona crisis the argument for and 
American·Habsburg diplomatic break was that it would leave one (the German) channel of official 
communication open. This time it was the Habsburg channel that was to be maintained. See WWPs 
41: 188·89. 
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and Royal Navy were operating only in the Mediterranean where American ships hardly ever 
sailed, and the issue was dropped eventually when in March 1917 Czernin reinforced the 
Ancona pledge.27 Relations, however, were far from cordial: despit_e Penfield's repeated 
assurances Tarnowski was never granted the opportunity to present his credentials and 
become Ambassador since he arrived in Washington at exactly the same time when the Ger· 
man note announcing unlimited submarine warfare was handed to the State Department. 
Instead, Wilson decided to recall Penfield to restore parity in representation. The American 
declaration of war on Germany was followed by the severing of diplomatic relations with 
Austria-Hungary, on the latter's initiative on 9 April 1917.28 This meant, besides the inevi· 
hO 
tability of a Habsburg-American showdown, that the Monarchy ha~ambassadorial representa .. 
tion in America for two years before the American declaration of war on her and three years 
before her dismemberment. This was a very clear indication of how rapidly the prestige of 
the Monarchy was declining in 'neutral' America. The refusal to send an Ambassador to 
replace Dumba for more than a year turned out to be a major diplomatic blunder on the part 
of the Ballhausplatz. 
The period between February and December 1917 (Le. from the American diplomatic 
break with Germany to the American declaration of war on the Monarchy) turned out to be 
a period of hesitation and transition. After the American entry into the war the Allied and 
Associated powers needed to coordinate their war aims; British and French war missions 
were sent to the United States. The British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour's visit 
proved to be extremely important: he informed the President, Lansing and Colonel House 
about the secret treaties and discussed maximum British war aims (including the cession of 
27. Davis (1958) pp. 247·48; 255·56; FRUS 1917 Suppl. 1 pp. 135-36. 
28. FRUS 1917 Suppl. 1 p. 594. 
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Transylvania to Rumania and Czech trialism) with them.29 Subsequently, Lansing asked 
Albert H. Putney, the head of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, to prepare 
a memorandum on the Monarchy. Putney's report was the first official American document 
favouring dismembermeneo and marked the first step of Lansing's gradual acceptance of 
that program. Despite all efforts, an Inter·Allied Conference, held in Paris in late November, 
failed to integrate war aims; not even a joint declaration was issued.31 Meanwhile, the 
President denied audience to the leaders of separatist movements, applying the principle of 
not meeting politicians from the Monarchy who pursued a policy other than that of the 
Ballhausplatz. While Wilson waged an open propaganda war against the German Government 
(but not against the German people), secret peace talks were opened with Vienna.32 
The President cleverly grasped the opportunity which was presented to him on a 
plate by the Allied note of 10 January: he could act as the ultimate mediator and bring the 
, 
war to an end on American terms. This could be achieved by detaching the Monarchy from 
Germany through a separate peace, which was to be won by offering the Ballhausplatz the 
American rejection of the dismemberment of the lesser Central Power. Wilson's plan was 
based upon the correct assumption that the Monarchy needed peace and on the mistaken 
belief that she wanted it at any price. Little did the President know when he sent the 
29. IPCH 3: 43 and 46. Trialism would have meant the extension of the dualist system to either 
the Czechs or the Poles or possibly the South Slavs. Further discussion of the idea is provided in 
Chapter 9 below. 
3~. Mamatey (1957) pp. 91.93. 
31. Seymour (1975) pp. 266.80. 
32. As wartime Habsburg-American peace talks have been discussed sufficiently the following 
account points out the general tendencies and focuses on the two occasions when Hungarian nego-
tiators were involved. For further details see Chambers (1939); M amatey (1957); Forster (1941); and 
in Hungarian, Fejto (1990). . 
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necessary instructions to his Ambassadors on 8 February 1917 that the Habsburg accep· 
tance of a separate peace would take another 21 months and direct American intervention 
in the war. 
When Wilson's new program was initiated things looked promising. By the spring of 
1917 the desire for peace was indeed very strong in the Monarchy. In his 'April Memoran· 
dum' Czernin expressed fear of revolutions, called attention to the grave domestic and mili· 
tary situation and stated that another winter campaign was 'absolutely out of the question'. 
The Emperor Charles sent Czemin's report to Berlin. The Imperial Chancellor Bethmann's reply 
was more optimistic, arguing that American supplies could be cut off by the submarines and 
that victory on land would be won before the arrival of American troops. This statement, 
however, failed to raise high expectations in Vienna. At the same time, Vienna's eagerness 
for peace did not mean the acceptance of a separate one. According to Czernin, a separate 
peace was 'a sheer impossibility'. He argued that it would mean changing sides and would 
transform the entire Monarchy into a theatre of war as a result of the almost inevitable 
German retaliation while Italy would never give up the territories promised to her in the 
Treaty of London at the expense of Austria·Hungary.33 
In return for peace and commitment to non·dismemberment the Americans, who had 
initiated the first move via Penfield on 22 February 1917,34 demanded separation from 
Germany, minor territorial concessions (some at the expense of Germany), Polish indepen· 
dence, and liberalization (federalism). Negotiations broke down when representatives of 
Vienna came up with two demands which, together or separately, were unacceptable: (1) 
33. Czernin (1919) pp. 21; 142; 146·54; 180; 325·36. 
34 WWPs 41: 267, Lansing to Penfield. 
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they insisted that Germany be informed; (2) and/or demanded the restoration of the status 
quo ante bellum. 
On two occasions, which took place in quick succession during October and 
November 1917, important Hungarian politicians were also involved in secret talks with the 
Americans. The first of these encounters took place in Berne, Switzerland on 25 October 
1917, between Karolyi and Hugh Robert Wilson of the American Embassy. It was an 
; 
unarranged meeting initiated by Karolyi probably through a former member of the Vienna 
Embassy, Mr. Dolbeare. Karolyi offered to displace Czernin and force Germany into peace 
talks if 'Austria·Hungary would not be heavily penalized territorially,,35 but considered a 
separate peace impossible because of Germany's hold over the Monarchy. While Hugh Wilson 
attached great significance to the meeting, the State Department did not, and no further 
~ction was taken.36 This was due to the fact that Frank E. Anderson, Lansing's unofficial _ 
representative, was on his way to meet Apponyi. They were to meet in Vienna and discuss 
the possibility of a separate peace but the American declaration of war (7 December 1917)11 
which apparently took Lansing by surprise, forced the Americans to reconsider Anderson's 
mission. He was instructed to stay in Berne and invite Apponyi there but, instead, Anderson 
secured an Austrian safe·conduct and departed for Vienna. Apponyi and Czernin, however, 
also rejected a separate peace and Lansing denied any connection between the Anderson 
mission and the State Department in the pressY While the Karolyi·Wilson and Apponyi· 
35 One must point to the similarity between this report and one by Ambassador Penfield, which 
is quoted in chapter five below. 
36 FRUS 1917 Suppl. 2, 1: 322·25; Wilson (1941) pp. 39·43. 
37 See FRUS LP 2: 73·85 for Anderson's final report to the State Department. For further 
details see FRUS 1917 Suppl. 2, 1: 458 passim. Lansing's denial in the press: New York Times 12 
April 1918, p.3. 
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Anderson talks were chosen primarily for their obvious importance for the present study, 
they represent the typical pattern of Austro·Hungarian • American secret talks: official and 
unofficial representatives of the Monarchy were willing to promise anything but giving up the 
German alliance. Thus, it remains one of the greatest puzzles of wartime American diplomacy 
why the Wilson administration continued its quest for a separate peace with the Monarchy, 
until as late as possible, when they could find not a single negotiating partner of any politi· 
cal stature to agree to it. 
Actually, the American approach until April 1918 was fairly simple: while Germany 
was the main enemy, they could toy with the Monarchy. Her exit from the war was 
understood to be the key to Germany's defeat. Austria·Hungary's separation could be secured 
through peace negotiations and she could be liberalized at the same time. Wilson apparently 
did not wish to implement the logical alternative, the liquidation of the Monarchy through 
her nationalities. Thus, he supported peace negotiations, lansing grew more and more 
convinced that dismemberment was the solution, while the Inquiry's report of December 
1917 (which formed the basis of the Fourteen Points) suggested something in between: in· 
citing domestic national tensions in the Monarchy without accepting her dismemberment. 
The Monarchy's unwillingness to compromise over the most important issue, namely 
separation from Germany, was certainly one of the reasons for the American declaration of 
war in December 1917. Equally important were, however, (1) the domestic pressure (lansing 
and some Republicans, such as TR, favouring dismemberment); (2) problems in Inter· Allied 
cooperation (With the U.S. not being at war with Germany's main ally, all coordination, 
including that of the Supreme War Council was ipso facto impossible); (3) Italy's military 
collapse (Caporetto); and (4) Russia's exit from the war (lenin's Decree of Peace). The 
declaration of war turned out to be the first step towards accepting dismemberment, but it 
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was by no means an immediate turning point. lloyd George's speech of 5 January 1918 and 
Wilson's Point X of the Fourteen Points (8 January 1918) did not call for dismemberment. 
Czernin's response to the Fourteen Points (24 January 1918) had a very positive reception 
in Washington in spite of his rejection of Point X as interference with the Monarchy's 
domestic affairs. On the other hand, dismemberment, as an alternative to federalization, 
gained more ground in France with Clemenceau's coming to power in November 1917. Arne· 
rican • Austro·Hungarian peace talks continued despite the state of belligerency: after late 
January 1918 George D. Herron and Heinrich Lammasch met on several occasions and in 
February Czernin offered peace again, this time through the Spanish court.38 
The actual turning point came as the result of a Clemenceau·Czernin showdown in 
April 1918. Secret negotiations had begun between France and the Monarchy through the 
two princes Sixtus and Xavier of Bourbon·Parma in December 1916, and during these talks 
the Emperor Charles recognized the right of France to Alsace·Lorraine. Meanwhile, another 
set of Franco·Austrian negotiations started in Switzerland in August 1917. During the so 
called Armand·Revertera meetings the French demanded that the Monarchy should agree to, 
among other things, the restoration of Alsace·Lorraine to France. In a speech delivered on 
2 April 1918 Czernin remarked that another set of secret negotiations had been wrecked by 
French demands of that region. In return, Clemenceau charged Czernin with lying. Czernin 
published some details of the Armand·Revertera talks while Clemenceau published a letter 
by the Emperor Charles from the Sixtus file. Few realized that until that point both politicians 
were telling the truth. Czernin, however, overreacted and forced Charles to deny authorship' 
of the letter. Further evidence from Clemenceau put all the blame on the Monarchy. Burian 
returned to the Ballhausplatz and the subsequent meeting of the two Emperors (William and 
38. Briggs (1932); Osusky (1926); WWPs 46: 440 passim. 
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Charles) in Spa on 12 May 1918 cemented the Central Powers into an inseparable com· 
plex.39 
The next month and a half marked the President's slow acceptance of dismember· 
ment as the only remaining means of forcing the Monarchy out of the war.40 On 29 May 
Lansing was allowed to release a communication expressing American interest in the Con· 
gress of Oppressed Nationalities of the Austro·Hungarian Empire, which was held in Rome 
in April 1918.41 On 19 June 1918 Wilson received Masaryk and together they focused on 
the Czecho·Slovak legion in Russia, which played an all·important part in Wilson's change of 
policy. Masaryk also brought up the necessity of the dismemberment of the Monarchy and_ 
later recorded that the President had agreed with him.42 Wilson finally gave in on 26 June 
1918 and his decision was announced publicly two days later.43 On 3 September he recog· 
nized the Czecho·Slovak National Council as de facto belligerent government.44 On 20 Sep· 
tember Wilson received Masaryk together with other minority politicians from the Monarchy, 
such as the Croat Hinko Hinkovi~ and the famous Polish musician turned politician, Ignac 
Paderewski, while encouraging notes were sent to lasi, the seat of the Rumanian govern· 
ment, and to Belgrade.45 
39. Chambers (1939) pp. 387·93; Forster (1941) pp. 91·106; Lansing (1935) pp. 262·66; Fejto 
(1990) 172·239. 
40 Note that chapter 11 below is devoted to the discussion of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy and 
his views on dismemberment. 
41. FRUS 1918 Suppl. 1, 1: 808·09. 
42. Unterberger (1989) pp. 222·24. 
43. Lansing (1935) p. 271; FRUS 1918 Suppl. 1, 1: 816. 
44. FRUS 1918 Suppl. 1, 1: 824·25. 
45. Prpi~ (1967) p. 195; Low (1963) pp. 16·21. 
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In September 1918 the only official American statement of war aims was still the 
Fourteen Points, although Wilson supplemented them with 'Four Principles' on 11 February 
1918. This seemed to offer a way of escape for the Monarchy and Burian called for an 
international peace conference on 14 September. Wilson replied only in general terms ('Five 
Particulars' speech, 27 September). The Imperial Manifesto of 16 October 1918, federalizing 
the western half of the Monarchy, but leaving the Kingdom of Hungary intact according to 
the demand of the Hungarian government, came much too late since the general acceptance 
of dismemberment as an Allied war aim (in terms of rhetoric it was called the right to 
national self·determination) offered the nationalities an easy choice: with the impending. 
collapse of the Central Powers they could opt either for secession and independence or for 
defeat and responsibility for the war within the Monarchy. In obvious desperation, Burian 
asked for an armistice on the basis of the Fourteen Points on 7 October through the Arne· 
rican embassy in Sweden. Wilson's reply of 18 October included the first op~n nullification 
of Point X. Andrassy succeeded Burian as Foreign Minister on 25 October and two days later 
he asked for a separate and immediate armistice on the basis of Wilson's reply of 18. 
October. Meanwhile, Colonel House was sent to Paris as the chief American representative 
on the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. On his arrival in the , 
French capital, House asked Walter Lippmann and Frank I. Cobb, two radical American 
journalists then serving in the American Military Intelligence, to write an explanation of the 
Fourteen Points. This was done by next morning and the so called Lippmann· Cobb Interpreta· 
tion, also nullifying Point X, was released to the French press immediately.46 The terms of 
the Austro·Hungarian armistice were decided on 31 October 1918 and it was signed in 
46. Steel (1981) pp. 149·50; IPCH 4: 162; 206·08. 
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Padua on 3 November 1918,47 by which time the Monarchy had practically ceased to exist 
as the previous week had seen the emergence of national councils in Prague, Agram (Zagreb), 
Budapest and Vienna while Rumania reentered the war on the side of the already victorious 
Allies to justify her claims to Transylvania. On the last day of October 1918 Karolyi was 
swept into power by a popular uprising, Hungarian independence was restored and a military 
convention was signed with the French commander·in·chief of the Eastern Allied Armies, 
General Franchet D'Esperey, on 13 November. Meanwhile, the 'Successor States' attacked 
Hungary and by occupying the territories they had claimed during the war created a fait 
accompli for the Peace Conference. Thus, the dismemberment of the Austro·Hungarian Empire 
went hand in hand with the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary, although the detach· 
ment of territories with clear Hungarian majorities was not among the openly admitted war 
aims of the Allies. 
The survey of American·Habsburg diplomatic relations during the war would be 
incomplete without an assessment of the war aims of the countries involved in the 
dismemberment of Austria·Hungary. Having seen the 'raw facts' it is now time to survey 
Allied war aims against the Habsburg Monarchy and to estimate their effect upon Wilson's 
policies. 
The first Allied country to publicly state its war aims against Austria·Hungary was 
Russia, the only Entente power which entered the war not against Germany but against the 
Habsburgs. As early as 12 September 1914, Sergei Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
announced his 13 points and five days later issued a proclamation to the 'Peoples of Austria· 
47. House was informing Wilson daily from Paris about the Armistice negotiations: LC TWWps: 
Series 5C: Wilson· House correspondence. Cables from House to Wilson, esp. Nos. 5 (Lippmann·Cobb 
interpretation); 16 and 24 (details of the Austro·Hungarian armistice); and 38 (its signing). 
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Hungary', promising them 'independence and the realization of [their] national strivings.'48 
In his 13 points Sazonov supported Czech trialism la plan that Balfour introduced to Wilson 
and House in April 1917) and called for the restoration of Polish independence. later 
suggestions by Sazonov's staff regarding the creation of an independent Czechoslovak 
republic fell on deaf ears in Petrograd. On the other hand, Sazonov's proclamation indicates 
that the explosive propaganda value of the Pan· Slav idea was also put to use right at the 
start of the conflict. Apponyi's articles for the New York Times in 1915, which are 
discussed in the next chapter, prove that Sazonov's threats were taken perhaps too seriously 
in Vienna. 
Russia was in charge of the negotiations with Rumania of the Treaty of Bucharest, 
which promised the eastern neighbour of the Habsburg Empire large chunks of Hungarian 
territory in return for siding with the Allies. Indicative of the seriousness of the promises 
made to Rumania was a subsequent secret Franco·Russian agreement to re·evaluate 
Bucharest's claims at the peace table. 
After the revolutions in 1917 Russia played no part in working out Allied war aims 
and concluded a separate peace with the Central Powers in Brest-litovsk in March 1918. 
It must be noted that Russia never sought American diplomatic or political assistance for the 
realization of its war aims against Austria-Hungary.49 
48 Quoted in Stevenson (1991) pp. 121·22. 
49 Stevenson (1991) pp. 118·22; see also: Lederer (1962) and the relevant passages in Spector 
(1962) and Zeman (1971). 
84 
The British and the French were much slower to formulate their war aims against 
Austria·Hungary than the Russians; in fact, London and Paris shared the fear that any early 
definition of war aims might threaten Anglo·French cooperation. Actuallv, the British Empire 
entered the war with the chief aim of restoring the European balance of power, using the 
German violation of Belgian neutrality as a casus belli. The first official call to define war 
aims was issued by Prime Minister Asquith in August 1916. In response, the Foreign Office 
submitted several memoranda discussing the requirements for a lasting peace. These papers, 
however, paid little attention to East·Central European matters: they called for an indepen· 
dent Polish state but ignored Czech and South Slav claims and the possibility of dismember· , 
ing the Habsburg Empire. 
In December 1916 lloyd George came to power and he created the Imperial War 
Cabinet in March 1917. In charge of territorial war aims in the War Cabinet was lord 
Curzon. Curzon saw no possible way of containing Germany in Europe and suggested taking 
its colonial holdings; he made only occasional references to the just solution of the Belgian, 
Serbian and Polish problems. 
Meanwhile, separatist politicians from the Habsburg Monarchy worked hard to 
convince the Foreign Office of the necessity of reorganizing the Danubian basin. The Czechs 
started their all·out campaign in London but then decided to move their headquarters to Paris· 
. a clear indication that BeneJ and Masaryk considered the French a better bet. Ante 
Trumbic established his Jugoslav Committee in london. Trumbic decided to stay in london, 
considering British plans for the establishment of a Balkan league most promising. These 
politicians made themselves useful for the Allies in various ways (providing information, 
intelligence work, military service) and got into direct cooperation with the British govern· 
ment. 
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Very much like Wilson, lloyd George's War Cabinet also sought to remove Austria· 
Hungary from the war through secret negotiations. Meanwhile, certain officials in the Foreign 
Office and members of Lord NorthcJiffe's propaganda agency, Crewe House, began to favour 
and even demand the reorganization of East·Central Europe. When the Sixtus affair ruled out 
a possible separate peace with Vienna, the War Cabinet gave in and in May 1918 agreed 
to grant full support to the nationalities. Calder maintains that British foreign policy arrived 
at this point through several 'shifts in emphasis' and that the 'decision to use the nation· 
alities to destroy Austria·Hungary was never taken,' but 'a host of less significant decisions, 
combined in their historical context, had the same effect.,50 
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the British made serious attempts to 
have their views accepted in the New World. They launched an extremely effective 
propaganda campaign against Germany in America and won the unconditional support of the 
publisher·tumed·diplomat American Ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page. On top of that, 
in Sir William Wiseman of MI 1 c (Britain's foreign intelligence agency), the British had a . 
representative in America who had unrestricted access to Colonel House and Wilson. Yet, 
however important Wiseman was in the development of Anglo·American connections, there 
is no indication that he engaged himself with East·Central European matters while in 
Washington.51 
50 Calder (1976) p. 174. 
51 This summary of British war aims is based upon: Calder (1976); Goldstein (1991); Fest 
(1978); Kennedy (1981) and Stevenson (1991). On Wiseman's role see: Fowler (1969); Willert (1952) 
and Andrew (1995) chapter 2. The statement that he played no part in the development of Wilson's 
East·Central European policies is based upon these secondary sources as well as upon a survey of 
both House's and Wiseman's papers in the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University. 
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France entered the war against the Central Powers in the hope of a quick victory 
against the old foe, Germany, and to recover Alsace-lorraine. Indicative of the initial French 
disinterest in Austro-Hungarian matters are Premier Viviani's repeated references to the 
Ballhausplatz as 'Boliplatz' and 'Baliplatz,.52 Of the two western Allies France was open 
to direct German attacks and the ever-changing military situation largely explains the often 
contradictory official and unofficial statements regarding war aims. Instead of developing a 
coherent policy towards Austria-Hungary, France used her as a bait in the war: to keep 
Russia fighting and to lure in the neutrals, Italy and Rumania. 
Although supporters of dismemberment as well as of a separate peace were there 
among the highest circles from the very beginning of the conflict, the emphasis shifted with 
every change of government during the war. This game of musical chairs, a typical feature 
of French politics, ended with Clemenceau assuming control in late 1917. The unfavourable 
military situation in the spring of 1918 and the successes of the Polish and Czech legions 
on the various fronts eventually tipped the scale in favour of the nationalities. After some 
hesitation, the Tiger spectacularly ended all hopes of a separate peace with the Sixtus affair 
and started to support openly Polish and Czechoslovak independence. 
The French apparently made few attempts to influence directly American war aims 
towards Austria-Hungary. After a brief visit in the United States by Viviani in April 1917, 
Andre Tardieu was appointed to lead the permanent French War Mission in America. His 
52 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981) p. 56. 
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contributions remained limited until the end of the war when he was named Commissioner 
Plenipotentiary of the French delegation to the peace conference. 53 
Italy and Rumania named the prize for their cooperation with the Allies and secured 
official promises in the Treaties of London and Bucharest respectively. Despite laying claims 
to certain Austrian territories the Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino, who was in charge 
of East-Central European matters, opposed the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. In doing 
so he was led by the consideration that recognition of an independent Czechoslovak state 
would encourage the South Slavs and that a strong and independent Yugoslav state would, 
challenge Italy for most of the territories secured by the Treaty of London. He only 
surrendered his position under immense diplomatic pressure from London and Paris during the 
final stages of the war. Meanwhile, Rumania nullified the Treaty of Bucharest by signing a 
separate peace with the Central Powers but reiterated its claims by re-entering the war on 
the signing of the Armistice with Austria-Hungary. Like Russia, Italy and Rumania did not 
influence American policy towards the Habsburg Monarchy during the war.54 . 
The outline of American·Habsburg diplomatic relations presented in the first half of 
the present chapter offers several conclusions about American war aims. Initially, American-
Habsburg contacts in certain cases remained ordinary neutral-belligerent relations while in 
some other cases they became semi-hostile: until the end of 1916 Wilson worked with no 
coherent line of policy towards Austria-Hungary, he simply improvised. The Allied note of 10 
January 1917 offered him a new possibility which he willingly grabbed. Wilson substituted 
53 On French war aims extremely helpful was Pastor (1994) as well as Stevenson (1982); 
Stevenson (1991); Andrew and Kanya-Forstner (1981) and Wandycz (1962). 
54 Italian war aims are discussed in Zivojinovic (1972) and Valiani (1973). The best account of 
Rumanian war aims is Spector (1962); see also Stevenson (1991) and Zeman (1971). 
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secret talks for a separate peace with Vienna for his earlier public calls for peace. Once he 
made up his mind he carried this policy as far as he possibly could; his sometimes dubious 
statements served only tactical purposes. Left with no alternative when Clemenceau pulled 
his trick in April 1918, Wilson had to and did go for dismemberment to escape from the cuI 
de sac he had led himself into by insisting on a single-line policy. Yet, during the entire war 
he demanded fair treatment for the various peoples of the Danubian basin and insisted on 
regional integration in East-Central Europe. 
It may be said with a considerable amount of conviction that Austria-Hungary played 
only a secondary role in the war aims of the Allied and Associated Powers (with the 
exception of Italy) during the war. Interestingly, the Habsburg Monarchy played the leading. 
role in the history of the World War for two one-month periods: In July 1914 it launched the 
European conflict and in October-November 1918 it ended the war with unconditional surren-
der. In between, the Habsburg Monarchy, and with it Hungary, was not only treated as but 
actually was a secondary belligerent, a pawn in the game of genuine world powers. 
This concludes the introductory part of our enquiries; the next two chapters assess 
the period of American neutrality while the remaining section of the present study is devoted 
to the examination of the post-April 1917 period, culminating in a reevaluation of President 
Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy. 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC OPINION DURING THE PERIOD 
OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY 
89 
Domestic public opinion has always been an important factor in American policy 
making, especially in time of international crisis. The First World War was no exception: 
several individuals and organizations, some private, others official, stepped up to satisfy the 
general American curiosity about the rapidly unfolding military and political crisis in the Old 
World. Even a quick glance at the relevant volumes of the index of the New York Times 
would reveal that the leading metropolitan (i.e. New York based) paper dealt with the war 
extensively from the early days of the conflict. Naturally, the Habsburg Monarchy was also 
discussed but the definitive study of the image of Hungary, based upon a thorough survey 
of the contemporary American press, is yet to be written. likewise, surprisingly little has 
been written about Habsburg related propaganda in America during the war. Since any such 
enquiry would extend much beyond the limits of a dissertation the present chapter focuses 
only on key issues and on the image of Hungary and certain Hungarian politicians. An in· 
teresting aspect of the problem is that while Austria-Hungary did not figure in the front line 
of any propaganda campaign in neutral America, Hungary and Hungarian politicians were 
regularly discussed in the press. This offers a logical way of presentation with an ever 
narrowing focus from the broader propagandistic issues of the war to the image of Hungary. 
The following discussion is based primarily upon the American press and propaganda publica-
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tions circulated in neutral America and to a smaller extent upon a handful of available 
memoirs and secondary sources.1 
Much has been written about First World War propaganda and it is generally 
understood that the years between 1914 and 1918 saw the emergence of propaganda as 
an important means of influencing major policy decisions. During the war in Hungary the likes 
of Apponyi had pointed out the dangers of anti-Hungarian propaganda2 and later this was 
seen as one of the most important factors in the dismemberment of Hungary;3 even as late 
as 1982 the Hungarian-American historian Stephen Borsody expressed the opinion that 'the 
Trianon peacemaking was above all the triumph of propaganda.'4 
Propaganda may have come of age during the First World War but propaganda 
regarding the Habsburg Monarchy and Hungary remained rather limited both in scope and in 
effect in the United States; and this was especially true of the period of American neutrality. 
Four years of war yielded some 100 propaganda pieces most of which were released and 
circulated by immigrant organizations and by some half a dozen publishers.5 Of this by no 
means impressive output only a small fraction, at best two dozen pieces, had reached the 
American public before the declaration of war on Germany. Most of this propaganda was, 
1 These include Lasswell (1927); Sanders and Taylor (1982); Viereck (1930); and the present 
author's recent piece, Giant (1993). Further references are given below. 
2 The Introduction to Gesztesi (1918) was written in 1917 by Apponyi, who very modestly 
overlooked his own contributions which are detailed towards the end of the present chapter. 
3 Apponyi Emlekkiinyv (1926) pp. 124-25. This piece was contributed by the former Consul-
General in Cleveland, Ernest Ludwig. 
4 Borsody (1982) p. 26. 
5 These general conclusions are, unless otherwise stated, are those of GIant (1993). 
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of course, printed material; the possibilities inherent in oral and film propaganda were prac· 
tically ignored in the Habsburg case. 
A comprehensive assessment of wartime Habsburg related propaganda in the United 
States is extremely difficult; the further we move away in time from the war the more diffi· 
cult it becomes to reconstruct such efforts. Nevertheless, some general tendencies are 
relatively easy to identify. Together with the main attack on Germany both the pro· and anti· 
Habsburg campaigns were also launched in the United States as early as the autumn of 
1914, although some of the methods applied so successfully against the Germans, most 
notably atrocity propaganda, had either failed or were simply dropped in the Habsburg case. 
The United States became a battleground for propaganda for two obvious reasons. Firstly, 
as the war progressed it became clear that her intervention, either as mediator or as actual 
belligerent, would be a significant if not the decisive factor in the outcome of the war, 
which made propaganda necessary. Secondly, the United States held the largest colonies of 
the peoples involved in the conflict outside their respective homelands, which made propagan· 
da relatively easy to organize and conduct, although these efforts remained rather limited in 
the neutrality period. It should be noted that dismemberment propaganda and Wilson's own 
efforts with the CPI are discussed separately in subsequent chapters. 
During the period of American neutrality Allied and Central Powers propaganda 
dominated the psychological battlefield of the United States; domestic campaigners tended 
to focus on the broader implications of the war. The main issue initially was responsibility 
for the war and later, with America's Entente orientation becoming more and more obvious, 
the winning of her military support for the Allies and the securing of her neutrality for the 
Central Powers. 
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It is generally understood that of all foreign propaganda in the United States prior 
to April 1917 the British campaign was by far the most effective. Conducted 'unofficially' 
by the Canadian journalist and novelist Sir Gilbert Parker from Wellington House, london, this 
campaign proved to be highly successful, not least because the American public was simply 
not aware of the involvement of the British government in it. Parker's able staff analyzed 
American public life and identified individuals to be approached. To maintain the academic 
and informal image of the campaign the use of the word 'propaganda' was banned and with 
every pamphlet mailed to the approximately 260,000 addresses a private letter from Parker 
was also enclosed. B Moreover, Wellington House worked not only with pamphlets but also 
through the press. Having cut the German underwater cables to North America during the 
early days of the war the British had nearly complete control of war news although 
American correspondents were sent to Europe and the Germans kept forwarding reports via 
South American and neutral channels.7 Meanwhile, Parker and his associates analyzed the 
American press on a weekly basis and supplied the right articles if they were deemed 
necessary. The overall aim of Parker's campaign was to have the United States intervene 
on the side of the Allies in the war. The best way to achieve that, Parker maintained, was 
to put the blame for the outbreak of the war on Germany and to present her to the Amer· 
ican public in the worst possible light through atrocity propaganda, such as the infamous 
Bryce Report of • mostly invented· German abuses in Belgium or the execution of the British 
nurse Edith Cavell.B Thus, with Germany identified as the main enemy Austria-Hungary did 
not have a place in the front line of British propaganda in America. In 1935 the American 
6 Sanders and Taylor 11982) pp. 169-72, is an excellent account; a copy of one such letter by 
Parker is printed in Peterson (1939), facing p. 52; see also Calder (1976) chapter 3. 
7 Desmond 11980) p. 293; von Papen (1952) p. 30. 
B Two good discussions of atrocity propaganda are Ponsonby (1928) and Read (1972). 
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historian James Duane Squires published the list of the Wellington House pamphlets sent to 
America: of 231 different items only five dealt with the Monarchy or some of her peoples 
in any detail.9 likewise, only a handful of non-government British propaganda pieces that 
reached the American public through various other channels, including church connections and 
simultaneous publication (as in the case of some of the Oxford War Pamphlets), discussed 
similar issues_ Thus, one of the most impressive chapters of World War One propaganda, the 
official and private British campaign for American intervention, hardly produced a dozen 
publications about the Monarchy and her peoples.10 Some discussed Austrian foreign policy 
in general and in the Balkans (Woods), others introduced the Czecho-Slovaks (Namier) and 
the Rumanians (Leeper), and the first atrocity propaganda pieces were also circulated. Of 
those, the works of R. A. Reiss of the University of Lausanne deserve some attention. Reiss, 
posing as a 'neutral', actually worked on the request and under the friendly guidance of the 
Serbian Premier Nicola Pa!ic, wrote his first piece in 1915 and revised it twice by 1919, 
keeping the issue alive practically all through the war. Interestingly, the New Europe group, 
a semi-official British pro-dismemberment organization led by Robert William Seton-Watson 
and Henry Wickham-Steed, ignored the United States in this period. ll Actually, the first 
issue of The New Europe enjoyed a good reception in The Nation, one of the leading political 
weeklies of the time, but there is no indication that further issues were circulated in the 
United StatesY The work of Norman Angell, the author of the best selling The Great 
9 Squires (1935), appendix. 
10 Note that all propaganda material cited in this and subsequent chapters is listed in the 
appendix below. 
11 The New Europe group has been studied sufficiently both in English and in Hungarian: Hanak 
(1962); Seton-Watson (1981); Arday (1990); Jeszenszky (1986). In the present and subsequent chap-
ters only the American aspect of their work is discussed. 
12 The Nation, 23 November 1916, p. 480. My conclusion, drawn from the lack of evidence, 
was kindly confirmed by Mr. Christopher Seton-Watson. 
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Illusion (1911), stood out from the multitude of books and pamphlets discussing a postwar 
league of peace. In America and the Cause of the Allies (1915) he briefly mentioned the 
Monarchy as well, and described her as a German power to be challenged by international 
cooperation. 
In sharp contrast with British propaganda, Italian and French efforts are hardly worth 
mentioning. In fact, the Italians seem to have produced not a single piece of propaganda in 
the neutrality period and the French showed a similar lack of interest; their preferences also 
lay elsewhere. Even the leaders of the 'Austria delenda' movement, the likes of Ernest Denis, 
Ernest Lavisse, Henri Bergson and Emile Durkheim, chose to stay away from the American 
campaign. Denis' famous journal, La Nation Tchegue, for example, was never released in 
English. 
Meanwhile, German propaganda in America,'3 conducted by the special agent Dr. 
Bernhard Derenburg, Ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff and the talented journalist, 
George Sylvester Viereck, had three clearly defined goals: (1) securing the loyalty of German· 
Americans to the home country; (2) refusing responsibility for starting the war; and (3) 
denying atrocity stories. German lecturers were invited to the United States to promote the 
case of their country and numerous pamphlets were produced for American public consump· 
tion. Yet, such an open campaign was apparently very much out of place in neutral America 
and the relatively poor English of the German pamphlets, together with the fact that they 
all carried the official stamp of the Imperial Government, was by no means enough to match 
the Parker campaign. 
13 The following account is based upon the works of Roetter (1974) pp. 37·41, 54·59; Squires 
(1935) p. 45; Lasswell (1927) pp. 146·49; Dodd (1920) pp. 150·57; and the corresponding chapter 
in Viereck (1930). 
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The press campaign was orchestrated by Viereck who founded The Fatherland. the 
leading wartime German·American weekly, in order to secure 'fair play for Germany and Aus· 
tria·Hungary' in August 1914. Continuing into 1920, the paper first took an open pro·German 
stand, switching after the diplomatic break in February 1917 to a loyalist tone and changing 
its title several times (it ended up as Viereck's American Weekly but everyone kept referring 
to it as The Fatherland); after the war it slowly faded away, being published monthly for 
some time. Despite the fact, as has been cited above, that the motto of Viereck's weekly 
was 'fair play for Germany and Austria·Hungary,' only a fraction of the paper was devoted 
to Habsburg matters; sometimes for several weeks the Monarchy was not even men· 
tioned.14 Similarly, only two German pamphlets have been found which discussed the 
Monarchy. One of these was not even translated into English while the other one consisted 
of general facts and figures about the lesser Central Power. Thus, while German propaganda 
in neutral America, with all its shortcomings, has been portrayed as second only to the 
Parker campaign, it clearly shared the British uninterest in Habsburg related matters. 
Consequently, it was up to the Habsburg Monarchy to promote her own case in 
America, something her representatives failed to understand. There was simply no Habsburg 
propaganda campaign in neutral America and the only, and rather feeble, efforts came from 
two Hungarians: the New York Consul· General Alexander von Nuber and his colleague in 
Cleveland, Ernst ludwig, both of whom entered the Hungarian diplomatic service after the 
war. Von Nuber and his staff compiled a 64·page general pamphlet about the Monarchy, 
which was very similar to the corresponding German one, and von Nuber himself discussed 
14 One striking example is that the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph and the coronation of 
his successor were hardly mentioned while an entire special issue was devoted to Bismarck, who 
was presented as a devotee of universal suffrage, among other things: 7 April 1915 issue, esp. p. 
24. 
--------- --------------- -------~ 
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the Pan-Slav danger to the Monarchy (he called it 'The Menace of the Bear') in an October 
1914 article for The Fatherland_15 In early 1915 Ludwig published a short book titled 
Austria-Hungary and the War, which was also released in Hungarian. It was extensively 
advertised in The Fatherland and received some favourable reviews not least because its 
introduction was written by the then very popular Ambassador Dumba. According to Ludwig's 
own post-war account,16 his book was the only attempt to explain the Monarchy's position 
to the American public. In his book, Ludwig claimed that with the defeat of the Allies 'Eng-
land will lose her German and Austro-Hungarian customers to a very large degree and ... this 
trade will shift to other countries, preferably to the United States.' This rather weak appeal 
was complemented with references to the friendly relations between the two countries 
before the war and to Hungarians fighting in the American Civil WarY 
Other than that, Austrian propaganda in America targeted the Slavic communities and 
not the general public. According to Voska, Austrian propagandists even used films to 
hammer their message home: 
For one thing, the Austrians showed in every Slavonic colony a motion 
picture titled in the native language. The plot was simple and obvious. A 
Slovak in the United States makes a shell for the allies. It goes to the 
Russian front, where, shot at the Austrians, it kills his brother .18 
As indicated several times above, peaceful propaganda was not the main priority of the 
Austro-Hungarian Embassy and Consulates in the New World, and the unfortunate Dumba 
15 The Fatherland, 21 October 1914, pp. 7-8. 
16 Ludwig (1921) p. 141. 
I? Ludwig (1915) pp. 187-88, 192-94. 
18 Voska and Irwin (1941) p. 131. 
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affair pulled the carpet from under Austro·Hungarian propagandists. Dumba's involvement in 
sabotage, which was but another clear indication that the Austro·Hungarian Ambassador was 
ready to follow his German colleague in official and unofficial ventures alike, resulted in his 
forced recall and had severe consequences. While the diplomatic consequences of the affair 
are discussed elsewhere, its propagandistic effects should be examined here. 
Dumba's conduct and dismissal was on the agenda on a daily basis in the press for 
more than a month 19 and did very little to enhance the reputation of the Monarchy in 
America. It also became a standard feature of domestic American propaganda after April 
1917 and came to be identified, as well as the Hungarian·Americans, with German intrigues 
in neutral America. Meanwhile, the journalist Geza Kende summed up the Hungarian position 
in a letter to the New York Times. Kende pointed out the lack of genuine American neu· 
trality, stated that Dumba was not very popular among Hungarian·Americans anyway, and 
then asked several revealing questions: 
Did the American press and the American people stop to think only a minute 
what it means for Hungarians in America to manufacture munitions which 
are intended to kill their own brethren and destroy the houses in which they 
were born? Don't you see the dark, tragic side of the situation? Is it not a 
crime against the mother country to help willingly and knowingly the enemies 
who want to destroy it? Is it not the duty of the Ambassador of Austria· 
Hungary, even of every good American citizen, to help these poor Hungarians 
in their desperate situation, and show them a way to get some other 
peaceful occupation which is not in contrast with their feelings and senti· 
ments?20 
19 Especially in the New York Times and the New York World. 
20 BH G Kps: Newspaper File: press cutting without date, September 1915; it appears to be from 
the New York Times, 19 September 1915 issue, Section II. p. 3. 
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His efforts came to naught chiefly because the New York Times published his letter with the 
headline 'Hungarian Defends Dr. Dumba's Course' and with the subheading 'Editor Kende 
Says Ambassador Did Right in Trying to Cripple Munitions Plants,' . which, together with 
a large number of cruel cartoons depicting Dumba's departure 21 give a clear indication of 
the general resentment in the New World. The only paper to print Dumba's apologetic denial 
was The Fatherland,22 but its general anti· Administration stance ipso facto ruled out a 
favourable reception of its efforts in the matter. In many places Hungarian·Americans, whose 
involvement in the affair was obvious, were physically assaulted and were driven from their 
jobs and property. Under such circumstances, the exploits of Sandor Tamos did little to 
improve their situation. In February 1917 Tamos, armed to the teeth with revolvers and 
pocket·knives, walked into the Navy Department and insisted that he wanted to join the US 
Navy. He was arrested on the spot and American newspapers were quick to dub him as a 
spy, especially when it was revealed that the British had already jailed him for six months 
on the same charges.23 (In fact, we do not know what he wanted then and there.) 
The Hungarian·Americans took the only logical step to demonstrate publicly their 
loyalty to the United States, which remained the main feature of their activities until the Ar· 
mistice.24 Dumba's fall from popularity to disgrace reinforced the general tendency to view 
21 Some of these were reprinted later in Dumba's own memoir, which was published in English 
in 1933. 
22 The Fatherland, 22 September 1915, pp. 118·19; 29 September 1915, pp. 134·35. The 
attitude of the other leading weeklies was understandably hostile: The Nation, 16 and 23 September, 
pp. 347·48 and 372 respectively; New Republic, 11 and 15 September, pp. 136 and 190 respective· 
ly. 
23 BH GKps: Newspaper File: unidentified cutting dated 12 February 1917 and headlined: Magyar 
Kern? (A Hungarian Spy?). 
24 Puskas (1982M) pp. 306·12; Vardy (1985) pp. 88.91. 
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the Monarchy as the sidekick to Germany in the war; Austro-Hungarian activists thus did 
more to ruin the reputation of their homeland than to promote her cause in the eyes of the 
American public. 
Meanwhile, Hungarian government propaganda continued to target not the American 
public but the Hungarians in America. The Hungarian-American clergy and press continued 
to receive payments (even after the diplomatic break in April 1917, through the Red Cross 
and the Swedish Embassy25) to resist Americanization, to counter anti-Habsburg propaganda 
by other immigrants from the home country and to promote repatriation plans.28 In a highly 
symbolic gesture the Hungarian Premier Count Istvan Tisza sent an official letter to the 
Hungarian-Americans conferring thanks for their loyalty and financial contributions on 23 
August 1915.27 Thus, loyalty to Hungary was an issue but dismemberment most certainly . 
was not; not a single voice was raised in favour of an independent Hungary. 
At the same time, other immigrants from the Habsburg Monarchy attracted little 
attention in neutral America. For most of them, the thirty-two months of American neutrality 
was a period of frustration and gathering strength. Their activities remained limited to 
attempts to create a central organization, to public demonstrations, and to the continuation 
of local rivalries. The two exceptions to this tendency were the Czechs and some South 
Slavs, who therefore deserve some special attention. 
25 OL K 26 1174. cs. XIV. tetel: folder no. 3441/1918; Puskas (1982M) p. 310. 
26 Vardy (1985) pp. 87-89. 
27 BH GKps: Newspaper File: undated press cutting titled 'Ozenet hazulr61' (A Message from 
Home). 
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By the end of 1915 the Czecho·Slovak liberation movement abroad was in full flow 
with the Bohemian National Alliance in direct touch with Masaryk and Benes under friendly 
British guidance. The Bohemian·Americans had three significant achievements during the 
period of American neutrality: Voska established an intelligence organization which worked 
in close cooperation with the British, they had their case heard in the House of Representa· 
tives and they managed to raise a minor storm in the American press over the arrest of Alice 
Masaryk. 
In order to prove their loyalty to the US and to win some favours with the White 
House and the British, Bohemian·Americans organized an intelligence agency to unveil 
Austrian and German sabotage in the United States. Voska and his 'faithful eighty·five' had 
no less than four informants in the Austro·Hungarian Consulate·General in New York, which 
was a hotbed of sabotage activity. Voska's team scored several major successes including 
the Archibald case, which led to Dumba's recall. Voska worked with Sir Guy Gaunt, the 
Naval Attache of the British Embassy in Washington and the head British intelligence in 
America. Successful counter·intelligence work was a spectacular way for the Czechs to 
secure the sympathy of both the British and the Americans.28 
The Bohemian·Americans also launched a campaign to educate the American public 
on Czech and Slovak issues. An early but spectacular breakthrough came in February 1916, 
when the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives heard the BNA leader 
Charles Pergler's call for an independent Czechoslovak republic. And although no further 
28 Voska and Irwin (1941) is the best account; see also Willert (1952) and Andrew (1995) 
chapter 2. 
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action was taken by any official American agency, this clearly served as encouragement for 
the future.29 
But the Czech related case that attracted most attention in America before 1918 
was the arrest of Alice Masaryk. Back in 1878 Masaryk married Charlotte Garrigue of 
Brooklyn, NY, and they moved back to Prague. When Masaryk escaped to the west in late 
1914, his daughter, Alice, stayed at home. In order to checkmate Masaryk, the Austrian 
authorities arrested his daughter in October 1915 and apparently sentenced her to death. 
Masaryk's Americans friends were quick to rally to her rescue. Charles Crane, a wealthy 
American and a major financial contributor to Wilson's election campaign whose son served 
as lansing's secretary, promised Masaryk to turn his daughter's case into a second Edith 
Cavell case. The Bohemian-born Congressman Adolph J. Sabath of Illinois also lent his full 
support on the issue, and so did Herbert A. Miller and Mary McDowell. The story was ex· 
tensively covered by the American press until August 1916, when the Austro-Hungarian 
Embassy officially announced Alice Masaryk's release.3o 
Just like the Czechs, the Serbians were also busily promoting their case in America. 
During the early days of the war Serbia was presented as the Belgium of the Balkans and 
, 
the British, as mentioned above, circulated several Serbian related pamphlets in America. 
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia an American Red 
Cross mission headed by Colonel Edward F. Ryan was despatched to the Balkans. A Serbian 
29 Pergler (1926) pp. 58-60. 
30 The best account of the Alice Masaryk case is Unterberger (1989) pp. 30-31; on Masaryk's 
American contacts see Unterberger (1989) pp. 24-31. Miller is discussed in chapter 7 below; 
McDowell worked at the University of Chicago. Edith Cavell was a British nurse caught "spying1by 
the Germans. Her execution was presented as a barbarous German exploit against women by Parker 
and his team in America. 
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Relief Committee was also established and Americans gave freely to support the underdogs 
of the Balkans.31 
Of all peoples of the world, apparently the Montenegrins were the first to secure the 
War Department's approval for recruiting in America, as early as 1915. On finding this out, 
the Serbian Premier PaSte' Quickly sent Colonel Milan Pribicevic' (later the first Yugoslav 
Minister of the Interior) to America. Ambassador ljubo Mihajlovic lent his full support to 
Pribicevic, who was authorized to open a special recruiting office in Washington.32 However, 
in the absence of a well·organized propaganda ~ampaign to capitalize on the situation, 
interest in Serbia soon died away. 
The fact that neither the Alice Masaryk case nor the trials and tribulations of Serbia 
could raise lasting interest in East·Central European matters indicated that neutral American 
public opinion was not yet ready for an all·out campaign. 
President Wilson remained the chief American propagandist of the neutrality period 
and his call for 'neutrality in thought as well as in action' in August 1914 was met with 
more enthusiasm than his call to arms in April 1917. Nevertheless, the war, together with 
a variety of general issues, such as postwar international organization and disarmament, was 
being discussed freely from the early days of the conflict. Austria·Hungary earned only a few 
casual remarks; in fact the only book length first hand account of the Monarchy was 
31 Armstrong (1971) pp. 33.34. 
32 Prpic (1967) pp. 182, 186·87. The broader implications of this episode are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
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incorporated into a vivid travelogue by the radical journalist John Reed.33 Neutral America 
was apparently more interested in general than in particular issues. Coming closest to 
actually dealing with the Monarchy, George Louis Beer, later a member of the Inquiry, noted 
that the Central Powers were right when protesting against the British blockade which cut 
them off from neutral American contraband.34 Beer's statement was among the few at· 
tempts to take a genuinely neutral stand; the majority of domestic American propagandists 
took a pro-British position. One good example was Nicholas Murray Butler, then president 
of Columbia University, who delivered a series of public addresses on British-American 
cooperation and disarmament, and discussed the war in a series of articles for the New York 
Times under the pseudonym 'Cosmos'.35 His ideas were discussed by Apponyi in several 
open letters and his articles were published collectively in a small volume in 1917. Similar 
problems were in the front line of the efforts of the League to Enforce Peace, led by the 
former President William Howard Taft, and of James M. Beck, a Republican lawyer, working 
with the Pilgrim's Society, an unofficial British propaganda agency in America. 
The shortage of references to (Austria-) Hungary in the various propaganda campaigns 
in neutral America was more than made up for by the coverage of a variety of related issues 
in the press. The Habsburg Monarchy, being one of the chief belligerents, was discussed 
practically on a daily basis, albeit with some bias, which was due to the general sympathies 
of the papers and the British control of news. It was within this framework that the views 
of leading Hungarian politicians, such as Tisza, Andrassy, Karolyi and Apponyi, were dis· 
33 This was indeed the same Reed who wrote Ten Days that Shook the World about the 
Bolshevik Revolution. 
34 Beer (1916) pp. 1, 12-13. 
35 Tumulty described Butler's articles as worthy 'of the most earnest attention': WWPs 40: 24, 
Tumulty to Wilson, 21 November 1916. 
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cussed together with several other problems including the future of the Monarchy. Instrumen· 
tal in this process were the leading metropolitan dailies (the New York Times and World) and 
the top political weeklies (New Republic and The Nation) but regional papers, in the case of 
Hungary The Philadelphia Public ledger, also contributed some valuable information and 
opinion. Nevertheless, most of the information cited in the American press was second hand, 
sometimes hypothetical (Tisza as Habsburg Foreign Minister), sometimes based more upon 
expectations than upon reality (Apponyi's appointment as Ambassador to America), and only 
on a very few occasions did it originate with American correspondents in belligerent Europe. 
Of the several possible ways of presenting this subject the topical one has been selected 
with a view to an analytical approach. 
The background of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which triggered 
off the World War, was given very little consideration in the American press. Besides 
Apponyi's attempts, which are detailed below, the British historian George Macaulay 
Trevelyan's 'Serbia and Southeastern Europe' in The Atlantic Monthly appears to be the only 
such venture. Written with accuracy and without bias, Trevelyan's survey of the various 
peoples and conflicts of the Balkans and the Habsburg Monarchy does not deserve to be 
identified with what propaganda came to represent during the First World War.38 
Another issue of greater significance, the future of the Habsburg Monarchy (and of 
Hungary), was given surprisingly much attention even during the early months of the war. 
As early as January 1915 the American journalist Frank H. Simonds discussed the possible 
36 The Atlantic Monthly, July 1915, pp. 119.127. 
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dismemberment of the Monarchy in the New Republic.37 He foretold that Austria·Hungary 
would lose one third of her territory, including Transylvania. Simonds concluded that the 
Habsburg Monarchy should be and would be transformed into an American type confederation 
of the four states of Austria, Hungary, Bohemia and Croatia. According to Simonds, while 
territorial losses were inevitable, dismemberment was to be avoided in the interest of 
international peace. The break·up of the Monarchy, he argued, would render the world war 
but a prelude to a long series of wars, waged between the many nations 
and races who are heirs·at·law in history to the Hapsburg estate. 
He also made an interesting statement regarding Hungary which, on the one hand, echoed 
the theory of Daco·Rumanian continuity and some anti·Hungarian cliches but, on the other 
hand, testified to some insight into the issues of the war. When discussing Transylvania, 
Simonds claimed that: 
Historica"y it is a part of that Dacian province which sent thither the 
colonists to whom the Rumanians trace their descent. Fina"y the Hungarian 
nation, which has long ruled here, has earned the deserved hatred of the 
Rumanian population by employing precisely the methods which made Austri· 
an rule odious in Italy. That Rumania will presently enter the war, occupy 
Transylvania, and thus add 21,000 square miles to its present area is 
inevitable. 
It is easy to understand why this article marked the beginning of much iII·feeling between 
Simonds and the Hungarian·Americans; conciliation was achieved only in mid·1920 when the 
American journalist raised his voice against the Trianon Treaty.38 
37 16 January 1915, pp. 13·14. The two citations below are from p. 14 and p. 13 in that 
order. 
38 In the August 1920 issue of the short lived The Commentator, a Hungarian·American monthly 
established to win support for Hungarian revisionist claims in the New World, the following comment 
was printed about Simonds: 'Aside from sma" inaccuracies, Mr. Simonds is right. His present view 
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like Simonds, the Englishman Henry Noel Brailsford, the author of several books and 
pamphlets on the war and a prominent advocate of the League of Nations,39 also chose the 
New Republic for publicizing his opinion in the matter. In 'Hungary and Independence' 
(February 1915) he gave an impressive account of the pros and cons of Hungarian indepen· 
dence outlining the Hungarian position with utmost accuracy. On the other hand, he saw the 
'only one sure way of escape' for Hungary from the melee of the possible dismemberment 
of the Monarchy in joining a Balkans federation, into which she would be driven against her 
own will. According to Brailsford, an independent Hungary would accept this solution because 
she would be to that federation 'what Prussia is to Germany,' even though 'the typical 
Magyar thinks of the Balkan races as Europe thinks of Africa.' The English publicist, howev· 
er, refused to believe that things would go that far; even at the cost of severe territorial 
losses Austria-Hungary would survive the war: 
[Austria-Hungary] may emerge a second-rate Power, destined for its great 
good to devote itself henceforward to the task of internal reorganization. But 
the economic and political reasons which forbid any real independence to 
Hungary· or to Bohemia· will make for its conservation. It inspires no love, 
but it arouses only local hates. It will survive as a convenience.4o 
In his other piece for the New Republic, which was written under entirely different circum· 
stances in August 1916, Brailsford again dismissed the break-up of Austria-Hungary as 
of the Hungarian situation [printed in the June 1920 issue of The Review of Reviews] is the more 
significant because he was the most ardent supporter of the intolerant French attitude so conspicu· 
ously manifested in Versailles .. .' (p. 6.). 
39 Since no proof has been found regarding the circulation of Brailsford's works in America they 
are not listed in the appendix. One impressive example of his work is A League of Nations, London, 
Headley Bros. Publishers, 1917. 
40 In the 13 February 1915 issue, pp. 44-45. All quotes are from p. 45. 
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illogical and dangerous. Besides repeating his earlier argument about regional economic 
cooperation he also addressed the League of Nations idea: 
To 'break·up' the Dual Monarchy means a dictated, an imposed peace. If you 
start the new era in the world's evolution by conference, negotiation and 
adjustment of interests, even though you may have had to fight a bitter war 
in order to bring the enemy to conference, you may on this foundation of 
conference build the superstructure of a league of peace. Within that league, 
as the rivalries of the Powers ceased to express themselves as mere vio· 
lence, you might expect pari passu the decay of the local strife of the races. 
On the basis of a dictated peace, on the contrary, no future system of 
conference, and no league of peace could be erected without a miracle.41 
Another solution to the future of the Habsburg Monarchy, Friedrich Naumann's 
Mitte/europa plan, naturally attracted the widest attention in the American press and was 
discussed more extensively than any other Habsburg related issue with the possible exception 
of sabotage. Naumann's book, unquestionably one of the most significant pieces of wartime 
propaganda literature, was written during the first half of 1915 but was not released in 
English until the very end of 1916. Nevertheless, the concept of a German Central Europe 
appeared in the American press long before. 
The first such exposition was published in Viereck's The Fatherland, as early as 
December 1914. In a half ·page article Franz von List outlined the possibilities inherent in an 
East Central European regional integration under German leadership.42 The plan itself was 
regularly discussed in the American press, daily and weekly alike, but it was not until the 
publication of the English edition of Naumann's work that it was introduced in detail to the 
American public. In December 1916 Gustav Pollak reviewed the book in a nine·column article 
41 From the 16 September 1916 issue, titled 'The Vicious Circle of Nationality,' pp. 157·59. The 
quote is from p. 158. 
42 In the 16 December 1914 issue, p. 13. 
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for The Nation.43 Pollak took the plan apart and pointed to its apparent weaknesses • such 
as the possible frictions between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the resistance of the various 
nationalities, the problems of imposing the German language as the official one on such a 
large territory, etc. Little did he have to say about Hungary but one of his statements is 
worth quoting because it casts some light upon the depth of Pollak's analysis: 
And even if Austrians and Germans allow themselves to be carried away by 
such glittering phrases, the sober-minded Hungarians may in due time be 
trusted to look at the situation after the war with a keen eye to their own 
interests. The Magyars have never fully relished the union with Austria, and, 
no matter what their present attitude may be, they will never allow the Dual 
Monarchy to enter into any scheme that may threaten to interfere with their 
future freedom of action. 
With America's entry into the war the Mitteleuropa program soon became the 'Pan-German 
plot' for world domination and a major theme for both domestic and foreign propagandists. 
The image of Austria-Hungary as a sidekick to Germany in general and in the war 
in particular was built from several themes. One of these was unquestionably the Naumann 
thesis; another one was the British campaign against Germany presenting her to be the one 
and only enemy dangerous enough to challenge even America in the near future; and yet 
another element was the emergence of dismemberment propaganda. As will be seen in the 
following chapter, American diplomatic representatives all around Europe also promoted this 
concept which, together with her early and spectacular military setbacks, relegated the 
Monarchy to the group of secondary belligerents in the eyes of the American press. 
43 'The Vision of a "Central Europe"', from the 14 December 1916 issue, pp. 557-60. This 




This concept of the Monarchy as a secondary belligerent was a recurrent theme in 
the American press from the outset of the conflict; yet the first editorial in a major American 
paper to discuss it was not written until December 1915. Then, in The Nation, an unidenti· 
fied member of staff claimed that Germany had fought Austria-Hungary's war and had drawn 
her under the complete control of Berlin. This article echoed yet another misconception about 
the Monarchy, namely that her affairs were guided not by Vienna but by Budapest; the 
author claimed that it was the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza who was pulling the 
strings.44 This takes our discussion to the intriguing problem of the image of leading Hun· 
garian politicians in the American press but before providing the details, the broader issue 
of Hungary's position in the Habsburg Monarchy must be briefly addressed. 
By 1914, the interpretation of the delicate and unique nature of the Dualist system 
created by the Compromise of 1867 had long been a hotly debated issue within and without 
the Monarchy; and is still debated by historians.45 The present author is of the opinion that 
Hungary was not the dominant partner in the Habsburg Monarchy; in fact one may say that 
there was no dominant partner at all. The Compromise of 1867 was neither a personal union 
nor the alliance of two equal countries. Neither side was willing to upset drastically this 
peculiar balance of power, not even after the outbreak of the war. Individual Hungarian 
politicians (Tisza and Burian in the early stages of the war and Apponyi in 1917) were most 
certainly influential in Habsburg policy making but, as has been emphasized in previous 
chapters, neither secession from Austria nor a break with Germany was considered a serious 
possibility in the highest Hungarian political circles. It was the New Europe group, and espe· 
44 'Austria's Future', in the 9 December 1915 issue. 
45 The presently 'official' Hungarian interpretation was written by Peter Hanak and is available 
in English in the 1967 volume of the Austrian History Yearbook. 
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cially Robert William Seton-Watson, who began to promote the ideas of Hungarian domination 
within the Dual Monarchy and of Tisza's sale responsibility for the outbreak of the war in 
the west, primarily in order to make Czech, Rumanian and Yugoslav dismemberment propa-
ganda more credible and their territorial claims more acceptable. 
However, the first European politician to accuse Tisza of starting the war, at least 
in the American press, was not Seton-Watson, but Karolyi, who during his second visit in 
1914 gave a long interview to the Cleveland leader on the causes of the war.48 Karolyi's • 
actually false47 - accusations were soon reinforced by various Allied sources and Tisza 
came to be viewed as one of the strong men of the Monarchy. Not only was he mentioned 
regularly by the press but he was also the target of much speculation. He was presented 
as the driving force behind Burian's policies and on no less than three occasions the New 
York Times broke the news that he would replace his protege in the Ba"hausplatz.48 His 
opinion was eagerly sought in times of crisis (Dumba, the sinking of the Ancona); his angry 
refusal to surrender the pride of the Monarchy was reported49 together with his pro-
American statements.50 Tisza was never attacked seriously in the neutral American press, 
48 ludwig (1921) p. 142. 
47 It was revealed after the war that Tisza initially protested against the ultimatum to Serbia. 
A very good analysis of the problem is Di6szegi (1984) pp. 278-87. 
48 3 January, 9 March, and 25 May 1915. 
49 New York Times, 24 December 1915, front page: 'Advices [sic) from Budapest dated Dec. 
15 convey the impression that the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister [sic), Count Tisza is • or was· 
likely to overrule Baron Burian, the Foreign Minister, in case the latter should be desirous of meeting 
the American demands in regard to the Ancona sinking.' No quotation can be more telling than this 
one. 
50 New York Times, 24 September 1916, p_3: 'Tisza Proclaims Friendship for US.' 
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which was probably due to the expectation that if no one else then Hungary would stand 
up against the Mitte/europa plan. 
Another prominent Hungarian politician, Count Julius Andrassy, the son of the man 
who had built the German-Habsburg alliance and who as the last Habsburg Foreign Minister 
actually undid it in October 1918, was also discussed from time to time. Hardly suspecting 
his future role in the termination of the World War, the American papers mentioned Andrassy 
usually in relation to domestic Hungarian affairs. The only exposition of Andrassy's views 
on the war was the transcript, in the New York Times, of an article he wrote for the Neue 
Freie Presse of Vienna on 18 February 1917. Andrassy expressed his belief that the United 
States would not enter the World War only because some American citizens, who were well 
aware of the risks they were taking, were killed in various U-boat attacks. He also asserted 
that submarine warfare was a new and effective 'method of fighting on which we have 
decided, well knowing what we are doing is in order to defend ourselves and to break 
through the cruel starvation blockade after three years of war: He issued a final warning 
stating that the Monarchy would not turn back; traditional sympathies for America would 
be abandoned should national interest dictate such a step.51 
Karolyi may not have been very popular in the White House but no Hungarian 
politician, not even Apponyi, had a better press in America. This was, at least in part, the 
net result of Alexander Konta's April 1914 special article in the New York Times, which 
appeared with the telling headline: 'To seek American Sympathy for Hungarian liberty' and 
the subheading: 'Remembering Kossuth's United States Visit, Members of the Independent 
51 New York Times, 21 February 1917, p. 2: 'Andrassy Thinks We Will Not Make War.' Another 
lengthy discussion of his views was the Bullitt interview, which was printed in the Philadelphia 
Public ledger on 19 October 1916. Bullitt is discussed below. 
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Party Are Coming to Ask Our Aid for Democracy's Battle Against Austrian Autocracy.' K~ro· 
Iyi's involvement in Hungarian politics was anxiously monitored thereafter and his numerous 
pro· American statements were promptly reported to the American public. The K~rolyi publicity 
campaign, for which he himself did very little, peaked on 7 September 1916, when the New 
York Times applauded the formation of his new Independent Party with the headline 'For a 
New Hungary on American Plan.' The article faithfully introduced the program of the K~rolyi 
party, which indeed stood for everything that had been expected from Hungary: universal 
suffrage, the equality of the various peoples of Hungary and her independence from Germany 
after the war. As will be seen in the chapters on post·April 1917 propaganda below, the pro· 
K~rolyi campaign was continued well into 1918, although obviously for different reasons, 
only to be given yet another push by his emergence as the first Premier of postwar indepen· 
dent Hungary. 
Unlike Karolyi, Apponyi may have had the odd bad review, but he was by far the 
best known Hungarian politician in American political and academic circles and the only one 
who actively promoted Austria·Hungary's case in America. Besides maintaining his connection 
with TR until the sinking of the lusitania, he opened up other channels as well and secured 
access to the American press, which no other politician from the Central Powers could boast 
of. He was in the centre of some amazing gossip and was 'promoted' to the distinguished 
position, which he of course never held, of 'former Hungarian premier' by the New York 
Times in November 1916. 
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The Apponyi-Roosevelt friendship entered the war with the Hungarian aristocrat 
asking the former President to see Karolyi on his second American visit in 1914;52 but this 
encounter never came about. Broader issues were also discussed between the two of them: 
they both agreed that the World War was not arbitrable, but, not surprisingly, disagreed over 
the question of Belgium.53 The first touch of uneasiness developed between them when TR 
warned Apponyi that 
as late as June you were writing to me somewhat reproachfully on the 
ground that I was not aiding you and your friends in your violent anti-Austri· 
an crusade. As late as June the Magyars of your kind, including you, were 
using language about Austria which was in effect exactly like what you now 
say about those who are fighting Austria and Germany ... For years all your 
complaints to me have been against Austria. You have not said one word 
about Russia; and this continued until within thirty days of the outbreak of 
the war. You say that this is a struggle against Russia.54 
Their disagreements over some of the broader issues of the war would probably not have 
been enough to bring about a break between the two of them; it was provoked by the Ger· 
man sinking of the Lusitania. On 1 June 1915 the last letter, marking the end of a unique 
friendship of two such distinguished politicians, was written by TR, who made his position 
very clear: 
I thank you for your long and interesting letter. I shall not attempt to go 
through over the points you raise. Since you have written, the Germans have 
sunk scores of American men, women and children on the high seas, commit· 
ting what I cannot but regard cold-blooded murder; and I feel more strongly 
52 lC TRps: Correspondence: TR to Apponyi, 6 July 1914. Unfortunately, it has been impossible 
to recover some of their correspondence since only TR's papers are available. 
53 LC TRps: Correspondence: TR to Apponyi, 17 September 1914; also printed in Roosevelt 
(1954) 8: 819-20. 
54 LC TRps: Correspondence: TR to Apponyi, 5 March 1915; also printed in Roosevelt (1954) 
8: 906-07. The quote is from the first page of the letter; also p. 906. 
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than ever. The Germans themselves apparently feel very bitterly toward me. 
I do not feel bitterly toward them; and I have nothing but genuine friendship 
for the Austro-Hungarians. You do not need to be told my admiration for the 
Hungarians. Well, when this terrible war is over and when my friends among 
the warring powers have grown so that they are desirous of seeing me, I 
shall look forward to seeing them, and you one of the first among them.55 
If this break was a severe blow for Apponyi's one-man American campaign, he did his very 
best to make up for the loss through other channels. Back in August 1914 he sent an article 
to TR and asked him to help have it published in some American newspaper.58 When The 
Outlook, which TR had edited earlier, refused, Apponyi cabled the ex-President to send the 
article to Alexander Konta.57 That piece, together with three more of his open letters, was 
published in the New York Times during 1915. In his first two pieces,68 which appeared 
on the same day (17 January 1915, Magazine section), Apponyi contended that the war had 
long been planned by Russia against the Monarchy and Britain joined it willingly using the 
issue of Belgian neutrality as an excuse. In his next piece, also addressed to Nicholas Murray 
Butler, Apponyi discussed the lack of American neutrality in the conflict.59 He predictably 
began with the contraband issue, warning that the lack of genuine neutrality would under· 
mine America's credibility as a mediator in the long run. He went on to analyze Butler's 
thesis of the 'war between democracy and autocracy,' and pointed out that while Britain 
should be viewed as democratic, certain developments in France presented her in a different 
55 LC TRps: Correspondence: TR to Apponyi, 1 June 1915. 
56 In the letter dated 17 September 1914, as cited earlier. 
57 lC TRps: Correspondence: Apponyi to TR, 24 October 1914. 
58 One was addressed to Nicholas Murray Butler, the other was the article he had sent to TR 
earlier. 
59 28 March 1915, Section V: pp. 4 and 20. The quotes are both from p. 4; the discussion of 
the 'yellow peril' is on p. 20. 
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light. He acknowledged Butler's remark that 'the appearance of Russia among the Allies is 
an anomaly,' but again claimed that Russia was not simply 'among the Allies' but actuallv 
their leader: 
I must repeat it over and over again: it is in origin a Russian war, with a 
clearly outlined Russian program of conquest. 
Finally, he addressed the question of postwar international organization in a way which gave 
away another aspect of his political views, hitherto unknown to the Americans. He began 
with a warning against misleading analogies, using one of his 1911 American speeches: 
The American Union's origin was the common struggle of several English 
colonies, now States, for their emancipation; unity of purpose was the main 
principle of their growth, union its natural result. Europe, on the other hand, 
is, in her origin and in her present state, a compound of conflicting interests 
and struggling potentialities. Mutual antagonism remained the principle of 
growth embodied in her several national lives. 
Apponyi went on to suggest the establishment of a postwar 'western coalition' including the 
United States but excluding Russia, a country, in his opinion, representing 'eastern mentality, 
which implies an unadmissable [sic] spirit of aggression' and of conquest.' Despite his 
apparent Russophobia, which stemmed mainly from the memories of 1849, Apponyi did not 
exclude the possible incorporation of Russia in the 'western coalition' at a later stage. 
Russia, however, might win admission to the coalition not through democratization, which 
would take her another couple of centuries according to Apponyi, but because the 'yellow 
peril' of Japan and China would force her into seeking assistance from the west. This racist 
attitude and fear of non-white peoples, although fashionable at the time, had not been 
characteristic of Apponyi's political writings and addresses earlier, and is somewhat puzzling. 
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The Hungarian politician's final open letter, printed on 12 October 1915 and ad· 
dressed to a Mr. Allen, 'a member of the World Peace Foundation,' proved to be the least 
convincing one. He simply repeated his arguments about the lack of American neutrality ('the 
manifest unfairness of her so·called neutrality has unfitted America to act as peacemaker') 
and Russian aggression, but with more passion than ever before: 
How on earth can you say that France and England are fighting for those 
principles which America upholds, when these two powers are in alliance 
. hR· ? Wit ussla .... 
While this was a point which caused some problem to those who wished to present the war 
as one of democracy vs. autocracy until the March 1917 revolution in Russia, Apponyi 
touched the wrong nerve with one of his final statements: 
What are the few hundred who went down with the lusitania, deeply though 
we mourn their lot, in comparison to the hundreds of thousands who are 
killed by American bullets fired by Russians from American guns, by Ameri· 
can explosives, a token of sympathy offered by a peace·loving democracy to 
the representative of darkest tyranny and wanton aggression?6o 
On several occasions Apponyi was criticized for his views as being 'made in GermanY',81 
and the October 1915 article was his last stand in the American press during the war. 
Nevertheless, his pacifism and pro· American statements were continuously reported on, and 
he returned to the focus of attention, and to the front page of the New York Times, in Sep· 
tember 1916, when he abandoned his earlier position regarding America's status as potential 
mediator in the war: 
60 All three quotes are from p. 10. 
81 See for example the editorial on p. 8 of the 28 December 1914 issue of the New York Times. 
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We are all living in hope that when at last peace comes and when the time 
arrives for a neutral power to offer her services, it will be the great republic 
across the Atlantic as most fit for a work of such magnitude. We all hope 
the United States Administration will take the affair in hand sooner or later, 
when they deem it proper to do SO.62 
Subsequently, expectations were rising both in America and in Hungary that Apponyi would 
replace the humiliated Dumba, and this (actually unfounded) rumour repeatedly surfaced in 
the American press. If anything, this was a clear indication of the fact that Apponyi's 
prestige in America remained as high as ever, despite his break with TR, his occasional 
remarks, and despite the criticism he received. 
As if to save much of the work of later historians, the two American journalists who 
visited Hungary during the war and reported on it to the American public summed up all the 
themes outlined above instead of making a genuine attempt to understand what was going 
on in Budapest. Their strikingly similar accounts, widely read as the only first hand informa· 
tion available, guided Henry Bayard Swope of the New York World and William Christian 
Bullitt of the Philadelphia Public ledger, to entirely different fates. 
Swope, whose single report, the thirteenth in a series about belligerent Europe, was 
printed in the 16 November 1916 issue of the prestigious metropolitan paper, later simply 
disappeared from the political scene. The ruthless press war between the World and The 
Fatherland soaked up most of his energy and, on top of that, he was roasted in the 
Hungarian·American press for what was considered a gross misrepresentation of facts.63 
62 23 September 1916, front page: 'America the Nation to Bring About Peace, Count Apponyi 
Tells Hungarian Parliament.' 
63 BH GKps: Newspaper File: cutting from a November 1916 issue of the Szabadsag: 'Egy 
Amerikai Magyarorszagr61' (An American about Hungary). 
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Bullitt, on the other hand, although writing for a less prominent regional paper, 
quickly rose to prominence, which makes this early chapter of his long (and rather hectic) 
political career even more interesting.64 Newly·weds in 1916, the Bullitts decided to spend 
their honeymoon travelling in the Central Powers interviewing key politicians to boost 
William's career as a journalist. He had all the makings of a talented journalist: good insight, 
an enjoyable style, the ability to ask the right question and to interpret the answers 
'correctly' even when he received none. Typical of his luck, they were in Budapest when 
Rumania declared war on the Monarchy and he interviewed Tisza, Apponyi and Andrassy. 
As indicated in the chapter on wartime diplomacy earlier, he submitted a copy of the Tisza 
interview to the State Department after he had been asked not to publish it. He cleverly 
skinned the same cat twice by publishing the rest of his interviews in the Public ledger, 
which secured the attention of the highest circles for him. Colonel House had him appointed 
to the State Department and later he was named for the peace delegation as well. His 
'adventures' at the Peace Conference are common knowledge as is the fact that after the 
war he teamed up with the famous psychologist Sigmund Freud to write a highly critical 
assessment of President Wilson. 
He began his front page accounts for the Public ledger on 15 October 1916, with 
a general introduction focusing mainly on Germany but already indicating that he had inter· 
viewed the 'Counts Tisza, Apponyi and Andrassy, the strong men of Austria-Hungary.' Four 
days later he devoted his entire contribution to Hungary. He claimed that during the week 
after the Rumanian declaration of war: 
64 The following account has been reconstructed from his articles, the diary of his wife (which 
is listed in the appendix for reasons outlined elsewhere), and by using Brownell and Billings (1987) 
pp.49-65. 
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I was able to interview the three strong men of the Habsburg monarchy and 
to record their reactions to the blow. On August 29 I talked with Count 
Albert Apponyi, the splendid old aristocrat who officially leads the Opposition 
party in the Hungarian Parliament. On August 30 I interviewed Count Julius 
Andrassy, the brilliant son of a great father, the candidate of the Opposition 
for the portfolio of Baron Burian and perhaps the cleverest man in Austria· 
Hungary. On September 3 I talked with Count Tisza, who since the day 
when he wrote the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia has guided the destinies of 
the dual monarchy. 
The rest of the article is a transcript of his interviews with Apponyi and Andrassy, which 
are more about what Bullitt wanted to hear than about what he was likely to have heard. 
, 
He went to Hungary with a full set of preconceptions and interviewed the three politicians 
the American public knew about; in a sense he was telling what he was expected to tell. 
Yet, it would be unfair to write Bullitt off with that since his third article for the Public Led· 
ImL on 3 December 1916, was a valuable contribution. He wrote a vivid account of life in 
wartime Vienna and Budapest for the Magazine section of his paper, spiced with witty re·. 
marks 'about the special hospitals to care for men who have been bitten by Italians;' a 
typical, although quite morbid, wartime Hungarian joke. At the same time, his account, 
sometimes stereotypical, is always on target and his analysis of the economic situation of 
the Monarchy ranks with the similar reports of Ambassador Penfield. Better than any other 
American, Bullitt understood the motivation behind the refusal of a separate peace: 
At the end of their resources of men, in swift economic decline, why do not 
the statesmen of the Habsburg monarchy strive to make a separate peace? 
Because they are gentlemen. In this day of 'real politik' such a statement 
seems ridiculous. Nevertheless, it is true. The Habsburg monarchy is an . 
aristocracy, with all the vices of an aristocracy, but with all the virtues as 
well ... I asked some scores of Austrians and Hungarians, among them Counts 
Tisza, Andrassy and Apponyi, the question, 'Why don't you save your own 
skin by making a separate peace?' Invariably the answer was, 'Because we 
are neither Italians nor Rumanians. We do not break our word.' 
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His message never got through to the White House and, as has been cited earlier, Wilson 
kept up his quest for a separate peace with the Monarchy even during the spring of 1918. 
A look at propaganda and public opinion in neutral America hardly offers any far 
reaching conclusions. Austria-Hungary was yet to become the topic of discussion for 
propagandists while Hungary was portrayed rather stereotypically in the press. The Monarchy 
was depicted as a tired second class belligerent, with Hungarian politicians, especially Tisza, 
being the driving force behind her actions. This presentation defined ipso facto the image of 
Hungary as well, (1) being the dominant half of the Monarchy, with Tisza the starter of the 
war; but (2) the only possible blocker of German eastward expansion, regardless of her 
actual position in the war and her refusal to break her alliance. 
The only politician to actively campaign in the American press for Austria-Hungary 
was, unquestionably, also the best qualified one, Count Apponyi. Yet, with the odds so 
heavily stacked in favour of British propagandists, he did not stand a real chance, and he 
enjoyed little help if any from both the Habsburg and the German diplomatic representatives 
in America. Besides his open letters the only first hand accounts that reached the American 
public were the reports of two American correspondents, both of whom wrote what they 
believed instead of what they may have seen. The intriguing aspect of this problem is that 
American diplomatic representatives all around belligerent Europe pictured the Monarchy in 
similar vein. Official American views of Austria-Hungary are the subject of the next chapter, 
which covers the relevant work of the State Department and of the various American 
intelligence agencies upto to April 1917, and which offers some concluding remarks about 
the period of American neutrality. 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
OFFICIAL AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 
DURING THE NEUTRALITY PERIOD 
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Having established in the previous chapter that propagandists and the press presented 
the Habsburg Monarchy to the American public as a second class belligerent, a satellite of 
Germany steered by Berlin and Budapest rather than by Vienna, attention here is devoted to 
the views of those official American representatives who were involved in Habsburg related 
decision making either as active participants or as suppliers of information. The fact that the 
United States was the leading neutral power in the war while Austria·Hungary was among 
the chief belligerents suggests several seemingly logical possibilities, especially in the light 
of Wilson's unconcealed ambition to act as the ultimate mediator in the war. One would 
expect, for example, that Wilson's official and unofficial advisors, the members of his cabinet 
and Colonel House respectively, developed a coherent opinion of and policy towards the 
Habsburg Monarchy. It also seems to be a logical expectation that the various Departments 
of Wilson's cabinet would play a leading role in this process by covering the political, 
diplomatic, military, naval and economic aspects of the problem. Regardless of the quality 
of such surveys, it is also logical to assume that within this framework Hungary would be 
given little attention, if any at all, which makes it necessary to widen the focus of our 
examination to the entire Habsburg Monarchy yet again. 
A thorough survey of published and unpublished sources suggests that official 
American representatives did not analyze the Habsburg Monarchy during the neutrality period; 
the only exceptions were the reports of Ambassador Penfield in Vienna. Generally, the 
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Monarchy was dealt with on a day to day basis, and none of the Departments went as far 
as to summarize whatever information it had collected. It is hardly surprising that the popular 
image of Austria·Hungary remained unchallenged in administration circles; in fact, some 
ambassadorial reports even reiterated it. For various reasons outlined below, the Departments 
of the Navy and Commerce did practically no work on the Dual Monarchy and the contribu· 
tions of the State and War Departments as well as of the various intelligence agencies under 
the auspices of the Treasury and Justice Departments fell well short of what may be called 
comprehensive. Following the discussion of these issues, and by way of concluding the 
analysis of the neutrality period, attempts will be made to explain the emergence and preva· 
lence of this unfavourable image of the Monarchy, and to evaluate the actual nature of 
American neutrality. 
Wilson's chief advisor during the war was the 'silent man of Texas,' the honorary 
Colonel Edward Mandell House, who never accepted any formal appointments with the excep· 
tion of Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Paris Peace Conference. 
House shared, not to say encouraged, Wilson's strong Anglo-Saxon sympathies and viewed 
himself as the ultimate behind-the·scenes operator in the White House. Back in 1911, House 
wrote an utopian novel, Philip Dru, Administrator, in which he portrayed the world as united 
in a global league of peace, led, of course, by the two Anglo·Saxon powers.' When Wilson 
invited him to be his private advisor, House willingly agreed and set out to realize his 
dream.2 The World War provided him with the best possible opportunity and he acted as 
Wilson's 'super-secretary of state', which relegated William Jennings Bryan, the official 
1 Cooper (1983) pp. 244-45. 
2 An entry in House's diary, dated 28 September 1914, proves this point: 'During one of our 
talks I was interested in hearing him outline some such form of government as I gave in Philip Dru: 
WWPs 31: 95. 
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Secretary of State, and his successor, Robert Lansing, into the group of secondary advisors. 
House was sent on several important diplomatic missions to Europe and negotiated with 
leading politicians of both camps, although he never visited Vienna. 
House, with his sights so firmly set on Britain and the West, displayed no interest 
in the Habsburg Monarchy at all; yet twice during 1915 he did take a stand on specific 
issues. First, he warned Wilson against accepting the first Vatican peace drive: 
I suppose you know that the Pope was elected through Austrian influence 
and that he is largely guided by it ... The Pope desires very much to be a 
mediator, and the Dual Alliance may so want to use him, but I am trying to 
make sure that the Allies will never accept him.3 
House's advice was accepted and later it formed the basis for the American rejection of the 
second, and more widely known, Vatican offer of mediation in 1917 as well. House then sug· 
gested during the Ancona crisis that the American position made clear to Germany in the 
two Lusitania notes should be emphasized by a diplomatic break with the Monarchy.4 For 
once, Lansing joined forces with House in this matter and Viereck asked with considerable 
anxiety in The Fatherland: 'Is the Administration deliberately provoking a break with Austria· 
Hungary?,5 Viereck must have been relieved to find out that it was not; this happened to 
be one of the few occasions when Wilson overruled his confidant and best friend.8 
3 WWPs 32: 522; House to Wilson from Paris, 14 April 1915. 
4 WWPs 35: 234; House to Wilson, 21 November 1915. 
5 The Fatherland, 22 December 1915, p. 352, editorial. 
8 WWPs 35: 406.07. 
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House forwarded several short reports by Penfield to Wilson, which echoed not only 
the Vienna Ambassador's views but also Allied propaganda: 
[Penfield] confirmed our belief that Austria-Hungary and Turkey are now but 
little more than provinces of Germany. The Central Empire runs from the 
Baltic to the Dardanelles and beyond. The Germans took charge during the 
troublous days of last spring when Russia was slowly overrunning Austria 
and by their efficiency and organization threw the Russians back. The 
Austrians are consequently grateful... The desire for peace is also prevalent, 
but there again the people are mere cogs in the great German war machine 
and as helpless to express their desires as the German soldier in the trench· 
es.7 
The striking absence of references to the German·Austrian relationship in the reports of 
Penfield, which are introduced below, indicates that House was projecting not only the 
Ambassador's views. A survey of House's papers, including his diary, has provided no 
evidence of any interest in the Habsburg Monarchy or Hungary during the war. 
A similar day to day attitude characterized the approach of Wilson's official Secretar· 
ies of State, first William Jennings Bryan, then Robert Lansing. Neither of the two was 
supposed to have a say in decision making, anyway: Bryan's appointment was a reward for 
the veteran Democrat's services to the party, while Lansing was chosen because Wilson 
'probably thought that he needed nothing better than a competent and experienced adminis· 
trative assistant.'8 During 1913, Bryan offered the Monarchy a cooling-off treaty, a move-
prompted not by the relationship between the two countries but by his somewhat idealistic 
quest for world peace. With a treaty of arbitration already in effect and having little 
admiration for Bryan, Dumba advised the Ballhausplatz against the offer but suggested that 
7 WWPs 36: 124, House to Wilson, 3 February 1916. 
8 Bailey (1963) p. 88. 
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it be accepted 'in principle.' With the outbreak of the World War the issue was dropped9 
and Bryan, the only genuinely neutral member of the entire Wilson administration, duly orga· 
nized neutral·belligerent relations between the two countries. He resigned in June 1915 
because he considered the second American note regarding the sinking of the lusitania too 
provocative.10 
His successor, Robert lansing, an international lawyer of considerable experience and 
former counsellor of the State Department, was openly pro-Entente and tried to push Wilson 
towards intervention more than once, which the President took with some resentment." 
A look at lansing's private memoranda and correspondence suggests that he too focused on 
Germany and paid little attention to the Habsburg Monarchy. His hostile attitude surfaced 
during the 1915 crises and later prompted him to take a pro-dismemberment stand long 
before Wilson's change of policy. When Dumba's activities were revealed lansing immediately 
demanded his recall, hardly giving the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador a chance to come up 
with an explanation. 
The contribution of the other members of the Wilson cabinet was similarly limited; 
the Departments of the Navy and Commerce practically ignored the Habsburg Monarchy, 
leaving her study to the State Department and Secretary of War Newton Diehl Baker's 
Military Intelligence Bureau, the so-called War College Division. Before providing the details 
of their contribution, the lack of interest on the part of the Departments of Commerce and 
the Navy must be addressed briefly. 
9 Davis (1958) pp. 40-48; Dumba (1933) pp. 226 and 230. 
10 Challender (1961) pp. 97-98. 
'1 Smith (1958). lansing's role is discussed in chapters 10 and 11 below. 
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The Department of Commerce could have provided a comprehensive economic analysis 
of the Monarchy to complement similar efforts in the diplomatic-military field from other 
Departments_ This task was not performed and, as will be seen shortly, the White House 
worked with assumptions instead of facts, most of which were provided by Ambassador 
Penfield_ Although the Department had access to published statistics from the Dual Monar-
chy, which were later handed over to the Inquiry, it had no representative with the Vienna 
Embassy_12 Josephus Daniels' Navy Department was obviously preoccupied with the subma-
rine issue and transatlantic trade, in which the Monarchy played a rather limited part. 
Austria-Hungary was not a major marine power in the sense Germany and Britain were, 
consequently she was rarely paid much attention. The farthest Daniels' staff had gone was 
to complete a set of extremely detailed maps of the Adriatic coastline by the end of 
1917.13 
Practically all official information thus came from the State Department and Military 
Intelligence. Characteristic of the division of labour between them was the fact that Penfield 
hardly ever reported on the military situation which was left to Captain Allan l. Brigge, the 
American Military Attache in Vienna. A detailed analysis of their reports requires some 
introductory remarks about the Department of State and, in more general terms, the Wilson· 
ian diplomatic corps. 
12 The lack of interest on the part of the Department of Commerce was most certainly the 
result of the British blockade which cut off the trade between the two countries. 
13 NA RG 45: NRCONRL: Box 878: WX5 Enemy: Austria-Hungary, Coastal Defenses, corrected 
version. Likewise, no record of any reports by the American Naval Attache was found in the other 
relevant collection, NA RG 38: 78/A: NICC. In fact there seems to be no record of his name either, 
the only proof that there was such a person is an off-hand reference by Penfield: FRUS 1915 Suppl. 
p. 13. 
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According to the most comprehensive study of the Department of State during the 
Wilson years: 
On the eve of the European war, Wilson was dependant on a Department 
whose leadership was almost entirely lacking in experience in foreign affairs 
and a group of appointed envoys overseas whose chief qualifications were 
their service and financial contributions to the Democratic party.14 
In all fairness to Wilson, when these appointments were made in 1913, hardly any American 
could foresee the impending global war and the role the United States was to play in it. 
Consequently, at the outbreak of the war the Department had barely a couple of dozen 
employees.15 In fact, it was so short on qualified personnel that the President, on the ad· 
vice of House, requested William Phillips, a young Republican and a TR man (I), to reoccupy,. 
the office of Third Assistant Secretary of State.18 When Bryan resigned during the lusitania 
crisis, Robert lansing, formerly second·in·command as counsellor, was appointed on 23 June 
1915. While in office, lansing tried to reorganize his Department without much apparent 
success, although he at least doubled its staff by the Armistice. 17 Austria·Hungary, together 
with Germany and Turkey, fell under the jurisdiction of the Near Eastern Division, headed by 
Albert H. Putney. Characteristic of the chaos within the Department was the fact that while 
Penfield and Gerard reported to Putney, other information regarding the Central Powers, 
coming from Allied and neutral sources, went to the West European Desk.18 Steps to 
14 Bell (1983) p. 27. 
15 The definitive study of the State Department is still Stuart (1936), for the purposes of the 
present study esp. pp. 91·104. 
18 Phillips (1955) pp. 25·26. Wilson's decision may also be seen as putting a token Republican 
into the Department, but that would have been an uncharacteristic move on his part. 
17 Bell (1983) pp. 35, 49·58. 
18 Stuart (1936) pp. 92·96; Bell (1983) pp. 22·24, 28, 55. 
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coordinate the work of these two divisions were not taken until JulV 1917, when Joseph 
Clark Grew, formerlv with the Berlin and Vienna Embassies, was asked to take charge of 
the West European desk.19 
On top of the apparent lack of organization and information within the Department, 
most Ambassadors, and especiallv Walter Hines Page in London and Penfield, tended to 
report directlv to the President and Colonel House as well as to the Secretary of State, 
which made Lansing's job no easier. This is not to suggest that the State Department would 
have been more effective had it received all the incoming information: after all, several 
students of Wilsonian diplomacy have pointed to the fact that his Ambassadors also lacked 
expertise and were denied a say in decision making.20 Although this policy was nothing 
new, still it was typical of Wilson that he made no amends after the outbreak and escalation 
of the war. Thus, it is not only unnecessary but would also extend much beyond the scope 
of the present study to introduce his key Ambassadors; yet a few striking examples must 
be mentioned. Gerard, in Berlin, failed to produce a single useful policy proposal regarding 
the Monarchv and reported mostly what Washington wanted to hear.21 Stovall, in Berne, 
was so uninterested that George D. Herron, one of Wilson's self·appointed agents and inter· 
preters in Europe, had to send his reports regarding the Monarchy from Switzerland to 
Washington via Paris.22 Walter Hines Page in London was so pro·British that even Wilson 
19 Grew (1953) 1: 326·30. 
20 See for example Calhoun (1986). 
~ 
21 An entry in the House diary on Gerard, dated 23 December 1913: 'The President was afraid 
of Gerard. He thought if we had any serious business with Germany, Gerard would fall short of the 
mark.' WWPs 29: 74. 
22 Wilson (1941) pp. 20·21; Briggs (1932) p. 29. Herron, living in Geneva, began to interpret 
Wilson's speeches for the European public in such favourable manner that the President took notice 
of him. Herron began to supply information to Washington and, as mentioned above, negotiated 
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got fed up with his reports23 while Thomas Nelson Page, holding the key post in Rome, 
hardly ever commented on the Monarchy and when he did so he chiefly used Italian mi,!itary 
intelligence information. Charles J. Vopicka, Bohemian by birth and the joint American 
Minister to Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, was arguably the most biased of Wilson's Ambas· 
sadors and was described by lansing as follows: 
Vopicka is a perfect joy. His broken English and vanity make him enjoyably 
absurd.24 
A staff with such qualifications hardly enabled the State Department to provide a comprehen· 
sive analysis of the Habsburg Monarchy. Its representatives drew heavily upon press reports, 
which were not very accurate, and the official Allied interpretation of Germany being the 
main enemy was accepted without much criticism. From the earliest days of the war, various 
reports from Europe pictured the Monarchy as inferior to and run by Germany, yet being 'one 
of the proudest Empires' in Europe. 
secretly with Heinrich lammasch in 1918. Briggs (1932) is the definitive study; it also lists Herron's 
writings. 
23lC GCps: Creel· Wilson correspondence: box 3: Creel's comment on Page: 'Walter Hines Page, 
like so many of our ambassadors, became more British than the British. As time went on, he 
complained bitterly that the President not only paid no attention to his dispatches, but there was 
ample evidence that he did not even read them. These complaints, reaching the United States, stirred 
a certain amount of criticism, and I called it to the President's attention. "Why should I read Page's 
dispatches?" he answered. "I can get the British point of view much more succinctly from the British 
ambassador.'" Initially, however, Page was viewed as a key member of the Wilson staff, mutual 
disenchantment must have developed later. Osgood (1953) pp. 154-60. 
24lC Rlps: Lansing's diary, 21 June 1919. Note that Lansing concluded that Vopicka 'has really 
done well at Bucharest.' He must have forgotten by that time that he had recalled Vopicka on the 
insistence of the German government, and reinstated him only after the German-American break. 
Mamatey (1957) pp. 122·23. 
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Yet, in American political circles the disenchantment with the Habsburg Empire, a 
conservative and Catholic monarchy, was apparent even before the outbreak of the war. In 
the musical chairs game of sorting out diplomatic posts Frank McCombs, Wilson's 1912 
campaign manager, was offered the Vienna Embassy. A 19 December 1912 entry in Colonel 
House's diary reveals that McCombs was 'distinctly disappointed at [sic] the ambassadorial 
offer.' McCombs' position was further clarified when he: 
said that the idea of 'being sent into darkest Austria' did not appeal to him, 
but he thought he would like to go to France.25 
With the coming of the World War, Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in london, 
became a most ardent promoter of the low-key image of the Habsburg Monarchy. He intro-
duced the topic as early as 2 August 1914: 
In one way at least race-hatred is at the bottom of it [i.e. the war] • the 
Slav against the Teuton. The time to have that fight out seems favourable 
to Russia· the old Austrian Emperor is in his last years,. the Slav States of 
his Empire are restive, not to say rebellious ... 26 
Without submitting a comprehensive analysis of the British attitude towards Austria-Hungary 
Page went on to report in similar vein arguing that the 'Austrians mechanically follow the 
Germans' and that: 
Austria is no longer thought of by the British as an independent power-only 
a German satrapy, like Turkey or Bulgaria.27 
25 WWPs 25: 614, 19 December 1912; WWPs 27: 127, 21 February 1913. 
26 WWPs 30: 330, Page to Wilson. 
27 WWPs 31: 372, Page to Wilson, 30 November, 1914; WWPs 35: 415, Page to Wilson, 31 
December 1915. 
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The Berlin Embassy under James W. Gerard, another financial contributor turned Ambassador, 
proved similarly ineffective. More a man of East Coast high society than a diplomat, Gerard 
was described by Mrs. Bullitt as 
one of the most amusing men I ever met. Brusque, frank, quick·witted, a 
typically judicial mind, and a typically undiplomatic manner, he is the last 
person in the world whom a German would understand. His dry, slangy 
American humour, his sudden lapses into the comic in moments of solemnity, 
his irreverence for the great, shock the worthy German. That he treats the 
Emperor in any other way than as a business acquaintance is most unlike· 
ly.28 . 
No evidence has been found to prove that Gerard submitted a single analysis of the German· 
Austrian relationship, although he may have done so when summoned to Washington for 
consultation in late 1916. Instead, his reports were filled with entertaining, but not very 
useful, gossipy remarks, of which the one regarding Count Julius Andrassy stands out: 
Andrassy is rather old and tired but his wife is full of energy and pushes 
him on ... It is possible that Andrassy through German influence may be made 
Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of Burian. This is to be the first step in . 
a German Coup D'Etat to take place on the death of Francis Joseph . the 
throne successor to be given Austria alone, and Prince Eitel Fritz, the 
Kaiser's favorite son, to be king of Hungary with possibly a Czech kingdom 
in Bohemia.29 
That the Habsburg Empire in Berlin was viewed with a British-type condescension was 
reinforced by the American Military Attache in the German capital, Walter Rockwell Gherardi, 
whose report was sent on to Wilson: 
28 Bullitt (1918) p. 16. Note that this volume is listed in the appendix for reasons outlined later. 
Gerard was related to the Sigrays, one of the most prominent Hungarian families. 
29 WWPs 38: 71, Gerard to Lansing, 8 August 1916. 
132 
More than the German, are the Austrian people desperately tired of war. The 
Austrian Government has not the ascendancy over the spirit and intellect of 
its subjects, nor have the people the national vigor which sustains Germany. 
In Austria the preventive measures in economic matters have been carried 
out only by half way methods and the conditions for living there are much 
worse than in Germany. It is to be expected that this will be a hard black 
winter for Germany and a worse one for Austria.3D 
With the American Embassies outside the Habsburg Monarchy supplying little useful 
information it was left to Penfield and the Vienna Embassy to provide the White House with 
the necessary inside views. Since Penfield is a little known member of Wilson's diplomatic 
corps, perhaps it is not out of place to pause briefly here and introduce him. 
Born in 1855, Penfield was among the few Ambassadors who had previous diplomat· 
ic experience: he served as Vice· Consul General in london during 1885 and as Consul·General 
in Cairo during the second Cleveland administration. He wrote several books on the Near East 
and earned decorations from several countries and from the Pope. His connections to the 
Vatican and his previous diplomatic experience, but, above all, his generous financial contribu· 
tions to the Wilson election campaign, secured him the post in Vienna. Appointed on 28 July 
1913, he served for 44 months, much to the satisfaction of President Wilson. After his recall 
from Vienna (28 March 1917) Penfield returned to New York and died in 1922.31 Unfortu· 
nately, he wrote no memoirs, which, together with the fact that it has been impossible to 
recover even the full list of his staff(!),32 renders the task of assessing his contribution ex· 
tremely difficult. 
30 WWPs 35: 131, Gherardi to House, 11 October 1915. A comprehensive account of wartime 
German·Austrian relations is Shanafelt (1985). 
31 DAB 7: 425·26; WWPs 27: 111, n. 1. 
32 The State Department diplomatic list is apparently incomplete. Some of the gaps, such as the 
name of the Naval Attache, are discussed elsewhere in the present chapter. 
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Besides the regular despatches to the State Department Penfield often reported to 
Colonel House on the latter's numerous visits to Europe, and sent 'frequent confidential and 
personal letters' to Secretary of State Robert Lansing. His tasks in Vienna were necessarily 
diverse; hereafter only those shaping the American views of the Monarchy as a belligerent 
are discussed together with, of course, his occasional references to Hungary. 33 
In many of his short despatches to Washington and reports to House, Penfield tended 
to use the (by now familiar) dramatic tone to describe the internal situation of the Monarchy: 
he reported the appearance of various diseases and the impending military collapse of the 
Habsburg Empire in March 1915;34 he claimed in April 1916 that general disillusionment 
with the war prevailed together with a strong desire for an immediate peace;35 and con· 
tended in February 1917 that 'Economic life of Austria-Hungary seems paralyzed.'38 Pen· 
field, unlike his fellow Ambassadors, at least advised Lansing that he had arrived at this 
conclusion gradually: 
I have dispassionately observed the gradual change in the public mood, from 
exaltation when the Central Powers were progressing in Poland a year ago 
and forcing Russia from Galicia to the current state of mind describable by 
no other words than utter and complete despair. The masses are thoroughly 
tired of the war and would welcome peace in any form that took but a 
reasonable amount of territory from them.37 
33 Davis (1958) carries a reliable general discussion of renfield's activities in Vienna. 
34 WWPs 32: 440, House to Wilson, 27 March 1915. 
35 FRUS LP 1: 654, Penfield to Lansing, 15 April 1916. 
36 FRUS 1917 Suppl. 1 p. 39, Penfield to Lansing, 6 February 1917. 
37 FRUS LP 1: 662, Penfield to Lansing, 23 September 1916. 
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In his longer letters to lansing, which covered the period between November 1915 and 
September 1916, Penfield provided a more detailed analysis of the Monarchy38 and, alone 
of all Ambassadors involved in the matter, earned the praise of both Wilson and House.39 
In his letters, the Ambassador, of course, addressed the broader issues of the war (the entry 
of Bulgaria and Rumania, the future of Serbia, etc.) as well as the domestic Austrian 
reaction to the 1915 diplomatic crises. He dealt extensively with the return of Dumba,--, 
established that anti-American feeling peaked in Vienna in February 1916 due to the Dumba 
and Ancona affairs and the debate over contraband, and explained the Monarchy's unwilling-
ness to send an Ambassador to Washington: 
The Foreign Office believes it has a bona fide grievance against the American 
Government, preventing the Teutonic representatives from telegraphing by 
wireless in secret to their governments, while the Entente representatives 
(have every facility of peace times.4o 
Equally significant is the fact that Penfield continuously informed lansing about the economic 
situation. Although admittedly not an expert, he was the only official American source of 
information in matters· such as war loans, the shortage of meat and fuel in Vienna, and the 
devaluation of the crown by 47 percent by the end of 1915.41 
From a purely academic point of view, Penfield's main contributions were his six· 
monthly reports on the Monarchy, all typed, and ranging from 20 to 80 pages. These five . 
38 These letters are all printed in FRUS lP 1: 639-64. 
39 FRUS lP 1: 659, Wilson to lansing, 27 July 1916: 'Thank you for letting me see this letter 
from Penfield. He always says something that is useful to keep in mind.' Characteristically, the letter 
mentioned by Wilson was more about Near Eastern affairs than about Central Europe. 
40 FRUS lP 1: 640, dated 4 November 1915. 
41 FRUS lP 1: 642-43, 648, 11 November and 9 December 1915. 
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reports are the longest and most detailed official American discussions of the Habsburg war 
effort before April 1917. He claimed that the Emperor Francis Joseph was running the 
affairs of the Monarchy single-handedly and with surprising vigour. He addressed the issue 
of Bohemian and South Slav unrest but never claimed that revolution was around the corner. 
He again discussed economic issues but admitted freely that he had no definitive information 
on the actual cost of the war, nor on the number of troops on the various fronts.42 Inter· 
estingly, he never wrote about the German-Austrian relationship; nor did he claim that the 
Hungarians were controlling the foreign affairs of the state or that Tisza had provoked the 
war. 
At the same time, although not unexpectedly, Hungary was paid very little attention 
in the diplomatic correspondence between Washington and the Vienna Embassy. This notwith-
standing, the first document to discuss the internal affairs of the Monarchy at length did 
come from Consul-General Coffin in Budapest. In his four-page memorandum for Bryan, the 
only one by Coffin on the subject, he put forward many of the ideas outlined in the previous 
chapter, which does not testify to a good understanding of the situation on his part. Coffin 
introduced his discussion by claiming that the 'general atmosphere is decidedly that of 
depression' in Hungary, which he attributed to the early military setbacks on the fronts and 
based upon information provided by an Italian correspondent who was not allowed to visit 
the trenches. The most important section of Coffin's report addresses three key issues: 
My impression is that, while the war is supposed to be a Hungarian war in 
that Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, and Count Forgach, Under 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and also a Hungarian, are said to have drafted 
42 The first two have been printed in FRUS 1915 Suppl. pp. 10-14 and 45-52. Copies of the 
other three reports have been found in the House collection at Yale. However, it appears that House 
did not read them: he does not comment on them and there are no marks on the reports. SMl 
EMHps: Series 3: Political Papers: Box 178, folders 1/4-6. 
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the Servian [sic] note, the Hungarian Government and people are heartily sick 
of the war now and are beginning to be apprehensive that whichever side 
may win Austria-Hungary and especially Hungary are bound to be heavy 
losers. I have heard it said that should the Central European alliance win, 
Austria-Hungary will not be much more than a German grand duchy in the 
future. Even the expression of such opinion is an interesting indication of the 
frame of mind here. I consider that if Russian successes continue racial 
troubles are inevitable in Hungary and a serious falling out between the Aus-
trians and the Hungarians would not surprise me.43 
Further information, of similarly limited value, was provided by Consul Chase in Fiume, who 
repeatedly reported on South Slav unrest and Italian agitation in the region.44 Penfield 
himself rarely mentioned Hungary and he too used second hand information: 'reaching me 
second hand' and 'a newspaper before me states' are typical introductions to Hungarian 
material in his communications.45 
Ignoring Hungary and consequently relying heavily only on Austrian opinion • and 
speculations· are among the major shortcomings of Penfield's performance. Another apparent 
problem with Penfield's reports is that he often discussed Near Eastern and not Central 
European problems, which suggests that he might have preferred an appointment to that 
region and that he would have performed there better.48 While trying to maintain an impar' 
tial position he also avoided numerous key issues, especially the German-Austrian relationship, 
which he clearly failed to understand. It also appears that in two cases he slightly over· 
reacted. Firstly, he was anxious, perhaps too anxious, to secure the friendly attitude of the 
43 NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708, reel 3: dated 27 September 1917. It speaks for itself that Coffin, 
although in Budapest, worked only with hearsay information. After the diplomatic break in April 1917 
he was transferred to Copenhagen. He reappeared during the Peace Conference. 
44 NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708, reel 3. 
45 FRUS LP 1: 654, 656. 
48 FRUS LP 1: 640, 646-47, 652-53, etc. 
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Vienna papers for America and on one occasion he forced the withdrawal of a cartoon criti· 
cizing President Wilson.47 Secondly, following the German·American diplomatic break, he 
stirred a minor storm by getting his staff ready to leave Vienna prematurely.48 Within a 
couple of weeks time, when Wilson finally decided to restore diplomatic parity between the 
two countries not by accepting Tarnowski as Ambassador but by recalling Penfield, the 
American Ambassador in Vienna was rather reluctant to leave his post. According to Joseph 
C. Grew, who was transferred to Vienna from Berlin, it was Czernin's tactful intervention 
that saved Penfield public embarrassment.49 Penfield apparently did not perform much better 
than any of his colleagues all around Europe but his reports, although of mixed quality, were 
certainly the only, and well received, source of first hand information about the Habsburg 
Empire. 
Before drawing the final conclusions about the image of the Monarchy and Hungary 
in neutral America, the work of the various American intelligence agencies must also be 
looked at. The work of the American Military Intelligence during the neutrality period has not 
been discussed at length, 50 and in the light of the reports coming from Vienna, it was not 
47 WWPs 37: 289, House to Wilson, dated 23 June 1916: 'I have a letter from Penfield in 
which he says: "On May 15th a low·class journal printed the enclosed cartoon against the President. 
I demanded an immediate interview with Baron Burrian [sic] and protested vigorously against the 
publication of such attacks against the sovereign ruler of a land with which Austria was not at war.· 
Within twenty·four hours I had a written apology ... "' House's comment is revealing: 'If Penfield can 
do it in Austria, Page and Sharp can do it in England and France.' 
48 The New York Times, 28 February 1917, front page: 'Americans Ready to Leave Austria'; 
'Penfield Completes Arrangements for All Diplomatic and Consular Agents to Depart'; 'Believes Break 
Imminent.' 
49 Grew (1953) 1: 320·25. 
50 Not a single secondary reference to American intelligence work in the Habsburg Monarchy 
has been found. 
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given priority. Captain Allen l. Briggs, 23rd Infantry, served as Military Attache and had a 
staff of three: two observers attached to the K und K Army (Major Clyde S. Ford, Medical 
Corps, and Captain Berkeley Enochs, Infantry) and an interpreter called l. H. Eisenmann.51 
Briggs' reports, numbering around 300 by the time of his recall in October 1916, were never 
digested by the War Department. Besides the regular weekly reports on the Austro·Hungarian 
Army and specialized communications covering a variety of issues from 'rolling kitchens' to 
the use of dum dum bullets, administrative questions were discussed in detail and Briggs sub· 
mitted analyses and pictures of the Austro·Hungarian General Staff. The single indication in 
the records found that Briggs' staff considered Hungarian material is a letter by Eisenmann 
to Washington complaining that they had not managed to secure enough Hungarian dictionar· 
ies.52 After Briggs was relieved from his post, his work was continued by Eisenmann,53 
which indicates that no replacement was named. This lack of interest also characterizes 
Briggs' reports on the Austro·Hungarian General Staff. His longest report, dated 6 January 
1916, was based upon one single source, the 1914 edition of the Austro·Hungarian Army 
list, an official K und K publication, and carried no comments at all. 54 When requested to . 
evaluate the performance of the General Staff, Briggs contacted the Imperial and Royal War 
Department for information and reported to Washington that: 
1. The Organization of the Austro·Hungarian General Staff has fully come up 
to expectations. Its reorganization is not contemplated. 
2. The strength of the General Staff as it was before the war has sufficed; 
in order to fill up gaps and to provide for new formations officers who had 
51 NA RG 165: WCDGC was the only collection covering the issue. Note that on one occasion 
Penfield mentioned a Captain Mcintyre, another military observer: FRUS 1915 Suppl. p. 13. 
52 NA RG 165: WCDGC: Box 265: no. 8108·42: letter by Eisenmann, dated 23 January 1917. 
53 NA RG 165: WCDGC: Box 259: no. 8039·60, dated 10 October 1916. 
54 NA RG 165: WCDGC: Box 428: no. 9286·F·l, dated 6 January 1916. 
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formerly belonged to the General Staff and had been transferred to the line 
have again be re-detailed in the General Staff. It is not possible to state the 
number of officers of the General Staff per 100,000 men. 
3. The duties of the officers of the General Staff have not been changed by 
the present war. 
4. The hypotheses under which the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was 
organized in time of peace have proved correct in time of war.55 
He complemented the above report with a one-page schematic chart of the organization of 
the General Staff. While this limited amount of material offers no far reaching conclusions 
as to the qualifications and insight of American Military Intelligence personnel in Austria-
Hungary, and one is even more reluctant to draw such conclusions in the total absence of 
naval intelligence reports, it is clear from the above that the general lack of interest in Habs· 
burg, and in Hungarian, matters prevailed in War Department circles as well. 
Domestic American intelligence work5B was split between the Bureau of Information 
of the Department of Justice and the Secret Service of the Department of the Treasury, . 
headed respectively by Bruce A. Bielaski and William J. Flynn. The chief concern for both 
organizations was German and Austro-Hungarian sabotage in America. Both agencies worked 
in close cooperation with the British, whose main source of information was Voska and his 
team. The heavy dependence of American intelligence work on the Bohemian-Americans, indi-
rect though it may have been, served the cause of the Czechs better than anything else save 
for their Legion in Russia in the summer of 1918. Lansing's plan to create one single agency 
to coordinate all intelligence work was flatly rejected by Wilson. With American entry into 
55 NA RG 165: WCDGC: Box 428: no. 9286-F-3, dated 7 February 1916. 
56 The only available account is Andrew (1995) chapter 2. 
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the conflict the emphasis gradually shifted towards intelligence work abroad, which is 
discussed in chapter 10 below. 
* * * 
The low-key image of the Empire of the Habsburgs in America was not a wartime 
development, it had emerged long before. Austria-Hungary was everything America was not. 
It was a proud but shaken old monarchy and not a confident young republic; it was Catholic 
and not WASP; it stood for protectionism and not for the 'open door'; and it was reluctant 
to introduce universal suffrage. Austria-Hungary was a continental European power but not 
a major player on the global scene; the 'awakening giant' of America did not have to 
consider it as a potential ally or enemy. Before the war Americans showed nothing but indif· . 
ference towards the Monarchy; even diplomatic relations were limited to the issues of trade 
and immigration. It also speaks for itself that the only really prominent American politician . 
to visit the Dual Monarchy was the much travelled Roosevelt; and so does the fact that· 
Wilson's 'travelling ambassador', Colonel House, never visited Vienna. Likewise, the leading 
American war correspondents were more interested in the western front and Germany than .. 
in the lesser Central Power. During the war, neither the members of Wilson's cabinet nor his 
ambassadors provided the President with accurate first-hand information. This was only 
partly due to the lack of enthusiasm and insight on their part, it was also because such 
services were not requested by the White House. The one Ambassador who could possibly 
have taken the initiative was Penfield in Vienna, but the striking similarities between his 
conclusions and the opinion of prominent politicians of the Monarchy indicate that he was 
141 
unable to form an independent view of his ownY It is apparent that both Penfield and 
Coffin read The Times of london with more interest than the Vienna and Budapest papers, 
which were of course not printed in English.58 This brings up another intriguing issue, that 
of British propaganda. 
There is a general tendency in secondary works on wartime propaganda to underesti· 
mate the British control of war news in America and the fact that British propagandists 
spoke, or more importantly wrote in, the very same language the Americans did. Thus, the , 
reasons for the success of the British campaign for war in neutral America must be sought 
not only in the hundreds of pamphlets they circulated but also in the indirect British control 
of the American press. While the occasional German attempts to purchase various American 
newspapers were viewed with resentment, the majority of war news came from British 
sources. The aim of British propaganda, as put forward by Parker, was to lure the United 
States into the war on the side of the Allies by presenting Germany not only as the single 
most dangerous adversary but also as a dangerous challenger to American interests in the 
Western Hemisphere. Simply telling the Americans how dangerous the Germans were was 
not the way to pull off this trick, not to say miracle. The only two propagandists who had 
the insight to realize this were Parker during the neutrality period and, although under 
entirely different circumstances, Masaryk in the summer of 1918. 
And this is where Parker's genius comes into the picture: he understood that 
American ideals should be targeted. The German violation of Belgian neutrality was cleverly 
57 Compare Penfield's February 1917 report and ezernin's April Memorandum of the same year, 
or Karolyi's reference to territorial losses and the corresponding reference in Penfield's account. 
58 This appears to be the only logical explanation to the fact that Coffin used only second·hand 
information. 
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abused: the 'Huns' were presented as animals to the American public (Bryce report) while 
the Imperial German Government, for the benefit of the Wilson administration, was portrayed 
as a violator of international agreements and was exposed as a saboteur. When neither this 
nor the introduction of unlimited submarine warfare, which was indeed provoked by the 
British blockade, brought America into the war, London played the ultimate card: the 
Zimmermann telegram. Direct German interference in the Western Hemisphere, during and not 
even after the war, was an extremely provocative open violation of the Monroe Doctrine.59 
To be dubbed as a satrapy (notice the use of an oriental term by Page) of such a challenger 
to America was just about the worst thing that could happen to Austria-Hungary on the 
propaganda front. 
Lacking the insight of Parker, the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representatives in 
America did very little to educate the general public or the political elite. The Dumba affair 
and the sinking of the Ancona very nearly proved to be the last straw to break the camel's 
back. It was not until the succession of Charles to the throne and of Czernin to the 
Ballhausplatz that the Monarchy swallowed its pride and, more than a year after Dumba's 
recall, an Ambassador was sent to Washington. This move was prompted not only by the 
wholesale changes in Vienna but also by the general mood of appeasement (the December 
1916 open peace drives) and the symbolic American guarantee of undisturbed wireless 
connection between the Washington Embassy and the Ballhausplatz.60 Furthermore, the 
59 Hardly ever has the significance of this aspect of the problem been given sufficient consider· 
ation, although a simple reference to the other two similar occasions in the 20th Century, namely 
to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and to the Cuban Missile Crisis, is sufficient to prove this 
point. 
60 Although according to Penfield Vienna attached much significance to this issue it appears that 
it was used as an excuse for not sending an Ambassador. It might also have been viewed as a 
possible easy diplomatic victory to restore dynastic pride. Note that these conclusions are merely 
speculative. 
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selection of Tarnowski by Czernin was a good decision: it implied that Vienna was not 
against Polish independence, and it was also a gesture towards Lansing. There is no 
indication that Apponyi had wanted the post in Washington or that his appointment was 
seriously considered at any point. Czernin, in fact, handled the Americans with confidence 
even after the American declaration of war on the Monarchy, and if not for his poor showing 
in the April 1918 Sixtus affair, he may well have been looked upon more favourably by later 
historians. 
Another question to be addressed is how Hungary fits into this framework. During 
the war Hungary was looked at through the prism of the Habsburg Monarchy and her ideal· 
ized pre-war image was gradually replaced by a two·track attitude. On the one hand, the 
concept of a liberal Hungary, or rather, the expectation that it was around the corner, was 
kept alive. In this case the New York Times article on Karolyi's program is very telling, as 
was the general expectation that Hungarian self-interest would eventually thwart the 
Mitteleuropa plan.61 On the other hand, the Americans were gradually coming to terms with 
a more real Hungary, which was presented with some exaggeration as the dominant partner 
in the dual alliance, a natural ally of Germany and the bringer of the war. This concept was 
apparently taken for granted and promoted by the two American correspondents who did go 
to Hungary during the war. Slowly, this new image of Hungary, although as much off target 
as the other one, began to dominate American public opinion, paving the way for the post-
April 1917 dismemberment campaign. During the period of American neutrality, however, 
61 On one occasion an editorial in The Nation, amusingly, based this expectation on a passage 
in Gibbon's work on the Roman Empire: 'While the force of circumstances links the fortunes of the 
Hapsburg Monarchy to those of the German Empire, the Magyars are certain, no matter what the 
outcome of the war, to pursue their ends with a view chiefly to Magyar interests. That shrewd 
sense of the practical which Gibbon long ago recognized in the Magyar race has again and again ... 
manifested itself...' 8 February 1917 issue, p. 1. 
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neither Wilson nor Penfield subscribed to this interpretation, which was more due to their 
indifference than to their insight. 
The gradually declining prestige of Austria-Hungary was but one of several open 
manifestations of the lack of American neutrality. Wilson's initial refusal to ban the export 
of contraband was due not to any dislike of Germany but to the cherished American principle 
of laissez faire, or if we want to be cynical, to raw business interests. However, once that . 
decision was made there was no turning back: the Allies, who sustained the blockade of the. 
Central Powers, insisted that trade be kept up while Germany and Austria-Hungary demanded 
either equal access to war material coming from America or a complete ban on sales. This 
was a situation the Wilson administration could not cope with. Unwilling to cut off trade 
with the Allies, Wilson began to protest against the blockade, but did so rather half-hearted· 
Iy. Thus the British policy, which was based upon an accurate assessment of Wilson's WASP 
sympathies, forced the Central Powers into acts (of sabotage and submarine warfare) by 
which they discredited themselves in the eyes of everyday Americans and policy makers 
alike. Added to that was the all-out atrocity campaign against Germany. These factors 
combined to secure American sympathy for the Allies. 
But in some cases the Americans went beyond mere demonstrations of sympathy or ' 
dislike. The present author, for example, finds it rather difficult to believe lansing's state· 
ment that Gerard opened accidentally one of von Bernstorff's officially sealed reports to the 
German Foreign Office, which was sent in the diplomatic pouch, in September 1915, at the 
height of the Dumba crisis.62 
62 WWPs 34: 528, lansing to Wilson, 27 September 1915. 
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Although this Gerard· von Bernstorff incident was not made public, it was apparent 
that Wilson's America was neutral neither 'in thought' nor 'in action'. The more politically 
conscious Slavic elements in the US were quick to grasp the possibilities inherent in the 
, /,eh,rtl! 
situation and acted accordingly. Pergler',s hearing~he House Foreign Relations Committee 
provided further encouragement. 
Another indication that the belligerents were not treated equally by the White House 
was the issue of recruiting in America. German and Austro-Hungarian subjects were not 
allowed to travel home and join the army back home. Meanwhile, Czech, South Slav and 
Polish-Americans simply had to jump the longest unguarded border in the world to join the 
Serbian divisions Of the Allied armies or the French Foreign Legion, which were then recruit-
ing in Canada. 63 Wilson took no steps to put an end to this indirect British recruiting in 
America. Moreover, Montenegrins and Serbs, the latter then at war with Austria-Hungary, 
were allowed to recruit in America openly as early as 1915 and May 1917 respectively. This 
set a precedent to follow, and the War Department granted similar privileges to the Poles 
and the Czechs in October and November 1917, that is before the United States declared 
war on the Habsburg Monarchy.64 
Interestingly, no action was taken either when Sir Guy Gaunt, the head of British 
Naval Intelligence in the US and the Naval Attache of the British Embassy in Washington, 
was found reading official secret German documents.55 To put this case more bluntly: 
63 Calder (1976) pp. 58-59, 226. 
64 Mamatey (1957) p. 132. 
55 Viereck (1930) pp. 77·80. Viereck claimed that they had consciously trapped Gaunt to test 
Wilson's reaction. The German Embassy must have been bitterly disappointed with the result. 
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calling for strikes in munition factories in America was enough reason to demand the 
immediate recall of an Ambassador while being caught red-handed spying in neutral America 
on Germany was excusable. 
One is under the impression that Wilson's decisions in these two cases (Le. recruiting 
and Gaunt's exploits) were a kind of indirect reward for the invaluable services rendered by 
Voska and Gaunt to the United States of America. Another and more obvious motivation was 
Wilson's well-known sympathy for peoples living under foreign domination, to which he 
testified publicly in his June 1917 Flag Day address.B6 
Yet those who thought that these concessions by Wilson were the first steps 
towards his acceptance of the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy were badly 
mistaken. After the initial ad hoc responses to diplomatic crises, Wilson developed a one-
track policy towards Austria-Hungary and stuck to it as long as he possibly could. And this-
policy was not dismemberment, but negotiating the Monarchy out of the war while securing 
fair treatment for all the peoples living within its boundaries. It was a combined military,' 
diplomatic and ideological crisis that eventually made him change his mind. The remaining 
chapters of the present study deal with the various attempts to convince the President of 
the necessity of reorganizing the Danubian basin along ethnic lines, with that April-June 
1918 crisis period and with Wilson's own conduct. 




In this opening chapter on the period of American belligerency, foreign and immigrant 
propaganda for the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy will be discussed. However, 
before that is done a few general introductory remarks should be made. The entry of the 
United States into the conflict on the side of the Allies was among the major turning points 
of the First World War, and it triggered off a series of realistic as well as unfounded 
expectations both in Europe and in America. The Allies received an enormous moral and 
military boost; their victory seemed to be but a matter of time. Berlin, on the other hand, 
did not panic; the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann firmly believed that the German Army would 
crush the Allies before the American military build-up could affect the situation. The fact that ' 
the Americans due to their slow build-up expected the war to run well into 1919 indicates . 
that Bethmann's expectations were not necessarily unfounded. Vienna was less confident: 
Czernin expressed the general feeling of disillusionment and fear in his 'April Memorandum', 
and contended that even another winter campaign would far overstretch the limited resources 
of his country. Propagandists both in Europe and in America were relieved to find that after 
Russia had, at least supposedly, taken a democratic turn in the March revolution, the conflict 
could now be presented as one between democracy and autocracy, which was exactly what 
Wilson did in his speech in Congress when asking for a declaration of war on Germany. The 
leaders of the various national movements for independence also felt that the time had come 
to secure American support for their programs and cash in on Wilson's rhetoric about the 
right to national self-determination. 
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Such expectations were based upon the assumption that the state of belligerency 
would sooner or later force the Wilson administration into a face to face showdown with 
the Habsburg Monarchy. With this in min~, Andre Cheradame, the leading French dismember· 
ment propagandist in America, very much like Apponyi in 1915, set out to present his 
country's case to the public. Cheradame's books and articles about the Pan· German danger, 
unlike Apponyi's earlier warnings against the 'Slav peril', were well received not least be· 
cause this was also the theme of Wilson's domestic propaganda campaign; the Chief 
Executive's repeated references to the 'One Central Empire' indicated that the White House 
would not change its pre· April 1917 position of viewing the Habsburg Monarchy as a second 
class participant in the conflict. But bitter frustration was in store for those who failed to 
see the gap between Wilson's rhetoric and intentions, at least until the early summer of 
1918. Then and only then did Wilson agree to the dismemberment of Austria·Hungary. 
The present and the following two chapters analyze the various aspects of wartime 
propaganda in America, in order to support the above arguments. In the present chapter the 
work of various Allied and immigrant propagandists is considered; in the next one the subject 
is American public opinion and the press, while in the final chapter on wartime propaganda 
Wilson's own campaign is introduced and evaluated. 
The British propaganda campaign proved to be the most effective in the post·Aprii 
1917 period as well. Having successfully completed his task with the American declaration 
of war on Germany, Parker resigned and his undercover campaign was replaced by an open 
one orchestrated by the charismatic press magnate Lord Northcliffe from Crewe House, 
London. In due course, British propaganda in America was adapted to the new situation.' 
Northcliffe's staff continued to manipulate the American press by controlling war news, 
promoting the British position on several key issues and preserving the spirit of the Atlantic 
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Alliance.1 As for anti·Habsburg propaganda, the New Europe group was given a free hand 
but domestic American developments rendered an all out dismemberment campaign unneces· 
sary. In September 1917 the Inquiry, President Wilson's task force for policy planning and 
peace preparations, was established and naturally became the target of the efforts of Seton· 
Watson and his colleagues. With some of its members involved in British peace preparations, , 
the New Europe group could openly press its views on the Inquiry. Ethnic maps, weekly 
reports and memoranda, including the relevant Peace Handbooks, were sent to New York 
through the State Department and various individuals, such as Douglas W. Johnson of Co· 
lumbia University, who served as a liaison officer between the Inquiry and similar French and 
British organizations.2 While most of these pieces discussed the replacement of the Monar· 
chy with a chain of independent nation states, the education of the American public was , 
continued. Seton·Watson's famous war books, German. Slav. and Magyar (1916), discussing 
'ruthless Magyarization', and Rumania and the Great War '(1915), including the first ever 
discussion of the theory of Daco·Rumanian continuity in English, were released and widely 
circulated. The British propaganda campaign undoubtedly reached important American person·, 
alities and reinforced the anti·Habsburg and anti·Hungarian tendencies within the Inquiry, but 
there is no evidence that it influenced, or even raised the interest of, President Wilson, who 
had acted as the sole conductor of American foreign policy during his tenure in office. 
Meanwhile, the Italians continued to ignore the possibilities of an American campaign: 
they produced one single piece of atrocity propaganda about how barbarously K und K 
soldiers destroyed various Italian churches. Nor did the French government believe that 
propaganda could help its cause in America. The French High Commission in the United 
1 May (1966) 2: 604·05. 
2 The Inquiry is discussed in a separate chapter below. 
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States, led by the young journalist Andre Tardieu who later played an all important role in 
the reorganization of the Danubian basin at the Peace Conference as one of the five French 
Commissioners Plenipotentiary, refrained from large scale propaganda activity; Tardieu himself 
wrote it off as 'indiscreet and dangerous,.3 Thus, it was up to the historian turned publicist 
Andre Cheradame to take up the challenge single-handedly and conduct the French campaign 
for dismemberment in the United States_ 
Cheradame, described by Seton-Watson as 'the gallant pioneer', was clearly obsessed, 
with the Pan-German danger. He launched the initial campaign against the German plan of 
the Berlin-Baghdad railway line and spoke out against the Habsburg Monarchy as early as 
1901 in his L'Europe et la Question d' Autriche. He viewed Austria-Hungary as but a toy in 
the hands of Prussian policy makers and as an instrument of 'ultra reactionary oppression.' 
He claimed that the Pan-German plan of an empire reaching from Berlin to the Persian Gulf 
could only be frustrated by the liberation of the 'martyred peoples' of the Monarchy, . 
including the Magyars, and by the reshaping of the region into a 'United States of Central 
Europe.' With the publication of Naumann's Mitteleuropa plan Cheradame undoubtedly saw 
his, and the world's, worst nightmare coming true. He embarked upon a one-man American . 
campaign and published several articles and three books.4 In his wartime American publica-
tions Cheradame put forward the same arguments he had used before, but cleverly adapted 
them to American issues: by July 1917 Pan-Germany had come to threaten the 'independent 
existence of the United States.'5 He introduced the Austrians, the Magyars, the Bulgarians 
3 Tardieu (1927) p. 237. 
4 May (1966) p. 554; Gesztesi (1918) pp. 47-52. Cheradame's articles are listed as pamphlets 
in the appendix below. 
5 'The United States and Pan-Germanism' The Atlantic Monthly, July 1917 issue, p. 720. 
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and the Turks as the 'vassals' of Germany; he called this a 'four·play feudal spirit.'6 
Che'radame argued, in public and in private, that the 'best way to crush Pan·Germany' was 
by 
organizing scientifically an insurrection of the peoples oppressed by the 
Germans, and Magyars in Central Europe. 7 
In one of his discussions of the 'vassals of Germany' he explained the case of Hungary as 
well: 
Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are • a fact not generally known among the 
Allies . 9,000,000 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by a million 
nobles, priests and officials., These 9,000,000 Magyar proletarians are 
exceedingly desirous of peace ... They would be quite capable of revolting at 
the last moment against their feudal exploiters, if the Allies, estimating accu· 
rately the shocking social conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to 
assure them that the victory of the Entente would put an end to the agrari· 
an and feudal system under which they suffer.8 
Cheradame was among the collaborators of the first issues of the New Europe9 and the only 
member of the group to pay considerable attention to the education of the American public. 
The release of his first discussion of the Pan·German plan in The Atlantic Monthly, although 
written before April 1917, coincided with the President's 1917 Flag Day address which led 
the Bohemian·Americans of the time as well as the (Slovak·) American historian Victor S. 
Mamatey to believe that the Frenchman's views had an immediate impact on Wilson.'o This 
6 Ibid, p. 726. 
7 lC TRps: Correspondence: Cheradame to TR, 2 July 1918. 
8 'How to Destroy Pan·Germany' The Atlantic Monthly, December 1917 issue, p. 829. 
B Hence his connection with Seton· Watson. The collaborators of the New Europe were listed on 
the inside cover of every issue. 
10 Unterberger (1989) p. 51; Mamatey (1957) p. 104, note. 
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was simply not the case: Wilson himself wrote to a friend that he had no time to read Cher· 
adame's articles,11 and the two had apparently never met. Nor did Cheradame manage to 
establish links with the Inquiry or the CPI. His association with Theodore Roosevelt was also 
rather fruitless: the most he got from the ex-President was some private encouragement.12 
German and Austro·Hungarian propaganda in America cam~ to an end with the 
departure of the official representatives of the Central Powers and t~e immigrant press took 
a pro·American stand. Only one post·April 1917 piece has been found, von Schierbrand's 
discussion on Austria·Hungarv. the Polyglot Empire 11917). More a journalist's than a histori· 
an's account, the book is centered around the dramatic not the factual, especially when 
describing domestic politics. An anecdotal survey of the provinces of the Habsburg realm, 
Ispiced with references to the difficulty of having to speak four to eight languages in order 
to be sure of getting even a beer) is followed by von Schierbrand's proposed solution: the 
federalization of the Monarchy. The real significance of the volume lies not in its contents 
but in the fact that it was published in America after the diplomatic break .. 
The Monarchy may not have engaged itself in a far reaching campaign in America 
but Slav propaganda in the New World was anxiously monitored first by the diplomatic corps 
and after May 1917 through Berne. In fact, a special stamp, reading , Slavische Umtriehe' 
(Slavic Agitation), was used to mark such reports, which were also sent to Budapest.13 
11 Mamatey (1957) p. 104, note. The author speculates that Wilson did not remember we"! WiI· 
son's promotion of the concept of the One Central Power was a conscious propaganda move on his 
part, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
12 lC TRps: Correspondence: TR to Cheradame 11 July 1918. Further details are provided in 
the following chapter. 
13 Ol K 26 XII. res. tete I, for every war year. 
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Wartime immigrant movements and propaganda for dismemberment followed similar patterns 
in America. Every immigrant group made attempts to create a central organization in 
America, to win the support of prominent Americans and to educate the American public. 
They also approached the War Department with the plan of establishing immigrant 'legions' 
and provided counter·intelligence services to prove the disloyalty of German· and Hungarian' 
Americans. 
This propaganda was predominantly anti·Habsburg and anti-Hungarian in character 
and may be grouped around four major themes: (1) general information about the origins of 
the war and the establishment of responsibility for it; (2) atrocity stories; (3) the introduction 
of the nationalities of the Habsburg Monarchy to the American public (including their history, _ 
grievances and aspirations); and (4) proposals for the reorganization of East·Central Europe. 
The Monarchy, but especially the Magyars and Premier Tisza, were blamed for the outbreak 
of the war (Bene~) and the conflict was often described as yet another chapter in the long 
history of the cooperation of Teutonic and Magyar Huns14 to destroy Slavdom (Namier, 
BeneJ). Since the American public knew practically nothing about the various Slav peoples 
involved, they needed to be introduced. This was done with a special emphasis on their 
history and culture, and facts were, more often than not, 'modified' to fit the individual 
claims of the given propagandists. Meanwhile, the Magyars were pictured as a bunch of 
Asiatic barbarians who not only had robbed the Slavs of their lands (Bene!, Hinkovi~) but 
also ruthlessly oppressed and 'Magyarized' them. The Magyars were shown as being 'more 
14 The word 'Hun' requires some explanation: in the usual tendency of scapegoating British 
propagandists put the label 'the Hun' on Emperor William II because of his notorious speech delivered 
to German troops sent to put down the Boxer rising in China in 1900. On the other hand, it is one 
of the popular misconceptions of Hungarian history, dating back to Medieval chronicles, that the Hun· 
garians were descendants of Attila's Huns. This co-incidence was also noticed and abused by Czech 
propagandists. 
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Prussian than the Prussians themselves'; it was claimed that the Slavs had 'taught the Ma· 
gyars the art of peace· agriculture, industry, and statecraft' (Vo~njak). These activists, in 
accordance with the New Europe group, suggested the 'complete regrouping of Central and 
South·eastern Europe' (Seton' Watson). This was to be done along ethnic lines and would 
result in the reunion of the various 'branches of the same nationalities' in 'democratic nation 
states' with the added benefit of thwarting the German plan of eastward expansion. Claims 
for territories with clear German or Magyar majorities were, of course, not introduced as yet. 
To further their case these propagandists also produced details of several shocking atrocities 
committed by the Magyars during the centuries in their ruthless attempt to destroy the 
various nationalities living in Hungary. Besides these similarities, the various campaigns of . 
the different nationalities produced interesting individual features as well which must also 
be discussed before drawing the balance of wartime dismemberment propaganda in the 
United States. 
The Czecho·Slovak campaign in America set the standard for all other dismemberment 
movements, and set very high ones indeed. The campaign itself, of course, was supervised 
by the Czecho·Slovak National Council in Paris (led by Bene!, Masaryk, and the Slovak Milan 
~tefanik) and promoted the program worked out by Seton·Watson and Masaryk.'5 The 
Bohemian National Alliance of America (hereafter BNA) was established as early as 18 
August 1914 under the leadership of Ludvik J. Fisher and Emmanuel Voska. Within a year 
it came to represent most Bohemian·Americans and embraced the program of Masaryk and 
his colleagues. On 27 October 1915 the BNA and the Slovak league of America, presided 
15 The best summations are Pergler (1926); fapek (1920) pp. 265·78; and the relevant parts 
in Mamatey (1957) and Unterberger (1989). 
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by Albert P. Mamatey, agreed to join forces towards the establishment of a federal Czecho-
Slovak state. According to the Bohemian-American historian and propagandist Thomas fapek: 
The American fechs [sic] played a double role in the drama which ended in 
the humbling in the dust of the Hapsburgs and the final disruption of the 
Dual Monarchy. In the first place they financed the external revolutionary 
movement. They are considered the richest, as they are admittedly the 
strongest, branch of the race outside the motherland. Secondly, it was ex-
pected of them that they would present the cause of the Cechoslovaks be-
fore the country and would endeavor to win for it [the] American public 
opinion.16 
Two paths were taken to win American public opinion and support for the cause of the 
Czecho-Slovaks: (1) counter-intelligence activities and (2) propaganda. As discussed in chapter 
4 above, instrumental in the former was Emmanuel Voska, a first generation immigrant who 
had made himself a modest fortune around the turn of the century, rose to prominence 
among the Bohemian-Americans, and joined forces with Masaryk at the outbreak of the war. 
He worked for Sir Guy Gaunt and Sir William Wiseman, the chiefs of British intelligence in 
America. In early 1918 Voska was appointed as Director of the Central European Division 
of the CPI by George Creel, who described him as 'the greatest secret agent of the war.'17 
The propaganda campaign was launched in 1915 and the words Wilson had used to' 
describe the Czechs in The State, 'no lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seem sufficient to 
reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorporation within Austria,'18 became the slogan of 
the movement. An early success was scored when on 25 February 1916 the House Foreign 
Relations Committee heard the Czech case presented by Charles Pergler, the vice-president 
16 ~apek (1920) p. 265. 
17 Voska and Irwin (1940); Willert (1952); Unterberger (1989) pp. 27-29; 124. 
18 Quoted in Unterberger (1989) p. 16. 
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of the BNA.'9 Pergler's speech was later printed as the first American pamphlet of the 
BNA. In due course the Czech-Slav Press Bureau was set up in New York and Vojta Bene§, 
Edvard Bene§' brother, was sent to America. The BNA published or circulated about every 
fifth propaganda piece discussing the Monarchy in the New World! Indicative of the scope 
of their efforts is a report by Vojta Bene! to Masaryk, which states that the BNA had 
circulated some 20,000 pamphlets before December 1916.20 The contents of this propagan-
da were generally in line with the well known ideas of Bene! and Masaryk.21 The one 
exception was Pergler's Should Austria Exist?, which was reprinted from the January 1918 
issue of the Yale Review. Pergler introduced ideas which may have been familiar within the 
Habsburg Monarchy but some of which certainly shocked its readers in the New World: 
Metternich once called Italy a mere geographical expression. This statement 
was never really true of Italy, but it may be applied to the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Who ever heard of anyone calling himself an Austrian? Even Francis 
Joseph, the late Austrian Emperor, once asserted that he was a German 
prince. There is no Austrian language, no Austrian literature, no Austrian 
nationality, no Austrian civilization. Still, states do not come into being 
without the aid of powerful social, economic, and political factors. Austria's 
main justification for existence may be found in Asiatic invasions, that is, of 
the Huns (Magyars) and later the Turks. German Austria, Hungary, and 
Bohemia became a federation of independent states, bound together only by 
the person of a common king, for the purpose of more efficiently resisting 
Turkish pressure, when in 1526 the Hapsburgs were called to the Bohemian, 
throne by the free choice of the Bohemian people.}~ 
19 Pergler (1926) Chapter III. 
20 Quoted in Seton-Watson (1943) pp. 96-100. 
21 They summed up their views in Bohemia's Case for Independence (Bene!) and in The New 
Europe (The Slav Standpoint) (Masaryk). Borsody (1982) offers a comprehensive analysis. 
22 Pergler (1918) p. 1. It was my supervisor, Dr. Okey, who called my attention to the fact that 
this was not simply extreme propaganda. 
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The best piece of introductory propaganda was a small volume of eight essays, some by 
Americans, edited by fapek and titled Bohemia Under Hapsburg Misrule. Interestingly, Hus 
propaganda, with which the entire campaign was launched in Geneva in 1915, was hardly 
used in America. Maps, postcards and public meetings, especially after Masaryk's arrival in 
May 1918, were among the other methods used and Vojtech Preissig, of the Wentworth 
Institute of Boston, prepared recruiting posters for the Czecho·Slovak Army.23 
In June 1917 Dr. Milan §tefanik went to the United States to win American support 
for the Czecho·Slovak National Council. He found only closed doors and on leaving the United 
States in December of the same year he voiced his disillusionment with President Wilson. He, 
nonetheless, managed to get the permission of the War Department for recruiting in Ameri· 
ca.24 But it was the arrival of Thomas G. Masaryk that changed the picture completely. 
He arrived on the West Coast via the Far East in late April 1918 and, on his way to 
Washington, was given an enthusiastic reception in Chicago, which was reported to both 
Vienna and Budapest in detail.25 Using the Czecho·Slovak Legion fighting in Russia as the 
point of departure, he launched an impressive propaganda campaign to educate the American 
public, secured the support of several important American politicians and signed a symbolic 
agreement of cooperation with the Slovaks in Pittsburgh on 31 May 1918.28 The Czech 
leader's four visits to the White House (between 19 June and 15 November) gave rise to the 
myth of the two well·informed professors working in close cooperation with Masaryk 
23 fapek (1920) pp. 272.73. 
24 Mamatey (1957) pp. 129.35. 
25 OL K 26: 1172.cs. XII. res. tetel: Z 1.200. Berne, 28 June 1918. One of the 'Slavische 
Umtriebe' reports. 
26 Mamatey (1957) pp. 280·87; Unterberger (1989). 
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convincing Wilson about the necessity of the dismemberment of the Monarchy.27 The 
historians Zeman and Mamatey have comprehensively refuted this theory by pointing to the 
obvious disillusionment in the Czech leader's own account of their meetings and by calling 
attention to the fact that he was first received as a Russian expert. 28 In actual fact, he 
was the nominal head of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Russia and had first hand information 
of the situation which was undoubtedly in the focus of Wilson's attention. The first interview 
had taken place just before Wilson announced his decision to join the dismemberment camp 
and they did discuss the issue but not even Masaryk himself claimed that he had influenced 
the President's decision.29 It appears that it was Wilson who used Masaryk for his own 
ends, namely to promote some regional integration to replace the Monarchy, and not the 
other way round. When Wilson recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de facto 
belligerent government on 3 September 1918 Masaryk swung into action again. To counter 
the Imperial Manifesto federalizing the Monarchy he issued. the Czecho-Slovak Declaration 
of Independence on 18 October 1918. He returned home as the first elected president of the 
newly created Czecho-Slovak Republic at the end of the year.3D 
One final aspect of the Czecho-Slovak program, the question of Ruthenia, must also 
be looked at briefly. Mamatey has gone as far as to claim that the Ruthenian-Americans had 
decided the future of their homeland; in his words 'the tail did wag the dog.' According to 
Mamatey, the Ruthenian-Americans approached Masaryk with the plan of joining the Czecho-
Slovak state if autonomy was granted only four days after the President had received their 
27 See for example Miller 11940). 
28 Zeman (1976) pp. 111·12; Mamatey (1989). 
29 Masaryk (1927) p. 283. 
30 Unterberger (1989) Chapter 18. 
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delegation in the White House. This solution seemed expedient to all parties involved with 
a say in the matter and the plan was realized at the peace conference.31 On closer exami· 
nation of the facts, however, a different picture takes shape. Masaryk initially expected that 
the Ruthenians of northern Hungary would join the Russians but when the Bolshevik 
revolution redrew the entire political picture he changed his mind. On the analogy of the 
'western corridor' between the Czechs and the South Slavs, he now envisaged an eastern 
one linking up Slovakia with Rumania thus completing the encirclement of Hungary. According 
to the historian D. Perman this was the only significant addition to Masaryk's plans after 
1915.32 Thus the Czech leader went to America, as correctly pointed out by the Hungarian 
historian Magda Adam, with the intention of securing the consent of the Ruthenian·Ameri· 
cans to his plan.33 The American National Council of Uhro·Russins was founded in Home~ 
stead, Pennsylvania as late as 23 July 1918, and its resolution called for full independence, 
saw union with Galicia and Bukovina as the second best solution and was not willing to. 
consider anything less than autonomy. Their delegation, led by Gregory I. Zatkovit, was 
received by the President on 21 October 1918, who suggested that they should seek autono· 
my. After the President's open nullification of Point Ten in his reply to the Austrian peace 
note, the Ruthenian·Americans signed the Scranton Resolution of 12 November 1918 (that 
is after the Armistice), which promised their compatriots at home autonomy within Czecho· 
Slovakia.34 Back in Carpatho·Ruthenia, however, four national councils were established 
advocating four different solutions and the decision to join to Czecho·Slovakia was not made 
31 Mamatey (1967). 
32 Perman (1962) pp. 14·15; 26. 
33 Adam (1993) p. 27. 
34 Mamatey (1967). 
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before 9 May 1919.35 There are also serious doubts about Mamatey's other claim, namely 
that the Ruthenian·American decision defined Wilson's stand in the matter. The detailed 
boundary proposals for the peace conference were worked out by the Inquiry in mid-October 
1918 and the authors of the final report did not take sides in the question. True, the 'Black 
Book' of 21 January 1919, the revised boundary proposals, suggested the incorporation of 
Ruthenia in the Czecho-Slovak state but the several reasons provided did not include the. 
Ruthenian decision to do SO.36 Masaryk well understood that self determination for Wilson 
meant regional integration more than the establishment of economically and politically 
unviable small states.37 During his stay in America he secured the support of both the 
Slovaks and the Ruthenians for his program summed up in The New Europe (The Slav 
Standpoint) (1918) but this did not mean that he influenced Wilson's policies or decisions. 
The South Slav movement for independence and unification was by far the most 
complex problem the Wilson administration had to face when the future of the Habsburg 
Monarchy was being considered. South Slav immigrants in America belonged to four different 
nationalities, spoke three different languages, practiced three different religions and used two 
different alphabets.38 In fact, the only thing they all seemed to share was uncompromising 
anti-Hungarianism. However, their efforts in America cannot be understood without a brief . 
exposition on the South Slav movement in general. By the turn of the century several 
solutions had been developed for the unification of the South Slavs living in South-Eastern . 
Europe and two of those emerged as serious alternatives during the war. The centralist 
35 Magocsi (1975). 
36 Miller (1924) 4: 231.32. 
37 This issue is discussed in chapter 11 below. 
38 Prpic (1967) pp. 174-75. 
161 
Greater Serbia program was developed and promoted by the Serbian Premier Nicola Pa~ic. 
The alternative, the establishment of a federal Yugoslav state, was represented by the 
Croatian politician Ante Trumbic, who set up his Yugoslav Committee in London in May 
1915. While the Greater Serbia program was backed by Serbia, often presented as the 
Belgium of the Balkans in atrocity propaganda, the West looked more favourably at Trumbi~'s 
federation plans. The questions of Bosnia·Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, together with 
Turkish, Greek and Rumanian claims to certain regions of the Balkans made the picture even 
more complicated. On top of all that, the South Slav program was the only one which 
conflicted with the interests of a major Allied country, namely with those of Italy.39 That 
the Italian government meant business when it demanded the fulfillment of the secret London 
agreement of 1915 became very clear when after September 1918 the Italians made several 
attempts to have the Siovenians and Croats declared enemies as Austrian subjects.4D 
The Italians could go that far, although their plea was rejected, only because Pa§ic 
and Trumbic had made no genuine attempt to work out a compromise solution. Both the 
Corfu Declaration (20 July 1917) and the Geneva talks (5·9 November 1918) were generally 
seen not as an attempt to develop a South Slav program but to sell territorial demands to . 
the Allies. Thus, the Serbo·Croat·Slovene state, also including Montenegro, was established 
on 1 December 1918, but American reservations were maintained until 6 February 1919, 
when recognition was eventually granted.41 
39 See the relevant passages in Mamatey (1957) and Lederer (1963); Pleterski (1983); 
Zivojinovic (1972). 
4D Lederer (1963) p. 40; Prpic (1967) p. 197; Miller (1924) 1: 56. 
41 Prpic (1967) p. 200. 
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The vast majority of the South Slavs in America had immigrated from the Habsburg 
Monarchy and favoured the federal solution while Pa~ic's plans were represented by the 
Serbian Minister in the United States, Ljubo Mihajlovic. The Wilson administration favoured 
the federalist solution but the President, quite consistently, refused to see separatist 
politicians before the reversal of his Habsburg policy. This mixed American position was 
exposed when a South Slav mission arrived in Washington in December 1917, that is after 
the United States had declared war on the Monarchy. The mission was composed of 
representatives of both Pa§ic and Trumbic but Wilson received only Milenko Vesni~, the 
Serbian Ambassador to Paris, the leader of the delegation. Vesni~ was consulted on East· 
Central European matters and was granted the honour to address both Houses of Congress 
before Wilson delivered his Fourteen Points speech. This move on Wilson's part served 
tactical reasons: Vesnic, who knew what the President was about to say could not call for 
the dismemberment of the Monarchy. 42 Further complications arose in August 1918 when 
Pasic decided to recall Mihajlovi~ who by that time came to stand more for federalism than 
for a Greater Serbia.43 This was most embarrassing since after the favourable turn in 
American policy most immigrant groups busily drew up plans for cooperation and produced 
documents of unification while Pdic demonstrated yet again his uncompromising attitude. 
A movement so divided was unlikely to create a central organization in America; the 
only such attempt was the reorganization of the ardently anti·Habsburg Croatian League into 
a Yugoslav National Council in Chicago on 10 March 1915.44 Meanwhile, the Serbian Relief 
42 LC TWWps: Series Four: Case file no. 2855: Serbia, contains all the documents related to the 
mission including its initial screening; Armstrong (1971) pp. 37·42. 
43 Mamatey (1957) pp. 312.13. 
44 Prpic (1967) pp. 176.77. 
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Committee was established in New York in 1916 and its posters were prepared by the 
famous French artist Theophile Alexandre Steinlen. However, it appears that the British circu· 
lated more propaganda material in America about Serbia than the Serbs themselves, although 
Mihajlovic scored a major success on the military front. In May 1917 he secured the 
authorization of Newton D. Baker, the Secretary of War, for the opening of a recruiting 
office in Washington for the Serbian Army.45 This was a sweet victory for Pasic since the 
Yugoslav war effort had passed unnoticed in Washington until September 1918.46 
The South Slav movement in America had other peculiarities as well. Its contribution 
to the American war effort did not seem to extend beyond the usual subscription to the 
Liberty loan campaigns and there is no indication of any Voska·type counter·intelligence 
activities either. They could not secure a say in decision making regarding the Monarchy 
although in one of the most amazing incidents of the entire war period they not only claimed 
that their vote had secured Wilson's re·election in 1916 but also sent him a telegram to the 
White House to remind him of it.47 Nevertheless, their main contribution to the South Slav 
movement was limited to providing manpower for the Serbian Army and financial support for 
Trumbic's Yugoslav Committee. 
South Slav propaganda in America reflected the divided nature of the whole move· 
ment. For a very long time anti·Habsburg declarations were almost immediatelv followed by 
45 Prpic (1967) pp. 186·87. 
46 Mamatey (1957) p. 313. Note the difference between Serbian and Yugoslav here: Serbia was 
a belligerent, the 'Belgium of the Balkans,' with all its implications, while the Americans continued 
to view the Yugoslav movement with suspicion until Wilson's turnaround in 1918. 
47 Prpi~ (1967) pp. 182.84. 
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pro-Habsburg ones.48 The South Slavs in America also had their fair share of atrocity 
propaganda by circulating the works of R. A. Reiss and publishing a pamphlet both in Britain 
and America titled Austro-Magyar Judicial Crimes. One of the very few pro-Monarchy, but 
at the same time anti-Hungarian, pamphlets was also written by a Croatian-American, the 
Rev. Krmpoti~. In Italy's Claims ... he rejected the 'Pan-Serb illusion' and argued: 
If after this war the Austro-Hungarian empire is desmembered [sic], of which, 
so far, there is not the slightest indication, the only successful adjustment 
among the Southern Slavs would consist in a federalization of the states on 
the basis of equality, and in not allowing' anyone state to absorb any 
other .. .!f, on the other hand, when the cloud of war has cleared, Austro· 
Hungarian sovereignty and monarchical integrity is not broken down, it is 
most certain that a new policy ,of federation must be carried out, which will 
give the Slavs in the Monarchy full power in the government of their respec· 
tive countries. 
The lack of trialism in the Monarchy, argued Krmpotic, was the sin of the Magyars, but 
democracy is coming; she shall break the Magyar oligarchy. The price for the 
long existing oppression of Croats by the Magyars is to be paid.49 
Despite Krmpotic's efforts South Slav propaganda reached new heights only with the arrival 
of Hinko Hinkovic and Bogumil Vo~njak. Hinkovic, a former Croatian representative of the 
Hungarian Parliament, was sent to America by Pa~i~ but he soon reverted to the federal 
idea.50 In The Jugoslavs In Future Europe Hinkovi~ discussed 'Magyar misrule in Croatia' 
and argued for dismemberment, claiming that if Austria-Hungary, 'this monstrous phenome· 
48 Prpi~ (1967) pp. 175-87. 
49 Excerpts from this piece have been found in SML COps: Inquiry: Box 61, folder 97; it was 
also quoted by Max Handman, who wrote a long report for the Inquiry about the Rumanians in 
Hungary. These issues are all addressed in the chapter on the Inquiry. According to the transcript 
in the Clive Day papers the above quotes are from p. 15. 
50 Mamatey (1957) pp. 115; 117; 312·13. 
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non,' survived the war it would 'repeat itself in yet another war.' He also echoed the 
German-Magyar conspiracy theory: 
The Magyars have always sought and found in Berlin support for their Imper· 
ialistic fancies just as, on the other hand, in Germany they have always been 
considered a most important pawn in the Hamburg-Baghdad game.51 
He described Karolyi's efforts within and without Hungary as the 'Karoly Comedy', claiming 
that his anti-German stand and calls for Hungarian independence were but mere theatrics.52 
After a similar discussion on Bulgaria, Hinkovi~ summed up the Yugoslav idea in the following 
words: 
That ideal is the unity in one single State of all the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, who are one nation, with the same language, and the same ten-
dencies, and whom only adverse fate has divided.53 
Bogumil Vo!njak, Trumbi~'s representative in America, was Siovenian by birth. 54 He was 
also one of the most talented dismemberment politicians to set foot on American soil. In A 
Dying Empire, easily his best piece, Vo~njak argued that an independent Yugoslav state would 
hold the key to hitherto unseen economic development in the Balkans. Such a state would 
also thwart German eastward expansion by cutting her off from the Near East and would 
deny her control over Central Europe by frustrating her plan to connect the Danube and the 
Rhine. Of the Magyars he maintained that the 
51 Hinkovi~ (n.d.) p. 27. 
52 Hinkovic (n.d.) pp. 31.34. 
53 Hinkovi~ (n.d.) p. 51. The passage was printed in italics in the original. 
54 Mamatey (1957) pp. 22-23; 115; 117. 
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world knows no shrewder falsification of history than the Magyars. Careful 
historical research will prove the great share of SIavdom in the foundation 
of the Hungarian State ... The tie holding together this artificial State was 
the Latin language. Slovenes taught the Magyars the art of peace-agriculture, 
industry, and statecraft. The Magyars were in the beginning the most 
unoriginal people for progressive civilization. They were warriors and nomads 
bearing their home and their constitution on the backs of their horses. Slav 
civilization changed them, and gave them more Western notions.55 
The Magyars, however, did not realize their indebtedness to the Slavs. They were always 
a minority in their own country and they 'began with brutal denationalization' in the late 
18th century to change this situation. The only Magyar to be respected was Kossuth who 
suggested the creation of a Danubian Confederation based upon racial equality. Instead, the 
Ausg/eich of 1867 secured Magyar domination in the Eastern half of the Monarchy and the 
Magyars 'became worse than Prussians, their ideology became more Prussian.' He suggested 
the creation of an independent South Slav State together with an independent Bohemia and 
the reduction of Hungary to her ethnic boundaries. 
By contrast with Czech but even with South Slav efforts, Rumanian propaganda 
activities remained rather limited all through the war period56 although the Rumanians were 
possibly in the most favourable position. Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies 
in return for the Treaty of Bucharest which guaranteed its ultimate aim of realizing Greater 
Rumania by, among other things, the annexation of Transylvania and the adjacent territories 
of Hungary to as far west as the river Theiss. All they needed to do was to secure Wilson's 
consent. With the Joint American Minister to Bulgaria, Rumania and Serbia, Charles J. 
55 All quotations are from Vo~njak (1918) pp. 140-45. 
56 The only accounts available in English are Devasia (1970); Constantinescu and Pascu (1971) 
pp. 127-43; and the relevant passages in Mamatey (1957). 
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Vopicka, seated at Bucharest they naturally opted for diplomatic methods57 and the mobili· 
zation of the Rumanian·Americans, who had almost exclusively immigrated from the Habsburg 
\ 
Monarchy, was not even considered until the American declaration of war on Germany. A 
Transylvanian·Rumanian mission, including Ion Mota, Captain Vasile Stoica, and the Rev. 
Vasile Lucaciu, was then sent to America in June 1917, with the double aim to win support 
for Greater Rumania plans and to establish a Transylvanian Legion within the American 
Army.58 
However, when a report by William H. Andrews, the American Charge d'Affaires, 
from Bucharest revealed that the members of the mission were Austro·Hungarian subjects,59, 
Wilson refused to meet them and the War Department turned down their plea for the legion. 
Meanwhile, in August 1917 King Ferdinand of Rumania wrote privately to Wilson listing , 
Rumanian grievances and asking American support for his Greater Rumania plan. The 
President's polite rejection was limited to an expression of sympathy for the sufferings of 
the Rumanians. At the same time Queen Marie of Rumania asked for State Department 
permission for an American propaganda tour, which Lansing flatly rejected.50 Thus, left with 
no better option, the members of the mission stayed in America and launched their own 
propaganda campaign. They achieved little success and their counter·espionage activities also 
remained fruitless. Rumania's exit from the war, which automatically nullified Allied promises, 
naturally gave a push to the American campaign. On 5 July 1918 the Rumanian National 
57 Spector (1962) Chapter I. 
58 Mamatey (1957) p. 123. 
59 Mamatey (1957) pp. 124·125. His discussion of Andrews' attitude is unfair; he charged the 
American representative with 'malice, bias, and ignorance.' 
60 Mamatey (1957) p. 123. Note that she spelt her name 'Marie' and not 'Mary'. 
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league of America was founded and declared the education of the American public to be its 
main goal. Public meetings were held in the Mid·West and along the East Coast and 
Rumanian related material was provided for various Boston, Cleveland, New York and 
Washington papers. The League launched its own journal, The Periscope, and circulated some 
6,000 copies of six pamphlets and several maps.61 Thus, the Rumanian propaganda cam· 
paign peaked after the President had reversed his Habsburg policy and, as in the case of the 
Serbs, British activists apparently circulated more pamphlets and books about Rumania than 
the Rumanian·Americans themselves. 
Neither the scope nor the quality of this Rumanian propaganda campaign matched 
the efforts of the Czechs or South Slavs in America. Rumanian territorial aspirations and war 
aims provided the central themes for these efforts and were complemented by anti· Hungarian 
atrocity propaganda. As for the causes of the war, on one occasion lucaciu went a step 
beyond the claims of Bene~. Interpreting the details of the Sarajevo assassination of the 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand with unique flexibility he claimed that the idea was conceived 
in Berlin, developed in Vienna, and carried out by Budapest. While this amazing revelation 
secured him large scale press coverage it failed to open up the doors of the White House 
for him. He introduced this theory in a Rumanian·American public meeting at Youngstown,' 
Ohio, but was never granted the opportunity to present their memorandum, including a 
demonstration of loyalty to the United States and Rumanian territorial claims, to Wilson.62 
All through the war the Wilson administration refused to deal with Rumanian 
territorial aspirations for several reasons. Rumanian anti·semitism had led to diplomatic con· 
61 Devasia (1970) pp. 207.25. 
62 BH GKps: Newspaper File: undated press cutting: lukacsiu munkaban (lucaciu at Work). 
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frontations even before the war, the Americans also charged the Rumanian government with 
unfair business practices, and Rumania was viewed as considerably more backward than the 
territories she claimed.53 The prestige of Rumanian representatives was ruined by the facts 
that the Bratianu government had sought French diplomatic support for the Transylvanian 
mission, by Andrews' report on its members, and by Stoica's open cooperation with Theodore 
Roosevelt.54 Furthermore, Wilson refused to take wartime secret agreements into consider·· 
ation and Rumania's exit from the war was by no means welcomed in Washington. Even in 
the entirely new situation created by Wilson's new Habsburg policy and the Armistice negoti· 
ations the President was waiting for a public demonstration. When that was provided by 
Vaida·Voevod's speech in the Hungarian Parliament (announcing the union of Transylvania 
with Rumania), and Rumania reentered the war against Hungary, the American recognition 
of the Greater Rumania program was finally offered to Bucharest but again without territorial 
commitments.65 
Drawing the balance of dismemberment propaganda in the United States during the 
First World War is no easy task in the absence of impartial contemporary and secondary ac· 
counts. Such a step would also be somewhat premature at the present stage of our 
discussion, without first introducing the opinion of the leading newspapers and prominent 
Americans. The discussion of these issues forms the backbone of the next chapter, which 
also provides some reflections on domestic American public opinion. 
63 Devasia (1970) pp. 40-89. 
54 Mamatey (1957) p. 124 sheds some light upon the French contribution to the Mission and 
Lansing's suspicions; Devasia (1970) pp. 214·17 sums up TR's cooperation with Stoica. The pre·sent 
author has serious doubts about that claim since Roosevelt's papers carry but a few indifferent 
letters between the two politicians. 
65 Spector (1962) p. 60; Low (1963) pp. 16·21. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
DOMESTIC VOICES AND THE PRESS 
In the present chapter our enquiries into the field of World War One propaganda are 
continued by summing up the views of various domestic American campaigners and offering 
an analysis of the final changes of the image of Hungary in the press. While some of the 
tendencies from the pre-April 1917 period were transferred into the period of American bellig-
erency, one major new development must be emphasized: with the declaration of war on 
Germany the United States had taken sides in the conflict, after which impartiality, real or 
pretended, could be and was abandoned. Realizing this, Viereck's The Fatherland became 
Viereck's American Weekly, the Szabadsag performed a similar turnaround, and the only 
paper to listen to some argument from the other side was the New Republic. Consequently, 
by the summer of 1918 not the preservation but the dismemberment of the Habsburg 
Monarchy became a 'necessity,' the sine qua non of peace. As before April 1917, American 
publicists discussed the broader issues of the war, but now with the added dimension of 
American intervention. New contributors took the centre stage, most notably TR and former 
Ambassador Gerard, together with a number of wartime organizations. Similarly, the press 
continued to be the chief source of information about Hungary, but the diplomatic break and 
later the declaration of war cut off the flow of first-hand information through visiting 
correspondents and Berlin. Thus, while before April 1917 reports on the cabinet changes in 
Hungary were quite reliable, after the diplomatic break this accuracy disappeared. Further-
more, the earlier pro-Hungarian statements were gradually replaced with anti-Hungarian ones· 
the final disintegration of the positive and idealized prewar image of Hungary was one of 
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the most distinctive developments of the period. Another, equally significant, change was the 
'discovery' of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Russia, which secured the interest and sympathy 
of the American public for the Czech cause exactly when Masaryk arrived in Washington. 
Supporting the Czech cause became fashionable in Washington, especially after Wilson's 
similar decision, and the whole movement culminated in the establishment of the Mid-
European Union (hereafter MEU), under the aegis of the CPI in late September 1918. The 
latter issue is addressed in the next chapter. 
The American public responded to the declaration of war on Germany with much 
excitement. The increased interest in the various issues suddenly on the agenda encouraged 
several individuals and organizations to express their opinion. A variety of war reference 
books were published in due course, among them a compilation of Two Thousand Questions 
and Answers About the War (1918) by the Review of Reviews, a leading monthly, and a 
similar Handbook (1918) by the National Security League; an interventionist organization un· 
der the leadership of Elihu Root, TR's former Secretary of War and State. Most of the 
questions raised were about Germany, but the various nationalities living in the Habsburg 
Monarchy were also given considerable attention; Tisza was portrayed as an arch-reactionary, 
an annexationist and the bringer of the war. Dumba's 1915 misadventures were beginning 
to backfire: not only were they discussed at length in these reference books but John Price 
Jones, in The German Spy in America (1917), a book published with TR's introduction, de- . 
voted an entire chapter to the activities of the former Habsburg Ambassador. 
Another interesting development of the post-April 1917 period was that while the 
state of war cut American correspondents off from German and Habsburg news sources, the 
returning Ambassadors became the main suppliers of first-hand information. Quite understand-
ably, their opinion was eagerly sought and widely publicized, and no one was more active 
172 
than the former Ambassador to Berlin, James Watson Gerard. His Face to Face with 
Kaiserism (1918) was among the most effective American propaganda books; excerpts from 
it were published even in Viereck's paper. Gerard addressed a variety of issues from gossip 
(which he seemed to like a lot) about the Kaiser through anti· American agitation to German 
plans to attack the United States. He devoted a full chapter to the Habsburg Monarchy 
(titled' Austria-Hungary: the Kaiser's Vassal State"), which is a unique record of an insider's 
. by no means unbiased • opinion. Gerard's nineteen-page section is a mixture of familiar 
cliches and declarations of sympathy, which is hardly surprising given his family ties. On the 
one hand, Gerard contended that the Monarchy was the weakest of the Central Powers, that 
she was on the verge of economic and military collapse, and that her affairs were guided 
by the German General Staff. On the other hand, he maintained a high opinion of the 
Hungarians, but also charged Tisza with provoking the war. These two undercurrents met 
in a passage which looks like an earlier paragraph from Wilson's The State spiced with war 
propaganda: 
Since then [1849], by superior political talents and taste for intrigue, the 
Magyars have not only held the Slovaks, Rumanians, etc., of their own 
country in political SUbjection, but have held much of the power in the Dual 
Monarchy. Their danger lies, however, in the predominance of German 
influence; and some day the gay, easygoing, pleasant Hungarians may awake 
to find the Prussian Eitel Fritz seated on their throne and to learn what 
Prussian efficiency means when applied to those whom [the] Germans 
consider an inferior people.2 
In sharp contrast with Gerard's piece, the belated publication of Mrs. Bullitt's diary of her 
1916 visit with her husband to Berlin, Vienna and Budapest stands out as the only pro· 
Hungarian view. Her statement about the POW situation: 
, Gerard (1918) pp. 165·83. 
2 Gerard (1918) p. 170. 
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We decided that if we were going to be interned we'd choose Austria or 
Hungary,3 
as well as the one about the Hungarian reaction to the Rumanian declaration of war: 
Billy and I heartily agreed that it was disgusting. One likes the Hungarians 
so much that a calamity to them seems a calamity to all,4 
indicates that her opinion was perhaps too complimentary, but certainly one-sided. The rest 
of the book is anecdotal in style and is centered around the sharp contrast between life in 
wartime Germany and Austria-Hungary, with her preferences lying with the latter. Several 
passages on the Monarchy correspond word for word with Bullitt's third article for the Public 
ledger, which makes one wonder who the author actually is. 
While Mrs. Bullitt's unconditional support for Hungary remained an isolated voice, the 
TR turnaround, starting with the letter to Apponyi about the sinking of the lusitania, 
attracted much attention and largely contributed to Hungary's loss of prestige in America. 
The ex-President took a gradually escalating bellicose stand against the Central Powers and 
began to promote the idea of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary in the early spring of 
1917. Before presenting the details of TR's campaign for the 'liberation of the Slavs' two 
general remarks are necessary to cast more light on his actual contributions. 
Firstly, it is generally understood that TR's wartime conduct was to a large extent 
determined by his attitude towards Wilson. There are several clear indications of the fact 
that Roosevelt was jealous of the opportunity which was offered to Wilson on a plate, 
namely to raise America's international prestige by bringing the World War to an end on 
3 Bullitt (1918) p. 246. 
4 Bullitt (1918) p. 250. 
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American terms, and to cash in on that in terms of personal prestige.5 The fact that Wilson 
did not take a stand against the Habsburg Monarchy when he asked for a declaration of war 
on Germany offered TR an easy shot at the incumbent President, which the ex· President 
gratefully accepted. Secondly, from a Hungarian point of view, the TR turnaround was 
nothing short of tragic. Before that, and of his own accord, Roosevelt had been the most 
enthusiastic supporter of Hungary; after it he became a leading dismemberment propagandist. 
Since he was clearly unable to influence the Wilson administration TR's support would not 
have helped the cause of Hungary directly; but his public support as the leader of Wilson's 
domestic opposition would have kept an alternative position, possibly even an alternative 
policy, alive. At worst, he might have secured a hearing for the Hungarians at the Paris 
Peace Conference, had he lived that long.: 
In National Strength and International Dutv (1917), which was in part written before 
the declaration of war on Germany, TR expressed sympathy for 'the mass of men of dif· 
ferent races to whom liberty is denied by the dual tyranny of the Germans and Magyars of 
Austria·Hungary,' and concluded that 
The war has shown that Austria has become a subject ally of Germany and 
an enemy of freedom and civilization. Unless we resolutely intend to break 
up Austria and Turkey, and insist on liberty for the subject races in the two 
countries, our talking about 'making the world safe for democracy' is a 
sham.B. 
A look at TR's private correspondence offers the obvious conclusion that this was not a one· 
off remark. While before his break with Apponyi there is no record of any contact with 
dismemberment politicians in America, after the diplomatic break with the Monarchy he was 
5 Cooper (1983) and Elleston (1965) are the two definitive studies. 
B Roosevelt (1917) pp. 89, 91. 
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regularly in touch with Mihajlovic, Vosnjak, Cheradame, Stoica and representatives of the 
BNA including Pergler, Vojta BeneJ and Fisher.7 The above passage demonstrates that TR, 
like everyone else, identified the Monarchy with Germany and the Hungarians with the 
Germans. In the light of his knowledge of Hungarian history, which he had demonstrated 
more than once earlier,8 this must be seen as a convenient step, one which allowed him to 
discuss broader issues without having to bother with the details. 
Roosevelt's press campaign against Wilson also seems to prove the above point. His 
criticism of Wilson's hesitant Habsburg policy in a series of editorials for the Kansas City 
Star was only part of a larger campaign. Between October and early December 1917 he at· 
tacked Wilson for not declaring war on the Habsburg Monarchy and pointed to the obvious. 
contradiction in the President's policy: 
If we really are at peace with Austria, we are flagrantly violating our duty. 
as a neutral and we ought to be condemned in any international court. But 
if we are really at war, then we are committing the cardinal crime of hitting· 
soft. If we had gone to war with Austria when we broke with Germany and 
had acted with proper energy, the disaster of Cadorna [an Italian defeat] 
would probably not have occurred.9 
When Wilson did ask Congress for a declaration of war on the Monarchy, Roosevelt changed 
tactics and began to focus on the details. On 7 December 1917 he wrote: 
The Austro-Hungarian and the Turkish empires must be broken up if we 
intend to make the world even moderately safe for democracy. There must 
7 lC TRps: Correspondence: under the names of the individuals listed. The earliest such contact 
was initiated by the BNA on 27 August 1917. 
8 This was recorded during his visit to Hungary. Nicholas Roosevelt, Coolidge's representative 
in Budapest before the Kun takeover, claimed that TR had a photographic memory. 
9 'A Fifty-Fifty War Attitude', dated 20 November 1917; in: Roosevelt (1921) p. 56. 
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be a revived Poland, taking in all the Poles of Austria, Prussia and Russia; 
a greater Bohemia, taking in Moravia and the Slovaks; a great Juga-Slav 
commonwealth, including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, while the 
Rumanians in Hungary should become part of Rumania and the Italians in 
Austria part of Italy. The Turk must be driven from Europe and Christian and 
Arab freed. Only in this manner can we do justice to the subject peoples 
tyrannized over by the Germans, Magyars and Turks.10 
He then dropped the issue for almost a year and resumed his attacks on Wilson's policy 
during the Armistice negotiations. While demanding unconditional surrender from the Central 
Powers TR also criticized Wilson's Point Ten of the Fourteen Points using practically the 
same argument and disregarding the fact that Wilson himself notified Vienna that in the new 
situation it needed to be revised: 
Again, the talk of merely giving autonomy to the subject races of Austria 
amounts to [a] betrayal of the Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, the Italians, 
and the Rumanians. The first should be given their independence and the 
other three united to the nations with which they really belong. Moreover, 
it is a betrayal of civilization to leave the Turk in Europe and fail to free the _ 
Armenians and the other subject races of Turkey.l1 
While these passages testify to a genuine interest on TR's part in the future of the peoples 
involved, it must also be remembered that all his references to the reorganization of the 
Danubian basin were included in attacks on Wilson's policies, which indicates where his 
preferences really lay. This point can be carried a step further by arguing that he did not 
come up with a single alternative for Wilson's program; he was, in fact he could easily be, 
a step ahead of the President who had to mobilize the entire country for such decisions. TR . 
cleverly capitalized on this situation, but the only issue in which there was a clear-cut differ· 
ence of opinion between the two of them was the league of Nations, which, in return, had 
10 'Four Bites of a Cherry'; in: Roosevelt (1921) pp. 65-66. 
11 'War Aims and Peace Proposals,' 12 October 1918; in: Roosevelt (1921) p. 228. 
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no bearing upon the future of Hungary. One of the many indications that Roosevelt did not 
give sufficient attention to the problems involved is the fact that he mixed up the Yugoslav 
idea with the Greater Serbia program.12 
Roosevelt was among the few dismemberment propagandists who efficiently utilized 
books and the press alike; his articles indicate the changing attitude of the leading American 
newspapers towards (Austria·) Hungary. This again was part of a broader tendency: as 
suggested earlier, the final stages of the war brought about the eventual destruction of the 
idealized myth of Hungary which had dominated the prewar scene and was strongly present 
during the twenty months of American neutrality. 
However,this drastic change did not happen overnight. The New York Times, for 
example, printed a special article by a Dr. Gerster titled 'No Hymn of Hate for United States 
in Hungary.' The author pointed to the long tradition of Hungarian·American friendship and 
brought up the statues of Washington in Budapest and of Kossuth in Cleveland as evidence 
for that. He further argued that Hungary had been dragged into the war by Russian expan· 
sionism: 'Hungary had to choose between going in with Austria and Germany and being 
swallowed up by Russia.' In the final passages Gerster drew a (false) parallel between the 
Magna Carta and the Golden Bull, and concluded that most Hungarians wanted peace more 
than anything.13 
12 His connections with Mihajlovi~ and his utterances suggest that he meant Yugoslavia when . 
he wrote: 'The Southern Slavs should be made into a greater Servia.' In: The Metropolitan, July 
1917, with map. 
13 15 April 1917 issue, Section 6 p. 11. 
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Thus, it was not the diplomatic break between Austria-Hungary and the United 
States that brought about the first change in the image of Hungary in the American press 
but the events between May and August 1917: Tisza's resignation over the issue of 
universal suffrage 14 pushed Hungary into the focus of attention for the first time during the 
war. When Tisza reportedly commented on the subsequent changes that they were nothing 
short of a revolution,15 optimism began to rise in America: another special article was prin-
ted in the New York Times. titled 'Hungary May Cause Rift in Teuton Ring', which was 
based upon an interview with Konta. The prominent Hungarian-American maintained that 
Hungary wants peace. Hungary could have a revolution within twenty-four 
hours if she wanted it, but she can see that the entrance of the United 
States into the war, with its sympathetic policy toward nations struggling , 
to be free, is a guarantee that Hungary, the largest of the nations struggling . 
for independence, will gain her ends more quickly through coming peace than 
through revolutionary methods. 
Konta then protested against the various Allied promises to· detach Transylvania from 
Hungary and warned that 'Before this could happen every woman in Hungary would go into 
the trenches.' Finally, Konta reiterated the Kossuth-Karolyi link and introduced the program 
of the Karolyi Party. Esterhazy and Wekerle were also mentioned briefly but it was again 
Andrassy, Karolyi and Apponyi who were identified as the 'three men who direct popular 
\ 
opinion in Hungary:16 
14 Tisza resigned on 23 May 1917; the Emperor Charles appointed Count Maurice EsterMzy as 
the new Premier of Hungary on 15 June. EsterMzy reorganized his cabinet on 18 August, then 
resigned two days later. Finally, Wekerle was appointed and remained in power for the rest of the 
war. 
15 New Republic, 16 June 1917, p. 169. 
16 New York Times, 16 September 1917, Section 7, p. 6. 
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The radical Hungarian-American journalist Eugene Bagger-Szekeres chose the New 
Republic for discussing 'The Hungarian Upheaval.' He described Tisza as the chief repre-
sentative of 'Hungarian junkerism' which had been oppressing not only the various non-
Magyar peoples of Hungary but also the vast majority of the ethnic Hungarians. He wei· 
corned the changes in Budapest as 'the climax of a democratic upheaval' and argued that 
Hungary, if given a fair chance, could, and willingly would, end the war. According to 
Bagger-Szekeres, an Allied guarantee of Hungarian territorial integrity in this new situation. 
would not only reinforce democratic tendencies within the country but would also remove 
the single reason Hungary was fighting for. Hungary's exit from the war would bring about 
an irreparable break within the Central Powers, and, on top of that, a democratic Hungary 
would be a willing participant in a Kossuth type Danubian Federation with a unified South 
Slav state (including Croatia) and with Rumania and Bulgaria. Such a federation, as Bagger-
Szekeres concluded in a well-written exposition, would be 'the only safe barrier against a 
possibly revived Prussian "Orang nach Osten.'"17 
Other Americans, however, were less enthusiastic about the developments in 
Hungary. An unsigned editorial in the New York Times, for example, attacked both EsterMzy 
and Wekerle: 
Reform the franchise as much as you please, so long as the Magyar minority 
continues to rule Hungary. A military 'decision' is the only honest and 
effective reformer of the Hungarian franchise. Not Wekerle, the stop-gap 
Premier, nor his successor, whoever he may be, but General Cadqna [of the 
Italian Army] will bring democracy to Hungary and to Austria.18 . 
17 New Republic, 22 September 1917, pp. 211.13. 
18 1 B September 1917, p. B: 'Hungarian "Democratic Lines."' 
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A more comprehensive analysis of the changes in Hungary, which at the same time was a 
critical assessment of the Bagger·Szekeres piece, was printed in the New Republic. The 
Serbian·American Voyslav M. Yovanovitch argued that the 'democratic Hungary' pictured by 
Bagger·Szekeres was but a myth. Not only had it been discredited when the Kossuthite 
Independent Party was previously in power during 1906·09 (he cited the Lex Apponyi, which 
drastically restricted non-Magyar education, as an example) but there was still not one single 
Hungarian politician who would extend democracy to the non-Magyar peoples of the country: 
Not only has Hungary failed to solve the problem of the non·Magyar national· 
ities, but she cannot even give true liberty, democratic liberty, to her own 
Magyar population until her national frontiers are reduced so as to contain 
only the compact mass of Magyars. An electoral franchise which would 
place on an equal footing all the inhabitants of Hungary, would send to the 
Parliament of Budapest a majority of non-Magyars, which would signify the 
end of Magyar hegemony in Hungary, a thing which not only 'democrats' of ' 
the Karolyi type but even the demagogues of the most advanced kind ..• could 
not permit. 
Yovanovitch concluded his persuasive piece by warning that instead of 'making advances to 
a "democratic Hungary"' the 'thirty million allies in the Austro·Hungarian Empire' (i. e. all the 
non·German and non-Magyar peoples) should be given encouragement.19 
It appears that while information about Hungary was not always reliable (for example 
the New Republic reported that Andrassy had replaced Tisza) these assessments were based 
upon a transcript from the 10 June 1917 edition of the Az Est (The Evening, a leading 
Budapest daily), quoting EsterMzy saying that 'democracy in Hungary can only be Magyar 
democracy' and an utterance by Wekerle that he would carry out his predecessor's franchise 
program. 
19 10 November 1917, pp. 48-49; the quote is from p. 48. 
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The two key events around the turn of 1917·18, the American declaration of war 
on Austria·Hungary and Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, received a very limited response in 
the press, which again proves the point that the American public was not especially 
interested in the Monarchy and her domestic affairs. In a letter to the editors of the New 
Republic, G. H. Mika of the Czech·Slav Press Bureau challenged Wilson's refusal to take 
drastic steps against the Habsburg Empire. He pointed out that Wilson's decision not 'to 
impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire' served the interests of the ruling 
Magyar·German combination and not those of the Allies. He suggested that Wilson's 
hesitation might have been due to isolationist tendencies in the White House and claimed that 
rearrangement in the form of dismemberment would be inevitable.20 In the same issue of 
the New Republic, an editorial addressed Wilson's Point Ten (which demanded the federaliza· 
tion of the Monarchy) and maintained that dismemberment would be a drastic step but a 
federalized Danubian basin would serve the interests of European, and global, peace bet·' 
ter.21 
Two articles in the 10 February 1918 edition of the New York Times, both printed 
on the same page, temporarily reopened the debate over Point Ten. An unidentified German 
contributor described 'Austrian Break·Up as Only Solution' and concluded his piece with the 
following passages: 
Austria, which since 1848 has lost its individual capacity for existence, will 
before long have ceased to exist entirely unless propped up by all the 
Governments of Europe. 
20 12 January 1918, pp. 314.15. 
21 Ibid, p. 294. 
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To permit her to live after this war through any petty political opportunism[,] 
which alone pertains to governments and not to peoples[,] would be to 
betray the peace of the future.22 
The other article, 'Slavs in Austria Appeal to Allies', is even more interesting. It is based 
upon an interview with Mika and Pergler, who openly challenged Wilson's (and lloyd 
George's) decision to maintain the Monarchy, claiming that its Slavs wanted not autonomy 
but independence; basing their appeal on Wilson's very own demand the peoples involved 
should decide their own future. This appears to be the first major breakthrough of the Czech· 
Slav Press Bureau in the leading American dailies, and forecasts what was to come after 
the Sixtus affair and after Masaryk's arrival in America. 
But before turning our attention to that final stage of the general American reevalua· 
tion of (Austria-) Hungary, a unique piece of press propaganda must be introduced. In the 17 
March 1918 issue of the New York Times the Rumanian-American K. Bercovici attacked 
Hungary and the Hungarians in an unprecedented, and un-repeated, manner. He began his 
piece, 'Hungarian Lust for World Power', with the prediction that 'at the close of the war 
we shall hear the death-knell of the Dual Monarchy.' He then proceeded with an emotionally 
overheated accusation of Hungary, reinterpreting her entire history, most amazingly, as one 
uninterrupted quest for the control of the Balkans and the Near East. Some of the other 
highlights are: 
The cruelty and intolerance of the Magyars is as proverbial in the Balkans 
as is their arrogance and stupidity. Long of arms, bowlegged, with fierce 
mouth and deep-seated, small eyes, the Magyar is the typical savage of 
history. Like his brother, the Teuton, he is an abject slave and a horrible 
master ... [After the war, the] mad passions, the blood lust so long repressed 
of all those thinly veneered barbarians, will be given free play. 
22 S . 2 ectlOn , p. 3. 
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Bercovici, like all American dismemberment propagandists, concluded his piece with a call for 
federation, which is the only constructive element in his writing: 
There is only one way to prevent terrible bloodshed in the Near East at the 
close of this war· the United States Government must see to it that all the 
nations of the Balkan Peninsula form a federated republic like our own. This 
would prevent future wars and save the Balkan peoples of the Kultur of the 
Teuton, Turk and Magyar.23 
The tone of this piece, together with the accusations of lucaciu introduced earlier, cast more 
light upon why the Americans refused to deal with Rumanian claims. The dismemberment 
propaganda of the New Europe group was presented in a credible way, but these Rumanian 
efforts were not only too emotional but also hardly credible. That notwithstanding, the fact 
that such a piece was published in a leading Metropolitan paper clearly indicates that the 
times were changing. 
The final six months of the war brought about Wilson's great Habsburg turnaround: 
the events starting with the Clemenceau • Czernin showdown prompted the President to 
reconsider his earlier views of the future of the Monarchy. This major review of American 
foreign policy went hand in hand with a similar change in the attitude of the American press. 
This, by no means accidental, coincidence has led many historians to believe that the press 
campaign for the Czechs played a decisive part in Wilson's decision. 
While this argument will be challenged in the next chapters, it must be emphasized 
that the final reinterpretation of the prewar image of Hungary was but a sideshow to this 
Czecho-Slovak publicity campaign. The presentation of the numerous calls for the 'liberation 
of the Slavs' and the destruction of the Monarchy, together with the making of the Masaryk 
23 Section 4, p. 5. 
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myth, would extend much beyond the scope of the present study;24 but it must be remem· 
bered that Hungary was discussed in this . newly developed . context after the spring of 
1918 in the American press. 
Besides the off·hand references to the 'band of Teuton·Magyar conspirators' running 
the Monarchy25 the myth of Kossuth's liberal Hungary ~as openly challenged for the first 
time in the American press. An unsigned editorial in the 30 June 1918 issue of the New 
York Times used an earlier pro·Hungarian statement from the (New York) Evening Post to 
take the myth apart: 
Instead of being nourished on the Kossuth legend and the fable that the 
Magyars are friends of freedom, 'every schoolboy' ought to know the facts 
about modern Hungary. He ought to know that of the 22,000,000 in Hunga· 
ry only some 9,000,000 are Magyars and 13,000,000 are of the non~ 
Magyar races, treated by the Magyar magnates and ruling caste with 
systematic injustice, oppression and cruelty ..• There are few more curious 
myths than this myth of Magyars of Hungary as lovers of liberty other than 
their own.26 
With the American press continuing to focus on Masaryk on the one hand and American· 
Habsburg diplomatic relations on the other, references to Hungary were few and far 
between. Nevertheless, the destruction of the Kossuth myth was followed by a reevaluation 
of the leading Hungarian politicians. A New York Times editorial on 28 October 1918 dis· 
cussed the ' Arch·Magyars',21 starting with the familiar description of Tisza and Burian: 
24 For discussions: Unterberger (1989); May (1967); Odlozilik (1967), etc. The first major paper 
to publish a pro· Czech editorial appears to have been the Washington Post: 'A Time for Revolution' 
16 April 1918; in Bennett (1921) pp. 205·06. 
25 Washington Post 3 July 1918, 'Nations Becoming Free'; in Bennett (1921) pp. 261·62. 
26 Section 2, p. 2. 'The Real Hungary.' 
27 Page 10; all quotes are from that page. 
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A month after his accession, Karl the Sudden dismissed Baron Stephen 
Burian, the echo of the arch-Magyar absolutist, Count Tisza, a chief archi-
tect of the war, and installed Count Czernin in his place as Austro-Hungarian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs_ 
The next target was Andrassy: 
Old Count Andrassy, associate and rival of Bismarck and Gortschakov, was 
an iron man committed to an iron policy. Count Julius is but papier mache. 
So far as his talent goes, he is a Magyar of the Magyars... There is an 
insolence, intolerable or amusing, according to the point of view, in the rise, 
however temporary, to power of this Magyar Chauvinist. 
And finally, together with the myth of Kossuth's liberal Hungary, out went the positive 
American image of Apponyi as well: 
Apponyi is the too notorious Minister of Education who shut up the Serbian 
schools, who prohibited the reopening the Rumanian teachers' training 
colleges, whose 'aim is to strengthen everywhere the national Magyar State,' 
who in ecclesiastical and educational questions seeks by all means and 
without scruple to Magyarize. 
The author finished his piece with a poetic exclamation: 
Wild is the folly that sets up hunkers like Andrassy and Apponyi in the 
agony of decrepit States .. 
One thing that is clear from the above is that Karolyi continued to receive positive reviews, 
especially after his takeover in Hungary. This was largely due to the efforts of Bagger· 
Szekeres, who promoted Karolyi's program in America. Bagger-Szekeres, alone of all Hungari-
an·Americans, stood up in public for Hungary, using the New Republic, apparently the only 
paper willing to listen to the other side of the story. In 'Because I Am a Magyar'28 Bagger· 
Szekeres suggested that 
28 20 July 1918, pp. 338-41; the quotes are from pp. 338, 340, 341 and 341 respectively. 
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The only sane course open to the Allies is to announce a detailed uncompro· 
mising program for the breaking up of the Habsburg empire and the estab· 
lishment of the independent Czecho·Slovak, Jugoslav and Hungarian states 
in its stead. 
Such an Allied declaration should also emphasize the necessity of regional integration as well 
as guarantee 
the independence and rights of the Magyar people proper, and define the 
boundaries within which the right of the Magyars to live their own national 
life and to cultivate their independent statehood is unassailable. To omit this 
would be a grave strategic error as well as an infringement upon justice and 
the integrity of the principle underlying the declaration. 
Given that, Bagger·Szekeres continued: 
the breaking up of the territorial unity of Hungary, involving as it does 
exploding the cherished fiction of historic rights, will in the end benefit the 
Magyars themselves no less than their Slav neighbors... There can be no 
happy and secure Hungary in the midst of an unhappy and insecure Europe, 
and Europe will continue to be unhappy and insecure as long as the menace 
of Slav irredentism darkens its south·eastern horizon. 
The conclusion is emotional and explicit: 
I believe in the full victory of the Allies and Czecho·Slovak and Jugoslav 
independence, not in spite of being a Magyar, but because I am a Magyar. 
And I believe ... that the time will come when all my countrymen will think 
as I do. 
An article like that was there to be replied to, and the famous Serbian-American Vladislav 
R. Savil, the author of South Eastern Europe (1918) and an outside contributor to the work 
of the Inquiry, did so. Also in the New Republic, Savic applauded Bagger·Szekeres' posi· 
tion:29 
29 24 August 1918, pp. 109-10, 'Because I Am a Jugoslav'; the quotes are from p. 110. 
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If all the Magyars should be animated with the spirit as expressed by Mr. 
Bagger, many territorial questions between them and the Slavs would be 
easily solved. The principles set forth by him of future readjustments among 
the races of Southeastern Europe I have been propagating since the war 
started and must be among the first to accept them. 
Savic also had reservations about specific details (such as the future of the Banat) and one 
general comment: 
However, it is not enough to recognize just principles, but it is necessary to 
fight for them. The truth and the victory of the Allies are 'on the march,' 
and the Magyars here in America would do a great service to themselves 
and to the world if they should immediately organize and express themselves 
for complete independence and equality of all the races of Hungary. The 
attitude of the Magyars in this country may influence their people in Hunga· 
ry and save the world many thousands of lives and billions of money. 
When Bagger-Szekeres wrote his piece in July 1918 hardly any Hungarian would have 
approved of it, not even Karolyi. But with the Central Powers losing the war, barely three 
months later, things changed dramatically, and it was up to the newly established Karolyi . 
regime to prove Bagger-Szekeres and Sa vic right. 
The nineteen months of American belligerency, spreading over the period between 
April 1917 and early November 1918, completed the transformation of Hungary's image in 
the eyes of the American public. The foreign and immigrant propaganda campaigns failed to 
influence the American public and policy makers in the desired way, despite the comprehen-
sive contents of such efforts. A glance at the figures of the Parker campaign and the various 
Czech and Rumanian ones testifies to this; and so does the output of the CPI, which is 
introduced in the next chapter. The general public was more interested in the war, in 
Germany's conduct and possible threat in the future, than in the largely introductory 
campaigns of the various national groupings of the Habsburg Monarchy, which explained real 
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or imaginary grievances accumulated over hundreds of years and which laid claims to 
territories most Americans had not even heard of before. 
The limited number of publications lab out two thirds of the pieces listed in the 
appendix were published or circulated in America after April 1917), together with the fact 
that the best known American to support such claims was Wilson's chief domestic opponent, 
explains the limited success of dismemberment propagandists in belligerent America. It must 
also be remembered that TR campaigned in a regional and not a leading daily; and that 
newspapers like the New York Times changed their attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy 
exactly when the President did so. Although it is anticipating one of the major conclusions 
of the present study, it must be pointed out, even before discussing the CPI, that Wilson's 
strong hold over the domestic propaganda front indicates that dismemberment propaganda 
in America peaked when the President deemed it necessary in orchestrating the war effort. 
Of course, dismemberment propaganda was not a post-April 1917 development. As 
indicated in the first chapter, it was present even before the war and it gained a new impe-
tus with the Parker campaign for American intervention. Yet, even during the neutrality 
period it attracted little attention outside immigrant circles. The general belief that the 
Monarchy was the weakest of the Central Powers and that she could be removed from the 
war by a separate peace led the American press and policy makers to maintain a relatively 
moderate tone regarding Austria-Hungary. Roosevelt and Cheradame proved to be the-
pioneers of the campaign against the Monarchy and Hungary that was to follow the failure 
of secret peace talks Ithe Sixtus affair). This tendency was boosted by the fact that the 
Russian intervention, defined by Wilson as a key element in America's national security, came 
to be linked with the Czecho-Slovak legion, thus offering an automatic link between high 
politics and dismemberment. Thus, dismemberment propaganda peaked during and after June 
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1918 but not because the various publication began to sell well overnight but because the 
press picked up the issue. Unterberger attaches too much significance to Masaryk's American 
friends, especially to Charles Crane; but, in fact, with the CPI censoring the American press 
and Creel consulting Wilson daily, it is obvious that this change was brought about by the 
Wilson administration itself. 
Parallel with the emergence of dismemberment propaganda, and by no means 
independently of it, went the review of the prewar image of Hungary in the American press. 
Before the summer of 1918 the Kossuth myth held strong, propped up by the expectation 
that Hungary might break up of the Habsburg·German alliance system. Thus it was neither 
the diplomatic break in April nor the declaration of war in December 1917 but the fall of 
Tisza and the failure of the 'revolution' to follow in Hungary that actually brought about the 
first step of this review of opinion. Slav and Rumanian protests against Wilson's Point Ten 
received little publicity, and produced only a handful of articles; including possibly the most 
extremist one. The newly developed expertise of the leading American dailies after June 
1918 must be attributed to the work of the Czech· Slav Press Bureau and Masaryk, and, in 
more general terms, to the interest in East Central European affairs created by the news of 
the Czecho·Slovak legion. The two articles quoted about the Kossuth myth and the 'Arch· 
Magyars' appear to prove these points. 
One last remark seems appropriate about Hungarian-American efforts, although 
further support for this claim is provided in subsequent chapters. A look at the articles by 
the three Hungarian·Americans who found access to the American press, namely Gerster, 
Konta and Bagger·Szekeres, indicates that the survival of the Kossuth myth until as late as· 
the final six months of the war was largely due to their efforts. It must be noticed that they 
represented the Kossuth myth and the program of the Karolyi party to the American people, 
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which was, like every other effort so far int?oduced, only one side of the problem. Early 
twentieth century Hungary was neither the· hell on earth presented by dismemberment 
propagandists, nor the fairyland described by Mrs. Bullitt and the Hungarian·Americans, but 
a curious mixture of the two. This was apparently not realized by the American public or the 
press. 
The remaining chapters discuss the views of Wilson's semi·official and official advi· 
sors (the CPI and the Inquiry, and the Departments of State, Wa'r and the Navy respectively), 
and our enquiries are concluded with an overview of Habsburg related issues through the 
eyes of the President himself. The work of Wilson's semi-official propaganda agency, the 
Committee on Public Information, is assessed first. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION 
AND AUSTRIA·HUNGARY 
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Having completed the examination of unofficial propaganda in America during the 
World War our attention must now be turned towards the Committee on Public Information, 
Wilson's own propaganda agency, which promoted American national interests as interpreted 
and defined by the President himself. The CPI has been discussed freely but its efforts to 
control hyphenated Americans and its dismemberment propaganda abroad have received little 
attention.' In earlier discussions of propaganda it has been pointed out that most World War 
One propaganda targeted Germany and the M,Ueleuropa plan~ and this was also true of the 
CPI. This in itself would explain the limited attention paid to Habsburg related issues but the 
fact that most of the relevant documents have been lost or destroyed2 largely contributed 
to this unfortunate tendency. 
The present chapter discusses the domestic campaign of the CPI among the Hungari· 
an-Americans, its dismemberment campaign conducted from Italy and Switzerland and the 
establishment of the Mid-European Union (hereafter MEU), which for reasons given below, 
offers not only a general conclusion to the work of the CPI but also far reaching conclusions 
about the attitude of the Wilson administration. 
, See the works of Vaughn (1980), Mock and Larson (1939), Cornebise (1984), etc. Creel's own 
accounts are cited below together with further references. 
2 See the bibliographical essay in Vaughn (1980), esp. p. 339. 
192 
The CPI was created by an executive order on 4 April 1917, that is two days before 
the American declaration of war on Germany. Its four-man leadership consisted of the radical 
journalist George Creel as head of the bureau, and the Secretaries of State (Lansing), War 
(Baker) and the Navy (Daniels).3 Characteristic of Wilson's attitudes was his decision to 
finance it from a special presidential defense fund which exempted Creel's Committee from 
Congressional control.4 Its task was to sell the American war both at home and abroad, and 
the CPI worked most effectively until its dissolution in the summer of 1919. Yet, all was , 
not well. Creel, a former muckraker, was too radical for the liking of the general public; and 
the fact that his qualification for the job was his unconditional support for Wilson's election 
campaigns also failed to raise his popularity.5 Not surprisingly, he met resistance on all 
fronts: he was continuously attacked in the press and in Congress and Lansing was also 
rather unwilling to cooperate.s 
Furthermore, Creel's appointment raised broader issues besides the personal one. It \ 
was one thing that the New York Times questioned his ability and willingness to establish 
a working relationship with the leading newspapers7 but the introduction of censorship and 
3 Creel (1947) p. 158. 
4 Mock and Larson (1939) p. 67. 
5 Creel (1947) pp. 156-58; Sullivan (1933) pp. 367·68, 423·28. 
8 Creel's comment on Lansing: 'Mr. Lansing was terribly upset for fear that people might think 
that he was "under" me.' Creel (1947) p. 158. The bone of contention between the two was the 
right to publish diplomatic correspondence. Normally, that is the task of the Secretary of the State, 
but Wilson decided that Creel should do it, which was another demonstration of his unfavourable 
attitude towards lansing. 
7 Vaughn (1980) p. 21. 
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the accusations that Creel actually manufactured war news8 involved Constitutional and 
legal issues. In justice to Creel one must point out that America's entry into the war 
necessitated some sort of censorship and that Creel's record in this matter is much better 
that those of his successors during World War Two and the Vietnam War. Creel apparently 
did not invent war news; he, nevertheless, sometimes presented it in a dramatic way to 
boost public support for the Wilson administration. While the morality of such conduct may 
be questioned, it cannot be denied that Creel was doing his job, and was doing it effectively. 
The domestic campaign of the CPI was well orchestrated and sweeping. Creel's 
bureau published the first ever federal daily, the Official Bulletin, which reached circulation 
figures over 100,000 by the end of the war. The CPI also prepared 94 different pamphlets 
in at least a dozen languages and circulated some 75 million copies of them. Alone of all 
propaganda agencies in America, the CPI also made extensive use of film and oral propagan· 
da. The Division of Films produced some twenty feature films, including 'Pershing's 
Crusaders', 'Under Four Flags' and an official weekly 'War Review.' Oral propaganda was 
carried out by the so-called Four Minute Men: by the end of the war some 75,000 govern· 
ment agents had delivered 755,190 four-minute speeches to a total audience well over 
300,000,000 people in cinemas before the main feature show. To the 47 Official Four 
Minute Men Bulletins 3 Army·, 4 Junior Four Minute Men·, and 6 News Bulletins were also 
added.9 The CPI thus extended its reach over the entire American society and, according 
8 The American political scientist Walton E. Bean has refuted these charges in Bean (1941). 
9 Creel Report (1920) pp. 15·18,32·43,47-61, 63-67. The definitive study of the Four Minute 
Men (whose name also carries a clear-cut reference to the American War of Independence) is 
Cornebise (1984). Further first hand information may be drawn from the privately published Four 
Minute Men of Chicago (1919). 
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to the sound assessment of the American historian Stephen l. Vaughn, not only conducted 
a successful anti-German campaign but also defined a new national ideology along the lines 
set down by President Wilson and other Progressives.1D 
In terms of war propaganda the most striking aspect of the CPI's domestic work is 
that it focused almost exclusively on Germany. This was by no means accidental and the 
way it was carried out testifies to the fact that Creel's abilities were largely underestimated 
by his contemporaries. It is common knowledge that Wilson's initial call to arms was met 
with little enthusiasm when it came to volunteering for the army. Besides the logical step 
of introducing conscription, Wilson embarked upon a sweeping propaganda campaign. Having 
already defined the war as the final showdown between autocracy and democracy in his call 
for a declaration of war on Germany, he then introduced the concept of the 'One Central 
Power' in his 1917 Flag Day address and kept it alive by repeating it in his call for a 
declaration of war on the Monarchy." Creel well understood his task: on the one hand he 
had to define what America stood for (democracy, making the world safe for democracy) 
and, on the other hand, had to manufacture an enemy which could be seen as a serious 
challenger to America. Individually, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary would have been 
strong enough, but a united autocratic Mitte/europa reaching well into the Near East, 
especially if spiced with ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, did do the trick and proved 
to be frightening enough to mobilize the American public under the flag. 12 Thus, the CPI 
10 Vaughn (1980) is devoted to this often· overlooked aspect of the work of the CPt. 
11 These addresses are discussed below in the Wilson chapter. 
12 St. Clair (1919) is a pictorial account of the liberty Loan campaigns. It reveals that Creel's 
effort was supported by a variety of prominent Americans, ranging from the millionaires Morgan and 
Schiff, through the Tafts and Pershing, to Charlie Chaplin. 
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completed the work started by Parker back in 1914, but did so with the Wilsonian reserva· 
tion of drawing a dividing line between the German people and government. 
This again made the Habsburg Monarchy a secondary target and not a single CPI 
publication was exclusively devoted to it. Some of the most famous CPt pieces, however, 
did mention it. Wilson's 1917 Flag Day address, for example, was printed and circulated in 
the famous 'Red, White and Blue Series' (referring to the national colours). The War Cvclope· 
!1ill, the CPl's 300·page reference war book, carried entries on Austria·Hungary, 
Magyarization, Tisza, Transylvania and the various national minorities of the Empire. Some 
of the Four Minute Men Bulletins also touched upon the issue occasionally and no. 24, 'The 
Danger to Democracy' (18 February 1918) was devoted entirely to the study of the 
Mitteleuropa plan, following the arguments of Cheradame and Wilson. 
Besides raising public support for the Wilsonian war effort by describing (and 
overstating) the German menace to mankind in general and to the United States in particular, 
another key task for the CPI was to secure the loyalty and support of immigrants from the 
Central Powers and neutral countries, or as one pamphlet put it, of 'those who are neither 
hot nor cold.'13 The chief targets of the work of the Creel bureau were the German· and 
Hungarian·Americans, but Bohemians and South Slavs, who for a long time qualified as 
enemy aliens, were also taken care of.14 As Vaughn points out, most of the relevant 
material has been lost or destroyed; consequently the following account, which focuses on 
the Hungarian·Americans, necessarily involves some speculation. 
13 Mock and larson (1939) pp. 213·32. The pamphlet in question was American and Allied 
Ideals, from February 1918. 
14 Creel (1972) pp. 191.99. 
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The American declaration of war on Germany and the work of the Creel Committee 
revived anti-immigrant tendencies countrywide. With the memories of 1915 still fresh, this 
tendency hit the Hungarian-Americans very seriously. In response, the Hungarian-American 
papers drafted and published 'The Ten Commandments of the Situation' (May 1917) warning 
against making provocative statements or falling for them.15 With the United States being 
at war with Germany but not with Austria-Hungary many felt insecure and the opinion of 
the members of the administration was eagerly sought. On 17 October 1917 Secretary of 
War Baker visited Cleveland, Ohio, and was interviewed by J6zsef Remenyi of the 
Szabadsag. Baker refused to comment on the government's policy towards Hungary but 
stated that President Wilson had not the slightest doubt about the loyalty of the Hungarian· 
Americans and expressed his appreciation for the support the Szabadsag had lent to the . 
American war effort.16 An equally welcome source of information was James W. Gerard,. 
who was interviewed by the same paper a week later. Gerard expressed his appreciation for 
the Hungarians and stated that the administration did not intend to dismember Hungary. He ' 
refused to comment on Karolyi and his program but recited the few Hungarian words he had 
learnt from the Sigrays.17 
These occasional demonstrations of sympathy were replaced by a coherent policy 
only after the American declaration of war on the Habsburg Monarchy. The Hungarian-Ame-
ricans had to face the shock of their new country going to war against the old one, 
something Julianna Puskas, the leading authority in the field, defined as 'the crisis of loyal· 
15 Puskas (1982M) pp. 306-07. 
16 BH GKps: Newspaper File: Szabadsag, 18 October 1917. 
17 BH GKps: Newspaper File: Szabadsag 24 October 1917. 
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ty.'18 Wilson made the blow easier to take by not using the term 'enemy aliens' in his war 
proclamation and by granting to immigrants from the Habsburg Monarchy full freedom of ac· 
tion, with the exception of leaving and entering the country without permission. Hungarian· 
Americans were also exempted from military service in the American Army and those already 
conscripted were sent home from the training camps.19 Nothing reflects better the general 
American expectations of these immigrants than another special article, for the New York 
Times, with the telling subtitle 'Law Puts Them on Par with Germans Here, but Many Will 
Be Favored Because of Their Loyalty to America and the Allies.'20 Endre Cserna, the editor 
of the Szabadsag, testified to a similar attitude in his editorial 'After the Declaration of War.' 
He maintained that all Hungarian·Americans should and would lend full support for the 
American war effort and interpreted Wilson's decision as a demonstration of sympathy for 
Hungarian independence.21 
It was at this point that the CPI decided to intervene. For reasons outlined earlier, 
Konta was selected to organize and lead the American-Hungarian Loyalty League (hereafter 
AHLl) in the early days of 1918.22 This move, however, was part of a broader plan: Creel's 
bureau had its sights firmly set on completing the Americanization of all immigrants, which 
was seen as the key to 'holding fast the inner lines.' The 'work among the foreign born' in . 
order to 'delete the hyphen' was started by the Foreign Section of the CPI and was 
18 Puskas (1982M): 'The Crisis of Loyalty: World War One', pp. 303·15. 
19 This proclamation was published simultaneously in English and in Hungarian in the New York 
Times and in the Szabadsag, on 12 December 1917. 
20 New York Times, Magazine Section, pp. 3 and 14; 'Austro-Hungarian Alien Enemies.' 
21 In the 10 December 1917 issue. 
22 Some of this material has already been presented in chapter two, but with the focus on 
Wilson. Hereafter the CPI • AHLL relationship will be discussed. 
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continued by the Division of Work Among the Foreign Born. 23 different loyalty leagues were 
organized and various national bureaus were also set Up.23 The Hungarian Bureau was 
headed first by Alexander Konta and then by Alfred Markus. 
The Creel· Konta cooperation yielded an impressive propaganda effort. Several public 
meetings were held in places where Hungarians lived in large numbers and declarations of 
loyalty to America were published in the leading American dailies. 24 The Hungarian·Ameri· 
cans purchased their fair share of the Liberty Bonds not simply because they wanted to, 
prove their loyalty that way but because the CPI placed advertisements in the leading 
immigrant papers and some liberty Loan posters were printed in Hungarian as well.25 The , 
CPI produced some one million pamphlets for the immigrants, and two of those, A Message 
to the Hungarian·Americans and Friendly Words to the Foreign Born, were also issued in 
Hungarian.26 Impressive as this effort may seem the chief success of the CPI was the 
establishment of government control over the immigrant press. This is another indication that 
Creel's insight has been underestimated: he quite rightly realized that the way to control 
Hungarian·American opinion was not to organize a national loyalty league but to manipulate 
the ethnic press. In his final report to Wilson Creel proudly quoted the telling figures that 
'54 articles based on Government material were released by the [Hungarian] bureau and 
published in practically all the 28 Hungarian papers extensively.'27 
23 Mock and Larson (1939) p. 220. 
24 Puskas 11982M) pp. 308·09; Mock and Larson p. 224; New York Times 3 June 1918. 
25 Mock and Larson (1939) p. 220. 
26 Creel (1972) pp. 457, 459. 
27 Creel Report (1920) p. 91. 
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Konta's rather shaky position in immigrant circles, the continuous attacks on Creel 
and the general distrust of immigrants from the Central Powers made it certain that the CPI 
and the AHLL had both hands full most of the time with issues they did not necessarily 
want to deal with. Konta's prewar connections with the Hungarian government, which were 
brought up again in September 1918, were quickly revealed by the Department of Justice 
and Creel was informed. Frank I. Cobb of the New York World, who had originally recom· 
mended Konta to Creel, explained to the CPI chief that ' 
There is a campaign going on against Konta. Some of it originates from 
Bohemian and Yugoslav sources due to the inveterate enmity toward the 
Hungarians... But, from my own personal experience, I have never known . 
Konta to do or say anything that did not measure up one hundred per cent 
loyalty to the United States.28 
On another occasion a representative of a firm in Port Henry, New York, wrote directly to 
Creel asking him whether the AHLL really belonged to the CPI. Creel's reply was a testimony 
of his support for Konta: 
The Hungarian Loyalty League is an organization in which this Committee is . 
vitally interested. What we are trying to do is to form these people into a' 
patriotic body so that we can reach them with literature, with speakers, 
with motion pictures, and in every other way try to bring them into closer 
touch with America. Anything that you may do for Mr. Konta will be appre· 
ciated.29 
28 Cobb to Creel, dated 27 March 1918, quoted in Mock and Larson (1939) pp. 222. Note that 
Cobb's recommendation was the best possible guarantee: as discussed earlier, his paper was the 
chief spy-hunting organ during the war. 
29 Quoted in Mock and larson (1939) p. 223. 
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The lack of harmony within the CPI was demonstrated by a statement of the chief of the 
Italian Bureau that the Hungarian-Americans, representatives of an oppressing race, should 
not be allowed to take part in the 1918 Independence Day celebrations.3D 
Konta's resignation in August 1918 was loudly applauded by the Hungarian-American 
press and it also brought about a most bizarre proposal. Writing directly to lansing, E. J. 
Kovatch of New York City pointed out that the AHll had failed because of the lack of 
genuine leadership, and stated: 
I would like to see it [Konta's post] filled only temporarily, that is until we 
could have Count Karolyi, the Ungarian Independant leader [sic], or some one 
else come here from Hungary.31 
While Kovatch's letter bears witness to Karolyi's continued popularity in Hungarian-American 
circles, in the light of Wilson's earlier outlined attitudes, it is hardly surprising that the 
administration refused to deal with this fantastic proposal. Kovatch's letter, however, marked 
the beginning of an all-out assault on both Konta (by the immigrants) and on Creel (by the 
Republicans in Congress), which culminated in the December 1918 hearings of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on German Propaganda in America during the War. . 
The CPI dismemberment campaign abroad ran into different sorts of problems, relied 
upon other sources of information, and attracted little genuine interest both during the war 
and among later historians. The following account offers only an outline of such work 
because sufficient documentation and memoirs are lacking. 
30 New York Times, 26 June 1918, page 3. 
31 NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708 reel 3: Kovatch to lansing, dated 23 September 1918. 
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Propaganda work abroad was orchestrated by the Foreign Section of the CPI, under 
another muckraking journalist, Will Irwin. The CPI developed no program for propaganda in 
the enemy countries and it was not until July 1918 that James Keeley, the editor of the 
Chicago Herald working for the Paris office of the CPI, was put in charge of that work.32 
American dismemberment propaganda was distributed from Switzerland and Padua, Italy. In 
Switzerland the CPI was represented by the special agent Vira B. Whitehouse, assisted by 
George B. Fife, Frank Bohn and Lieut. F. B. Mostowski. The Padua section, attached to one 
of the three main Allied Propaganda Boards, was headed by the Harvard architect G. H. Ed· 
gell, who was assisted by John F. Bass and Lieut. Walter F. Wagner. Other prominent 
contributors to the CPI effort were the young diplomat Hugh Gibson and Captain Walter 
Lippmann of the Military Intelligence Bureau Ihereafter MIB), both stationed in the French 
capital.33 
Until August 1918 the main activity of the CPI was attempting to demoralize the 
K und K troops on the Italian front. Balloons and airplanes were used to spread various 
leaflets on the enemy lines. On 6 June 1918 Gibson warned Irwin that some of these 
leaflets needed further improvement to become more credible: besides translation problems, 
K und K soldiers were unlikely to believe that they would really be transported to America 
upon surrendering and would enjoy the same rights as President Wilson 'within one hour of 
landing.' Gibson concluded that 
The foregoing is not meant to be carping but it does show that the stuff to 
be sent over the line must be carefully combed out if we are not to have it 
turned against us by the Germans ..• The field for this work in Austria seems 
32 Mock and Larson 11939) p. 258. 
33 Mock and Larson 11939) pp. 243·44. 
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to be getting better every day, and a great deal can doubtless be accom· 
plished both through airplane work and the Swiss papers.34 
Meanwhile, the work in Switzerland was based upon the realization that the manipulation 
of the Swiss-German press offered a direct route to the Austrian public. Accordingly, the CPI 
news bulletins were placed in the leading Swiss papers by Mrs. Whitehouse's staff, but no 
records of contacts with Germans or Austrians have been found.35 
August 1918 proved to be a turning point in the history of Allied propaganda during 
the First World War. Between 14 and 17 August 1918 an Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference 
was held in London, with Keeley and Lippmann among the five American observers. It was 
agreed that the Allies would concentrate their propaganda efforts on the break up of Austria· 
Hungary and the reorganization of the Danubian basin along ethnic lines.38 This decision 
was in accordance with the generally accepted view that the key to the defeat of the 
Central Powers was the liquidation of Austria-Hungary, the weakest link in the Mitteleuropa 
scheme, which pushed the Padua board into the focus of attention. Italian and Yugoslav 
disagreements marred the work of the Board and the Americans remained onlookers rather 
than active participants; and the distribution of leaflets remained their chief activity. 
The Foreign Section of the CPI relied heavily upon War Department material. The 
Military Intelligence Bureau was finally activated and Colonel R. H. Van Deman of the Gener· 
34 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-6, Box 1. 
35 Whitehouse (1920) offers a reliable account. She was selected by Creel with Wilson's 
approval, but much to the dislike of Lansing and Stovall's staff in Berne. Her difficulties with Stovall 
and Hugh Wilson caused the President to intervene on her behalf. For further details see Creel (1972) 
pp. 317·26. 
38 Seton-Watson (1981) pp. 297.98. 
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al Staff was appointed as the liaison officer between the CPI and the War Department. The 
MIB prepared one of the longest and most comprehensive assessments of the Habsburg 
Monarchy: a typed 77·page 'Psychological Estimate.'37 The document introduces the various 
nationalities of the Empire, and outlines the unifying factors at work. An assessment of 
domestic Habsburg propaganda is followed by the introduction of the Czechoslovak and 
Yugoslav movements. The concluding section of the document outlines the 'American 
Program.' The author claims that 
The most interesting phases of the present Austro·Hungarian situation to the 
psychologic worker are the Cezech·Slovak [sic] and Jugoslav movements for 
independence. In the absence of any immediate hope of detaching Austria 
from her alliance to Germany, encouragement of these revolutionary move· 
ments will add to Austria's reasons for seeking peace even if they do not . 
result in actual dissolution of the Empire.38 
After a brief exposition of America's assets, Hungary is also assessed: 
The trouble about working upon any proposition to democratize Hungary is 
that to be anything but hostile to all Hungarians is to excite suspicions of 
the Jugoslavs, who are convinced that no good can come out of any Mag· 
yar. To a less extent this applies also to the Czechs·Slovaks [sic]. If one 
thing must be sacrificed to the other, the Hungarian prospect is certainly 
less favorable than the Jugoslav and the Czechs·Slovak. 
At the same time, it is true that many American Hungarians in America and 
many who have returned to their native land are sincerelv democratic and 
anti·German. The stronger these people are, the less time Tisza and Buria[n] 
will have to devote to strengthening the German alliance. Hungarians should 
be approached with the idea of a Hungary dwelling at p'eace within her own 
limits, and enjoying profitable intercourse with free neighbor states, and with 
Western Europe. In the present state of misery among the Magyar poor, 
such a prospect will look good to them, and for America to hold it out to 
them will not alarm the Slav peoples. Cooperation with loyal Hungarian ele· 
37 NA RG 63: CPI 17 E·l: 'Austria·Hungary. Psychological Estimate', dated June 1918, no 
author. 
38 Ibid. p. 69. 
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ments in this country will be the first step in undertaking such a prog· 
ram.39 
The author of the report suggests that agitation against Austria·Hungary should be conducted 
from Padua and the Ukraine, which means that the other logical choice, Rumania was not 
even considered. Further suggestions included: 
The efforts of this Padua force will naturally be directed first toward 
increasing disaffection in Slav national elements of the Austrian army in 
Italy, and second to encouraging the spirit of resistance in the Slave [Slav] 
elements of the Austrian civilian population ... 
It is impossible that American propaganda in Austria·Hungary at this stage 
of the war will do any good if it is merely propaganda. Fine words about the 
beauties of democracy and the evils of German rule will not be enough 
unless they are backed up by evidences of actual physical support and 
assistance. The recent utterances of Secretary Lansing are an evidence of 
this sort. Still more valuable for propaganda purposes would be news of the 
actual establishment of Czecho·Slovak and Jugoslav units in the United 
States army. And most valuable of all would be news of the actual par· . 
ticipation of these units in the Italian, or of course in the Serbian, campaign 
against Austria. Of secondary value of news of this sort will be reports of 
nationalistic activity of the South Slavs, Czechs, Poles, etc., in the United 
States.40 
There are further indications that the CPI seriously considered the possibility of inciting 
revolutions within the Central Powers. Frank Bohn in Switzerland suggested such action 
against Germany41 and John Kaba, a Bohemian·American member of the MIB submitted a 
detailed plan to bring about 'labor troubles, strikes, etc., in Austria·Hungary.' Kaba suggested 
that 'some of the East Side (N.Y.' loud, big mouthed Hungarian Jewish and other foreign so· 
cialists' be organized into 'some sort of secret society.' These socialists, together with the 
39 Ibid. p. 70. 
40 Ibid. pp. 72.73. 
41 Mock and Larson (1939) p. 261. 
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various oppressed peoples of the Monarchy would sabotage the Austro-Hungarian war effort 
and 'accelerate the fall of Germany.'42 
Besides outlining such impressive and ambitious campaigns, other MIB reports 
consisted of more specific recommendations regarding the text of the leaflets to be used.43 
One of the most amusing proposals was transmitted to Creel on 30 March 1918. Albert L. 
Williams of Madison, Wisconsin, suggested the following line of action: 
Already we have offered terms of peace which the common people are 
anxious but powerless to accept, therefore let us offer to them direct a 
TREATY OF INDIVIDUAL PEACE.44 
Various individuals, including Allen T. Burns of the Carnegie Corporation and Nicholas Klein, 
a Hungarian-American from Cincinnati, Ohio, also advised the CPI on the course of action to 
be taken. Burns suggested that a revolution in Austria-Hungary could be stimulated by 
immigrants in America.45 Klein outlined the situation in Hungary and claimed that 'a political 
revolution is a matter of months.'46 It was characteristic of lansing's unwillingness to 
cooperate that the State Department contributed only a single Habsburg related report, which 
was of little use for the Creel bureau.47 
42 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-6, Box 1: Van Deman to Creel, 18 May 1918, Kaba's memorandum is 
dated 12 May. 
43 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-6, Box 1: H. Richmond Armour to Baker, 14 June 1918, is a good 
example. 
44 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-5, Box 1: Van Deman to Creel; capitals in the original. 
45 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-5, Box 1: not dated. 
46 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-5, Box 1: 30 April 1918. 
47 NA RG 63: CPI 17 A-5, Box 1: Thomas Nelson Page to lansing, dated 14 February 1918. 
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The actual scope and effect of the CPI dismemberment campaign have been impossi· 
ble to establish. Neither Creel's final report to Wilson nor the CPI collection carried any 
overall assessments of such work, and there are only three reports available which cast 
some light upon the American effort. A 28 April 1918 report by Bass lists the personnel of 
the Padua board, discusses Italian· Yugoslav conflicts at length, and quotes the American 
military representative in Padua, Colonel Palmer, as saying that 'it would be impossible for 
us to conduct an independent campaign of publicity across the Iines.'48 Another report by 
Wagner, dated 4 August 1918, provides a diagram of the organization of the Padua 
Board.49 The third report, probably by Wagner, is a set of instructions and advice for Edgell 
on his taking over the American section of the Padua Board. The report consists of the 
following indication of the scope of American efforts: 
I believe that you will find there is need for large scale activity without 
much delay. I do not know the exact figures on the work being done, but 
as compared with the French front [I] believe we are far behind... The 
opportunities are far greater on the Italian front because of the large number 
of connections through the Czecho and Jugo Slavs, which make possible a 
wide variety of approaches to the very heart of the enemy country. This is 
especially true of American propaganda because of the number of Czecho 
and Jugo Slavs in America. The whole situation is full of possibilities, and 
it is extremely unfortunate that the work has been delayed for so long. No 
more time should be lost in getting the machinery into effective action.50 
The fact that this report is dated 13 September 1918, together with the lack of any further 
information in the matter, suggests that the CPI played a very limited role in the demoraliza· 
tion of the K und K units on the Italian front, and there is strong ground for suspicion that 
48 NA RG 63: CPI 20 B·3, Box 2. 
49 NA RG 63: CPI 20 B·3, Box 1. 
50 NA RG 63: CPI 20 B·3, Box 2. 
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CPI activists, in spite of the various proposals introduced above, were not involved directly 
in inciting revolutions within the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Nevertheless, the final chapter of American dismemberment propaganda was written 
by the CPI back in the United States. The history of the Mid-European Union has been dis· 
cussed at length both by participants, such as Masaryk, and by historians, chief among them 
the American Arthur J. May. But this has been done without paying sufficient attention to 
the CPI in this exceptional venture. 
If the CPI was unwilling to incite revolutions within the Central Powers, similar 
reservations did not seem to apply back in America, where considerable support was lent to 
separatist politicians agitating against the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of creating an 
organization representing all dismemberment propagandists in America, with the exception of 
the few Hungarians, originated with the Czech leader Thomas G. Masaryk.51 On his arrival 
in America Masaryk revived his contacts with the sociologist Herbert A. Miller of Oberlin 
College, New York. Miller contacted Irwin and Creel and the CPI agreed to lend its support 
to Masaryk and his colleagues.52 
The MEU was born on Sunday, 16 September 1918, in New York City. Masaryk was 
elected president and Miller was named executive director, drawing his salary straight from 
the Creel bureau. The MEU consisted of the leading dismemberment politicians then in 
America (Masaryk, Hinkovit, Stoica, Paderewski) as official members and several prominent 
51 Masaryk (1927) p. 237. 
52 May (1967) pp. 254·55. Note that this is the only comprehensive summary of the work of 
the MEU and is based upon some invaluable privately held materials. 
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Americans (Senators lodge and Hitchcock, ex-President Taft) and the Ambassadors of the 
three Allied countries as honorary members. Its aim was to coordinate and harmonize the 
aspirations of the various peoples represented and, as Colonel House suggested, to sort out 
their disagreements before the peace conference. 53 A general program was agreed upon 
during what proved to be the last formal session of the Union, and on 26 October 1918 
Masaryk read out the 'Declaration of Common Aims' in a well directed public meeting in the 
Independence Hall in Philadelphia. The next day, perhaps a bit prematurely, the philadelphia 
Public ledger applauded the 'safe Mitteleuropa', made in America.54 
But the initial enthusiasm was soon replaced by discord. The Italian Ambassador di 
Cellere described the MEU as a Slav scheme to nullify Italian claims in the Adriatic and 
protested against Miller's involvement. Subsequently, the State Department severed official 
connections with the Union and Miller's salary was discontinued by the CPI.55 Soon after, 
Italian-Yugoslav and Polish-Czecho-Slovak rivalries also surfaced58; the American historian 
Arthur J. May chose the perfect quote to conclude his discussion of the MEU: 
The story of the Mid-European Union shows not only Masaryk's wisdom and 
foresight. It reveals the fact that the New Europe which he had in mind . 
refused to be born. 57 
It follows from the above that the CPI lent its support to the establishment of an organiza-
tion on American soil which aimed to destroy and replace a major European power, then at 
53 May (1967) pp. 256-60. 
54 May (1967) pp. 250-51. See also Miller (1940). 
55 May (1967) p. 260. 
58 May (1967) pp. 265-70. 
57 May (1967) p. 271. 
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war with America. Thus, while Wilson, acting as the moral leader of the world, had earlier 
refused to do anything 'that would directly or indirectly bring about revolution, even in an 
enemy country,'58 by the final months of the war he abandoned this policy. The involvement 
of the CPI in the organization of the MEU, regardless of its actual performance, is a unique 
chapter in American history. The establishment of the MEU must be seen as the crowning. 
of all dismemberment propaganda efforts in America during the First World War. It was 
initiated by Masaryk, possibly the most talented separatist politician from the Habsburg Mon· 
archy, but it must be noted how well it was received on the domestic American scene, 
which had been prepared by Creel and the President. The idea of the MEU was based upon 
the realization that Wilson expected some sort of regional integration to take place after the 
liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy. The public acceptance of this plan was clearly demo 
onstrated by the enormous press support to the venture and the assistance of several 
prominent Americans, who before the war had held a different view. 
The first and broadest conclusion emerging from the examination of the work of the 
CPI is undoubtedly that it was not only meant to sell the American war at home and abroad, 
it also controlled and supervised all propaganda efforts in America. The CPI successfully 
monopolized the domestic propaganda front and gained indirect control of the immigrant 
press, which was the most likely source of discord. For example, the way the CPI managed 
the Hungarian·Americans was exemplary, at least from the point of view of the Wilson 
administration. On top of that, Creel's bureau boosted and centralized dismemberment 
propaganda efforts in the MEU, thus establishing control over those as well, and carried out 
its own, rather limited, campaign against Austria·Hungary abroad. These considerations sug· 
gest that it was not dismemberment propagandists who manipulated the President; to the 
58 Quoted in Mock and larson (1939) p. 261. 
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contrary, it was Wilson who, through the CPI, controlled the efforts of dismemberment 
propagandists in America. It must be emphasized yet again that dismemberment propaganda 
in America in general and in the press in particular, peaked after Wilson's change of policy; 
in fact it may be said that it was allowed to peak when Wilson deemed it necessary. 
While the control of domestic American public opinion and propaganda was thus 
established through the CPI, another semi-official organization, the so-called Inquiry, was also 
established with the more specific task of policy and peace planning. This group of experts 
and their work regarding (Austria-) Hungary is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
THE INOUlRY: PREPARATIONS FOR A SCIENTIFIC PEACE 
Besides a comprehensive study by lawrence E. Gelfand, surprisingly little has been 
written about the Inquiry. Biographies and autobiographies carry the odd chapter1 and some. 
of its memoranda have been discussed in articles in various periodicals.2 These studies have 
focused on wartime American plans about the reorganization of the Danubian basin or on 
some members of the Inquiry but its work on the Monarchy is yet to be fully assessed. This 
chapter intends to provide that analysis with a strong focus on Hungary through a look at 
the organization of the Inquiry, its Austro-Hungarian division, and its memoranda and 
proposals. 
By definition the Inquiry, so named by one of its leaders, the Canadian historian 
James T. Shotwell3, was President Wilson's private task force entrusted with preparations 
for a 'scientific peace' and with working out detailed policy proposals. The initiative for such 
an organization came from the State Department following the establishment of similar 
research groups during the previous year in Britain and France under the aegis of the Foreign 
Office and the Quai d'Orsay respectively.4 Actually, lansing began to organize his own peace 
planning staff, but failed to inform the President. He then was caught by surprise when 
1 See: Steel (1981); Martin (1968); Martin (1980); Shotwell (1937); Seymour (1965). Further 
references are provided in the footnotes below. 
2 Jeszenszky (1988); Adam (1987); Romsics (1992); Svoboda (1989). 
3 Shotwell (1937) p. 8. 
4 Arday (1990) pp. 128-29; Gelfand (1963) p. 124. 
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Wilson let him know that House had been entrusted with such work.5 In this respect, the 
Inquiry was a typical and logical element of the Wilsonian foreign policy framework. For 
reasons of expediency it was placed under the supervision of the State Department, but that 
was as far as Wilson was going to gO.8 The President financed the Inquiry from the same 
special defense fund he was using to finance the CPI,7 in order to minimize Congressional 
and State Department control. Besides appointing Colonel House as director to secure his 
own control over the Inquiry Wilson even intended to keep the entire venture secret but the. 
news was broken by the press before long.8 
The organization of the Inquiry was launched with much enthusiasm. House named 
Sidney Edward Mezes, his brother-in-law and the former president of the University of Texas 
and the City College of New York, as director. David Hunter Miller, a New York lawyer and 
the partner of Gordon Auchincloss, House's son-in-law, was appointed treasurer, and Shotwell 
research coordinator while Walter Lippmann, whom Wilson considered to be the only radical 
he could work with, became secretary.9 The only significant change in the leadership of the 
Inquiry was the replacement of Lippmann with Isaiah Bowman, the president of the American 
Geographical Society (hereafter AGS), in mid-1918.10 Instrumental in the selection of the 
research staff, besides the official leaders, was Archibald Cary Coolidge of Harvard, the best 
5 Gelfand (1963) pp. 1-31. 
B Shotwell (1937) p. 3. 
7 Gelfand (1963) pp. 99-100. 
S See the 29 September 1917 issue of the New York Times: Gelfand (1963) pp. 39-41. 
9 Floto (1981) pp. 61-62; Seymour (1965): Introduction. 
10 On Bowman's role see Martin (1980): Chapter Five. 
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qualified American expert on East European affairs of the Inquiry, who later led the American 
mission in Vienna in the first half of 1919.11 
During its existence the Inquiry employed 126 research fellows and administrative 
workers and spent approximately a quarter of a million dollars from the President's defense 
fund. The predominantly East Coast based researchers, coming mostly from the Universities 
of Princeton, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, and the AGS, were paid up to 541 dollars per month 
with the likes of Mezes, Miller, Coolidge and Bowman drawing no salary at all. The head· 
quarters were set up on the second floor of the building of the AGS, which also provided 
the Inquiry with staff, equipment and maps. The Inquiry collected some 2,000 memoranda, 
of which only every fourth was written by the regular staff, about 1,500 maps, some of 
which were later used in military training, and ran a card catalogue of all available sources 
without actually having a library of books of its own. Reports were prepared in four copies. 
with one each staying with the author and his division chief while two were catalogued at 
the headquarters by author and topic. The research committee, headed by Shotwell, was . 
responsible for reviewing every document submitted, which became practically impossible by 
the summer of 1918 with the growing number of memoranda and the lack of qualified 
reviewers: thus the Inquiry had overextended itself much before the Armistice.12 Regular 
progress reports were also prepared and fields of regional research were clarified to include: 
(1) the Western Front; (2) Austria-Hungary; (3) the Balkans; (4) Russia; (5) Turkey; (6) the 
Far East; (7) the Pacific islands; (8) Africa; and (9) Latin America.13 
11 The correspondence file of the Inquiry in the National Archives testifies to Coolidge's role in 
the selection of personnel; see also Shotwell (1937) p. 6. As for his expertise, see his Nationality 
and the New Europe in Coolidge (1927) pp. 221·40. 
12 Gelfand (1963): Chapter Three. 
13 FRUS PPC 1: 104: Organization of the Inquiry. 
214 
As for information, the Inquiry had access to a wide range of sources. Among 
government agencies it was linked with the Departments of State, Commerce, Agriculture 
and the Interior, and with the War Trade Board and Military Intelligence Headquarters. Other, 
non·government agencies besides the AGS, such as the National Research Council, the Ameri· 
can Economics Society and the National Board of Historical Service, also provided invaluable 
help.14 Furthermore, after the spring of 1918 Douglas W. Johnson of Columbia University 
served as a liaison officer between the Inquiry and similar British and French organizations, 
collected memoranda, such as the British Peace Handbooks or de Martonne's essay on the 
Ruthenians of Hungary, and interviewed a wide range of politicians. ~5 Not surprisingly, 
advocates of dismemberment both in Europe (Bene!, Seton· Watson, Temperley, Vesnic, etc.) 
and in the United States (Masaryk, Pergler, Stoica, etc.) had direct access to the Inquiry 
which ruled out an unbiased approach not only to the Monarchy but also towards Hungary: 
the principle of audiatur et altera pars was clearly disregarded. 
According to Mezes, 'the bulk of the work of the Inquiry dealt with Mittel Europa, 
indeed, with the distracted areas of Central Europe and the Near East',18 which in itself 
may be seen as Wilson's admittance of his ignorance of these regions. In actual fact, more 
than half of the regional research divisions, as listed earlier, dealt with the Monarchy with, 
quite naturally, the Austro·Hungarian division, placed at Yale under Charles Seymour, being 
the centre of such work. Before discussing the proposals of the Inquiry regarding the future 
14 Shotwell (1937) p. 14; Gelfand (1963) pp. 44·45, 131; FRUS PPC 1: 107·08: Cooperation 
with Other Government Organizations. This indicates that the work of the Inquiry was considered 
more significant than that of the Foreign Section of the CPI, which received only MIB information. 
15 Gelfand (1963) pp. 126·30; SML Ips: Box 3: Folders 8 and 21 include Johnson's detailed 
reports to Bowman. 
16 Seymour and House (1921) p. 5. 
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of the Monarchy and Hungary· as these two issues remained inseparable until the end of 
the war . the Austro-Hungarian division must be introduced and evaluated. 
As stated above, Charles Seymour of Yale was appointed head of the division, which 
was located at the Ivy League university to have quick access to its Iibrary.17 An assistant 
professor of history studying the electoral systems of the world Seymour was entrusted with 
the examination of the nationality problems of the Monarchy}8 Despite Gelfand's surprising 
claim,19 he was not qualified for such a task, and openly admitted it: 
But Day, and Lunt [the Italian expert], and I, myself had not special knowl· 
edge of the regions to which we were assigned ..• We were kept on because 
Bowman liked our reports.2D 
His two closest assistants were the American Clive Day, also of Yale, and Robert J. Kerner, 
a Czech nationalist, drafted from the University of Missouri. Day, an economic historian and 
the author of The History of Commerce (1907), in which he did not discuss the Monarchy 
at all, was nevertheless asked to prepare an economic survey of the Danubian basin while 
serving also as the head of the Balkans division.21 The appointment of Seymour and Day 
thus was due to their personal acquaintance with Bowman, as Seymour himself pointed out 
almost 50 years later, and not because they were real experts.22 In fact, the only real 
17 Gelfand (1963) p. 103. Note that the Italian experts of the division, William E. Lunt and 
Austin P. Evans, are not discussed since they submitted no work on Hungary. 
18 Gelfand (1963) p. 57. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Quoted in Gelfand (1963) p. 315: thus he actually contradicts himself. 
21 Gelfand (1963) p. 59. 
22 Seymour (1965) p. xxiii. 
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expert, albeit a rather biased one, of the division was Robert J. Kerner, a Czech born 
historian who compiled the first Slav bibliographies in the United States.23 His command 
of most languages of the region and specific knowledge of not only Bohemia but also the 
South Slav problem made him indispensable although his colleagues were aware of his strong 
bias.24 A three·page critique of his reports stated that his writings 
are seriously affected in value by the author's tendency, already mentioned, 
to inject into his statement of facts, at frequent intervals, the partisan 
tenets of the Czechs. Without references and authorities by which to control, 
his statements the reader always distrusts the fidelity of his statements to 
the actualities. The revision of the papers should look particularly to the 
exclusion of the party dogmas.25 
It is the case of Kerner that proves that the Inquiry, like lansing with his diplomatic notes, , 
was working with guidelines provided by the President. Kerner, a Czech nationalist, naturallv 
favoured the establishment of an independent Bohemia, yet he submitted several reports 
discussing federalization and not dismemberment. This must be seen as the result of outside 
constraint since at least on one occasion he did indeed give away his real views. In reaction' 
to the Spa agreement he wrote a short piece, A New Policy for the United States in Central 
Europe (16 May 1918), in which he argued that: 
Within a very short time (a week or two) a public declaration of a new ' 
policy of the liberation of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe should 
be made and all possible material and moral assistance offered to them. 
As a result, small nations would revolt against German and Magyar rule and they 
23 Gelfand (1963) p. 57. 
24 Gelfand (1963) pp. 57.58. 
25 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 306, unsigned appendix. Note that a full list of the memoranda 
relevant to this chapter is provided in the appendix below. 
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should be given de facto recognition and definite assurances that the great 
disinterested power of the United States will be thrown on the side of 
democracy and justice in a careful delimination [sic] of ethnic boundaries 
with just compromises in regard to military, economic, and political consider· 
ations.26 
Several authors have argued that this was an all important policy making document27 but 
there is no evidence that Kerner was asked to write this piece or that it ever reached the 
President. Furthermore, Wilson's letter to House dated 2 September 1917 made it clear that 
individual members of the Inquiry were not expected to write policy proposals: 'Under your 
guidance these assistants could collate all the definite material and you could make up the 
memorandum by which we should be guided:28 In the 10 May 1918 report on the work , 
of the Inquiry Kerner, Day and Seymour were described as 'an unusually strong combination 
which should be kept intact for the final peace conference:29 During the autumn of 1918 
Richard B. Barrett, Florence A~ Hague, Charles Sweeney and Thomas Burk (who also worked 
for Day's division) were added to the staff of the division, but their contributions proved to 
be less important. They were involved mostly in typing and compiling statistical data and, 
neither the Washington nor the Yale collections of the papers of the Inquiry contain a single 
memorandum written by either of them. Besides Day, two other regular members of the 
Balkans division also contributed to the work on Hungary and the Monarchy. Paul Monroe, 
formerly director of the School of Education at Columbia University, was asked to report on 
the educational system of the Monarchy. In his single piece on the subject Monroe introduced 
the 1868 and 1907 Hungarian education laws without any comment and presented the 
28 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 839. 
27 Jeszenszky (1988) pp. 658·59; Svoboda (1989). 
28 WWPs 44: 120.21. 
29 FRUS PPC 1: 85. 
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'Language Question and Education' by simply quoting R. W. Seton·Watson's German. Slav, 
and Magyar.3D Another, more comprehensive contribution came from Leon Dominian, ana· 
tive of Turkey. Dominian was initially invited by the AGS to write a book on linguistic 
frontiers in Europe and, being available at the right time, he was attached to the Balkans 
division. As will be seen during the discussion of the suggestions of the Inquiry, linguistic 
frontiers, as worked out by Dominian31, were the starting point for boundary proposals. 
The division was supplied with a wide variety of material by different outside 
sources. The State Department provided several reports by Ambassador Stovall and Seton· 
Watson on the Monarchy and a memorandum by Putney discussing Slav aspirations. Dismem· 
berment propaganda was also available in abundance: besides pamphlets, wartime declara· 
tions and interviews by Johnson, special reports for the Inquiry were also written by the 
likes of Hinkovi~, Masaryk and Stoica. The relevant British Peace Handbooks and various 
French memoranda were acquired through Johnson, the Embassies and by Coolidge, who 
visited several European countries during the summer of 1918. 
At the same time, the Inquiry paid little attention to the Rumanian and Hungarian 
positions. Max S. Handman, a Rumanian born sociologist mistakenly identified by Gelfand as 
a member of the Balkans division,32 produced the only pro· Rumanian memorandum ever used 
by the key members of the division. Meanwhile, William Howell Reed, the actual Rumanian 
30 SML Ips: Box 7: Folder 63. 
31 See: Dominian (1917). 
32 Gelfand (1963) pp. 59·60. A look at the correspondence file under Handman's name in the 
National Archives makes it very clear that he was denied an appointment because of his direct 
connections with the Rumanian government. 
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expert of the Balkans division,33 focused on Rumanian aspirations outside Hungary until the 
end of November 1918. As for Hungary, the Inquiry has not a single memorandum presenting 
the Hungarian position. In October 1917 an unidentified Dr. Green, who spoke Hungarian, 
approached the Inquiry offering his services. In a letter to Shotwell dated 3 November 1917 
Coolidge put forward the following proposition: 
I am sending along Green's Hungarian article. To tell the truth it does not 
impress me ..• At the same time a man who knows Hungarian is not to be 
found every day and I am not sure we may not want to use Dr. Green. 
Owing to his training he would be able to investigate the subject and we 
need not particularly accept his conclusions.34 
The issue was dropped without further comment. Similarly, during July 191 a Day made a 
vain attempt to enroll someone who read Hungarian to deal with statistical information.35 
Another, more revealing, incident also implies that the Austro-Hungarian division displayed 
very little interest in the Hungarian position. At Bowman's request during August 191 a Miss 
Mary T. Scudder of the National Research Council interviewed several New York immigrants, 
including Kende, Konta, the Reverend laszlo Harsanyi (the inventor of the myth of Wilson's 
anti-Hungarianism), and Charles Feleky. According to Miss Scudder Feleky was 
the possessor of a most unique library on works pertaining to Hungary, all 
the books being in English. The library has cost him a great amount of 
money although he does not emphasize that point. He spent a very sultry 
afternoon climbing up a small ladder and selecting books that pertained to 
our subject and those [th]at were the best authority ... Through Mr. Feleky 
we have secured references that could only have been obtained after a great 
33 See under his name in NA RG 256: Inquiry: Card Record of Personnel and Personal Assign-
ments, 1917·1918. Note that Handman is not listed here. 
34 HPl ACCps: Correspondence: Box 1: The Inquiry: Peace Aims. Also in NA RG 256: Inquiry: 
General Correspondence, under Coolidge's name. 
35 NA RG 256: Inquiry: General Correspondence, under Day's name. 
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amount of research and some of these sources we would never have located 
without his aid.36 
There is no evidence to prove that this survey was ever digested by the Inquiry or that the 
references provided by Feleky were used. In fact, the only pro-Hungarian reference ever used 
was Knatchbull-Hugessen's work. At the same time, maps and official statistical publications 
from the Monarchy were acquired and used most extensively. 
The work of the Inquiry regarding (Austria-) Hungary clearly falls into two periods, 
the dividing line being July and August of 1918, which, by no means accidentally, coincided 
with Wilson's change of policy. Characteristic of the first period was the collection of all 
available material (most of which was never digested) and an attempt to cover all imaginable 
aspects of the region and its problems. The focus of the work was considerably narrowed 
down in the second period when mostly boundaries and economic issues were considered and 
recommendations were finalized. 
The vast majority of the memoranda and statistical surveys in any way related to 
Hungary were prepared during the first period. With the widest possible focus, these reports, 
ranged from discussions of Habsburg foreign policy and territorial acquisitions through 
specialized surveys, such as the one on the forest resources of Austria-Hungary, to the first 
actual proposals discussing the future of the Monarchy. As indicated earlier, this work was 
almost exclusively carried out by Seymour, Day and Kerner.· 
The analysis of Austro-Hungarian politics and government, nationality problems and· 
the representation of the nationalities on various levels of administration was the task of 
36 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 110. 
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Kerner. He produced more than twenty reports (including resumes and revised versions) and 
he deserved most of the criticism he received. He introduced the Dualist system simply as 
a personal union, not because he was unaware of its actual nature (he could have checked 
out Wilson's own work on it) but to make the separation of Hungary and Austria look easier, 
providing further ground for the separation of Bohemia: in brief, to promote the idea of 
, 
dismemberment. He described the Slavs as 'more democratically inclined' than either the 
Germans or the Magyars and claimed that the survival of the Monarchy was in the interest 
of only the Catholic Church, the Jews and western pacifists.37 He presented only one side 
of the problem of the nationalities and did so with unconcealed bias. According to Kerner 
the non· Magyar peoples of Hungary were denied the freedom of religion, education, speech, 
press and assembly. Even the non·Magyar primary schools had been closed down and legal. 
action had been taken against 938 non·Magyar newspapers between 1886 and 1908.' 
Hungary was ruled by the Magyar 'landed gentry' and the non·Magyar peoples were sub· 
jected to Ku Klux Klan-like persecution.38 He hardly ever provided references to back up his 
statements, and none other than his own reports and published statistics. A similar lack of 
impartiality characterized his political evaluations, which included the following and numerous 
similar statements: 
Corrupt practices. bribery. forgery. diet·packing. and career·exploding prac· 
ticed by the Bans and their henchmen in Croatia. as in Hungary. reduce the 
institutions of both to so much paper.39 
37 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 306. 
38 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 311. 
39 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 306. Underline in the original. 
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It is little wonder then that besides the above cited critique of Kerner's memoranda, which 
pointed out his poor command of English as well, one of the progress reports also stated 
that 
Owing to the fact that Professor Kerner is himself of Czech descent and an 
enthusiastic Czech nationalist, it is felt that his work requires careful 
checking up by men of cooler judgement.40 
After Seymour's initial and rather unsuccessful venture into the fiel~1 the economic survey 
of the Monarchy and Hungary was left to Day, who produced two reports (one of them, 
unfinished) and several statistical compilations. In his first report (1 February 1918) he 
examined Hungarian river and railway transportation, exports and imports, crop production 
and mining. He concluded that the Hungarian economy matched only that of the Balkans; and 
he disregarded, among several other things, animal husbandry and food industry. In his other, 
unfinished, memorandum he discussed Hungary only as the trading partner of Bosnia· 
Herzegovina. His statistical compilations, covering exports, imports, religion, industry and 
forest resources, were based upon sources published in German in the Monarchy and carried 
no critical evaluations. Day's reports thus reflect a complete lack of interest and insight, 
together with the fact that the plan of a systematic economic analysis of the region was 
dropped around the end of February 1918 and that work was never completed. 
The discussion of Slav aspirations within the Monarchy and plans for her reorganiza-
tion were undertaken by Kerner and Seymour. These reports constitute the division's main 
contribution to the work of the Inquiry during the period and carry special significance for 
40 FRUS PPC 1: 85. 
41 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 519. For example, Seymour mistakenly concluded that the 
economic centre of Hungary was the so called 'Duna-Tisza koze' (that is the territories between the 
Rivers Danube and Theiss). 
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students of Hungarian history. It was Kerner's, by American standards, unique knowledge 
of Bohemian and South Slav history that made him not only indispensable for the Inquiry but 
allowed him to write his best memoranda. Displaying considerable historical and theoretical 
knowledge he discussed federalism with or without the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
and, among other things, supported the idea of the Czech· Yugoslav corridor (a claim put 
forward by Masaryk and Bene! both during the war and at the Peace Conference, which the 
Yugoslavs never embraced) on strategic grounds.42 Seymour attended to the same issues 
from a statistical viewpoint in three convincingly written pieces. He correctly identified South 
Slav claims to the Bacska, Baranya and the BamU but refused to take sides by simply 
establishing that these were ethnically mixed territories. Driven by ethnic and economic 
considerations, he flatly rejected the Czech·Yugoslav corridor and successfully defended his 
position not only during the war but also at the Peace Conference. For reasons he did not 
reveal, he considered the attachment of the territories of Hungary with a Rumanian majority 
to the Kingdom of Rumania inadvisable, which influenced his federalization plans as well.43 
Seymour regarded both trialism and federalism as possible means of reorganizing the 
Danubian Basin. He believed that the political balance of the Monarchy could best be reo 
stored by granting the Poles or the South Slavs, the two largest Slav national groupings 
within her boundaries,44 equal rights to those of the Austrians and Hungarians. He preferred 
Polish trialism on the grounds that it could be carried out during the war and would drive 
42 NA RG 256: Inquiry Documents 310; 312; 316. 
43 NA RG 256: Inquiry Documents 516; 517; 520. 
44. This statement is obviously not true and is yet another demonstration of Seymour's 
superficiality. The Poles and the South Slavs are the largest national groupings (if we consider the 
latter to be such) in the region but the Habsburg Monarchy included only a segment of both. The 
largest Slav grouping within Austria-Hungary was, of course, that of the Czechs. 
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a wedge between the Germans and the Habsburgs, which could be capitalized upon by the 
Allies.45 That notwithstanding, he considered the South Slav solution as almost equally 
feasible and described four different versions of it; with Hungary, in all four cases, losing 
Croatia-Slavonia and Fiume.46 As an alternative to trialism Seymour also discussed the 
federalization of the Habsburg Monarchy. His 25 May 1918 memorandum is not just the only 
detailed American federalization plan but also the only disinterested one of any significance 
from the entire war period. Seymour suggested that the following six states replace the 
Monarchy: Austria, Bohemia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland-Ruthenia, and Transylvania. Despite 
the fact that this 'division can hardly be called one which would satisfy the different ethnic 
and political groups of the Dual Monarchy,' Seymour argued, it 'has the practical advantage 
of combining existing administrative units without cutting boundaries' and it 'provides federal 
states based to some extent on history~ each of which has a definite if not a pure racial 
character.' In terms of size and population Hungary would be by far the largest federal state, . 
argued Seymour, although she would have to cede Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, that 
is 22,000 square miles of her territory and 4.8 million of her inhabitants.47 From a Hungari· 
an point of view this was still by far the most favourable wartime proposal drafted outside 
Hungary. 
Wilson's new Habsburg policy in the summer of 1918 also marked the beginning of 
the second period of the work of the Inquiry. Mezes explains: 
45 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 507. 
46 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 506. 
47 Adam (1987) pp. 50-56; NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 509. Note that Seymour is inaccurate 
here: the territorial figure correctly refers to Croatia, the population figure to Transylvania. This, 
however, was probably not an effort to make Hungary's losses less dramatic; Seymour's writings 
indicate that he was often just inaccurate. 
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It became evident, namely, that many kinds of information bearing on the 
drawing of boundary-lines would be needed, and that no information that did 
not bear on such settlements, excepting general economic information that 
would be needed in drafting the economic clauses of the treaty, would be 
of any value. In August, therefore, the staff of The Inquiry was asked to 
confine its consideration to such data, and soon after the work clarified and 
definite objectives were established. Only the regions along or adjacent to 
probable boundary lines were now studied.48 
This was the period of organized and coordinated work on the future of the Danubian Basin; 
in fact, actual preparations for the peace negotiations were started. The division submitted 
, 
an ambitious research program for the period between August and November, according to 
which plans for: (1) dismemberment; (2) federalism (either along ethnic or historic lines); (3) 
trialism; and (4) reformed dualism were to be developed considering racial, religious, cultural, , 
economic, political and historical factors. Statistics, maps, and the presentation of the 
positions of all parties concerned were also included.49 A look at the output of the division 
during the second period under examination reveals that this program was far too ambitious 
and work was actually limited to the topics outlined by Mezes.' The enrollment of Burk, 
Sweeney, Hague and Barrett around September 1918 was a clear indication of the signifi-
cance the leaders of the Inquiry attached to the work on the Monarchy. In due course, the 
division collected and reviewed some 150 maps, built a reference card catalogue and finalized 
its recommendations during the last three months of the war. 
The shift from writing memoranda to building reference card catalogues was one of 
the most clear-cut changes in the work of the Inquiry and its Austro-Hungarian division, 
although the collection of information and reports was continued. A comprehensive Who's 
48 Seymour and House (1921) p. 5. 
49 SML Ips: Box 7: Folder 62. 
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Who was compiled which identified over 60 politicians in any way connected to the dismem· 
berment of the Monarchy. The other general catalogue, of political parties and the press, is 
far less impressive. However, it does prove that the Americans identified the most important 
Hungarian newspapers and closely monitored the changes in the Austrian and Hungarian 
governments, while the attempt to profile some politicians (like Andrassy and Khuen· 
) 
Hedervary) through their newspaper articles proved less successful and was abandoned in 
due course. As for Austria·Hungary, three detailed sets were created surveying (1) population 
density, (2) religious and language statistics and (3) industry •. These compilations, which like 
all such records were typed or handwritten on5 by 8 inch cards, are broken down to 
districts (jaras) and are based upon official Austro·Hungarian statistical publications. These . 
card records were made good use of not only during the war but also during the peace 
negotiations.50 
The best summation of the map program, described by Mezes as 'one of the largest 
undertakings' of the Inquiry51, may be read in the relevant chapter of the biography of 
Chief Cartographer Mark Jefferson.52 In late August Bowman secured his services for the 
Inquiry to boost the rather slowly unfolding map program.53 As a result of Jefferson's 
enthusiastic efforts some 1,500 maps were piled up, of which every tenth covered some or 
all the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. The division's maps have never been indexed 
or catalogued and constitute a curious mix. The majority of these maps are printed and carry 
50 These card records are catalogued separately in NA RG 256: Inquiry, which in itself is 
sufficient proof that they were taken to Paris. 
51 Seymour and House (1921) p. 5. 
52 Martin (1968): Chapter Eight. DiMauro (1991), an unpublished Masters thesis, is the only 
other such reference. 
53 Martin (1968) pp. 169.71. 
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statistical information. The more important ones, some of which naturally come from the first 
period, are the so called 'base maps', which are hand made, display boundary proposals, and 
were attached to key memoranda. 
The beginning of the Armistice negotiations in early October indicated that the peace 
negotiations were at hand and a detailed and comprehensive 61-card inventory to all material 
related to the Habsburg Monarchy was created. More importantly, the division also submitted 
its final recommendations acting upon instructions dated 1 October 1918.· The actual report. 
is not dated but Mezes provides a clue, stating that by mid-October 'tentative boundaries for 
the whole of Mittel Europa had been worked out' and submitted to House. This almost 100-
page report, including several maps, is of enormous significance for a number of reasons. The 
report, entitled Epitome of Reports on Just and Practical Boundaries within Austria-Hungary 
for Czecho-Slovaks, Juga-Slavs, Rumanians, Poles, Ruthenians, and Magyars discussed the 
proposed boundaries from the point of view of dismemberment.54 For the first time the Hun-
garian position was also considered; the authors suggested the reconsideration of that 
solution and warned that the 
proposed boundaries would dismember a historic state. They [the boundaries 
of Hungary] have existed for two hundred years. 'just and practical' bound-
aries are unjust from the Magyar point of view. The Magyars have been 
masters of Hungary for eight centuries. To place a large proportion of them 
(nearly 25 per cent) under the control of nationalistic groups whom they 
have regarded as serfs and inferiors would start violent irredentism and 
create future dissension and war. 
54 NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 514; Document 512 is an ll-page resume. 
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In the introduction the principles applied in the drawing of the boundaries were outlined as 
follows:55 
The determination of the linguistic frontier by reference to a majority speak· 
ing a given language appears to be consonant with the accepted principles \ 
of modern democracy; and gives a perfectly definite line as. a basis for' 
further work ... The boundaries of language thus established, marked out for 
the committee a definite block for each of the projected states, whose: 
outlines had then to be shaped with reference to other considerations. . 
A study of topography showed, as was to be expected, that the line of 
division between language groups is, in many districts, entirely impracticable 
as a national frontier. The committee sought then to find the line nearest to 
it, which would serve the needs of defence. With this consideration alone in 
mind, (and lacking, it may be proper to state, the judgement of a military 
expert), it modified the original line, sometimes extending it to include regions 
of alien speech (Magyar districts in Czecho·Slovakia), and sometimes restrict· 
ing it and thereby excluding regions of kindred speech (Slovene districts in 
the north and west of the Jugo·Slavs). 
The line thus fixed by a compromise between the conflicting demands of 
nationality and military topography, may be regarded as a first approximation 
to the demand for 'a just and practical boundary' ... 
This proposed boundary has been tested with reference to demographic 
considerations, (density and movement of population in the frontier zone), and 
to the distribution of religions ... Conditions are such in Austria·Hungary that 
no serious danger to the new states need, apparently, be apprehended from 
either of these sources. 
The economic element in the problem of delimination [sic) of new states 
deserves, in the opinion of the committee, more detailed consideration. Anal· 
ysis in this field was necessarily postponed until lines had been struck, 
based on simpler factors, within which the statistical investigator might 
work, and the conclusions were used rather to test and criticize the pro· 
posed boundaries, than to modify them in a constructive way. 
The authors also voiced serious reservations against their very own proposals: 
55 Note the significance of Leon Dominian's work, as indicated earlier. 
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The committee is forced to the conclusion that the frontiers supposed [sic] . 
are unsatisfactory as the international boundaries of sovereign states. It has . 
been found impossible to discover such lines, which would be at the same 
time just and practical. An example of the injustice that would result may 
be instanced in the fact that a third of the area and population of the 
Czecho-Slovak state would be alien to that nationality. Another lies in the 
placing of a quarter of the Magyars under foreign domination. But any 
attempt to make the frontiers conform more closely to the national line 
destroys their practicability as international boundaries. Obviously many of 
these difficulties would disappear if the boundaries we·re to be drawn with . 
the purpose of separating not independent nations, but component portions 
of a federalized state. A reconsideration of the data from this aspect is 
desirable. 
The real significance of this report lies in the fact that it includes the only detailed wartime 
American boundary proposals regarding Hungary. The boundaries outlined here are practically 
identical with the ones presented on the map of Seymour's earlier introduced federalization 
plan, although modifications were incorporated. The revised American position on the region 
prompted the authors to suggest the incorporation of Slovakia not into Hungary but into a 
new Czechoslovak state and to leave open the future of the Ruthenian territories of northern . 
Hungary while the plan of an independent Transylvania was abandoned for its incorporation 
into Rumania. Full details are provided in the appendix below. 
A thorough analysis of the Inquiry and its work regarding (Austria-) Hungary offers 
several far reaching conclusions. First and most important is the fact that it was not the 
Inquiry that influenced Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy but it was the President who set out 
the guiding lines (first federalization, then dismemberment and regional cooperation) for his 
task force and granted it free access to all available information. Before the change of the 
President's policy the emphasis was on reforming the Habsburg Monarchy either through 
trialism or by federalizing her and Kerner's overt and covert calls for dismemberment were 
swept aside. Wilson's new policy of dismemberment and the coming of the Armistice set 
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new requirements for Seymour and his colleagues. The inventory and the final report may 
be seen as the culmination of the efforts of the Austro-Hungarian division although it was 
pointed out that economic problems needed further attention and that the authors of the 
report had reservations about their own suggestions. This awkward situation was largely due 
to outside constraint but it was also the result of the division's overall inability to tackle the 
issues in a satisfactory way. This offers a second conclusion: as has been pointed out the 
\ 
work of the division had a strong anti-Hungarian bias and its 'experts' could live up to the 
, 
standards they had set for themselves neither in terms of quality nor of impartiality. Thirdly, 
. , 
economic issues were disregarded: the plan for the complete economic analysis of the 
Danubian Basin was practically dropped as early as February 1 9 1 B_ Fourthly, the Inquiry 
worked on all the logically possible solutions Ihaving a compromise peace or the defeat of 
the Central Powers in mind) to the future of the Habsburg Monarchy and Hungary. From a 
Hungarian point of view the most favourable boundary proposals were put forward by 
Seymour, Who, nonetheless, failed to comprehend several important issues, such as th~ 
significance both the Hungarians and the Rumanians attached to the possession of Transylva-
nia. Furthermore, Seymour finalized his suggestions by May 191 Band all later modifications 
were added not in the light of knowledge gained through research but in response to the 
changes in Wilsonian high politics. This can best be demonstrated with the case of Slovakia: 
in the May memorandum Seymour suggested that Hungary should retain that region, but 
indicated, with a dotted line on the map, that alternatively it might be added to Bohemia. 
Dismemberment became a foregone conclusion by October 1 9 1 Band Masaryk's agreement. 
with the Slovak league settled the issue: the final report suggested that Slovakia should join 
Bohemia. Finally, the fact that the Inquiry worked under instructions from the President and 
produced detailed proposals Iregardless of their actual value) disproves lansing's often cited 
claim that Wilson went to Paris without a detailed program. As for the later contribution of 
the members of the Austro-Hungarian division to the Hungarian peace treaty, Seymour and 
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Day served on the territorial committees which drew Hungary's post·1919 boundaries while 
Kerner was attached to the Coolidge mission and was sent to Prague as its representative. 
Many historians have argued that peace preparations may have been removed from 
the jurisdiction of the State Department, but that lansing nonetheless played a decisive role 
in the shaping of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy after April 1917. The following chapter 
assesses the work of the State Department, refutes the claims of Lansing's influence and 
concludes the discussion of the work of the War Department; all that with a view to setting 
the stage for the reinterpretation of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy and the final conclusions 
of the present study. 
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CHAPTER TEN: 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILSON'S CABINET 
The previous two chapters indicated the great significance Wilson attached to semi-
official organizations which he could control without interference. This, together with the 
lacklustre performance of his cabinet in Habsburg matters during the neutrality period, implies 
that his official advisors continued to playa limited role in decision making, especially in East 
Central European affairs. The careful examination of various memoirs, primary and secondary 
sources strongly suggests that this was indeed the case. The following is an introduction 
to the work of the Departments of State, War and the Navy, with a special emphasis on 
the contribution of Secretary of State lansing and of Military and Naval Intelligence. 
Several authors, approaching Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy from various aspects, have 
claimed that lansing was instrumental in reversing the American policy regarding the future 
of the Danubian basin. Often drawing heavily on one another's work these authors have 
claimed that lansing, as Secretary of State, was in an excellent position to pressurize Wilson 
towards the acceptance of dismemberment, which he himself had embraced during the spring 
of 1917. lansing developed his own solution of replacing the Habsburg Monarchy with a 
chain of independent states forming a barrier both against Germany and Soviet Russia, and, 
it is argued, persuaded Wilson to accept it by the summer of 1918. Some of these authors 
realized lansing's limited say in policy making but instead of drawing the logical conclusion, 
claimed that he was given a free hand in the Habsburg case, an issue of secondary impor-
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tance.' While these interpretations seem coherent and impressive, on closer examination of 
the facts they prove to be far less convincing. These authors have disregarded Wilson's 
concept of the Presidency and of the conduct of foreign affairs as well as the actual nature 
of the Wilson-lansing relationship. The revision of this lansing myth is one of the key 
aspects of this chapter, which is followed by a discussion of the work of Military and Naval 
Intelligence. The War Department, as has been indicated in the chapter on the CPI, activated 
the MIB and additional information was also expected from the intelligence section of the 
American Expeditionary Forces (hereafter AEF). Naval Intelligence continued to focus on Medi-
terranean matters and monitored the Yugoslav movement. The nature of our enquiry makes 
it necessary to widen its focus to the entire Habsburg Monarchy once again. 
Before analyzing lansing's role in Wilsonian policy making towards the Habsburg 
Monarchy we need to take a brief glance at the State Department during the period of 
American belligerency. As has been mentioned earlier, in July 1917 Joseph C. Grew, formerly 
with the Berlin and Vienna Embassies, was placed in charge of the West European desk. He . 
was asked to digest the Habsburg related information coming in from the Embassies, and 
William C. Bullitt, who came to be seen as an expert on the Central Powers on the strength 
of his 1916 articles for the Philadelphia Public Ledger, was appointed assistant secretary of 
state in order to help Grew. Meanwhile, Putney, the chief of the Near Eastern division, was 
requested to write detailed analyses of the Habsburg Monarchy and especially of the various 
nationalities within her boundaries. Putney, a friend of Masaryk, did so with apparent bias, 
, See: Barany (1966); Smith (1961); Hartig (1974) and the relevant passages in Mamatey 
(1957). 
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and his reports not only helped lansing shape his Habsburg policy but they were also sent 
over to the Inquiry.2 
The declaration of war on Germany and diplomatic break with Austria·Hungary 
transformed American diplomatic representation in Europe. With the withdrawal of the Berlin 
and Vienna Embassies the American legations in neutral capitals north and south of the 
Central Powers gained a central role both in organizing various secret meetings and in 
collecting information. Bordering on both Germany and Austria·Hungary and having a German 
language press, Switzerland was in a key position, which was realized not only by the CPI 
but also by lansing. Hugh Robert Wilson of the Berlin Embassy and Allen Welsh Dulles and 
Dolbeare of the Vienna staff, were transferred to Berne to strengthen Stovall's team.3 
Meanwhile, the Budapest Consul· General Coffin was sent to Copenhagen and slowly faded 
out of the picture.4 
Despite lansing's efforts to respond to the state of American belligerency his. 
Department continued to be under·informed and neglected. Ronald Steel, the acclaimed 
biographer of Walter Lippmann recorded: 
That fall [1917] Lippmann frequently went to Washington to confer with 
officials. On one trip he stopped by the State Department to see the people 
in the Near Eastern division. The division turned out to be one man, who had 
never been to the area, and a small filing cabinet. Lippmann then went 
upstairs to talk to the Secretary of State. He explained to Robert lansing 
2 Mamatey (1957) pp. 92·93; Pergler (1926) pp. 77·93; Putney's reports were found in the Yale 
collection of the Papers of the Inquiry. 
3 Wilson (1941) p. 5. 
4 Only one post April 1917 report by Coffin has been found: on 1 February 1918 he commented 
on cabinet changes in Hungary. See: NA RG 59: DFSD: M 708 reel 3. 
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what the Inquiry was doing and how it had to deal with the problems of the 
Balkans, such as the borders of Yugoslavia and the Macedonian issue. 'Let 
me show you on the map,' Lippmann suggested to the secretary, pulling 
down one of the big roller maps attached to the wall.The map was fifty 
years old, showing the frontiers that existed before the first Balkan wars.5 
That the situation did not improve much for almost a year is indicated by the fact that in 
June 1918 Bullitt had to contact the Inquiry to obtain a full list of the members of the I 
Austrian and Hungarian cabinets.s, 
President Wilson was certainly aware of the situation prevailing in the State 
Department and it is hardly surprising that he did not rely too heavily on it. lansing, 
nonetheless, developed his own policy towards Austria-Hungary and wrote a series of 
memoranda for the President to convince him of the necessity of dismembering the Habsburg 
Empire and replacing it with a chain of independent nation states which would serve as a 
barrier both against Germany and Soviet Russia. To understand Lansing's position and his 
role in bringing about the Wilson turnaround in the Habsburg case, it is necessary to take 
a closer look at the man and his views and beliefs. 
Born into an upper-class New York family, lansing was trained as an international 
lawyer, graduated from Amherst College in 1886 and entered the New York bar three years 
later. After 1892 he was a regular American representative in international arbitration 
tribunals and made several important friends_ Socially active, he was among the founders of 
the American Society of International law and edited its periodical until his death in 1928. 
His growing fame earned him the appointment as counsellor of the State Department on 1 
5 Steel (1981) p. 130. 
6 NA RG 256: Inquiry: General Correspondence: Lippmann to Bullitt, 26 June 1918. 
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April 1914. In June 1915 he replaced Bryan as Secretary of State, served for almost five 
years and was forced to resign on 12 February 1920. He then returned to legal practice and 
wrote several articles and two important recollections of his years in office.7 
Behind this illustrious career there stood a man of contradictions, a man of extremes. 
The 'official' lansing was cold, calculating, logical and accurate, the characteristics of a 
good lawyer.8 His cooperation with Wilson was based upon a rather peculiar interpretation 
of loyalty, which meant working in harmony with the President when they agreed and 
maintaining 'public neutrality' when they did not.9 Despite his personal charm, which 
impressed several foreign diplomats in Washington, most of his compatriots, including the 
President, his second wife, House and Creel, had serious reservations about him; Tumulty on 
one occasion fabricated evidence to prove his disloyalty and to get rid of him. to 
The 'private' lansing was sour and witty, and often felt frustrated and humiliated 
for being neglected. He returned criticism secretly in morality plays, poems and general 
remarks, which he penned into his highly revealing private notebooks;~t he also voiced his 
disillusionment, albeit in more moderate terms, in two lengthy memoirs. A striking aspect of 
the 'private' lansing is the fact that he viewed Germany on the level of the worst atrocity 
propaganda. t2 Had he kept that inside he would have spared himself much embarrassment 
7 DAB 5: 609.11. 
8 Smith (1961) p. 103; Mamatey (1957) pp. 79·80. 
9 lazo (1985) p. 53. 
10 Smith (1961) p. 103; lazo (1985). 
11 Brands (1985) on the topic is pioneering. 
12 Brands (1985) pp. 30.31. 
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and criticism, but he let it out on several occasions. The Secretary of the Interior Franklin 
K. lane, for example, recorded in a private letter that during a cabinet meeting lansing, with 
apparent conviction, confirmed the obviously unfounded rumour that the wives of the 
American diplomats, before leaving Germany in February 1917, were bathed in acid by the 
Germans to find out whether they had any official secrets written on their skin in invisible 
ink.13 On another occasion, at the Princeton graduation ceremony in 1917, he called Germa-
ny 'the wild beast of Central Europe' and described the Germans as 'butchers and assassins,' 
much to the amazement and dislike of the attending correspondent of the New York 
Tribune;14 all that at a time when Wilson was carefully drawing a dividing line between the 
German people and their government. 
lansing's background and utterances reveal strong Anglo-Saxon sympathies and an 
almost paranoic fear of German intentions in the Western Hemisphere. Not surprisingly, 
lansing saw his worst fears realized in the Zimmermann telegram, which offered Mexico 
large chunks of US territory in return for entering the war on the side of the Central 
Powers_Is Thus, lansing came to view Germany as the chief enemy of peaceful global 
democratic development and it was in this context that he began to consider the necessity 
of dismembering the Monarchy_ However, lansing's view of the German issue only makes 
sense as part of his broader concept of national security, international order, and the use 
of force. For him: 
13 lane (1922) pp. 239-40; F. K. lane to George W. lane, 25 February 1917. 
14 lC Rlps Box 70: Scrapbook No.6: press cutting from the 17 June 1917 edition of the paper. 
IS Smith (1958) pp. 162-63. 
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National safety is as dominant in the life of a nation as self·preservation in 
the life of an individual. It is even more so, as nations do not respond to the 
impulse of self·sacrifice. 16 
With a mild form of idealism, Lansing viewed democracy as inherently peaceful, but threat· 
ened by Prussian militarism. He believed that the world was slowly developing into a 
universal federal state but, unlike Wilson and House, maintained that this process should not 
be hurried by the premature establishment of a League of Nations.17 The international 
lawyer in him prompted him to consider traditional diplomacy and the strengthening of the 
then existing worldwide arbitration more expedient.18 This peaceful attitude, however, as 
in the case of Wilson, did not exclude the use of force: 
Force is the great underlying actuality in all history, which, regardless of the 
higher intellectual or spiritual impulses affecting human conduct, must be 
recognized and reckoned with in international and national relationships.19 
This, when applied to American foreign policy, meant that all democratic forces in the world, 
and especially Germany, must be met by force if necessary. This was Lansing's own version 
of 'making the world safe for democracy' but while for Wilson the use of force was the last 
resort· which he nonetheless took to on several occasions and all around the globe· Lansing 
thought it to be a natural, common and necessary means of conducting international 
relations.2D This difference in their political philosophy made Lansing and the President 
unlikely companions: as Daniel M. Smith, Lansing's most prominent biographer put it, 'The 
16 Lansing (1921) pp. 102.03. 
17 Brands (1985) pp. 29·30; Smith (1961) p. 106. 
18 Smith (1961) pp. 120.21. 
19 Quoted in Smith (1958) p. 7. 
2D Smith (1958) pp. 7·9; Smith (1961) pp. 102·03. 
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amazing feature of the Wilson-Lansing relationship is that it lasted so long.'21 The Secretary 
of State always seemed to have been a step ahead of the President in leading the American 
people into the World War, which has been seen by several historians as the clearest 
evidence of his actual influence. That this was not the case may be demonstrated through 
the development of Lansing's Habsburg diplomacy and by outlining Wilson's attitude towards 
him. 
Before the American declaration of war on Germany Lansing and Wilson worked 
together quite effectively.22 Before the spring of 1917 there was one single occasion when 
Lansing took the initiative in a Habsburg related matter: as has been discussed, during the 
Ancona crisis he suggested a diplomatic break with the Monarchy., When Wilson refused to 
go that far Lansing retreated. It took him another year and a half to begin to consider the 
dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy and develop his alternative policy, since he was 
apparently not satisfied with Wilson's conduct. On 6 May 1917 Lansing had a long interview 
with the British Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour and his secretary, Sir Eric Drummond, , 
the leaders of the first British war mission to the United States. Balfour gave the Secretary 
of State a copy of his own October 1916 memorandum, The Peace Settlement in Europe. ' 
Very much along the lines set out in his memorandum and during his earlier conference with 
House and Wilson, Balfour suggested the partial reorganization of East Central Europe along 
ethnic lines to Lansing.23 Wanting to know more about the details, Lansing then asked 
21 Smith (1961) p. 103. 
22 Smith (1958) is the definitive work. Other references are Hartig (1974), an unpublished 
dissertation which adds but little to Smith's work, and Pratt (19281, which is a semi-contemporary 
account. 
23 Mamatey (1957) pp. 89 and 91; Balfour's memorandum was found in SML EMHps: Series 
3: Political Papers, box 181, folder 1: 1/103. Note that this was the Czech trialist proposal coming 
originally from Sazonov. 
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Putney of the Near Eastern division to draw up a memorandum on Slav aspirations and the 
future of the Monarchy. Given his connections not only to Masaryk but also to Pergler and 
Mihajlovic, it is hardly surprising that Putney suggested the dismemberment of Austria-Hunga· 
ry.24 Thus, the real significance of Putney's memorandum and its supplement, dated 26 
May and 5 June respectively, lies not only in the fact that these were the first official 
American documents suggesting dismemberment but they also mark the beginning of 
lansing's interest in the matter. lansing, however, kept quiet for the rest of the year, 
although the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the beginning of the Brest-litovsk peace talks 
certainly gave him second thoughts. When Wilson announced his intention to maintain the 
unity of the Monarchy (Point Ten) lansing wrote a short memorandum, possibly for his own 
use, which he did quite often, titled The Nationalities of Austria-Hungary (10 January 1918), 
in which he contended that the President 
will have to abandon this idea and favor the creation of new states out of 
the imperial territory and require the separation of Austria-Hungary. This is 
the only certain means of ending German power in Europe.25 
This was more an indication of the line lansing would take during the critical period between 
April and July 1918 than a real attempt to influence Wilson's decision. 
lansing, without understanding the French Premier's motivations, described 
Clemenceau's conduct in the Sixtus affair as 'a piece of the most astounding stupidity' and" 
came to be convinced that it ended all hopes of a separate peace with the Monarchy. This, 
in lansing's opinion, called for a review of American policy towards the Habsburg Empire: 
24 Mamatey (1957) pp. 91·93; Pergler (1926) pp. 77·78. 
25 lansing (1935) p. 261. The only comprehensive analysis of lansing's Habsburg related 
memoranda is Barany (1966). Note that some of Barany's conclusions are contested in the present 
chapter. 
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if she could not be removed from the war by a separate peace she then must be liquidated 
through her nationalities, argued the Secretary of State in another memorandum, dated 10 
May 1918.26 The German-Habsburg agreement at Spa and Burian's return to the 
Ballhausplatz led him to the conclusion that dismemberment had become inevitable: 
When, therefore, the Emperor Karl showed that a separate peace was vain 
and when he became the vassal of Germany, a revision of policy became 
necessary. From that moment Austria-Hungary lost its right to exist as an 
Empire including these oppressed races ..• In view of the new state of affairs 
it seems to me that Austria-Hungary must be practically blotted out as an 
empire. It should be partitioned among the nationalities of which it is com· 
posed. As a great power it should no longer exist. 27 
Lansing then presented the same ideas to the President in yet another memorandum on 24 
June 1918, arguing: 
That would mean in effect the dismemberment of the present Austro-Hungar· 
ian Empire into its original elements, leaving these independent nationalities 
to form such separate states as they might themselves decide to form, 
especially if the severance of Austria and Hungary resulted.28 
Lansing proudly acknowledged Wilson's reply two days later as his personal triumph and it 
was the same letter that convinced many historians of Lansing's influence on the President: 
I agree with you that we can no longer respect or regard the integrity of the 
artificial Austrian Empire. I doubt if even Hungary is any more an integral 
part of it than Bohemia. I base this judgement in part upon a very interest· 
28 FRUS LP 2: 127.28. 
27 Lansing (1935) p. 265. 
28 Lansing (1935) p. 270. 
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ing and illuminating conversation I had a month or two ago with a group of 
Magyar Americans, who spoke very plainly to that point.29 
Despite this seemingly strong evidence, Lansing's influence on Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy 
is hardly more than a myth, based upon deduction. It can be refuted on several grounds; one· 
way of doing so is by pointing to the obvious difference in opinion between the two of them: 
Lansing's leave-them-alone attitude hardly fit the President's plans for regional cooperation, 
which he expressed more than once. 
Another way of proving Lansing's limited role in Habsburg related policy making is . 
by analyzing Wilson's attitude towards his Secretary of State. Here a strong case can be 
presented to prove Lansing's rather limited influence in the White House. The American , 
historian Thomas A. Bailey has already been cited as saying that Wilson chose Lansing 'to, 
succeed Bryan in mid-1915 primarily because he believed that he needed only a skilled ' 
international lawyer to frame his policy decisions,'3D for which Lansing was certainly highly 
qualified, although the President 'never really trusted or admired him:31 With the rules thus 
set at the very moment Lansing entered office, they worked together effectively and without 
problems until December 1916. Under detailed instructions, Lansing drew up diplomatic notes 
and Wilson edited them before sending or publication. After minor friction in March 1916, 
which nonetheless revealed some of Lansing's frustration,32 the Secretary of State was 
very nearly sacked in December 1916. He not only criticized the President's peace note but 
29 LC RLps: Memoranda, vol. 1: 155-56. Lansing's memoranda are available in handwritten and 
typed form. The above reference applies to the typed version. 
30 Bailey (1963) p. 88. 
31 Smith (1961) p. 103. 
32 Hartig (1974) p. 290. 
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did it publicly, intimating that war with Germany was at hand.33 Justifiably enraged, Wilson 
forced him to withdraw his press statement publicly and told House, somewhat unjustly, that. 
Lansing had 'no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little ability of any kind.' Wilson, 
furthermore, seriously considered replacing Lansing with Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, 
who was known to be a pacifist.34 But House, in order to secure his own favourable 
position, intervened on Lansing's behalf. A revealing entry from House's diary from 1919 
sheds further light upon the situation: 
[Lansing] has not been entirely considerate, after what I have done for him. 
On the other hand I always appreciate the fact that I have been what 
Gerard once termed 'super-secretary of state,' and Lansing has played a 
minor part and has done it without complaint.35 
After this incident the President gradually restricted Lansing's jurisdiction over diplomatic 
matters even further and informed him about several major decisions, such as the Peace 
without Victory address and the declaration of war on the Monarchy at the very last mo· 
ment.36 Three further incidents during the first six weeks of 1918 also indicated Lansing's 
limited influence on Wilson. 
Until the very last minute, the President did not inform his Secretary of State that 
he was going to deliver the Fourteen Points address, the first (and only) public declaration 
33 Hartig (1974) pp. 290-91; Smith (1961) pp. 109·10. Lansing's own account can be consulted 
in Lansing (1935) pp. 186-87. 
34 Hartig (1974) p. 291. 
35 SML EMHps: Series 2: Diary, vol 14 pt. 2: pp. 62·63. 
36 Smith (1961) pp. 109·10; Barany (1966) pp. 226·27 and 232. Note that the only logical 
reason for withdrawing Anderson's official credentials in December 1917 only a couple of days 
before the declaration of War on the Monarchy seems to be that it was only then that Lansing was 
informed about Wilson's decision. 
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of American war aims; it appears that the visiting Serbian Minister to Paris, Vesnic, knew 
more about it than lansing.37 Nor did Wilson seek lansing's advice on the most important 
secret American-Habsburg peace overture, the Herron-lammasch talks. Instead, he summoned 
Voska to the White House for the first time, probably on Wiseman's suggestion, and asked 
him about the Austrian professor-politician. It took several days for Voska to identify his 
man; had Wilson asked lansing he immediately could have told his boss that they had 
worked together on several 'Congresses of International law' before the w~r.38 Wilson also 
did not bother to inform lansing until a couple of hours before his speech on 11 February 
1918 that he was going to outline the 'Four Principles' of peace to Congress.39 Thus, 
several months before lansing ever considered dismemberment, he lost the remnants of 
Wilson's confidence in him. He never seemed to be able to recover it and the next time he 
did take the initiative, in Mexican affairs in 1920, he was asked to resign. 
Two other aspects of the lansing myth must also be introduced to complete our 
argument. It has been argued that lansing manipulated Wilson with his memoranda carefully 
worded to appeal to the President's idealism, and that lansing was given a say in Habsburg 
matters because they were only of secondary importance. The first claim is based upon a .. 
suggestion that lansing was intellectually superior to Wilson, well understood his weaknesses 
and abused them. The problems with this interpretation are that it is impossible to say which 
reports actually did get to the President on the one hand and that it disregards Wilson's 
view of lansing on the other. The other claim, that the future of the Habsburg Monarchy 
37 Barany (1966) pp. 226-27. On lansing's reaction see: Barany (1966) p. 232. 
38 Unterberger (1989) p. 107; Voska and Irwin (1941) pp. 117·21; Osusky (1926) p. 661 quotes 
lammasch on his knowledge of lansing. 
39 Unterberger (1989) p. 106. 
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was an issue of secondary importance, is also questionable. The limited American interest, 
which has been emphasized during our enquiries, indicates the same thing but the events 
between April and July 1918 pushed the Habsburg issue into the foreground. It is discussed 
in the next chapter how the Russian intervention and the spring 1918 German offensive on , 
the Western Front, together with the Sixtus affair, brought about Wilson's change of policy 
and it is also argued there that these issues brought the future of the Danubian basin into . 
the centre of Wilson's attention. Having said that, any evidence that lansing's influence in 
the White House grew during the last months of the war would support the claims that his 
opinion was well received; but, in fact, Smith contends that 'by the time of the Armistice, 
Wilson held his secretary in rather low regard.'4o 
Meanwhile, after the Bolshevik revolution lansing came to view Soviet Russia in very 
much the same light as he did Germany (he even wrote about it in his notebooks in the same 
vein) and considered it to be single most serious challenge to be faced after Germany's 
defeat.41 He thus came to the conclusion that the Successor States of the Habsburg 
Monarchy would serve not only as a barriere de /'est against Germany but also as a cordon 
sanitaire against Bolshevik Russia. It was with these additional considerations in mind that 
lansing drew up the final recommendations of the State Department for the Peace Confer· 
ence. In his 21 September 1918 memorandum he contended that the German control of . 
Russia opened up another route to the Persian Gulf" and it offered the Germans 'the 
opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their "Mittel·Europa" pro· 
ject.' According to lansing, this should not be allowed: 'The treaty of peace must not leave 
40 Smith (1961) p. 121. 
41 Brands (1985) p. 31; lC Rlps: Correspondence, vol. 40: lansing to Richard S. Hugenford, to 
Edward N. Smith and to Elihu Root, all dated 14 November 1918. 
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Germany in possession directly or indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient: Having 
set out these guiding lines Lansing then discussed the necessary territorial changes that 
would secure international peace in twenty·eight points, of which eight dealt with the 
Monarchy.42 The details are given in the appendix below, which allows the reader to 
compare Lansing's proposals with those of the Inquiry. 
The examination of the available records of American military and naval intelligence 
work after April 1917 testifies to little improvement compared to the period of American. 
neutrality, although certain steps were taken to upgrade both domestic and foreign intelli· 
gence.43 Therefore, intelligence work is discussed not because of its significance but to 
offer a complete round·up of American efforts during the war. However, it must be empha· 
sized that some of the related documents have apparently disappeared and that the earlier 
statement regarding the lack of secondary sources applies to this period as well. The follow· 
ing account of Habsburg related American intelligence work must be read with these 
restrictions in mind. A brief reference to the work of the MIB, which has been introduced 
above, and of the intelligence section of the AEF is followed by an assessment of naval 
intelligence. 
An overview of the entire war period and a look at the nineteen months of American 
belligerency suggests that the Americans did not use their own agents in intelligence work, 
at least not in the Habsburg case. The reports of the MIB cited in the chapter on the CPI 
appear to be the only evidence of any such work. The lack of regular summaries (weekly or 
monthly) even in the AEF collection, together with the limited scope of these reports, clearly 
42 Lansing (1921) pp. 192·97; the quotes are from pp. 192·93. 
43 Andrew (1995) pp. 53.57. 
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indicate the lack of interest on the part of the War Department. Self·appointed informers, 
mostly immigrants (Klein), and Bohemian·American members of the MIB (Kaba) together with 
a handful of press cuttings from Swiss papers and a few Italian intelligence summaries • and. 
all that undigested . hardly lifted the War Department and Secretary Baker to the status of 
prominent advisors to the President in Habsburg matters.44 
The record of naval intelligence, while far from impressive, is somewhat better. 
Drawing upon practically the same sources of information as the War Department staff, 
Daniels' assistants at least came up with policy proposals and uncovered an undercover 
Austro·Hungarian propaganda effort involving Madrid and Mexico. That notwithstanding, the 
majority of the reports of the Office of Naval Intelligence were, as limited in quality and 
quantity as those of the War Department, but with a focus, quite understandably, on the 
Yugoslavs instead of the Czecho-Slovaks. 
The story of the undercover Austro·Hungarian propaganda effort is hardly more than 
a sideshow to the main propaganda campaigns and is not being discussed with similar efforts 
because the material used was apparently in German, Spanish and Hungarian, and was meant 
more for continental European and Mexican than for American consumption. It was revealed . 
by the American naval Attache in Madrid in late December 1917, who apparently opened a 
letter by a German propagandist called Oscar Schurmacher to the Austro·Hungarian Consul 
in Tampico, Mexico. Acting upon this information, the American authorities opened the mail· 
44 No further MIB reports have been found which are in any way related to Habsburg affairs. 
The AEF records are similarly disappointing: a card catalogue of reports on immigrants in America, 
seven Inquiry reports, press cuttings, and an undated and unsigned introductory note to the 
population statistics of Hungary appear to be the AEF's only contributions: NA RG 120: AEF, entries 
1619 and 1620. 
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bags of the S.S. Alfonso Thirteenth, probably a Spanish ship, in Havana and thus obtained 
a list of people involved. An 11 March 1918 report from Madrid explains it all: 
Andre Revesz and Oscar Schnuermacher [sic], who have their office in Calle 
Belen, 16, publish an Austrian propaganda review of no great importance. It 
appears every two months in German, Hungarian and Spanish. 
Revesz, of Hungarian nationality, collaborates with various Spanish newspa· 
pers, subventioned [sic] by the Central Powers. It is also probable that he 
is occupied in the offices of his Embassy. 
With that, the issue was practically dropped and there is no evidence that any Hungarian· 
Americans were involved in any way; it was certainly not brought up during the Konta 
hearings in the Senate in December 1918.45 
A far more interesting and revealing aspect of the work of the Department of the 
Navy was a set of policy proposals prepared by the Planning Section. The Planning Section 
of the Department of the Navy was 'set up in london in January 1918 on the request of 
Admiral Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy. During 1918 it 
worked in close cooperation with the planning division of the British Admiralty and with both 
British and American Naval Intelligence.46 Of its four score memoranda five dealt with 
Austria-Hungary. Numbers 9, 16 and 27 were bi-monthly updates on the Adriatic situation, 
the only such regular intelligence summaries prepared by any American authority.47 More 
important were numbers 62 (4 November 1918) and 63 (3 November 1918) which discussed 
45 NA RG 38/ 78: A: NICC: file no. 20988/ 377, four documents in all. 
48 NA RG 45: NRCONRl: TX: Planning Section: box 668: Memoranda no. 2 (2 January 1918) 
and no. 45 (10 August (1918). Note that these memoranda are bound together in one volume, while 
separate copies are scattered in boxes 669-71. An index to these reports may be found in box 662. 
47 Ibid, dated 30 January, 7 March, and 16 May 1918. 
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respectively the American participation in the execution of the Austro-Hungarian Armistice 
and the steps necessary to keep the revolutions in the Monarchy under control.48 As for 
no_ 62, it is common knowledge that the Americans participated only as observers in the 
execution of the naval terms of the Padua Armistice. The Imperial and Royal Navy was 
handed over to South Slav authorities by Admiral Nicholas Horthy, the rv~·~~e Regent of 
Hungary, on 31 October 1918 at Pola; and the Americans played no part in removing 
'obstacles and mines' from the River Danube. 
No. 63, 'Proposed Decisions in the event of a Revolution in Austria-Hungary • from 
a Naval View Point,' is an interesting document. It must be noticed that it was written after) 
the revolutions had taken place in the Monarchy, which it actually did acknowledge in the 
Czech case. Its central theme was encouraging a similar 'democratic' turn in Germany and . 
the establishment of a pro-American Yugoslav government while preventing a possible 
Yugoslav-Italian conflict, which then seemed likely and which materialized within a short· 
time. The report suggests the~ ordering of an American flagship and two destroyers into the 
area, the American occupation of some coastal fortifications, and the despatch of American 
military and naval observers into the debated territories. The examination of the extent to 
which this rather ambitious plan was carried out goes beyond the scope of the present study 
but it must be noted that the observers mentioned in this report later played an all-important 
role in organizing food relief in the region and in the various local commissions of the peace 
conference. 
The above examination of the three key Departments of Wilson's cabinet suggests 
that they continued to play the same very limited role after April 1917 as they did before. 
48 Ibid. 
250 
lansing's attempt to reorganize the State Department brought little improvement in the 
absence of qualified personnel and accurate information. Grew and Bullitt may have qualified 
as experts by American standards but a brief spell in Vienna and a few interviews hardly 
make experts overnight. Besides Penfield, who immediately retired, not a single member of 
the original Vienna staff was called back to Washington after the diplomatic break; and 
asking Dulles, still in his early twenties, to do all the work in the field alone was certainly 
a tall order. 
In Washington the two key members of the State Department who developed and 
expressed their opinion in the Habsburg matter were Secretary of State lansing and chief 
of the Near Eastern division Putney, who both subscribed to dismemberment at the outset 
of American belligerency. Putney wrote long memoranda but his only audience was lansing; 
true, his reports were sent over to the Inquiry but there is no evidence to prove that any 
of them was ever used. Lansing, on the other hand, embraced Putney's conclusion, prompted 
by Masaryk and other separatist politicians, that the Habsburg Monarchy should be dismem· 
bered. lansing's initial concern was Germany and Soviet Russia entered the picture only 
during the summer of 1918, when intervention in Siberia became a central issue. He came 
to accept the then fashionable concept that a reorganized East Central Europe would block 
both the Mitteleuropa plans and the spread of Bolshevism into Western Europe. lansing 
promoted this program most enthusiastically and many historians came to see him as the 
driving force behind Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy. However, the nature of the Wilson·lansing 
relationship, as described above, rules out such a combination ipso facto; lansing was not 
a major force in policy making. 
The American Military and Naval Intelligence also continued to playa limited role in 
Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy. This indicates the complete lack of interest in Habsburg 
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matters and, in broader terms, the fact that Military and Naval Intelligence played a far more 
limited role in the First than in the Second World War. 
The following chapter concludes our enquiries into the official and public American 
attitudes towards (Austria-) Hungary during the First World War not only by summing up our 




A NEW LOOK AT WILSON'S HABSBURG DIPLOMACY 
Having reached the end of our enquiries into wartime American attitudes towards 
(Austria-)Hungary it is now time to present the missing piece: Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy, 
which places the above discussions on several topics in a broader perspective. But first, 
some historiographical comments. In the 1950s and 60s Woodrow Wilson's approach to the 
Habsburg Monarchy was the subject of several scholarly enquiries.1 Some more recent 
studies of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary have also touched upon Wilson's wartime 
policies and his contribution to the postwar reorganization of East-Central Europe.2 Common 
to all these writings, sometimes with little attempt at further analysis, has been a portrayal 
of Wilson as the open minded professor-tumed-politician, understanding the problems of the 
region and influenced largely by Robert Lansing, his second Secretary of State, and by 
immigrant politicians and propaganda. Meanwhile, the past 25 years have brought new devel-
opments in Wilson research due to easier access to most of the related but unpublished 
archival material and to the extensive publication of the Woodrow Wilson Papers by Princeton 
University on the one hand and the invaluable contribution of a new generation of historians 
on the other.3 The revised image of Wilson the politician, making his major political decisions 
alone while working on the realization of a new regulated international capitalist world order, 
provides potentially an entirely different framework for the analysis of his approach to the 
1 See especially Barany (1966); Mamatey (1957) and May (1957). 
2 May (1966); Zeman (1961); Valiani (1973) and, in Hungarian, Fejto (1990). 
3 Levin (1968); Gardner (1987). See also the works of William Appleman Williams and Arno J. 
Mayer, as listed in the bibliography. 
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Habsburg Monarchy. So far, however, no one has stepped forth to offer an analysis along 
these lines. 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide that new look both at Wilson's prewar 
approach and wartime policies towards the Monarchy and to challenge the misconceptions 
in this matter. Wilson as an academic showed little interest in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
As President he did make his decisions alone and the consent to the dismemberment of the 
Monarchy was no exception; the influence of Lansing and the immigrant movements upon 
him has been vastly exaggerated. A survey of Wilson's published and unpublished papers 
suggests that he neither fully understood nor paid much attention to the problems of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. He projected a liberal capitalist progressive image of the United States 
onto the world, christened it the League of Nations, and made it his own and, consequently, 
America's main war aim. In this broader framework Austria-Hungary was of secondary 
importance; it was part of the world to be transformed and liberalized. Wilson's lack of 
understanding did not have a serious bearing upon his conduct during the war in the 
Habsburg case simply because he never realized it. The analysis of whether it mattered at 
the Peace Conference in 1919 goes much beyond the scope of this investigation. 
Another interesting aspect of the problem is the contradiction between Wilson's per· 
sonal sympathy for the peoples of East-Central Europe living under foreign domination and 
his diplomatic conduct with regard to the Monarchy, together with the fact that the former 
was never allowed to override the latter. Wilson decided to change his policy during the 
spring and summer of 1918 when, as a result of a series of dramatic events, he saw the 
collapse of his earlier Habsburg diplomacy and when broader considerations also pointed in 
that direction. Both before and after his option for dismemberment of the Monarchy, howev· 
er, he remained a proponent of regional integration in East Central Europe. 
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The claims that Wilson fully understood the problems of the Monarchy4 are based 
upon two elements: his academic career as a political scientist and historian and the influ· 
ence of immigrant propaganda and propagandists in exile. While the latter issue is discussed 
towards the end of the present chapter, a look at Wilson's academic output regarding the 
Monarchy offers the best possible point of departure. 
Without going into unnecessary repetitions about Wilson's academic writings it 
appears to be sufficient to point out that he mentioned the Habsburg Monarchy, in any 
context, in four of his works5 and devoted to it a sum total of some thirty pages. In his 
writings Wilson testified not to a genuine interest or understanding of the problems of the 
region but to a good insight into constitutional issues (which played a very limited part during 
the war) and to a set of unconcealed prejudices. He displayed a romantic attitude towards 
Hungary, and also towards Bohemia, which was we" in line with broader American tenden· 
cies. His superficiality and casual remarks got him into trouble more than once in 1912, 
peaking in his campaign speech discussing the Magna Carta and America's success as 
opposed to other peoples' failures in their quest for democracy. This lofty condescension was. 
going to be one of the underlying motifs of his political thinking and it helps explain the 
rather superficial treatment the problem of the nationalities within the Empire was going to 
receive at his hands. 
The fact that Wilson became President of the United States, together with the 
outbreak of the World War, necessarily transformed his approach to Austria·Hungary. While 
4 May (1957); Kisch (1947); Unterberger (1989). 
5 Three have been discussed earlier; the fourth, which in fact was the first one, was a rather 
mediocre essay on Bismarck, the significance of which has also been over·emphasized. 
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his academic and early political career reflect Wilson's own views without any serious 
constraint, his conduct as President of the United States was affected by, above all, the 
constantly changing international situation in the war and his rapidly developing concept of 
a new liberal postwar world order. Before discussing the dual nature of his wartime 
approach towards the Habsburg Monarchy it is necessary to outline the ideological frame· 
work within which Wilson was working. 
Thomas Woodrow Wilson may have entered the White House with no elaborate 
foreign policy concept but his belief that a strong interdependence existed between foreign 
and domestic politics made him ready to deal with international affairs.8 He shared the 
Progressive belief that the inherent harmony of interests within the capitalist system had 
been upset by the misapplication of individualism and laissez faire. In his opinion, the need . 
to restore and safeguard this harmony of interests and to adapt to the realities of industrial . 
America, together with an economic depression and the vanishing of the old (continental) . 
frontier, called for government action through orderly reform. Wilson based his presidential 
campaign on domestic reform (the New Freedom), and carried it out in less than two years. 
However, as early as 1912 he urged that 'government and business must be associated' in . 
order to seek new markets, new frontiers overseas, primarily in Latin·America and the Far 
East. He believed that it was the task of the American government to promote and safe· 
guard overseas economic expansion. His foreign policy, idealist and realist at the same time, , 
was anti·imperialist, inasmuch as it rejected colonization, and was based upon international 
cooperation and the open door on the one hand and democracy and self·determination on the 
other.7 
6 Cooper (1983) p. 266. Williams (1962) offers some extra considerations on this issue. 
7 Williams (1962) pp. 86.88. 
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Wilson's idealism was firmly rooted in Calvinism and American liberal exceptionalism. 
He believed that he was acting according to God's will and consequently refused to compro· 
mise over significant issues.s He was also convinced that morality and welfare went hand 
in hand and was willing to force his version of morality onto other peoples: 
If I cannot retain my moral influence over a man except by occasionally 
knocking him down, if that is the only basis upon which he will respect me, 
then for the sake of his soul I have got occasionally to knock him 
down ... [and] sit on his neck and make him listen.9 
He also accepted the concept of American exceptionalism claiming that the United States 
was the only truly democratic country in the world; the Americans were God's New Chosen 
People destined to bring about a new Golden Age.1D Although he refused to interfere with 
the domestic affairs of other countries, when it came to the realization of his new world 
idea he conducted a series of military interventions from Mexico through Europe to the Far 
East, 'to make the world safe for democracy'.l1 
Between December 1915, his first recorded reference to a league of nations,12 and 
the Fourteen Points in January 1918, when he defined it as America's war aim, Wilson de· 
veloped in detail his concept of a new liberal world order, by applying his own image of ' 
America to the world. He envisaged a regulated capitalist system based upon disarmament" 
collective security, and the open door providing for the orderly development of white peoples 
8 Heckscher (1991) pp. 23.24. 
9 WWPs 37: 38. This is one of Wilson's most regularly cited utterances, and is very revealing. 
10 Levin (1968) pp. 2.5. 
11 Calhoun (1986) is the standard, and the best, study. 
12 Ambrosius (1987) p. 19. 
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and the securing of an international harmony of interests. According to Wilson, international 
cooperation would exclude the possibility of future wars and revolutions and supply the 
framework for teaching the less developed (Le. non-white, and occasionally even non-WASP 
white) peoples of the world democracy and self-determination. As primus inter pares in this 
system, the United States would find and secure new frontiers and markets in abundance 
in a world made safe for democracy.'3 
Wilson believed that the coming of a new order was inevitable as the old order had 
entered an irrational state of war, a war of self-destruction between autocracy, represented 
by the Central Powers, and the balance of power (Britain and France) in alliance with 
autocratic Russia. Aware of his powerful position as President of the United States, Wilson 
first tried to mediate between the two alternative camps hoping that he would be able to 
force his own views on them at the peace table. His final effort in that direction was the 
December 1916 peace overture, culminating in a somewhat desperate call for a peace 
without annexations and indemnities. Delivered on 22 January 1917, the Peace without 
Victory address was possibly Wilson's best and certainly his most idealistic speech. With his 
efforts at mediation frustrated and under the influence of blatant demonstrations of German 
hostility (unlimited submarine warfare, and the Zimmermann telegram offering Mexico large 
chunks of US territory) together with the liberal revolution in Russia in March 1917, Wilson 
decided to intervene. In his call for a declaration of war on Germany in Congress he 
described American intervention in the World War as a crusade for democracy against autoc· 
racy. He could do so only because Russia, the odd one out in the Entente camp, had suppos~ 
edly adopted democracy in the March Revolution. Consequently, Wilson viewed the March 
Revolution as the first victory of his new world ideals and was the first head of state in the 
13 levin (1968) pp. ,., O. 
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world to recognize the new Russian government. At the same time, he defined the United 
States as an Associated Power in order to emphasize the difference between American and 
Allied war aims. It took him another eight months to declare war on Austria·Hungary. 
It follows from the above that Wilson's wartime Habsburg diplomacy was unlikely 
to reflect a high opinion of the traditionally conservative and Catholic Monarchy. Char· 
acteristic of broader American attitudes was that it took more than half a year to find a 
suitable Ambassador to Vienna in Frederick Courtland Penfield after Wilson's first choice, 
Frank McCombs, had flatly refused to be 'sent into darkest Austria."4 During the period, 
of American neutrality Wilson himself also came to hold the Habsburg Empire in rather low 
regard. In his eyes, the Monarchy had demonstrated its preference for autocracy by fighting 
on the side of Germany as well as its unwillingness to terminate the conflict on American 
terms. Wilson's reservations were further strengthened by the reports from the American 
legations in London, Berlin and Vienna, which described the Monarchy as a sidekick to 
Germany and as a country unable to maintain even domestic control. 
The first manifestation of this negative attitude was a December 1914 interview 
with Henry Bruce Brougham, an editor of the New York Times, which then was overtly anti· 
German. Brougham quoted Wilson saying among other things that ' Austria·Hungary will go 
to pieces altogether . ought to go to pieces for the welfare of Europe."5 This statement 
reveals that Wilson considered the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary desirable. That this 
was part of a broader revulsion against the nature of Habsburg rule is suggested by Wilson's 
14. WWPs 27: 127, an entry in House's diary, dated 21 February 1913. 
15 WWPs 31: 459. The interview is dated 14 December 1914. On the position of the New York 
Times see Knightley (1975) pp. 119-20. 
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only other public reference to the issue of forced solidarity before his change of policy. It 
came during his 1917 Flag Day address, in which he focused on the realization of the 
German Mitte/europa plan: 
It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples 
played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and 
political units which could be kept together by force,- Czechs, Magyars, 
Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, Turks, Armenians,- the proud states of Bohemia 
and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable. 
Turks, the subtile [sic] peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to 
be united ... They would live under a common power only by sheer compul· 
sion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had 
reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.18 
Wilson's tacit approval of indirect British recruiting among the American Slavs and his 
authorization of Montenegrin, Serbian, Czech and Polish conscription in the US before his 
official declaration of war on Austria·Hungary also seem to support the above argument. 
The fact that President Wilson privately favoured the cause of the nationalities but 
did not allow his personal feeling to overcome his diplomatic goals shows him to have been 
a very disciplined politician. But Wilson was not only disciplined in this matter, he was also 
quite uninterested. As shown earlier, both as the head of the largest neutral state and as 
war leader of the United States on the side of the Allies his main concern was forcing his 
rapidly developing new world order idea onto all other belligerents. His famous catch phrases, 
such as collective security, disarmament, League of Nations, etc., suggested global and regio-
nal integration rather than disintegration. He viewed even self·determination in the framework 
of international cooperation, which was made clear only by his 1918 diplomacy. With these 
broader considerations in mind it was relatively easy for him to maintain his discipline in the 
18 WWPs 42: 501. 
260 
Habsburg case even despite the occasional personal or diplomatic attempts to confront him 
with the question of dismemberment, not to speak of certain American·Habsburg diplomatic 
crises in the neutrality period. 
But escalating diplomatic tensions, especially the three incidents in 1915, and the 
rapidly declining prestige of the Monarchy did not lead to an open American attack on its 
territorial'political integrity. On the contrary, stemming partly from his lack of interest and 
also from the desire to maintain his neutral image, the President refused to meet any of the 
separatist politicians from the Monarchy who visited the United States. He turned down the 
Hungarian aristocrat Count Michael Karolyi in 1914 as well as the Transylvanian·Rumanian 
Vasile Stoica and the Slovak politician but French citizen Dr. Milan ~tefanik in 1917 on the 
grounds that they were 'conducting an active agitation against the present policy of the 
Austro·Hungarian government.' The treatment of the December 1917 South Slav mission to 
America testifies to the fact that Wilson, interestingly enough, maintained this tendency even 
after the American declaration of war on the Monarchy. 
The Chief Executive's approach to open peace moves sheds further light upon his 
diplomatic preferences. As indicated earlier, his initial aim was to terminate the war on his 
own terms. The details and failures of his offers of mediation in 1914 and House's peace 
missions to Europe are a standard feature of studies on Wilson.17 The interesting aspect 
of the problem is that all other peace overtures, with the obvious exception of the 
President's peace drive in December 1916, came directly or supposedly (in Colonel House's 
interpretation the Vatican peace drives were dictated by Vienna) from the Central Powers. 
Wilson chose to reject or ignore these simply because they would not have guaranteed the 
17 See for example Smith (1965). 
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unconditional acceptance of his program of a new liberal world order. A glance at the 
December 1916 peace moves both provides a good example of Wilson's conduct and takes 
the discussion of his Austro-Hungarian diplomacy a step further. The background for the 
peace moves was provided by events in Vienna. In November 1916 the Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor Francis Joseph died. In his coronation speech the young Emperor Charles defined 
peace as his immediate aim, promised democratic reforms within the Monarchy, and reorga· 
nized his cabinet accordingly. The subsequent open peace overture coming from Berlin, but , 
conceived in Vienna, was simply ignored by the President. By issuing his own peace feeler 
only six days after the German one (12 and 18 December 1918 respectively) Wilson 
obviously tried to regain the initiative so as to have his own program accepted. The Presi· 
dent actually called on the belligerents to announce their war aims openly. The Entente reply 
of 10 January 1917, among other things, called for the liberation of oppressed peoples living 
in the Monarchy and Turkey. It confronted Wilson, for the first time diplomatically, with the. 
idea of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary. He evaded the question by demanding a 
peace without annexations.18 
Idealist as it was, the Peace without Victory speech of 22 January 1917 marked 
the beginning of a new approach to the Monarchy. The President eagerly grasped the possi· 
bility inherent in the Entente reply and the new policy of the Ballhausplatz, which was 
initiated by Count Ottokar Czernin, the new Habsburg Foreign Minister. Here was a realistic 
chance, for the first time during the war, to break up the' German-Habsburg alliance by 
appealing to the Monarchy's desire for peace. Wilson's position as potential mediator was 
further strengthened by the Entente note calling for the dismemberment of the Monarchy: 
its refusal by Washington was expected to become the President's strongest card in dealing 
18 For the full text of the speech see WWPs 40: 533-39. 
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with Vienna. The first move was made as early as 8 February 1917, when Lansing informed 
Ambassador Page in London that the President was: 
trying to avoid breaking with Austria in order to keep the channels of official 
intercourse open so that he may use her for peace. The chief if not the only 
obstacle is the threat apparently contained in' the peace terms recently 
stated by the Entente Allies that in case they succeed they would insist 
upon a virtual dismemberment of the Austro·Hungarian Empire. Austria needs 
only to be reassured on that point, and that chiefly with regard to the older 
units of the Empire. It is the President's view that the large measure of 
autonomy already secured by those older units is a sufficient guarantee of, 
peace and stability in that part of Europe so far as national and racial influ· 
ences are concerned and that what Austria regards as the necessities of her 
development, opportunity, and security to the south of her can be adequately , 
and satisfactorily secured to her by rights of way to the sea given by the 
common guarantee of the concert which must in any case be arranged if the 
future peace of the world is to be assured. 19 
In due course, secret peace negotiations were started between Washington and the 
Ballhausplatz. The Americans demanded a break with Germany and the federalization of the 
Empire together with the . at least from the American point of view - relatively minor 
concession to restore Polish independence. In return the Americans offered what they be-
lieved Austria wanted most, namely peace and official rejection of its dismemberment. 
, 
The only thing Wilson failed to understand was the fact that Vienna's eagerness for 
peace, strengthened by Czernin's 'April Memorandum' in which he concluded that another 
winter campaign was 'absolutely out of the question,' did not mean the acceptance of a 
separate one. Czernin later argued, quite sensibly, that the Monarchy could have won nothing 
by signing a separate peace. Besides these considerations he shared, among others, 
Apponyi's moral reservations about breaking up the German alliance. With neither side willing 
19 WWPs 41: 158.59. 
263 
to yield, all secret talks failed and the frustration over the break·down of the peace talks 
largely contributed to Wilson's decision to declare war on the Monarchy in December 1917. 
Naturally, a series of other considerations were also involved. Mounting domestic pressure 
as well as the problems of inter·Allied cooperation (the fact that the United States was at 
war with Germany but not with any of her allies) likewise played their part. Furthermore, 
the President's decision was influenced by the weakening of the military position of the 
Allies, especially by the Italian collapse at Caporetto and Russia's exit following the bolshevik, 
revolution in November 1917. 
In the transition period between the American declarations of war on Germany and 
the Monarchy (April and December 1917 respectively), two further developments deserve 
special attention. First, the President introduced the concept of One Central Power into his 
rhetoric. When discussing the American declaration of war on Germany in his 1917 Flag Day 
Address Wilson stated that the government of Austria·Hungary had 
acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but 
at Berlin's dictation ever since the war began. Its people now desire peace, 
but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin. The so·called Central 
Powers are in fact but a single Power.20 
He repeated the same argument almost word for word in his 1917 Annual Message on the 
State of the Union, when he asked Congress for a declaration of war on the Monarchy: 
The government of Austria·Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or 
in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples but as the instru· 
ment of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard 
the Central Powers as but one.21 
20 WWPs 42: 501. 
21 WWPs 45: 200. 
264 
This new element in Wilsonian rhetoric was to serve two different goals. First, mounting 
open pressure on Vienna on the one hand and offering her the same old peace terms on the 
other was expected to raise Austria's willingness to step out of the war in order to save 
the Empire. Secondly, it was a clever propaganda move. One way of selling the war to the 
American people was presenting an enemy mighty and dangerous enough to be taken 
seriously even by the United States. To that end Wilson not only presented the One Central 
Power as reaching from the heart of Europe well into the Near East but he made it one of 
the main themes of his domestic propaganda campaign. He had created his own ministry of 
propaganda, the Committee on Public Information, two days before the declaration of war 
on Germany. The CPI industriously promoted this concept by repeated references to it in the 
Official Bulletin, its daily publication, by circulating the Flag Dav Address as a pamphlet, and 
by oral propaganda. 
A look at the other important development of the period between April and December 
1917, namely the beginning of peace preparations in the United States, also takes the dis-
cussion of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy into the last year of the war. On 2 September 1917 
Wilson instructed House to organize a peace planning research group, which came to be 
known as the Inquiry. Besides scientific preparations for peace its other task was to provide 
policy proposals for the President. The first such memorandum was completed by the end 
of December and was revised on 2 January 1918. Drafted in a hurry by House together with 
Sidney Edward Mezes and Walter lippmann, the section of the memorandum on the Monar-
chy suggested that nationalist discontent should be incited within the Monarchy without ac· 
cepting its dismemberment. The authors expected that such a move would raise the willing-
ness of the Ballhausplatz to negotiate a separate peace.22 House and the President dis-
22 WWPs 45: 463-71. 
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cussed the memorandum in detail on 4 January and Wilson began to work on his Fourteen 
Points.23 On the very next day British Premier David lloyd George delivered his famous 
Trade Union speech in which he declared that the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy 
was not the war aim of his government. Thus the final version of Wilson's Point Ten ('The 
peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and 
assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.'24) was 
consciously left open for different interpretations. Wilson told Secretary of the Navy Jo· 
sephus Daniels that the United States 'could not undertake to dictate the form of govern· 
ment of any country or dismember' it.25 At the same time, he indicated to French Ambassa· 
dor Jules Jusserand that it meant dismemberment.28 Czernin's encouraging public reply to 
the Fourteen Points on 24 January was welcomed in Washington and secret negotiations 
were reopened in Switzerland and through the Spanish Court. 
Thus, neither the American declaration of war on the Monarchy nor the Fourteen 
Points brought a change to Wilson's earlier policy towards Austria-Hungary. The President's 
flat rejection of the La Guardia plan at the turn of 1917 and 1918 also confirms this 
conclusion. The significance of the La Guardia plan was that it raised the logically possible 
alternative, also favoured by the American press, of causing a Habsburg-Hungarian split. 
Wilson found undercover activity in the middle of Europe unacceptable both morally and 
politically; it clearly did not fit his plans at that time. 
23 WWPs 45: 459, n. 1. 
24 WWPs 45: 537. 
25 WWPs 45: 559. 
28 WWPs 46: 78 and 83. 
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The causes of President Wilson's political turnaround should then be sought in the 
period between April and June 1918 which, therefore, must be subjected to a detailed ana· 
lysis. It was a combination of diplomatic, military and ideological factors that eventually 
brought about Wilson's spectacular reversal of policy. Developments in Russia created both 
the ideological and the military aspects of the problem while the diplomatic crisis was the 
net result of a heated Clemenceau·Czernin exchange. 
The bolshevik revolution of November 1917 transformed Wilson's Russian policy. The 
failure of 'democratic Russia' was a serious blow to the Wilsonian new world order since 
its success would have proved the practicability of his program. Instead, the President had 
to face a serious ideological challenge from the left and the possible collapse of the Eastern 
front. The ideological challenge came from V. I. Lenin, the revolutionary leader of the > 
bolsheviks. His alternative solution of anti-capitalist and anti·imperialist revolutionary socialism 
attacked the very foundations of the Wilsonian program. Unlike Wilson, Lenin argued that . 
war was the natural rather than the irrational state of capitalism because at the core of 
capitalism there were inherent contradictions and not a harmony of interests. Ignored or sup· 
pressed, these contradictions would sooner or later erupt in yet another war. This implied 
that instead of orderly reform from above, world revolution was needed to bring about a real· 
Iy new world order based upon international cooperation among socialist countries and devoid 
of nationalism and imperialism.27 This was a challenge Wilson, as the moral leader of the 
Allies, had to take up. 
Initially, the military aspect of the problem hardly troubled the Chief Executive who 
believed that American intervention on the Western front would guarantee the eventual 
27 The first historian to compare Lenin's and Wilson's programs was Levin (1968) pp. 13·73. 
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defeat of Germany, even if the war dragged on until 1919. The possible reopening of the 
Eastern front had little appeal for Wilson who saw no possible means of or reason for 
dividing the American army and its transport facilities between the Far East and Western Eu· 
rope. Actually, the military problem in the Far East was not the reopening of the Eastern 
front but keeping Japan out of Siberia and supporting anti-bolshevik forces with minimum 
open military commitment. 
The bolsheviks stabilized their position at home by signing a separate peace treaty 
with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918. Despite the civil war between 
the Red and several White Armies Wilson began to believe that intervention was needed. 
Brest·Litovsk not only meant the expected collapse of the Eastern front, it also granted the 
Germans free access to Russian supplies making the success of their plan to finish off the 
Allies before the American intervention could be felt more likely. France, Britain, and Japan, 
although for different reasons, demanded drastic action: intervention in Siberia, arguing that 
the United States should join them in the name of Wilson's very own call for collective 
security. Keeping in mind that America's Far Eastern interests could be impaired if Japan 
took over Siberia and led by anti·bolshevik feelings, President Wilson was ready to inter· 
vene.28 Intervention, however, would be meddling with Russia's right to self·determination, 
interference with her domestic affairs. Wilson clearly needed an excuse good enough to 
connect military intervention disguised as collective security with non·interference. 
28 Calhoun (1986) pp. 189·210; Gardner (1987) p. 186. Several historians who took Wilson's 
statements regarding non·interference on their face value have been misled into believing that he did 
not want to intervene: see esp. Unterberger (1982) and (1989). It has been demonstrated by Calhoun 
and Gardner that he did intend to intervene but wanted to stop short of an out and out war. 
Foglesong (1991), an impressive doctoral dissertation based upon American and recently opened 
Russian archival sources, agrees with Calhoun and Gardner. 
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Meanwhile in Britain, Lloyd George's War Cabinet reiterated the old balance of power 
policy by publicly rejecting the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Premier's 
Trade Union speech served two purposes. It was meant to be a gesture towards Vienna 
which was expected to encourage the Ballhausplatz to continue secret peace talks. At the 
same time, it aimed to contain the advocates of the radical reorganization of East-Central 
Europe along ethnic lines, who began to dominate the Foreign Office and Crewe House by 
early 1918, and challenged the War Cabinet for control over British foreign policy. This 
struggle came to a stalemate towards the end of March 1918 when the British realized 
what the French had already known and the Americans would never understand: Czernin was 
not willing to negotiate a separate peace.29 
In France the veteran politician Georges Clemenceau, the Tiger, came to power in 
November 1917 and retained control until well after the Armistices. His main aim was 
defeating Germany and creating an international system which would guarantee French 
security. He championed the dismemberment of the Monarchy in order to replace her with 
French satellites on the Eastern border of Germany (Le. barriere de /'est in the form of the 
little Entente). By the end of March 1918, nonetheless, French morale was sinking due to 
a German offensive on the Western front and the collapse of the Eastern one. More than 
ever, France now was badly short of manpower and needed the various Czechoslovak and 
Polish legions. Domestic opposition was also mounting.3D 
The whole international scene was set ablaze by the so called Sixtus affair, a heated 
Franco-Austrian showdown. By jumping at a public statement by Czernin and revealing the 
29 Fest (1978) pp. 191.220. 
30 Watson (1974) pp. 283-90. 
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details of earlier Franco-Habsburg negotiations, Clemenceau dramatically cut off all secret 
peace talks. He took the situation to the limit, forced Czernin's resignation and pushed. 
Emperor Charles into surrendering Habsburg military control to Berlin. Lansing called 
Clemence au's move 'a piece of the most astounding stupidity,,31 while the general feeling 
" 
in France was that this move was dictated by the French premier's notorious temper. 
There are strong grounds for suspicion that this was not the case. When called on 
to give an explanation in the Foreign Relations Committee of the French Parliament, the Tiger 
stated that it was a premeditated move. He claimed that a half-peace with the Monarchy 
was no guarantee of either French security (which by then depended heavily upon the 
military contributions of the Czechs and the Poles) or the fulfillment of promises made to the 
Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs.32 If this was really true, Clemenceau's action was anything 
but stupid. Intentionally or not, with a single masterstroke he created a fait accompli in 
France, Britain, and the United States. His action boosted French morale, in the midst of the 
last major German offensive of the war on the western front, and forced his own policy on 
his domestic opponents by slamming the door on any other solution. He upset the stalemate 
in Britain in favour of the dismemberment oriented Foreign Office and Crewe House and, by 
cutting off secret peace talks, removed the cornerstone of Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy. 
At exactly the same time the propaganda front was also activated. The Congress 
of Oppressed Nationalities convened in Rome. Initiated by the French and Italian governments 
together with certain members of the Foreign Office, the Congress accepted resolutions 
31. Lansing (1935) p. 265. 
32 Watson (1974) quotes Clemenceau's revealing testimony of 19 April 1918: see p. 292. On 
the significance of the nationalities in military matters see Calder (1976) p. 218. 
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demanding the dismemberment of the Monarchy in the name of self·determination.33 Lord 
Northcliffe's propaganda agency, probably with the unwritten consent of the CPI, made sure 
that the details reached the American public. Meanwhile, Lansing was industriously preparing 
memoranda for the President advising him to change his policy towards Austria·Hungary. 
Thus, by the end of April 1918, Wilson was facing two dilemmas. More significant 
was the problem of Far Eastern intervention, to which Wilson was continuously seeking the 
best possible solution. With the Russian problem on his mind he paid little attention to his 
other project: ending the war by removing Austria·Hungary from it. Wilson must have 
understood that his single· line policy of secret peace talks had run into a cuI de sac when 
Clemenceau cut off all ties with Vienna, but he was still reluctant to consider the other 
alternative, dismemberment. Such a drastic reorganization of East·Central Europe was by no 
means part of his new world order program. Wilson decided to wait, and there was no 
indication that these two issues would ever be linked in any way. 
That link, however, was eventually provided by the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia. 
It was this 50,000 strong military force organized in Russia from former POWs who were 
willing to fight against the Central Powers that eventually linked the issue of dismemberment 
with Wilson's concern over bolshevism and Siberian intervention. In February 1918 the 
legion, fully armed and under the nominal leadership of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, set out 
for Vladivostok to be shipped to the Western Front by the French. En route to the Far East· 
they clashed with bolshevik forces for the first time on 25 May 1918. This was the lifeline 
Wilson had been waiting for.34 He could justify American intervention in Russia by aiding 
33 Valiani (1973) pp. 199·256 is an outstanding account. 
34 Calhoun (1986) pp. 210·13; Perman (1962) pp. 40·43. 
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the Legion against German and Austro-Hungarian POWs armed by the bolsheviks on the one 
hand and, in the new diplomatic situation created by Clemenceau, could reward the Czecho· 
slovaks with independence on the other. The news of the Legion's first decisive success 
reached Washington on 29 May 1918, and the very same day brought two indications of 
what was to come. An official communication expressing the American Government's interest 
in the Rome Congress of Oppressed Nationalities was released while Wilson privately 
informed Sir William Wiseman that he 'intended to support the Czechs, Poles, and Juga-Slavs' 
against the government of Austria·Hungary because the Sixtus affair had ended all hopes of 
a separate peace.35 
Meanwhile, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk arrived in the United States and launched an 
all-out propaganda campaign for Czechoslovak independence. Characteristic of Wilson's 
hesitation was the fact that it took Masaryk several weeks and the full support of his many 
friends in America to secure an audience with the President. Eventually, they met on 19 
June and, according to Masaryk, they discussed the Czechoslovak Legion and the future of 
the Habsburg Monarchy. Masaryk's program was based upon the Wilsonian principles of self-
determination and collective security: it consisted of the establishment of a non-German anti·, 
German Central Europe of independent nation states, instead of Austria-Hungary, under Slav 
(and naturally Czechoslovak) leadership. This plan for regional cooperation, packaged in a way 
to appeal to Wilson, achieved its aim. Interestingly, the President overlooked many of its 
weak points: no questions were raised about the probable Austrian and Hungarian objections, 
nor about the possibility of drawing boundary lines acceptable to all the peoples living in the 
Danubian basin. Furthermore, there is no indication in the writings of the Czech leader that 
he presented his 'New Europe' idea to the President as not only a barriere de rest against 
35 WWPs 48: 437, n. 3; and 48: 205-06, respectively. 
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Germany but also as a cordon sanitaire against Soviet Russia. Not that it mattered by then. 
Wilson finally consented to the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy on 26 June 1918 
when he also suggested that 'Hungary should also be considered an independent nationality, 
no longer united with Austria.'36 An official statement, released two days later, simply con· 
firmed this decision. The two broader issues, namely the removal of the Habsburg Monarchy 
from the war and the intervention in the Far East, thus came to be linked and solved by the 
Czechoslovaks. Those two issues ensured that the future of the Monarchy, for the first and 
only time during the war, became Wilson's chief concern. His decision was not the result of 
the efforts of either Lansing or separatist politicians, nor of dismembe~ment propaganda; it 
stemmed from the collapse of his earlier Habsburg policy, which was brought about by Cle-
menceau's move, and the role of the Czechoslovak l~gion in solving Wilson's seeminglv more 
and more pressing Far Eastern problem. 
After the end of June events followed one another in a straight line: the representa-
tives of the nationalities were invited to the Independence Day (4 July) celebrations, Wilson 
urged South Slav Americans to adopt the Yugoslav idea and told a Ruthenian-American 
delegation to seek autonomy within the new Czecho-Slovak state. The Czechoslovak National 
Council in Paris was recognized as a de facto belligerent government and encouraging 
despatches were sent to Belgrade and Rumania .. The Committee on Public Information, 
meanwhile, came to be involved in the Allied dismemberment propaganda drive within the 
Monarchy and organized a Mid-European Union of American and visiting dismemberment poli-
ticians in the New World. Eventually, with Wilson's former sympathies for the Hungarians 
swept aside, Austria and Hungary were declared separated and defeated powers and treated 
accordingly. 
36 Lansing (1935) p. 271; WWPs 48: 456 and 464. 
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Another misconception related to this period comes from Hungarian historians. It has 
been argued that even after July 1918 Wilson hesitated to carry his new program to its 
extreme and complete the dismemberment of Austria·Hungary. This argument is based upon 
the realization that he did not want to contribute to the establishment of small and eco· 
nomically unviable states between Germany and Soviet Russia, and upon his supposed 
hesitation during the Armistice negotiationsY This interpretation (very much like the one 
regarding intervention in Siberia) is based upon taking Wilson's public statements at their 
face value. After his decision he did expect some regional cooperation to take place in the 
Danubian basin (hence the involvement of the CPI with the MEU) and he reiterated his new 
policy in private more than once. The fact that he communicated his decision to Vienna only 
during the final stages of the Armistice negotiations must be seen not as proof of hesitation 
but as cool calculation. Wilson had been frustrated by Vienna's diplomatic tricks more than 
once between February 1917 and April 1918. This time he wanted to, in fact he had to, 
make sure that this Habsburg peace drive was a sincere one. The Ballhausplatz also had to 
demonstrate its acceptance of the fact that instead of guaranteeing the integrity of the 
Habsburg Empire the American program now was its dismemberment. The element of 
hesitation was there between April and June 1918 and not afterwards in Wilson's Habsburg 
policy. 
Wilson was the last Allied leader to accept dismemberment and, despite claims that 
the Monarchy fell apart after the collapse of the Central Powers, he largely contributed to 
the outcome. The fact that Wilson, the prophet of a new world order, decided in favour of 
the dismemberment of Austria·Hungary in the summer of 1918, when the end of the war 
seemed by no means within reach, presented the nationalities with the following choice in 
31 Adam (1989) pp. 23·26. Note that this book is also available in English. 
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case the Central Powers were defeated: they could stay with either Austria or Hungary and 
suffer the consequences of a lost war, or join one of the newly established or enlarged 
successor states on the side of the victors. The fact that Austria-Hungary 'fell apart' in late 
October 1918 proves that the leaders of the nationalities had taken the logical choice. 
The issue of various influences on Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy must be addressed 
again and a few final thoughts should be offered. Wilson's entire performance during the 
World War justifies Arthur S. Link's conclusion that the President made his policy decisions 
alone. At best, he shared them with his private advisor and friend, Colonel House, but the 
latter's lack of interest has been demonstrated; he played practically no part in shaping 
America's Habsburg diplomacy. The Inquiry is a good example of Wilson's general tendencies 
to disregard his official advisors on the one hand, and of his reluctance to take advice from 
his very own advisors on the other. While both the British and French peace preparatory 
organizations were created and functioned within their respective foreign offices, the Inquiry 
was only nominally attached to the State Department. It was actuallv controlled by House 
and reported not to the official but to the 'super-secretary of state'. The one point that was 
not made in the chapter on the Inquiry concerns wartime policy proposals. The Inquiry's only 
general proposal regarding the course of action the United States should take during the war 
was submitted in the very early stages of its work, in December 1917. True, it did have an 
influence on the Fourteen Points but it did not suggest anything Wilson was not thinking of 
himself anyway. It must be noted that the next such proposal was prepared on 21 January 
1919, on the President's direct request. The fourteen month gap tells an entire story: Wilson 
did not expect policy proposals even from his private policy planning staff. 
The influence of wartime dismemberment propaganda and propagandists is especially 
interesting from the point of view of the present work, since these efforts focused on 
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Hungary and emphasized 'forced Magyarization.' But again, there is no evidence to prove that 
Wilson nursed any anti-Hungarian feelings, and nor did he show any interest in such efforts. 
In fact, the work of the CPI suggests that, instead of reading the works of dismemberment 
propagandists, he rather utilized these efforts to serve his own ends. This is an all-important 
aspect of wartime American policies towards Hungary: the sole conductor of such policies 
was working with a set of misconceptions which he had developed before the war, and took 
no steps to obtain a better picture of the situation. It may be argued that wartime dismem· 
berment propaganda or the disinterested reports of his Ambassadors and intelligence staffs 
would not have provided him with a better and more impartial picture anyway. What really 
matters is the fact that Wilson failed to realize the limitations this situation imposed upon 
his decision making process. 
Lansing's decisive contribution to Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy is hardly more than 
a myth, which stems from his own exaggerated remarks, from projecting post·1945 tenden· 
cies in the White House onto the period of the First World War,38 and from the fact that 
Lansing, as Secretary of State, was continuously in the limelight and signed most of the 
official public statements in the matter. The Lansing myth disregards the sharp difference 
of opinion between Wilson and Lansing and the fact that Wilson had little admiration for his 
Secretary of State. 
The final point to be addressed is the role of American attitudes towards Hungary 
in Wilson's Habsburg diplomacy. Before the war, Hungary's image in America was one-sided, 
romanticized and often out of touch with reality. The outbreak of the World War offered a 
38 It must be remembered that John Foster Dulles was Lansing's nephew. Dulles seemingly ran 
US foreign policy alone, which apparently led many historians to draw that parallel. 
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chance to revise that image but no steps were taken during the entire period of American 
neutrality in that direction. While the United States was neutral and the Habsburg Monarchy 
was a belligerent, such a review was optional; with America joining the Allies against the 
Central Powers an analytical look at Hungary, as the lesser part of the lesser Central Power 
but tied to Austria in a unique way, should have become a necessity. This is all the more 
important since there was a logical alternative to dismemberment: to break-up the Habsburg-
Hungarian compromise in order to remove the Monarchy from the war, which was seen as 
the key to the defeat of Germany. 
But there is another side to the same coin. During the entire course of the war there 
was not a single Hungarian organization or agency working in the Allied and neutral countries 
towards the realization of Hungarian independence. While other nationalities from the 
Habsburg realm were industriously educating Allied and neutral public opinion and politicians 
from the very beginning of the war, the Hungarians expected to sort out the future of their 
country between Vienna and Budapest, and not abroad. When dismemberment (a distinct 
possibility in 1914 but a more and more serious threat as the war dragged on) became a 
joint Allied war aim during the summer of 1918 no one was there to promote the case of 
Hungary in the United States. 
Thus, the revision of the prewar image of Hungary was carried out not before but 
after the American decision in favour of dismemberment and not by the real or supposed 
experts of the Administration but in the press. The lack of Hungarian participation in this 
process naturally resulted in another set of extreme interpretations instead of a genuine 
understanding not only of Hungary but of the entire Danubian region. 
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La Guardia's plan to separate Hungary from Austria and thus force the Monarchy out 
of the war was nothing more than a logical rather than a real possibility. This was due to 
several factors including timing and attitudes on both sides. Firstly, La Guardia's proposal 
came at the wrong time: the American public and the press might have been supportive of 
such a course of action, but Wilson was not. At the turn of 1917 and 1918, he was 
launching his last covert diplomatic campaign for a separate peace with Vienna. Any 
indication of American plans to separate Budapest from Vienna would surely have ended a" 
talks. Secondly, there was hardly any support for such a policy even in Hungary: no unified 
stand by the Opposition and no diplomatic activity abroad. Thirdly, nor did the Hungarian· 
Americans lend their full support to the cause of Hungarian independence. Divided over polit· . 
ical and religious issues and under immense pressure to prove their loyalty to the US, they 
did not stand up for Hungarian independence and failed to seek contacts with the White 
House. 
This continued to be the case until the very end of the war; thus Wilson's June 
1918 reversal of policy passed practically unnoticed in Hungarian political circles and no 
steps were taken to counter it. The Bagger·Szekeres articles of summer 1918 suggest that 
a campaign for Hungary would not necessarily have been impossible even during the closing 
stages of the war. Under no pressure from anyone, Wilson in June 1918 went as far as his 
preconceptions about Hungary allowed him to go, and he himself called for the separation 
of Hungary and Austria. The various Hungarian-Americans calls for such a step, few and far 
between anyway, were not detailed during our enquiries simply because the State Depart· 
ment chose to disregard them. The first move was made by Braun in MaV 1917; the others 
came during and after September 1918.39 By that time Karolyi had come to represent the 
39. Barany (1967) pp. 151-55; NA RG 59: DFSD: m 708, reel 3: 864.00/22-23. 
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only alternative policy but, unknown even to himself, he was not considered to be an 
acceptable solution in the White House. 
Thus, overlooking the weak points in the Seton·Watson·Masaryk plan for the creation 
of a 'New Europe' and seeing Hungary in black and white largely contributed to the shaping 
of an unbalanced East·Central European diplomacy on Wilson's part. This American diplomacy 
backfired not only during the Peace Conference period but, on a much larger and tragic scale, 
in another World War. As for the President, he did not nurse any anti·Hungarian feelings, he 
was too uninterested for that, but he did have certain reservations about certain Hungarian 
politicians, which influenced some of his decisions during the Peace Conference period. 
Most ironically, during the entire period between 1914 and 1918, Hungarian attitudes 
towards the US and American policies and attitudes towards Hungary shared the same 
problems: lack of information, misunderstanding, and uninterest. Hungary's attempts after the 
Armistice to win a favourable 'Wilsonian peace' also proved to be based upon a set of 
misplaced expectations; the realization, when it eventually came, proved to be very a painful 
one for the Hungarians. 
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SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK: 
During the second half of the nineteenth century the Americans developed a romanti· 
cized attachment to the liberal Hungary of 1848·49, which was reinforced by Kossuth's 
immensely successful American visit during 1851·52. And although by the turn of the 
century that image of Hungary had become largely outdated, the Americans still maintained 
their earlier view. While events in Hungary during 1905-09, together with a minor Kossuth 
revival in America (1906·08), appeared to justify the American position, there were other 
signs as well: the arrest of an American government agent (Braun) in Budapest and open 
anti·assimilation propaganda by the Hungarian government among the immigrants in the New 
World indicated that the Americans were facing a more real and quite different Hungary. It 
was genuine and overall lack of interest on the part of the Americans that prompted them 
to maintain that earlier romantic attitude and disregard the real Hungary. 
Then came the First World War, a global conflict, which forced the Americans to 
reconsider their position; but the adjustment to reality, or rather, the acceptance of an al· 
ternative view of Hungary, did not happen overnight. During the period of American neutrality 
and the eight months between April and December 1917, the Wilson administration had the 
option to deal with Hungary separately, but did not take it up. After the American declara· 
tion of war on the Monarchy the President and his advisors might have dealt with Hungary 
separately, but again failed to engage with the Hungarian issue: un interest continued to be 
the underlying element in American attitudes. 
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Wilson conducted American foreign policy towards East·Central Europe singlehandedly 
but with his sight firmly set on broader issues (including the League of Nations and 'making 
the world safe for democracy'); he devoted little attention to (Austria·) Hungary. Under no 
pressure from the President, members of his cabinet also failed to take the necessary steps 
to obtain reliable information about Hungary, the lesser half of the lesser Central Power, 
especially before the end of 1917. The discussions of the work of the Departments of State, 
Commerce, War and the Navy as well as the lacklustre performances of Military and Naval 
Intelligence appear to prove this point. 
At the same time, however, non· Magyar immigrants from the Habsburg Empire, 
encouraged by the obviously non·neutral stand of the Wilson administration, began to promote 
their opinions and territorial claims openly. And although minor successes were scored • 
especially by the Czechs who had their case heard in Congress and secured press coverage 
for the Masaryks • they had to wait for a favourable turn in global high politics to stand a 
real chance of achieving their goals. It might be said that early attempts at dismemberment 
propaganda yielded poor results but they certainly set the stage for the all-out campaign in 
1918. 
Following American entry into the war, both the President and Secretary of State 
Lansing came to view Austria-Hungary as the weakest link in the Mitteleuropa project and 
considered the removal of the Habsburg Empire from the war to be the key to Germany's 
defeat. Lansing soon took an open pro·dismemberment stand and steered the entire State 
Department in that direction. He continually pressurized the President to accept this policy 
but, for various reasons, Wilson refused to take the advice of his official advisor in foreign 
affairs. (See chapter lOon both issues.) Instead, the President responded to the state of 
belligerency in his own way: by continuing secret peace negotiations with Vienna and by 
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creating his own semi-official policy and peace planning task force, the Inquiry. But after a 
single policy proposal, which was written in part by his own private advisor, Colonel House, 
the President instructed his research team to focus on peace planning instead, and provided 
them with the proper guidelines and with all available information. If anything, this proves 
that Wilson was reluctant to take the advice even of his very own task force; he continued 
to orchestrate America's foreign affairs alone, and refused to share the responsibilities of 
decision making. 
The lack of interest in Austro-Hungarian matters, displayed by the President who at 
the same time monopolized decision making, led wartime American diplomacy into a cuI de 
sac when things suddenly began to speed up and change. Wilson's continuing reluctance to 
deal with (Austria-) Hungary backfired during the critical period of April·July 1918 when a 
series of military and diplomatic developments removed the cornerstone of his Habsburg 
diplomacy: the offer of territorial integrity for a separate peace. It must be rem~mbered that 
Wilson and lansing firmly but mistakenly believed that the Sixtus affair had ended all 
chances of a separate peace. Ironically, in this issue of overall importance it was not the 
actual truth but what Wilson thought to be the truth that really mattered. (See the relevant 
discussions in chapters 3 and 11.) 
During the war, the possibility of bringing about a Habsburg-Hungarian break in order 
to remove the Monarchy from the war was given practically no consideration by the White 
House, which was due to the earlier mentioned lack of interest on Wilson's part. For a 
variety of reasons, the President did not ask his staff for up-to-date information on (Austria-) 
Hungary. As he himself stated during his 1912 interview with Kende (chapter 2), he consid-
ered himself to be an expert of the matter .. and apparently saw no need to revise his 
views. And the emphasis here is on 'saw no need to revise his views.' The Emperor Charles 
282 
seemed ready to negotiate with Wilson, and the separation of Austria-Hungary from Germany 
seemed a considerably easier and less radical option than knocking the Habsburg Monarchy 
out through her nationalities. Why should Wilson have bothered with Hungary and the 
Hungarians when not one Hungarian politician offered him a clearcut alternative? (KArolyi 
seemed to be the only possibility and was picked up by the US press. However, for reasons 
outlined in chapter 2, Wilson refused to deal with him.1 
Thus, with no alternative in store following the Clemenceau-Czernin showdown, and 
with Allied diplomats stepping up the pressure on the Chief Executive, Wilson went for, had 
to go for, the option he had tried to avoid: dismemberment. And with no one there to 
promote the case of Hungary, dismemberment came to mean for Wilson what the Czechs and 
other separatist groups wanted. Wilson's summer 1918 decision was due to the fact that 
the President's chief concerns of the moment, including the French termination of the secret 
peace talks, the German offensive on the western front, and the Siberian intervention, all 
came to be linked with dismemberment by the Czechoslovaks. When Masaryk demonstrated 
that he, like Wilson, wanted regional integration in the Danubian basin, the President reversed 
his Habsburg policy. 
Public opinion and propaganda, while providing a sometimes alternative and some· 
times supporting set of opinions, failed to play a key role in the above developments. The 
overall lack of interest rendered dismemberment propaganda practically impossible, even after 
Wilson's turnaround. American, immigrant and Allied propagandists continued to focus on 
introducing the region to the general public and on enumerating real and imaginary griev· 
ances, some of which dated back to medieval times. Dismemberment propaganda had yet 
another serious handicap in America: first the Parker campaign and then the CPI described 
not the Monarchy but Germany as the main enemy. Actually, dismemberment propaganda in 
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America peaked not before but after Wilson's change of policy, which indicates that it was 
probably the White House that controlled public opinion and not the other way round. 
Meanwhile, the press industriously monitored events in Hungary, albeit with mixed 
results, and during the early stages of the war even presented Apponyi's views. In general, 
the prewar positive myth of Hungary remained unchallenged in the American press until 
Wilson's turnaround, which indicates that the press, like propaganda, also followed the Pre· 
sident's lead in most cases. 
Wilson may have believed that he well understood the developments within the 
Habsburg Monarchy (and his initial claim has been taken up by several historians) but it is 
obvious that the press knew more about Hungary than the entire cabinet, including the 
President. (Which, in light of the rather strange press statements presented in chapters 4 
and 7, is even more striking.' Besides uninterest on the part of leading Americans, this was 
also due to the lack of Hungarian propaganda abroad (as pointed out by Apponyi) and to the 
views and conduct of the Hungarian·Americans, who remained divided over the issues of 
religion and loyalty. This prevented them from taking a unified stand in support of the home 
country; calls for an independent Hungary were few and far between. From a Hungarian 
point of view, this was rather tragic since the publication of the writings of the Hungarian· 
American journalist Jeno Bagger·Szekeres indicate that a properly worded Hungarian propa· 
ganda campaign in America would not have been entirely out of the question even during the 
fall of 1918. (Although Bagger·Szekeres went much beyond what even K~rolyi would have 
offered then.) 
The dismemberment of Austria-Hungary went hand in hand with the dismemberment 
of the former Kingdom of Hungary. The Allied War Council, which drafted the terms of the 
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various armistices with the Central Powers, declared the newly created Republic of Hungary, 
without any hesitation or discussion, to be a defeated party in the war. The period between 
November 1918 and June 1920 saw the realization of the territorial claims of the Successor 
States, which were justified post facto by the Treaty of Trianon. Meanwhile, Hungary sank 
into the quagmire of revolutions and coups, and it took several years to stabilize the political 
and economic life of the country; and even today, many Hungarians still find it difficult to 
cope with the Trianon verdict. 
* * * 
Finally, we must summarize how the tendencies and attitudes outlined above 
continued during the Armistice and peace conference periods. It is obvious that in the entirely 
new setting of the peace conference new tendencies surfaced, but it is equally obvious that 
old tendencies also survived. Most importantly, Wilson's summer 1918 reversal of policy set 
the guiding line: the Americans came to consider the dismemberment of the Habsburg 
Monarchy to be fair and necessary, and the satisfaction of the reasonable territorial claims 
of the Successor States not only just but a well-deserved compensation for their contribu· 
tions to Allied victory in the Great War. The period between November 1918 and December 
1919 (the Signing of the Armistices and the final American withdrawal from Paris respective· 
Iy) saw the Americans, for the first time ever, getting directly involved in Hungarian affairs. 
Wilson's summer 1918 commitment to the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy practi· 
cally meant that the Americans assumed the role of peacemaker in the region. Furthermore, 
with the President's popularity reaching new heights, the Americans were expected to be not 
only peacemakers but also bringers of justice •• all in a region of which they knew very little 
and for which they cared even less. 
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The two key features of America's Hungarian, and in general terms East-Central 
European, policies in this period were (1) the continued lack of interest and (2) the disintegra-
tion of Wilson's overarching control of American diplomacy. Other tendencies of the period 
worthy of consideration include (3) the Hungarian reactions to this American policy, (4) 
American public opinion, and (5) the promotion of regional integration (one of the corner-
stones of Wilson's diplomacy during the war) in East-Central Europe in 1919. 
The continued lack of interest displayed by the Americans during the fourteen months 
under examination should perhaps not be too striking after what we have found out about 
the war period. On the top level it was due to the fact that Wilson's attention was other-
wise engaged, while on lower levels it was manifested in the continued lacklustre perfor-
mance of Military Intelligence as well as in the conduct and utterances of lansing and of 
the various members of the American field missions. Wilson travelled to Paris as the head 
of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (hereafter ACNP) with the primary aim of 
creating a league of Nations and ending the war with one general treaty. He expected that 
the treaty would set out the guiding principles of postwar international cooperation and the 
league would solve all the minor regional disputes, including those of East-Central Europe.
' 
Similar lack of interest among the rank-and-file of the ACNP highlighted many of the 
earlier mentioned contradictory elements of American attitudes and policies towards Hungary 
and East-Central Europe. On one occasion, for example, lansing remarked that the Peace 
Conference had been convened to draw the boundaries of the Successor States and that 
Austria and Hungary would get whatever was left after that; later he himself protested 
against the severe decisions affecting Hungary. Meanwhile, intelligence summaries were pre· 
1 Walworth (1986) and Bailey (1963) are two good accounts of that. 
286 
pared by Bullitt between November 1918 and January 1919, who also briefed the five 
Commissioners Plenipotentiary on a daily basis. When Bullitt was sent on his infamous mis· 
sian to Russia, the MIB took over intelligence work and performed it very much the same 
way as it did during the war. The lowest point of American Military Intelligence work in the 
entire period came on 29 March 1919, when a report stated that there was no immediate 
danger of a bolshevik takeover in Hungary. 2 (Eight days after it had actually taken place!) 
As the Peace Conference dragged on endlessly, more and more Americans, including for 
example Nicholas Roosevelt, (relative of TR and member of one of the field missions in 
Vienna) expressed their desire to go home and leave everything behind.3 House never devel· 
oped any interest in Hungary and Wilson continued to be otherwise engaged; and after 
signing the German peace treaty, most of the ACNP packed up and went home. 
While overall lack of interest continued to determine American attitudes towards the 
Danubian basin, the other main feature of wartime American diplomacy, Wilson's one·man 
control of foreign affairs, began to disintegrate after his arrival in Europe. Between November 
1918 and December 1919 Wilson had to share decision making not only with his fellow 
negotiators from Europe but also with his own staff. For the first and only time in his life 
(with the possible exception of his Mexican failure in 1916) Wilson could not dictate •• he 
had to negotiate. Had he convened a powerful task force during the war or if at least he 
had been more sensible and less stubborn in selecting the personnel of the ACNP, he clearly 
would have stood a better chance of realizing his hopes and of leaving the White House on 
2 lC TWWps: Series 6M: Weekly and Daily Reports on the Central Powers by Bullitt; Series 6N: 
War Department General Staff: Daily and Weekly Intelligence Summaries. 
3 SMl WGDps: Diary. Davis recorded on several occasions that Roosevelt was completely fed 
up and wanted to go home. Similar references may be read in practically all the contemporary recol· 
lections. 
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a high note in March 1921.4 With Wilson trying to stay in control, American diplomacy at 
the Paris Peace Conference got turned inside out: during the war there had been a variety 
of opinions and one single line of policy; now there were several opinions and a variety of 
policies. In a sense, American diplomacy in 1919 began to look like its European counterpart: 
something Wilson refused to acknowledge and failed to cope with. The ACNP broke up into 
three rival groups of the State Department representatives, House's staff (members of the 
Inquiry) and Hoover's team (the American Relief Administration, hereafter ARA), all working 
at cross·purposes most of the time. This was a most unfortunate situation for the President: 
his relations with lansing would alone have given him enough problems but the subsequent 
breaks with House and later with Hoover resulted in his complete isolation in Paris.1i This 
atomization of American foreign policy, together with Wilson's fight against the odds for the 
treaty at home, broke down his health, made him even more uncompromising and resulted 
in the complete failure of his plans. It is hardly surprising that under such circumstances Wil· 
son devoted little attention to issues of secondary importance; the future of Hungary, even 
when combined with the threat of bolshevism, was dwarfed by the broader issues of the 
league of Nations in Paris and the treaty fight at home.s 
Further indication of Wilson's loss of control of East·Central European and Hungarian 
affairs in Paris is the freedom of action members of the Inquiry and the field missions 
enjoyed. In late January 1919, Wilson asked the Inquiry to prepare a brief outline of 
boundary, economic and labour proposals for the ACNP to follow during the impending nego· 
tiations. This the Inquiry did, and the volume (which was based almost exclusively upon the 
4 Bailey (1963) chapter 6 is an entertaining account. 
5 Floto (1981); Walworth (1986). 
e The definitive account of the treaty fight is still Bailey (1945). 
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October 1918 report outlined in chapter 9 and presented in part in Appendix CI came to be 
called the Black Book. It was later amended with the addition of two Red Books, one 
dealing with colonial the other with European matters. Since the Americans were the only 
disinterested party in East-Central Europe, their position was by far the most fair, and they 
acted, all through 1919, as moderators. One obvious example for that is the frustration, 
chiefly by Seymour and Day, of the proposed Czech-Yugoslav corridor.7 The lack of any 
suggestion that the American negotiators (Seymour, Day and Allen Welsh Dulles among them) 
consulted the President on territorial issues indicates that Seymour and his colleagues 
worked with the guidelines they themselves had worked out during the final year of the war 
and which they summarized in the Black and Red Books. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Americans got involved in regional politics, too. The Peace 
Conference not only decided the terms of the Hungarian peace treaty but it also interfered 
with the domestic affairs of Hungary. In this the Americans were as active as their fellow 
peacemakers. The ARA's Captain Gregory's negotiations with the Social-Democrat leaders 
from Budapest in Vienna to bring about the downfall of the Communist regime of Bela Kun 
in Hungary (while Albert Halstead's State Department mission was instructed to stay out of 
such talks) indicate that by July 1919 American diplomacy had travelled far from the old 
Wilsonian premise of non-interference. 8 While in December 1917 subversive means were 
unacceptable to Wilson, by the spring of 1919 they became an integral part of American 
policy towards Hungary. The East-Central European performance of the ACNP must be 
evaluated with these considerations in mind; this aspect clearly requires further research. 
7 L. Nagy (1965); Deak (1941). 
8 There is more research to be done on the various American field missions. Their documents 
are among the ACNP records in the National Archives and in Stanford. 
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Hungary at the same time was going through perhaps her most severe diplomatic, 
political and social crisis in the twentieth century. The Successor States (of the Habsburg 
Monarchy) launched attacks on Hungary in the hope of securing the territories they had laid 
claims to by the use of arms, thus presenting the peace conference with faits accomplis. 
With Karolyi's belief in Wilson unshaken, Hungary refused to fight, which, in the long run, 
proved to be a fateful decision.9 Hungary's only possible diplomatic link to the Allies, the 
post in Berne, was also wasted. Karolyi, unaware of the President's actual feelings towards 
her, appointed Rosika Bedy·Schwimmer as Hungarian Ambassador to Switzerland. Quite un· 
impressed, not to say hostile, Sotvall forced her recall through Herron in the last days of 
1918. The appointment of the experienced diplomat the Baron Ladislaus Szilassy in mid· 
January 1919 came way too late.10 The Berne connection, however, was not completely 
wasted. Many prominent Hungarians, including Andrassy, Count Paul Teleki (later twice 
Premier of Hungary) and Ludwig (as Red Cross representative), travelled to the Swiss capital 
and carried on a pro-Hungarian campaign, mostly in English and in French. 11 That notwith· 
standing, Karolyi's stubborn insistence on the one-sided observation of the Armistice and the 
Belgrade military convention (13 November 191 a), together with the diplomatic fiasco in 
Berne and the limited American, interest in the cause of Hungary, significantly reduced his 
chances of realizing his ambitious program to secure a favourable peace for the new 
Republic. 
9 Horvath (1939). 
10 Pastor (1975). 
11 The only account of the post-1918 Hungarian propaganda campaign is the present author's 
forthcoming piece in the Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies. 
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All this became clear with the opening of the Paris Peace Conference (18 January 
1919) when it was announced that the defeated countries, Hungary among them, would only 
be invited to sign their respective treaties •. and not to discuss them. The Paris Peace 
Conference drafted a peace treaty for Hungary and demanded the establishment of a 
government representing all factions of society, which would then be recognized and invited 
to sign that treaty. The Hungarian boundaries were approved by the Council of Four on 12 
May 1919 and were cabled to Budapest on 13 June. The subsequent invitation to Paris (1 
May 1919) was withheld by the Allied representatives in Vienna (including Coolidge and 
Nicholas Roosevelt) and was eventually cancelled on their insistence. '2 The fall of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic (1·2 August 1919) was followed by the Rumanian occupation of 
the eastern half of the country and Budapest. The Peace Conference eventually decided to 
intervene and sent an Allied Mission of four generals to Budapest. When that mission had 
also failed, Sir George Clerk was instructed to go to Hungary and produce 8n acceptable 
government. Clerk successfully completed his assignment by convening a government headed 
by Karoly Huszar, which was recognized by the Conference. '3 later in 1919, Admiral 
Nicholas Horthy gained political control of the country, in 1920 Hungary signed the Treaty 
of Trianon, and the last Rumanian troops were withdrawn. 
The Allied victory in the war and the chance to realize Wilson's attempts to 'make 
the world safe for democracy' in Paris attracted a lot of attention and set the stage for 
extensive news coverage back in the US. This was done by a host of American journalists 
who escorted the President and the ACNP to Paris. But with an ocean apart from the 
peacemakers, American public opinion again had no say in decision making in Paris. The 
12 Roosevelt (1953) pp. 115.17. 
13 The definitive account is Ranki (1967). 
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hectic events in Hungary were also viewed with some interest, and the American public was 
provided with first hand accounts by war correspondents. The New York Times continually 
reported on the developments in Hungary and another major American daily, the Chicago Tri-
bune, also joined in. Simonds now worked for the American Review of Reviews, while Will 
Irwin of the CPI and the novelist Kenneth Roberts sent their contributions to the Saturday 
Evening Post. The last extensive coverage on Hungary was Isaac Marcooson's 'The New 
Hungary' in the 12 November 1921 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. which was probably 
written in response to the interest renewed by the signing of the separate American-Hungari· 
an peace treaty. 
Meanwhile, back in December 1918, a desperate Hungarian propaganda campaign for 
territorial integrity, mobilizing the political and academic elite of the country (including 
Apponyi), was also launched; but it did not, it could not bring about the desired result. This 
campaign focused primarily on Europe but the American public was also targeted. Eugene 
Pivany was sent back to the New World to organize the Hungarian-Americans and conduct 
Hungarian propaganda there. A major success was scored when the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, headed by Wilson's chief opponent, the Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, heard the 
Hungarian case as presented by Pivany and other Hungarian-Americans. An English edition 
of the Pesti HrrlaD (Budapest Gazette) was also widely circulated in America and PivAny 
wrote several pamphlets, too. In 1920, The Commentator, a short-lived Hungarian-American 
monthly, was also launched to educate the American public. But however impressive this 
campaign was, it clearly came way too late and had little influence on the American public, 
which continued to focus on broader issues: peacemaking in Paris and the treaty fight at 
home. 
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By way of conclusion, we must look at the issue of East-Central European integration 
at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It has been emphasized that Wilson not only 
demanded the right to national self-determination for all peoples but that he also expected 
some sort of integration to take place after the war. On the global scale, he envisaged a 
new liberal world order with the League of Nations; and he also expected some regional 
cooperation in East-Central Europe. (See especially chapters 3, 9 and 11.' Initially, he 
instructed his experts, the Austro-Hungarian division of the Inquiry, to work on the federaliza-
tion of the Habsburg Monarchy. After his reversal of policy towards Austria-Hungary he came 
to embrace Masaryk's vision of a 'New Europe,' and encouraged the leaders of the various 
nationalities to join it. 
East-Central European integration, of course, was not an American project. Its first 
modern manifestation was Kossuth's plan for a Danubian Confederation, which made him, 
as has been pointed out in the sections on dismemberment propaganda, just about the only 
acceptable Hungarian for the non-Magyar peoples of the Danubian basin. The issue, however, 
became really hot during the war, when several players on the international scene came up 
with their own solutions. The official German version was, of course, Naumann's 
Mitte/europa project, while its counterpart, the 'New Europe,' was worked out in detail by 
Masaryk and Seton-Watson. Meanwhile, yet another plan, Oszkar Jaszi's version of regional 
integration (1918), received relatively little attention outside Hungary. Besides the Inquiry, 
the British and French organizations entrusted with peace preparations also worked on similar 
projects. The region really came to the focus of attention when it was decided that it was 
to serve not only as a barriere de test against Germany but also as a cordon sanitaire to 
contain the bolshevik threat from Russia. 
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Consequently, the Paris Peace Conference devoted considerable attention to the 
issue. Regional cooperation was not only encouraged but was also included in the various 
treaties drafted at Paris. The Successor States were to treat their minorities in a decent 
way to root out possible irredentism and to create a chance of cooperation with their 
neighbours. At the same time, the defeated parties in the war were compelled to grant most 
favoured nation status to the victors and sign economic agreements with their victorious 
neighbours within a couple of years. Furthermore, as part of the French security system 
established at Paris, the Successor States soon created the 'little Entente,' a military 
alliance aimed more against Hungary and Austria than against Germany or Russia. 
But this rather selective regional cooperation did not really stand a chance •• and this 
can be said with confidence not only with the benefit of hindsight, knowing what happened 
in the 1930s and 1940s. In fact, East-Central European integration was doomed to failure 
the very moment the decision to liquidate the Habsburg Monarchy through her nationalities 
was made. And not in 1919 or with the rise of Hitler. If national hatred is incited and 
countries gain new territories at the expense of each other (and here it must be emphasized 
that such conflicts took place between the victorious Successor States, too), they are rather 
unlikely to live in peace and cooperate. The summer 1918 Allied decision to launch the final 
propaganda offensive against Austria-Hungary together with the dictated peace terms in 
1919 drastically reduced the possibility of genuine regional integration in the Danubian basin. 
The dream has lived on, the desire is there .. but East-Central Europe remains divided over 
a set of historic grievances. 
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APPENDIX C: 
TWO KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF 
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER THE WAR 
1. The Boundary Proposals of the Inquiry, October 1918: 
BOUNDARIES IN AUSTRIA·HUNGARY 
I. Czecho·Slovaks 
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[The proposed boundary between Czecho·Slovakia and Hungary:] East of Marisch Ostrau the 
line cuts through Austrian Silesia, reaching the present boundary of Galicia; thence it follows 
the Carpathians to longitude 18°30'. Here it turns southward at the extreme extension of 
the Czecho-Slovak speech line to the northernmost elbow of the Theiss; where it enters the 
border of the Hungarian plain. The boundary turns westward by the valleys of the rivers 
Eipel and Sajo, which nearly cut off the mountains northeast of Budapest from the Slovak 
uplands. The border of the Slovak uplands is crossed by streams flowing south. The dividing 
line of Slovak and Hungarian speech lies somewhat further north on the mountain slopes, but 
these east and west flowing streams are the nearest natural features suited for a boundary. 
The line reaches the Danube at Esztergom. This and Komarom remain Hungarian. The 
boundary continues on the eastern arm of the Danube to Pressburg (Pozsony), which is left 
on the Czecho-Slovak side. It will be noted that Pressburg stands on a navigable river which 
is also an international boundary ... 
[Comments on boundary problems:] 
... where the proposed line departs from the linguistic frontier, it lies outside of it, thus 
giving the Czecho-Slovaks important regions (some 38,000 square kilometers in all, amounting 
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to 30 per cent of the area of the proposed state) in which they are a minority ... [T]he 
bringing of the eastern part of the southern boundary of the proposed state well down into 
the Hungarian plain [finds its] primary justification in the desirability of eliminating strate· 
gically dangerous salients and of making Eastern Czecho-Slovakia more than a narrow finger 
between Silesia and Galicia on one side and Hungary on the other. Except that Czecho-
Slovakia is given direct access to the Danube and thus gains a trade outlet likely to be free 
of control by neighboring states, these additions are of slight economic importance. And even 
the Danube outlet cannot be considered as really vital to the economic strength of the 
proposed state. 
II. Jugo-Slavs 
[The boundary between Jugo-Slavia and Hungary:] Thence the line passes to the Drave[,] 
follows down the stream to within 10 miles of Marburg where it crosses over to the Mur 
Valley, then down the Drave to its junction with the Danube. the present boundary along the 
Drave between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia crosses the river repeatedly, leaving many bits 
of Hungary south of the stream. When the river becomes an international boundary the mid· 
channel or one bank would presumably be adopted as the boundary. From the mouth of the 
I 
Drave the line passes eastward to a point on the Theiss in latitude 45°27'. Then [it runs] 
in a nearly easterly [direction] to the Rumanian boundary as drawn. 
[Comments on boundary problems:] 
... These districts [the Bacska and the Banat] are geographically separated, both from 
old Serbia and Croatia-Slavonia by the Danube. Historically they have no connections with 
the Serbo-Croat districts. On the other hand, apart from their linguistic claims, which are not 
absolutely incontestable, the Jugo-Slavs have vital economic need of the cereal regions of 
the Banat included within the proposed frontier. Without those regions the proposed Jugo· 
Slav state would show a decided deficiency in the production of cereals as against their 
consumption, while, if the districts across the Danube were included, it would be economi· 
cally self-sufficient in this regard. 
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III. Rumanians 
[The linguistic line between Rumania and Hungary is very irregular and unsuitable for a 
boundary. According to the proposal, Grosswardein (Nagyvarad, Oradea) and Arad should go 
to Rumania} leaving Debreczen and Temesvar to the nation of the plains ... When the 48th 
parallel is reached the boundary follows the course of the Theiss upstream to the boundary 
of the Bukovina. 
[In the section on the distribution of peoples:} 
... The Szekler minority in eastern Transylvania presents the most serious complication 
in the settlement of the Roumanian [sic} question on linguistic lines. These people are 
intensely pro-Magyar in their sympathies and would deeply resent incorporation in a foreign 
country, especially in the country of that race which they have looked down upon as former 
serfs. 
[Alternative boundaries:} 
The alternative line shown on the map represents an adjustment that would be 
necessary in case the Ruthenian districts of Hungary were to be divided between Czecho-
Slovakia and Rumania. As far as the Ruthenians are concerned, there might be no serious 
objections to this agreement, but for the sake of a tenable frontier this would require the 
inclusion into Rumania of an uncomfortably large Magyar area and would not be just to the 
Magyars. 
[Comments on boundary problems:} 
The incorporation of Temesvar, which is ardently desired by the Rumanians, would 
deprive the Magyars of their sole remaining market-town of importance in this region. Nor 
can the Rumanians, like the Serbs, claim further extension in the Banat on the grounds of 
economic necessity, for without such extension they would still produce an amount of 
cereals considerably in ex-cess of their needs. 
V. Ruthenians 
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The south west boundary of Ruthenian speech runs along the western foothills of the 
Carpathians. The political boundary suggested would run very near it, following the River 
Theiss from Szaldobos (48°10'N, 23°25'E) to Meso-Vari, where it would cross the river Borsa 
and follow it to the proposed boundary of Czecho-Slovakia. 
[Under distribution of peoples the authors wrote:] 
The proposed boundaries, for topographic reasons, diverge considerably from the 
linguistic frontiers... [O]n the south, by gaining the line of the Theiss and the Borsa, they 
would take in a long narrow zone which lies outside their linguistic frontier and is predomi· 
nantly Magyar. [With regards to alternative boundaries, the authors saw a serious possibility 
in the] division of the Ruthenian parts of Austria-Hungary between Poland, the Czecho· 
Slovaks, and Rumania with guarantees of the national rights of the Ruthenians. 
[A comment on boundary problems:] 
Assuming, on the one hand, that an independent Ukrainian state is hardly likely to be 
created, and, on the other hand, that Austria·Hungary is to be dismembered, it becomes not 
a little difficult to forecast the fate of the Ruthenians in the Hapsburg Monarchy ..• 
VI. Magyars 
[Having already discussed all the other boundaries the authors dealt exclusively with the 
Austrian-Hungarian boundary and remarked that]... the advantages of maintaining the 
historical frontier are obvious. 
[The authors established that the territory of the lesser Hungary would be 112,000 km2, i. 
e. 40% of the prewar state. Magyars would form an absolute majority with 82% (7.4 mil· 
lion) while the largest minority would be the Germans with 11 % (1 million)] .•. who outnumber 
the Magyars along the western frontier. The rectification of the historic boundary along this 
frontier is not proposed, but it would secure some 200,000 Germans from Magyar political 
control. 
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The proposed boundaries would leave more than two million Magyars under the political 
domination of the other nationalities. Of these about half would be included in the Rumanian 
area; they are, in greater part, the Szeklers, of south-eastern Hungary, who furnish one of 
the chief difficulties of the Rumanian problem. About a million Magyars would be under the 
political control of the Czecho-Slovaks; they could not be included in lesser Hungary unless 
the northern frontiers were pushed back considerably. The main objections to such an 
enlargement of the Magyar frontier are of topographical character, particularly that it would 
narrow the Czecho-Slovak state to a dangerous degree ..• 
[In the section of historical notes the authors stated that the Magyars had been living in 
their country since the ninth century. In the 16th century they were invaded by the Turks, 
who were driven out in the 18th century and Hungary was reunited under the Hapsburg 
crown.] ... Since that time, excepting during the Napoleonic epoch, the Hungarian monarchs 
have maintained intact the historic boundaries of the kingdom, . boundaries which may 
roughly be said to have been established as early as the twelfth century. In the territory it 
includes as well as in its constitution, Hun-gary is one of the oldest states now in political 
existence. 
Thus the boundaries proposed for the Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, and Rumanians 
provide for the dismemberment of an historic state. Whatever the natural rights of non Ma-
gyar nationalities and however heavy the Magyar yoke upon them, it is incontestable that 
the boundaries of Hungary have existed as an historic fact for two hundred years. Hence the 
vehemence of Magyar opposition to the creation of a Slovak state in the north and a 
Rumanian in the south. The inclusion of Croatia-Slavonia in an independent or autonomous 
Jugo-Slav state has greater historical justification ... but we must remember that Croatia had 
accepted Hungarian rule three centuries previous this date. 
VII. Economic Data 
6. Magyars 
The Magyars, retaining the central plain of the Danube basin, would have a district 
which has long been the granary of the Habsburg lands. Every county produces a surplus of 
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the cereals, except that in which the large consuming population of the capital is situated; 
and the new Magyar state would have for sale abroad a total surplus of about 37 million 
quintals, nearly equal to the amount consumed at home, or, in other words, a supply 
sufficient to meet the needs of another 9 million people. 
The mineral resources, represented by a product valued at 63 million crowns out of a 
total for Austria·Hungary of 426 million, do not compare in value with those that would be 
acquired by the Czecho·Slovaks, and would scarcely suffice home needs of coal and iron, the 
main components. Now [nor] would the manufacturing industry, which employs about 
344,000 people, in factories of some size, change the distinctly agricultural and rural 
character of the new state. It is to be noted, moreover, that is concentrated to a very large 
extent in the capital, and both here and in the provinces has been regularly stimulated by 
public subsidies of various kinds. A political convulsion, stripping Hungary of the subject terri· 
tories, would almost certainly lead to a decline in her manufacturing industry. 
Hungary seems certain to maintain her trade relations with the people of German 
Austria, and southern Germany. These relations are a natural result of the complementary 
nature of the two parties: one with an excess of food stuffs, the other with a deficiency. 
For this trade, as well as access to the Black Sea, the Danube offers a cheap and adequate 
route. Hungary should also have assured a means of access to the Adriatic, such as it has 
enjoyed by its railroad to Fiume. It has, however, no such imperative need of reaching out 
to distant markets and sources of supply, as has a distinctly industrial country like that pro· 
posed for the Czecho·Slovaks, and will probably use the route to the Adriatic even less than 
in the past. It will find an assured market for its surplus food in Central Europe, and will 
probably make its purchases in the same market. 
[Source: NA RG 256: Inquiry Document 514: 'Epitome of Reports on Just and Practicable 
Boundaries within Austria·Hungary for Czecho·Slovaks, Jugo·Slavs, Rumanians, Poles, 
Ruthenians, and Magyars.' For discussion see chapter 9.] 
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2. lansing's proposals, dated 21 September 1918: 
First. The complete abrogation or denouncement of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all 
treaties relating in any way to Russian territory or commerce; and also the same action as 
to the Treaty of Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or 
Germany's allies ... 
Fourth. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria, and in possession of the port of Danzig. 
Fifth. An independent state, either single or federal, composed of Bohemia, Slovakia, 
and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia) and possessing an international right of way 
by land or water to a free port. 
Sixth. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to which should be 
annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in which the Ruthenians predominate. 
Seventh. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should ultimately be given 
sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the 
central mouth of the Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to 
the boundary there is doubt.) 
Eighth. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate, namely Croatia, Siavonia, 
Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a 
single or a federal state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be later 
settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and Italy. My present view is that 
there should be a good Jugo-Slav port. 
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Ninth. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights of free 
navigation of the Danube. 
Tenth. Restoration to Italy all the Italian provinces of Austria. Italy's territory to 
extend along the northern Adriatic shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the 
eastern side of the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy. (This last 
is doubtful.) 
Eleventh. reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title of the Archduchy 
of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outl~t 
to the sea would be like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea 
and the Baltic. 
Twelfth. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow in general those 
established after the First Balkan War, though Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of 
the AEgean coast and obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the 
Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding Constantinople, to be 
subsequently decided upon ... 
[Source: Lansing (1921) pp. 193-95. For discussion see chapter 10.] 
Comment: These were the two key proposals regarding the future of East Central Europe, 
and of Hungary, which the ACNP took to Paris. 
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